



JAWAHARLAL NEHRU  
AND  
INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY



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**YURI NASENKO**



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## Note

It is with a deep sense of satisfaction that we have published this scholarly analysis of an aspect of India's policy of non-alignment—how India's first Prime Minister shaped an initially amorphous concept into a dynamic ideology. While we are aware that several books have presented analyses of this policy, we also feel that a clear, lucid and balanced comment is necessary to put both the architect and his work in proper perspective in the contemporary political landscape. Nehru and his policy of non-alignment are therefore examined in the proper historical and political context.

It is a matter of considerable regret that the author could not complete this study.

THE PUBLISHERS



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## Introduction

INDIA'S FOREIGN policy conducted under the guidance of Jawaharlal Nehru is a subject of interest to all observers of international affairs, besides Indologists. India is the first state to have pursued a policy that was new in the history of international relations—the policy of “non-alignment”. This policy has been adopted by many recently free Asian and African countries which now play an important role in world politics. Thus, a study of the history of the non-alignment policy, of the circumstances that explain the choice of this policy, the international and domestic political factors that led to its implementation, and the prospects of its further development, should be of considerable scientific and practical interest.

The shaping of India's foreign policy was largely influenced by international developments after World War II : the weakening of the forces of imperialism and reaction, growth of the forces of democracy and progress, the breaking away of a number of countries in Europe and Asia from the capitalist system and formation of a world socialist system, and the upsurge of the national liberation movement and beginning of the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism. With the new alignment of forces in the world arena, India as an independent country needed to formulate her own foreign policy.

An important aspect of the complex process whereby Indian foreign policy was elaborated consisted in the influence exerted on this process by the country's main political parties and the diverse groupings within the ruling party, the Indian National Congress (INC), which reflected the interests of different classes

and sections of Indian society. It would be no exaggeration to say that Indian foreign policy took shape as the resultant of conflicting internal political forces.

Some historians in the West maintain that since the National Congress party enjoyed a "monopoly of power" in the first twenty years after independence the influence of opposition parties on foreign policy matters was negligible. Indeed, owing to the great influence the Congress party enjoyed among the mass of the people and to the majority system of representation, the Congress party held 364 out of 488 seats (74.6 per cent) in the House of the People of the Parliament after the first general elections in 1951/52, 359 out of 494 seats (72.6 per cent) after the 1957 elections, and 354 out of 494 seats (71.4 per cent) after the 1962 elections.

But, nevertheless, the opposition parties were able to exert an influence on the parliamentary majority by securing the support of some groups within the Congress party. Thus the late General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India, Ajoy Ghosh, wrote in 1961 that the extreme right-wing parties of Swatantra and Jan Sangh by themselves "would not be so dangerous. But the fact is that they have powerful friends and supporters inside the Congress—in the Right wing of the Congress. Also, they get financial and other support from some of the biggest monopolists who...want to build up parties like the Swatantra and Jan Sangh in order to bring more pressure on the Congress and force it to shift still more to the Right".<sup>1</sup>

The foreign policy of independent India has been dealt with in a number of works by Soviet writers, but the influence exerted on this policy by India's internal political forces has received little attention both in the Soviet Union and abroad. In the present study an analysis is made of the struggle of India's internal political forces over problems of foreign policy.

To understand the evolution of the policy of non-alignment, it is necessary to trace the gradual changes in the foreign policy views of Jawaharlal Nehru, who helped formulate India's foreign policy and who put it into action during the first seventeen years of India's independent development.

The decision that Nehru should from the start undertake

the direction of India's foreign policy, besides discharging the duties of his office as head of the Indian government, had every justification. The National Congress party had as early as 1920 adopted a resolution expressing in a general way a desire to establish cooperation with the neighbouring countries, but it was too absorbed in India's internal affairs to pay proper attention to international developments. It was largely owing to Nehru's efforts that since the mid-20's the Congress party began to interest itself in international relations. At the end of 1926, Nehru learned while in Europe about the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities soon to be held in Brussels. He wrote to his party suggesting that he attend the Congress and was authorised to represent the party at Brussels. The Congress and, afterwards, the meetings of the League Against Imperialism, which was set up by the Congress and which Nehru joined, had helped him, as he himself noted later, to understand some of the problems of colonial and dependent countries.<sup>2</sup>

A few months after the Brussels Congress, Nehru visited the Soviet Union together with his father on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. During their four-day stay in Moscow they visited Red Square, the Lenin Mausoleum and the Museum of the Revolution, and had talks with Chairman of the USSR Central Executive Committee M.I. Kalinin and Foreign Minister G.V. Chicherin.

At the end of 1927, after his return to India, Nehru took an active part in formulating the foreign policy of the Congress party. The party adopted a resolution, which was in effect its first foreign policy statement, containing a declaration that India should not participate in imperialist or any other war. This position was repeatedly reaffirmed by the National Congress party and was its key foreign policy principle in the late 1920's and in the 1930's.

Michael Brecher, a Canadian historian, wrote in his biography of Nehru that "from the mid-thirties onwards he was the acknowledged Congress spokesman of foreign affairs. In fact, it was he alone who made the party conscious of world politics during the struggle for independence".<sup>3</sup> Thus, when an interim government was formed by the Congress party on



September 1, 1946, Nehru, besides being the head of the government, was put in charge of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. When India became a British dominion, on August 15, 1947, Nehru, who was named Prime Minister, retained the post of Minister of External Affairs.

The rout of the striking forces of world reaction—Nazism and Japanese militarism—in World War II radically altered the correlation of forces in the international arena and resulted in an unprecedented upsurge of the movement for national liberation in Asia. An intensification of the anti-imperialist struggle of the Indian people brought about a crisis of British rule in India and forced Britain to recognise the independence of its largest colony. The acuteness of the crisis was admitted by Governor-General Lord Mountbatten<sup>4</sup> when he spoke at the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly of the Indian Union. He said :

“It is barely six months ago that Mr. Attlee [the then Prime Minister of Britain’s Labour government—*Y.N.*] invited me to accept the appointment of last Viceroy [of India—*Y.N.*]. He made it clear that this would be no easy task—since His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom had decided to transfer power to Indian hands by June 1948. At that time it seemed to many that His Majesty’s Government had set a date far too early. How could this tremendous operation be completed in 15 months?

“However, I had not been more than a week in India before I realised that this date of June 1948 for the transfer of power was too late rather than too early; communal tension and rioting had assumed proportions of which I had had no conception when I left England. It seemed to me that a decision had to be taken at the earliest possible moment unless there was to be risk of a general conflagration throughout the whole sub-continent”.<sup>5</sup>

It should be noted that the British colonisers, Lord Mountbatten among them, had spared no efforts to stir up strife between the Hindus and Muslims and "justify" India's partition on religious grounds into two states—the Indian Union and Pakistan. The partition of India was an essential part of the plan for the "transfer of power to Indian hands", which came to be called (also in Indian and English bourgeois historiography) the Lord Mountbatten Plan. It was none other than Mountbatten who had persuaded the British government to shift the date of the "transfer of power" from June 1948 to August 1947 so as to avoid the "risk of a general conflagration". Mountbatten also persuaded Indian national liberation leaders that the division of India was necessary.

Without minimising the responsibility of the British colonisers, Mountbatten above all, for the division of India, it should nevertheless be pointed out that there were internal political factors which made it possible for the English to carry out their plans.

Owing to the uneven development of capitalism in the country and the condition in which different groups of the local bourgeoisie were formed, a bourgeoisie emerged among the Hindus earlier than among the Muslims. As a result, the Hindu bourgeoisie was more numerous and held stronger economic positions in the country than the Muslim bourgeoisie, and in some towns of colonial India members of the Hindu bourgeoisie were more often exploiters of their own people. Thus the religious opposition between the Hindus and Muslims became meshed with the rivalry of different groups of the bourgeoisie, and often it reflected the class struggle as well. That happened not only in towns but also in the countryside, particularly in Eastern Bengal, where most of the landlords were Hindus while the bulk of the peasants, mainly down-trodden tenants, were Muslims. Since Eastern Bengal, which in August 1947 became a province of Pakistan, accounted for over a half of its population, it is clear that in the case of many people in colonial India religious differences were combined with class antagonism.

That was why the Muslim League, which was the second largest political party in India after the Indian National

Congress, and which put forward the slogan of setting up the state of Pakistan, was supported not only by the big landowners the Punjabi Muslims, and the upper commercial and industrial Muslim bourgeoisie (whose interests the Muslim League represented), but also by the middle and petty Muslim bourgeoisie, intellectuals and peasants, and even by some Muslim workers.

After India's partition had been decided on, Maulana A.K. Azad, the leader of the Congress party, met Mountbatten and tried to persuade him to postpone it for a year or two. Partition of the country in the atmosphere that prevailed at the time, Azad pointed out, would cause "rivers of blood" to flow. To this Mountbatten replied: "At least on this one question I shall give you complete assurance. I shall see to it that there is no bloodshed and riot. I am a soldier, not a civilian. Once partition is accepted in principle [i.e., by the British government — *Y.N.*], I shall issue orders to see that there are no communal disturbances anywhere in the country. If there should be the slightest agitation, I shall adopt sternest measures to nip the trouble in the bud. I shall not use even the armed police. I will order the Army and the Air Force to act and I will use tanks and aeroplanes to suppress anybody who wants to create trouble".<sup>6</sup>

On May 18, 1947, Mountbatten left for London by plane and on June 3, the bill on the transfer of power was adopted by the British government. It said that India was to be divided on the basis of the religious principle into two states, having the rights of dominions. The bill was approved by the British parliament on July 18, 1947, and came into effect on August 15, 1947. In the Indian Union, a part of the Constituent Assembly (elected in India in June 1946) became the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion which formed a government headed by Nehru. On this government's advice, the British king appointed Lord Mountbatten Governor-General of the Dominion.

Contrary to Mountbatten's assurances, the partition of India was accompanied by riots, massacres and mass migrations on an unprecedented scale. According to the figures cited by the biographer of the Mountbattens, Alden Hatch,

about a million persons were killed. There were more than 12 million refugees in India and Pakistan.<sup>7</sup>

Partition of the country gave rise to many issues which complicated relations between the two new dominions. The Indian Union now had to establish relations with other states, define its position on major international problems, and so on. But before these matters could be considered, the new state had to determine its status in the United Nations Organisation, establish diplomatic relations with other countries and set up a Foreign Ministry; that is, it had to deal with questions of international law and administrative and political questions.

In connection with the partition of India a discussion took place in the United Nations as to what was to be done about India's membership in the Organisation and who was to inherit the international obligations and privileges of the former Indian government. The question was all the more urgent since India was one of the founders of the United Nations. At a UN General Assembly session in 1947 the Argentine delegate suggested that each of the two dominions should submit a fresh application for admission to the membership of the United Nations. However, this was opposed by the UN Secretary-General, who shared the opinion that a member of the Organisation did not cease to be a member simply because its constitution or its frontier had been subjected to changes.<sup>8</sup> The Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, who investigated the implications of the Indian Independence Act, made the following proposals: (1) The new Dominion of India continues as original Member State of the United Nations with all rights and obligations of Membership; (2) Pakistan will be a new non-Member State and would have to apply for admission in keeping with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>9</sup>

Finally the decision was reached that both dominions had rights and obligations in accordance with the international agreements in which undivided India had participated, but that the existing diplomatic representatives abroad continued to function for India while Pakistan would have to appoint other representatives in the countries of her own choice.<sup>10</sup>

Before the Interim Government of India was formed on September 1, 1946, her relations with other countries had been maintained merely at the consular level. By July 1945 43 countries had their consuls in India while India had her representatives in a number of countries. In September 1946 the office of the Indian High Commissioner (the embassy) was opened in London. It, however, dealt only with questions of payment of pensions to former British officials in India and other minor matters. It began to concern itself with political questions only since August 15, 1947, when India's status was changed.<sup>11</sup>

During the time that the Interim Government was in office India established diplomatic relations and exchanged ambassadors with the USA, the USSR, China and some other countries. The establishment of diplomatic relations between India and the USSR, on April 13, 1947, was preceded by an exchange of letters between Nehru (the letter was dated September 21, 1946) and the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs (the letter was dated October 2, 1946).

In the summer of 1947, V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>12</sup> visited a number of countries as Nehru's personal envoy, and held non-official talks with heads of states and governments during which the question was discussed as to the levels at which they would like to exchange representatives with the Indian Dominion. On August 15, 1947, embassies, missions and consulates of the Indian Union were opened in France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Turkey, Iran and some other countries. High Commissioners were appointed to Canada, Pakistan and Ceylon, three British Commonwealth nations. The High Commissioner in Australia had been appointed somewhat earlier.

In the foreign affairs department of the Indian Union there was at first a large number of Englishmen. Even later, in March 1949, the *National Herald* reported that the Foreign Ministry accounted for 560 out of the 743 foreign nationals employed by different ministries and departments of the Indian Union. Although they had been forced to recognise India's political independence, the British colonisers made every effort to retain their control over the economic and defence policy

and, in particular, the foreign policy of the former colony.

As for the Indians, they had had to accept this state of things owing to an acute shortage of trained local personnel.

British influence was introduced into the Foreign Ministry of the Dominion not only by the English officials, but also by Indians who were trained by the English and who were formerly with the Indian Civil Service which was part of the colonial administration. The US Ambassador to India in the 'fifties, Chester Bowles, wrote in the Ambassador's Report : "One reason the new Congress party government took up the reins of office so smoothly in 1947 was the Indian Civil Service inherited from the British".<sup>13</sup> It should be recalled in this connection that Indian foreign policy in the early years after independence was unavoidably subject to British influence.

The Indian people would hardly find this state of things satisfactory. Thus the establishment of an Indian-foreign policy department and the gradual replacement of English officials by Indians were not merely an administrative matter, but constituted an essential part of the political struggle for the consolidation of India's independence.

## NOTES

1. *World Marxist Review*, No. 2, 1962, pp. 11-12.
2. Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography*, London, 1941, p. 163.
3. Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography*, Oxford University Press, London, 1959, p. 565.
4. Admiral Mountbatten (b. 1900) is a great-grandson of Queen Victoria, and uncle of Philip, Duke of Edinburgh (husband of Queen Elizabeth II); during World War II, he was Supreme Allied Com., S.E. Asia.
5. *Constituent Assembly Debates. Official Report*, Delhi, 1947, Vol. V, No. 2, p. 15.
6. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom. An Autobiographical Narrative*, Orient Longmans, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, New Delhi, 1959, p. 190.

7. Andrew Mellor, *India Since Partition*, Turnstile Press, London, 1951, p. 45.
8. K.P. Karunakaran, *India in World Affairs. August 1947-January 1950*, Oxford University Press, Calcutta, 1952, p. 6.
9. *ibid.*, p. 7.
10. *ibid*
11. *ibid* pp. 3-4.
12. Before India's independence, V.K. Krishna Menon had for many years headed the Indian League in London (a public organisation for the promotion of Indian self-rule). Later he was appointed the first Indian High Commissioner in London.
3. Chester Bowles, *Ambassador's Report*, Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1954, p. 85.

## Shaping of Foreign Policy of the Dominion of India (1947-1949)

THE VICTORY won by the Soviet Union in World War II, the appearance of several socialist states in Europe and Asia, the deepening crisis of the colonial system of imperialism and the achievement of political independence by India and a number of other countries—all these marked the beginning of a new era in world history.

On August 15, 1947, a government formed by Nehru began to function in what was known as the Dominion of India. It expressed the interests mainly of the national bourgeoisie. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs and the affairs of states, Vallabhbhai Patel, speaking at a luncheon for big industrialists, given by the Indian monopolist Goenka, described some Indian government members in the following words: "When I ask you to bury the past and not to bother at all about it, I should also like to remind you that our Finance Minister *belongs to your own class* [italics mine—Y.N.]. He knows his own mind, is able, clever and efficient.... Our Commerce Minister is also an experienced industrialist. Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, the Minister for Industry and supply, is not a Congressman, but an able, painstaking and conscientious public servant. I am quite certain that all these Ministers would like to secure your cooperation in making India industrially great".<sup>1</sup>





of Nehru's role in shaping and carrying out Indian foreign policy, Professor Hiren Mukerjee, a leader of the parliamentary group of the Communist Party of India, adds : "None of his colleagues, *howsoever resistant to some of his ideas* [italics mine—Y.N.], could challenge his authority in this sphere...."<sup>9</sup> George Patterson, an English expert on Asian affairs, writes that while Nehru and Patel "were administratively 'sovereign' in different spheres, policy matters were a joint prerogative—except in foreign affairs, where Nehru's word was rarely, if ever, challenged".<sup>10</sup> At the same time Patterson notes that the "struggle for pre-eminence between the idealistic Pandit Nehru and the pragmatic Sardar Patel continued after Independence over several issues, and from 1947 to 1950 India was in fact ruled by a 'duumvirate'".<sup>11</sup>

And Krishna Menon, the distinguished Indian diplomat and public figure, who was a trusted aide of Nehru and who had ample opportunity to observe the state of things in the government, considers that in 1947 India was ruled by a "triumvirate", namely, Nehru, Patel and Gandhi.<sup>12</sup>

Here we have three different views on Nehru's role in the formulation of the Indian Union's foreign policy. It seems to us that neither Patel nor, least of all Gandhi intervened in the formulation and declaration of general foreign policy principles by Nehru. But when it came to the government's practical moves, whether concerning Pakistan or Kashmir or any other major foreign policy issue, both Gandhi and Patel not only tried to influence Nehru, but also interfered in the carrying out of foreign policy measures.

The Indian Prime Minister and his Deputy could not be more unlike. Nehru hated dictatorship and was a humanist dedicated to the ideas of social progress. Patterson gives the following description of the two men : "Nehru was charming, mild, courteous, generous to a fault, sensitive, impulsive and emotional. Patel was dour and ruthless, unimaginative and practical, blunt in speech and action, cool and calculating. Nehru was the voice of Congress, disliking the political intrigues, lobbying and manipulations. Patel was the organiser of Congress, a master of machine politics who revelled in political manoeuvres".<sup>13</sup>

But, of course, it was not the dissimilar personalities of the two men alone that accounted for their different approach to political questions. The main thing was that they expressed the interests of different sections of Indian society. "Nehru commanded the loyalty of the radicals and Patel the loyalty of the conservatives. Nehru was the idol of the working-class, the majority of the Westernised intelligentsia, the youth and the minorities. Patel was leader of the business interests, the orthodox Hindus, senior civil servants and most of the party functionaries".<sup>14</sup>

This is an important point, for it enables us to understand the distribution of forces in the government of the dominion. We have no access to routine official documents, and as for the Constituent Assembly records and press reports, if they afford a glimpse of the differences between Nehru and Patel,<sup>15</sup> they say nothing at all about the views on foreign policy matters of the other government members who abstained from making public statements on such questions.

From the above-quoted observation one may infer that whenever differences arose in the government Patel was supported by representatives of Indian big business, namely, by Defence Minister Baldev Singh and Finance Minister J. Matthai, who were connected with Indian princes, by K.C. Neogy, the Minister for Commerce, Gopalaswami Ayyangar,<sup>16</sup> the Minister for Railways and Transport, by S.P. Mookerjee, the Minister for Industry and Supply, and a representative of the Hindu Mahasabha, the party of militant Hinduism, by R.A. Kidwai, the Minister for Communications, who was a big landowner, and by B.R. Ambedkar,<sup>17</sup> the Minister for Justice, who was closely connected with the Indian Civil Service.

This supposition is confirmed by the fact that these ministers resigned from the government soon after Patel's death in December 1950. Only S.P. Mookerjee resigned somewhat earlier, in April 1950. The rest of the government members, who had sided with Nehru when there was disagreement, continued to work with him.

Patel and his supporters in the government were not the only ones who tried to bring pressure to bear on Nehru.

Several people attempted at different times to influence Nehru's decisions on certain questions. They were: Governor-General Lord Mountbatten, Nehru's sister Vijayalakshmi Pandit (the first Indian Ambassador to Moscow in 1948 and subsequently to Washington and London), Dr. S. Radhakrishnan (Indian Ambassador to the USSR in 1949-51, subsequently Vice President and President of India), Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a leader of the National Congress party, K.M. Panikkar (who was Indian Ambassador to China), and V.K. Krishna Menon.<sup>18</sup>

Special mention must be made of Mountbatten. Brecher, a well-known scholar in his field, had every reason to think that Mountbatten, as well as V.L. Pandit, had tried to influence Nehru with a view to strengthening India's relations with the West.<sup>19</sup> But in the summer of 1948 Mountbatten left India, being succeeded on June 20, 1948, as Governor-General by Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, one of the oldest Congress leaders.

When we speak of the pressure which Patel and his supporters in the government, and Mountbatten, V.L. Pandit and others sought to bring to bear on Nehru, we have in mind the general direction of foreign policy and Nehru's decisions on major issues. Much, however, also depends on who carried out policy and in what manner. S.V. Bharathi, a noted Indian publicist, writes that Nehru left organisational matters to his senior officials, and that insufficient control and blind faith in the people who enjoyed his confidence were Nehru's chief weak points.<sup>20</sup>

In the early years of India's independence, G.S. Bajpai, Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, was put in charge of the execution of foreign policy. Bajpai was not merely an administrator but also an adviser, especially during the talks on the Kashmir issue, both in the United Nations and on the spot—in India and Pakistan. Bajpai was an Indian Civil Service veteran, who was so loyal to the British that they had sent him in 1921-22 to the Washington Conference for Limitation of Armaments to "represent India".<sup>21</sup>

But despite all that, Indian foreign policy, as we shall see

further on, became more and more independent with every year and was directed at consolidating India's foreign policy positions and preserving peace. This was furthered to no small extent by the fact that along with the pressure exerted on Nehru with a view to bringing India closer to the West, there was the influence of Parliament, of political parties and the press, i.e., pressure exerted by the national bourgeoisie and other classes of Indian society interested in the consolidation of independence and in securing peaceful conditions necessary for the elimination of India's age-old underdevelopment. Nehru himself was a true patriot, to whom the future of the Indian people was of the greatest concern. He saw the principal aim of his life in making his country really independent, ridding it of the deep-seated evils of the past and leading it along the path of progress.

— As to the role played by Parliament in determining the country's foreign policy, there are two views on the matter. "The more caustic critics stated that Parliament was becoming 'no more than Pandit Nehru's *darbar*'...<sup>22</sup> that Nehru—aided on occasions, perhaps, by a handful of confidants—really makes policy, or that the major decisions are made in the Working Committee of the Congress Party, almost without exception on the initiative of the Prime Minister and in his presence...that Parliament plays a role...as a rubber-stamp".<sup>23</sup>

The other view, expressed by Krishna Menon, seems more correct. In the Indian Parliament, besides members' questions, weekly question time, etc., five or six debates on foreign affairs are held every year. Since the government had a majority in Parliament such debates were not likely to alter the decisions of the government on general foreign policy problems. However, the importance of the debates on foreign policy was determined by three factors. Firstly, they were meant for the outside world; secondly, they educated the people; and thirdly, they helped to make foreign policy acceptable to all members of Parliament.<sup>24</sup> Menon spoke of Nehru's great respect for Parliament, adding: "I believe that Nehru was more sensitive to the Opposition than almost any other Prime Minister in the world that I know of. I think it was largely because he knew

that the people who were on his side did not represent all opinion".<sup>25</sup>

The Constituent Assembly of the dominion was formed of a part of the Constituent Assembly of colonial India, elected in June 1946; the deputies representing the parts of India that formed the Indian Union composed its Constituent Assembly. Its party composition can therefore be judged from the results of the 1946 election in "Zone A" provinces, i.e., provinces with a predominantly Hindu population. These provinces had elected 190 deputies including 156 Congress deputies, 17 Muslim League deputies, 4 Englishmen, and 13 representatives of other parties and organisations (among them B.R. Ambedkar and S.P. Mookerjee). Besides the deputies who were elected, even if by indirect procedure, there were another 64 deputies<sup>26</sup> who, as is well known, were appointed by the princes.

Bearing in mind the composition of the Constituent Assembly, let us look at the status occupied by the National Congress party, the Muslim League Hindu Mahasabha, and the Socialist Party of India (a collective member of Congress until March 1948) in the nation's political life. The position of the Communist Party should also be mentioned. Although it was represented in the Assembly by a single deputy, Sumnath Lahiri, the party played a significant role in India's political life.

At the time when India achieved independence the Congress party was the largest and most influential political party in the country. Whereas in 1946-47 it had 5.5 million members, in 1947-48 it had 10.5 million members, i.e., its membership nearly doubled within a single year.<sup>27</sup> Such rapid growth is often observed when a party becomes the ruling one. In the case of the Congress party, the growth was due to yet another important circumstance, namely, that it was the Congress party that successfully led the national liberation movement, the movement for the country's political independence. It was mainly this that accounted for the growth of the prestige of the National Congress party among the broad sections of the people.

At the same time, the Congress party expressed the interests of the national bourgeoisie above all. In the period of the struggle for India's liberation the upper bourgeoisie regularly

subsidised the party. After independence had been achieved, a part of the Indian monopolists began to object to giving further support to the Congress party, being opposed to the policy it had adopted of building up the public sector of the economy and to the foreign policy principles it had formulated.<sup>28</sup>

But despite the fact that Indian big business played a significant role, exerting pressure of the Congress party and on the government formed by it, this party "cannot be identified with the Indian bourgeoisie or any one section of it. Embodying the progressive tendencies of the bourgeoisie, the Congress party was for a long time leader of the broad mass of the people and expressed the interests of the masses at a certain stage of the country's development. Having taken control of the state, it, even representing the interests of definite classes, had to take account of the interests of all sections of society".<sup>29</sup> This point is of particular importance for an understanding of the foreign policy pursued by the National Congress party.

In the period of the struggle for independence diverse political forces in the Congress party were united by a common goal—liberation of the country from British domination. After the goal had been achieved, however, the struggle within the party intensified, and this weakened the party.

Proposals were advanced as early as autumn 1947 to reorganise the Congress party. First of all it is necessary to turn our attention to Gandhi's "Testament to the Nation". It described the type of organisation which Gandhi thought the Congress party should have. In summarising it, the *Times of India* wrote: "He would not be averse to disbanding the existing Congress organisation so that a new organisation composed of servants of the people could take its place and truly serve the lakhs<sup>30</sup> of villages in the country and also help the people in the attainment of social, moral and economic independence as well".<sup>31</sup>

If Gandhi proposed broad non-party organisation to replace the Congress party, Acharya Kripalani (Chairman of the Congress party until November 1947) expressed a contrary view. He proposed that not only the Congress party be preserved, but that its members be armed and undergo military training so that every city, every town and every village would have a

disciplined citizen-army, which would be an instrument of service in peace and a guarantee of security in war. Purushottamdas Tandon, a prominent Congress member, went even further by demanding that the Congress party be militarised with the aim of getting back the areas ceded to Pakistan.

A committee consisting of Chairman and Secretaries of provincial Congress bodies was formed to study the various proposals on the reorganisation of the National Congress party. The committee concluded that the Congress must exist as a political party, though in a more compact form than before. Soon a point was introduced in the Congress Rules, prohibiting Congress members from belonging simultaneously to any other political party or religious-communal organisation. As this was expected to cause many to leave the Congress party, the newly adopted Rules provided for the admission of new members to ensure the party's growth.

It is worth noting that although India had a Western-type parliamentary system, the Congress party, unlike most of the bourgeois political parties in the West, did not turn into an appendage of the parliamentary group, thus avoiding the situation in which party work among the masses is conducted mainly during parliamentary election campaigns. After Independence, too, the National Congress party continued to conduct organisational and ideological work among the people, trying to bring under its influence diverse social sections—the industrial workers, peasants, women, the youth and students—through all-India organisations that were to carry on their activities under Congress guidance. Following its example, other Indian bourgeois parties tried to do the same.

The second most influential political party in colonial India was the Muslim League, which expressed the interests of the Muslim landowners (in the Punjab above all) and the upper commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. After the partition of India on a religious basis, the Council of the Muslim League held a meeting on December 14-15, 1947, in Karachi, at which a decision was adopted to split the party into two parties—the Pakistan Muslim League and the Indian Union Muslim League. Council members and rank-and-file members of the League residing or having taken up residence on the territory



of either one or the other of the new states were to form the Council and rank and file of each of the new parties respectively. The Pakistan Muslim League became the ruling party of Pakistan, but the Indian Union Muslim League, which continued as an opposition party, quickly lost its significance as a political party, despite the fact that there were in the Indian Union 43 million Muslims whose interests the League claimed to represent.

The matter was that after the partition of India the Muslim League rank and file who remained in the Indian Union were seized by feelings of general disenchantment and cast into dejection. This was noted by Abul Kalam Azad, a Muslim and a leader of the National Congress party, who wrote : "It is strange, but the fact is that these Muslim Leaguers had been foolishly persuaded that once Pakistan was formed, Muslims, whether they came from a majority or a minority province, would be regarded as a separate nation and would enjoy the right of determining their own future. Now, when the Muslim majority provinces went out of India and even Bengal and the Punjab were divided...they at last realised that they had gained nothing, but in fact lost everything by the partition of India... It was now clear to them that the only result of partition was that their position as a minority was much weaker than before".<sup>32</sup> Thus it came as no surprise that the first meeting of the Council of the Indian Union Muslim League, held on March 10, 1948, in Madras, was attended by only 30 of its 147 members. Following a debate which took place behind closed doors and lasted ten hours, the meeting decided to retain the League organisation which in future was to devote itself principally to religious, educational, social and cultural ends.<sup>33</sup>

This decision met with no support from the mass of Muslims in the Indian Union because, firstly, the new League was the successor of a party whose prestige among the Indian Muslims was thoroughly undermined and, secondly, the Muslims were faced with problems other than those on which the party leaders wanted to concentrate the attention of its members. Soon in the province of Madras ten members of the Muslim League group in the Legislative Assembly left the

League. Later, groups of League members in the legislatures of West Bengal, Assam, and other provinces left the League.<sup>34</sup> The Muslim League was further weakened until it ceased to exist as an all-India party.

The third most influential among the political parties of India soon after the war was Hindu Mahasabha which expressed the interests of the Hindu landlords and princes. This party, founded in 1906 as a counterbalance to the Muslim League which was established shortly before, for many years had hardly any influence. *The Indian Year Book, 1945-46* notes, "during the first twenty-five years of its life, the Hindu organisation had to struggle for its existence..."<sup>35</sup> It began to attract public attention only when, after the Muslim League had adopted its Pakistan Resolution,<sup>36</sup> it was joined by K. M. Munshi, a prominent National Congress member, who started, in December 1940, a campaign for "Akhand Hindustan".<sup>37</sup> During the talks conducted in the spring of 1946 in India by a British Cabinet mission with representatives of the Congress party and the Muslim League, Hindu Mahasabha submitted to it a memorandum demanding independence for a united India that would have a federal structure, which would mean autonomy of the provinces and states under a strong central government.

The influence of Hindu Mahasabha grew sharply during the first months after India's partition. The riots and massacres that accompanied the partition, the migration of millions of dispossessed and embittered Hindu refugees, and the economic hardships experienced by the country as a whole, created an atmosphere in which many people were ready to listen to the chauvinist anti-Muslim propaganda conducted by Hindu Mahasabha and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a militarised organisation associated with it.

RSS, set up in 1925, was a military-fascist organisation to which only Hindus were admitted. Since 1941 it had been headed by M. Golwalkar, its "Supreme Leader" who had been with this organisation of "Indian storm troopers" since its birth. The Indian press observed that by the beginning of 1948 RSS had mustered enormous strength and had countless sections from Kashmir to Cape Comorin, with a total membership

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of two million.

The most favourable conditions for the activities of Hindu Mahasabha and RSS were found in refugee camps. There were 150 such camps in India at that time, the largest of which, Kurukshetra, contained 300,000 people. At the beginning of 1948, over 1,200,000 adult refugees were still jobless and without a home.

After India's partition Muslims continued to be killed in many towns and districts of the Indian Union by Hindu fanatics who were incited by anti-Muslim propaganda. As these killings and the burning and wrecking of Muslim homes created chaos in the country and strained relations with Pakistan, Mahatma Gandhi called on the Government, and Home Minister Patel above all, to take measures to safeguard Muslim lives and property. On January 12, 1948, Gandhi went on a hunger strike. This enraged Patel<sup>38</sup> while Hindu Mahasabha and RSS leaders began to accuse Gandhi of "betrayal of the sacred cause of the Hindus", saying that his fast had served to weaken the Hindu front and describing his policy as "suicidal".<sup>39</sup> On the 20th of January and again on the 30th attempts were made on Gandhi's life, and during the second attempt he was fatally shot.

The reaction to the assassination of Gandhi was different from what its organisers had expected. They had hoped to build up the political positions of extreme chauvinists in the state administration and the country at large. But as soon as it became known that Gandhi had been assassinated by Vinayak Godse, editor of the Hindu Mahasabha newspaper at Poona and an RSS member, Gandhi's followers, students and artisans above all, began to wreck Hindu Mahasabha and RSS premises and kill their members. Immediately after the assassination of Gandhi "the idealist Nehru, as the political heir of Gandhiji, rose in peoples' estimation and the realist and practical Sardar Patel and Dr. Mookerjee got isolated within and outside the Government".<sup>40</sup>

Despite statements to the press issued by L.B. Bhopatkar, President of Hindu Mahasabha, and M. Golwalkar, leader of RSS, and despite the resolution passed by the Working Committee of Hindu Mahasabha on February 2, 1948, which

sought to prove that they had nothing to do with Gandhi's assassination,<sup>41</sup> many leading members of Hindu Mahasabha and RSS were arrested.<sup>42</sup> On February 4, 1948, RSS was banned by the Indian government. Hindu Mahasabha, by decision taken by its working committee on Feb. 15, 1948, declared that it would cease to engage in political activities and would henceforth conduct social and cultural work only. This decision, adopted on the advice of S.P. Mookerjee (who until the end of 1946 had been President and then Vice President of the party), saved Hindu Mahasabha "from the wrath of the party in power. It continued to exist".<sup>43</sup>

After a few months most of those arrested were released and on August 7, 1948, the Working Committee of Hindu Mahasabha convened in Delhi to consider the question of resumption of political activities. In December 1948 Hindu Mahasabha began to demand that the ban on RSS be lifted and this end was soon achieved. But Hindu Mahasabha had so irrevocably compromised itself by the assassination of Gandhi that it could not have hoped to restore its former influence. In May 1949 it stated in the party programme that it "disapproves of India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth", that "land should belong to the State" and "the minimum requirements of land for a family as a unit should be fixed", that "all key industries should be nationalised", and so on.<sup>44</sup> But such statements which were made for demagogic purposes did nothing to increase the party's popularity.

In May 1951, shortly before the first general elections in India, a new religious-communal party, Bharatiya Jan Sangh, was formed with the aim of uniting all Hindu chauvinists. Its organiser, S.P. Mookerjee, had left Hindu Mahasabha in November 1948. That the new party was a successor to Hindu Mahasabha can be seen from the fact that it took over from the latter its militarised organisation—RSS.

It should be pointed out that both in Parliament and in Indian public life Hindu Mahasabha (and later Jan Sangh) derived their strength from the support of their sympathisers in the National Congress party and other bourgeois political parties, and in public organisations in India.

Whereas the overt and covert supporters of Hindu

Mahasabha in the National Congress party were not organised, matters were different with the Socialists who were affiliated with the Congress party and were known as "Congress-Socialists". They expressed mainly the interests of the urban petty bourgeoisie and the upper crust of the working class. In the early years after the war there was growing friction between the Congress leaders and the Socialists. The latter boycotted the elections to the Constituent Assembly in June 1946, and the sole Socialist member, Damodar Swarup Seth, was elected because he happened to be chairman of a Congress provincial committee at the time.

After Gandhi's assassination the Socialist leaders, J. Narayan, R.M. Lohia and K. Chattopadhyaya, held a press conference at which they demanded the resignation of the government and declared their readiness to serve in the new government now that the country was faced with a political crisis.

The Socialist leaders' move had wide repercussions. They were sharply attacked by all Indian bourgeois newspapers which considered their statement harmful to the national interests.<sup>45</sup>

In January 1948 the Executive Committee of the Socialist Party adopted a decision, which was kept secret pending approval by the party congress, on withdrawing from the National Congress party. The congress, held in March 1948, endorsed the decision. The object of the Socialists was to win to their side those who were disenchanted with the National Congress party and ultimately establish a two-party system in India. At the same time, Acharya Narendra Deva, one of the Socialist party leaders, in addressing the congress, called on his party to join efforts with the National Congress party for the purpose of abolishing the Communist party. The government of the National Congress party was criticised at the conference for its "totalitarian tendencies", for its inconsistent policy on the labour question and its attitude towards the princes.

The total membership of the Socialist party in 1949 was 12,360. The Socialists attributed the small membership to the party's stipulation that every member should devote at least 14 hours a week to party work.<sup>46</sup>

But despite its small membership and the fact that it had only one representative in the Constituent Assembly, the Socialist party exercised a considerable influence on the socialist life of the country. It had the support of miners, railway workers, dockers, textile workers and workers of the sugar industry. Many of the trade unions of these contingents of the working class were affiliated with the Socialist-led trade union centre, Hind Mazdoor Sabha. The Socialist party had its own organisation of peasants, youth organisation, and so on. One more evidence that it wielded considerable influence in the country is the fact that it published 21 weeklies in different languages spoken in India.

During World War II, Indian Communists like the Socialists were in the National Congress party, although on the basis of individual, not collective, membership. After Nazi Germany had attacked the Soviet Union and an anti-Hitler coalition was formed, differences of opinion emerged between the Communists and the Congress leadership chiefly on the question of whether India should support Britain's war effort. Congress party members accused Communists of "betraying the country's interests", of being "British spies", etc. Subsequently, Bhulabhai Desai, a well-known lawyer and Congress figure, as did later a Congress subcommittee of which Nehru was a member, on looking into the charges made against the Communists, dismissed them as groundless. The Communists gave full support to the Congress party at the end of the war. But nevertheless they were expelled from the National Congress party in 1945. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of India, however, continued to support the policy of the Congress party and later (until 1948) also of the government which it had formed.<sup>47</sup>

From February 28 to March 6, 1948, the 2nd CPI Congress which represented the more than 89,000 members of the Party convened in Calcutta. As Ajoy Ghosh, General Secretary of the Party's Central Committee, noted in his article in the newspaper *For a Lasting Peace, For People's Democracy*, published on October 19, 1951, the new Communist Party leadership had failed to work out a correct political course, owing to the fact that Leftist sectarian views had prevailed in the policy and the



methods of work, and to a desire to bypass the democratic stage of the revolution. Meanwhile since the spring of 1948, repressive measures against the Communists were launched throughout India, for which Vallabhai Patel, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs, was mainly responsible. In a number of provinces a ban was imposed on the activities of the Communist Party and on the publication of most of the Party's 11 weeklies brought out in all the principal languages spoken in India.<sup>48</sup>

All this did enormous damage to the Communist movement in India, and by the start of 1951 CPI membership had dropped to 25,000. It was only after a new draft programme had been worked out in the spring of 1951, which gave priority to the tasks of the struggle against feudalism and charted a course for creating a broad anti-feudal and anti-imperialist front, that the Communist Party of India began to regain its former influence.

But despite the aforementioned errors of the CPI, the Communists' criticism of the foreign policy of the Indian government in 1948-49 and, later on, of its deviations from the declared neutralist policy, evoked sympathy from the public. It should be borne in mind that the CPI had numerous supporters among industrial and farm workers, that it guided the activities of the All-India Trade Union Congress and of the Kisan Sabha, the All-India Peasants' organisation. The Communist Party also had many sympathisers among the intelligentsia.

After World War II, when a new alignment of international forces had taken place, the young Indian state had the task of formulating its foreign policy and making its first foreign policy moves. In his first address over Delhi radio in September 1946 Nehru stated foreign policy principles which the Indian national government intended to follow, pointing out that India proposed to keep away from the power politics of groups

of states aligned against one another and to establish friendly relations with all countries.<sup>49</sup>

Scholars belonging to different trends of thought have given a similar assessment of these principles. Here are two examples. The English author George Patterson writes : "Indian foreign policy arises from a combination of emphasis; anti-colonialism (the result of resentment at British dominance), anti-racialism (British imperialism had racial superiority overtones), an awareness of 'Asianism' (Asian Nationalistic movements have a common bond—strong feelings against the arrogance of the West), and sympathy for divided countries because of her own partition".<sup>50</sup>

Professor Hiren Mukerjee, a noted figure in the CPI, gives a broader interpretation which is based more on the realities of Indian political life, but which is essentially similar to Patterson's appraisal. Professor Mukerjee enumerates the following "main pillars" of Indian foreign policy: "anticolonialism,... full equality of all races... non-alignment, which meant hostility to none, but a deliberate detachment from competitive power blocs, a determination to judge international issues on their merits and to exercise freedom of action on the basis of such judgement...recognition of Asia and of Africa, as a newly emerging and vital element in world politics...relaxation of international tensions and a peaceful approach...for achieving disarmament and settlement of disputes without recourse to violence and war".<sup>51</sup>

Concerning India's first foreign policy moves, the Indian researcher, K.P. Karunakaran, noted that after August 15, 1947, the Union of India had inherited not only the international status of undivided India and her membership in the UNO, but also her foreign policy,<sup>52</sup> i.e., the foreign policy of the interim government of India formed on September 1, 1946, and called attention to repeated statements by the Indian Prime Minister, that India would not join any political bloc.<sup>53</sup> The Soviet scholar, V.P. Nikhamin, pointed out that even before British rule was abolished, Nehru declared on September 7, 1946, that India would not join groups of states that were aligned against one another.<sup>54</sup>

A similar point of view was expressed by nearly all writers

on India's foreign policy. The view that Nehru believed from the outset that India should pursue a policy of non-alignment is firmly established in literature dealing with international relations.

Let us now turn to the end of 1945, when there was an unprecedented upsurge of the national liberation movement in India and when the National Congress party was faced with the task of formulating its foreign policy with account taken of the changes that had occurred in the world and inside the country and of the likelihood that the Congress party would become the country's ruling party. Early statements on India's foreign policy can be found in a number of public speeches by Nehru and particularly in his conversation with B. Shiva Rao who had returned from San Francisco where the conference that had drawn up the Charter of the United Nations was held.<sup>55</sup>

At the beginning of the conversation<sup>56</sup> Nehru said that should the United Nations prove ineffective, an Asian Federation was "a possibility in the near future," with large groups forming in Asia "for their own protection against outside aggression" and against "economic penetration". For these reasons, as also because of old cultural bonds between Asia and Africa, Nehru predicted with confidence that "a closer union of the countries bordering on the Indian Ocean both for defence and trade purposes" as well as for "cooperation in foreign policy" was almost certain to emerge.

At the end of the conversation Nehru did not speak of the "possibility" of a conference being called for the preliminary discussion of his idea, as he had said at the beginning of the conversation, but of the "likelihood" of such a conference being called, for which his choice of venue was India. Although Nehru said that such a conference would not be opposed to the United States or any other power or group of powers, the idea of an Asian Federation was so clearly anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist that no reservations could conceal it.

What Nehru had said here is significant not only because it represented one of the early attempts to determine new India's foreign policy line, but also because it contained the important suggestion concerning a military-political alliance of the countries bordering on the Indian Ocean. Nehru, as we shall

see, soon gave up this idea.

But early in 1946 Nehru tried to carry out his plan for calling a conference. He went to Bombay where he raised 100,000 rupees for organising the conference; during his visit to South-East Asian countries in March 1946 he secured support for his idea from the leaders of Burma and Indonesia, and so on.<sup>57</sup> Later, when he was much occupied with political and state matters, Nehru continued to devote attention to the preparations for the conference.

At that time the fight for political independence was still in progress in India and several other Asian countries while the African people were only beginning to wage a national liberation struggle. Thus it was decided: (a) to hold a conference of the Asian countries alone and call it an Asian Relations Conference; (b) not to hold it at government level but to invite scientists and scholars and representatives of the public; and (c) to ask the Indian Council of World Affairs, a non-governmental body set up three years before, to organise preparations for the conference.<sup>58</sup>

It should be noted that in the early drafts of the conference agenda paramount importance was attached to the question of joint defence of the Asian countries. Early in May 1946, B. Shiva Rao, who was an influential member of the Indian Council of World Affairs, said in a letter to the Conference organisational committee, in which he communicated Nehru's ideas concerning the agenda, that it "should not only include but give first place to defence and security problems of the Indian Ocean area". Accordingly, the question of defence was put first on the 8-point preliminary agenda. However, Nehru soon changed his mind and the Council's letter of May 27, 1946, which announced the conference agenda, made no mention of defence problems.<sup>59</sup> An explanation for this was later included in the conference records: "Defence questions were excluded because the defence of Asia is bound up with world security, and discussions on it would be unreal without the representation of the USA, USSR and Britain".<sup>60</sup>

It is understandable that Jansen, an Indian writer on international affairs, should express surprise that Nehru did not see earlier how "unreal" such discussions would be. Jansen

believes that the change in Nehru's views on the matter occurred when "the responsibility of office and power had begun to cast its shadow before".<sup>61</sup>

This is not likely, however, if only because Nehru did not become Vice-Chairman of the Viceroy's Executive Council (in fact, the head of the interim government) until three months later. A more likely explanation is that in May 1946, when an acute struggle was going on over the terms of the "transfer of power to Indian hands",<sup>62</sup> Nehru had hopes of gaining America's support against Britain, the old colonial ruler, and that it was for the sake of seeing these hopes realised that he gave up his idea of joint Asian defence.

The Asian Relations Conference was held at Delhi from March 23 to April 2, 1947. It was attended by delegations of 28 countries, including representatives of the Central Asian and Transcaucasian Soviet republics, observers sent by the United Nations and the Arab League and by institutes of international (or Pacific) relations of the USSR, Britain, the United States and Australia. Opening the conference, Nehru greeted all participants, mentioning in particular the delegates from the Soviet Republics of Asia which, he said, "have advanced so rapidly in our generation and which have so many lessons to teach us...." Especially forceful was that part of the speech in which Nehru said: "Far too long have we of Asia been petitioners in Western courts and chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own legs and cooperate with all others who are prepared to cooperate with us. We do not intend to be a plaything of others".<sup>63</sup> The Conference helped to strengthen the solidarity of Asian countries and was a predecessor of the Bandung (or Asian-African) Conference.

An important foreign policy move by India was her co-operation with the Soviet Union at the 1946 UN General Assembly session. As early as September 1946 Krishna Menon, after his meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister, said in Paris that "he saw no reason why the strongest friendship should not form the permanent basis of relations between India and Russia".<sup>64</sup>

At the General Assembly session the Indian and Soviet

delegations had similar views on such problems as the unanimity of the great powers in the United Nations, withdrawal of British troops from Greece, membership in the United Nations, and so on. In December 1946 the head of the Indian delegation stated that more cooperation had been possible with the USSR than with either Britain or the USA, for "the Soviet approach to most problems had been somewhat more liberal".<sup>65</sup> This cooperation between India and the Soviet union aroused uneasiness in certain Western circles.

The first steps aimed at determining the foreign policy position of independent India, such as Nehru's proposal at the close of 1945 on setting up an Asian Federation for joint defence, Nehru's speech over Delhi radio on September 7, 1946, on the foreign policy of new India, cooperation with the Soviet Union at the UN General Assembly Session in 1946, and the convening of the Asian Relations Conference in March 1947, had been implemented even before the proclamation of political independence. And when that day, August 15, 1947, came, the young state was assailed by such misfortunes that during the early months of its existence as an independent country urgent internal problems such as ending religious-communal clashes and the resettlement of refugees, pushed everything else into the background.

Foreign policy questions appeared on the agenda of the government of the Union of India only after an undeclared war with Pakistan over Kashmir had started.

### **The Kashmir Question and Relations with Pakistan**

When on August 20, 1947, the Union of India Constituent Assembly session opened, R.K. Sidhwa, an Assembly deputy, asked to be given the floor to make a special statement. On Independence Day, August 15, he said, hundreds of thousands of people gathered at the Fort of Agra to attend the ceremony of the hauling down of the British flag and hoisting of the national flag. A British officer intervened, saying that he would not have the British flag hauled down in the presence of British troops. The gathering calmed down only after an Indian serviceman had managed to hoist the Indian flag. Following Sidhwa another deputy, Balkrishna Sharma, rose and said that

Colonel Hilman who was in command of the Kanpur garrison had issued a special order forbidding the ceremony of hauling down the British flag and replacing it by any other.<sup>66</sup>

Sharma was interrupted by Rajendra Prasad, Chairman of the Constituent Assembly, who said that since the Assembly had met for the purpose of drafting a Constitution and was not yet sitting as the Legislative Assembly of India, it could not consider such questions. He added, however, that he was not quite clear in his mind about it.<sup>67</sup> There was an uproar in the Assembly. The noise and confusion continued until Nehru, speaking "more or less as a layman than as an expert", said : "It seems to me perfectly clear that this House is obviously a Sovereign body and can do just what it likes.... and has the right to carry on as a Legislative Assembly". He also said that two or three instances that had been brought to notice regarding the incident at Agra Fort were being enquired into.<sup>68</sup>

These debates in the Constituent Assembly are significant not only because they created a precedent whereby the Assembly took upon itself all legislative functions. They also show how, at an early stage of the existence of the Union of India, the British (in this case officers of no high rank) thought they had a right to interfere in everything. This interference proved disastrous when decisions were taken on the future of some Indian states, Kashmir in particular.

Under the Indian Independence Act (adopted by the British Parliament on July 18, 1947) the rulers of the states occupying a third of the territory of colonial India were to decide independently whether to join the Union of India or retain their former relations with Britain. At the end of May, Mountbatten met 75 most influential princes in order to persuade them to make up their minds before August 15.

The British, who hoped to be able, even after "leaving India", to retain their troops there and to set up strategic military bases in India, assigned a particular place in their plans to Kashmir. But the Maharaja's hopes, encouraged by the British, that Kashmir would remain an "independent state" were blasted by the anti-feudal movement of the people of Kashmir. Mass demonstrations against the Maharaja, which had started already in 1946 and proceeded under the slogan "Get out of

Kashmir!" did not stop after the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah and other leaders of the local National Conference party. Describing the political situation in Kashmir in the summer of 1947, Vijay Kumar, an Indian student of the Kashmir problem and himself a Kashmiri, wrote : "Military and police methods had only succeeded in deepening the popular resolve for an early overthrow of the rule of autocracy. The National Conference, enjoying large support throughout the Valley, had emerged as the strongest and the most popular organisation of the people".<sup>69</sup>

The National Conference of Kashmir (NCK) was close to the Congress party and followed its leadership, but it represented the left wing of the Congress organisations. During the war the more progressive of the NCK members drafted the programme of the party and the future constitution of Kashmir. The latter was published as a brochure entitled "New Kashmir".

In these circumstances the British were forced to abandon the idea of proclaiming the "independence of Kashmir"<sup>70</sup> and began to support Pakistan, which was more dependent on them at the time and which wanted Kashmir for itself. In June 1947 Mountbatten, who had come to Kashmir for "a rest", spent four days trying to persuade the Maharaja to ascertain the will of his people by any means and join whichever Dominion his people wished.<sup>71</sup> This was tantamount to demanding that Kashmir accede to Pakistan, as three-quarters of the Kashmiris were Muslims who, in Mountbatten's view, could wish for nothing better than to become citizens of a Muslim state.

At the same time, as Alastair Lamb, an Australian Orientologist, has pointed out, many Pakistanis still believe that when India was divided the British were "at least keeping the door open for Kashmir's accession to India". By a decision of the Radcliffe Commission, set up to delimit the border between India and Pakistan in the Punjab, the district of Gurdaspur which had a preponderantly Muslim population was given to India : "Had the whole Gurudaspur district gone to Pakistan, then India would have lost Pathankot and the only practicable road from East Punjab to Jammu".<sup>72</sup>



This might seem to contradict our conclusion about Mountbatten's attempt to have Kashmir accede to Pakistan. But as a matter of fact there is no contradiction, and Lamb writes further : "It is now clear that the Radcliffe award here was in no way related to the Kashmir question; rather, it was based on considerations arising from the division of the waters from certain canals".<sup>73</sup>

Soon after Mountbatten, the leaders of the National Congress party joined the struggle for Kashmir. Shortly before India's partition, Acharya Kripalani and then Mahatma Gandhi visited Kashmir. Before leaving Delhi, Gandhi said that his tour was absolutely non-political and undertaken simply as a formality to redeem a thirty-year-old promise made to late Maharaja Pratap Singh.<sup>74</sup> Gandhi's visit to Kashmir and his conversation with the Maharaja yielded fruit. Gandhi wrote to Patel : "I had an hour with the Maharaja and the Maharani. He agreed that he must follow the people; but he did not come to the point.... you have evidently to do something about it".<sup>75</sup>

Patel and Kripalani began to hold talks with the Maharaja. They tried to persuade him not to yield to threats and intrigues, promising that the NCK would not lead the people against him. Simultaneously they insisted on the release of Sheikh Abdullah, assuring the Maharaja that the Sheikh would support him against Pakistan. On September 29, 1947, Sheikh Abdullah and his associates were released from prison. Speaking at a mass meeting at Srinagar three days later, Sheikh Abdullah praised Gandhi and Nehru and was sharply critical of the Muslim League's "two-nation" theory.<sup>76</sup> Sheikh Abdullah's speech showed that this leader of the NCK, who earlier had fought for making Kashmir an independent democratic republic, now favoured Kashmir's accession to India.

Did this change in Sheikh Abdullah's views reflect the prevalent mood in Kashmir? There are different opinions on this point. Prem Nath Bazaz, leader of the Kisan Mazdoor Conference (the Kashmir party of peasants and workers), noted that besides the NCK there were 16 political parties and a large number of associations and groupings in Kashmir which could be divided into three groups on the question of Kashmir's accession either to India or to Pakistan. The first group included

such organisations as the Muslim Conference which advocated accession to Pakistan on a religious basis. The second group included the Kisan Mazdoor Conference and the Socialist Party of Kashmir which saw no difference in Kashmir going either way but demanded that the issue be settled democratically by an impartial and fair plebiscite. The third group included those who, like the Praja Parishad, were for Kashmir's accession to India whether the Kashmiris wanted it or not.<sup>77</sup> Actually the resolutions passed by the Kisan Mazdoor Conference on September 5 and by the Socialist Party of Kashmir on September 22, 1947, demanded Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Since the Praja Parishad had supporters only among the Hindu part of the population of Jammu and enjoyed no influence in the Kashmir Valley, we may conclude that what Bazaz was implying is that by far most of the Kashmiris were for accession to Pakistan.

Almost all Indian authors, however, try to prove that the Kashmiris supported accession to the Union of India.<sup>78</sup>

While the Congress leaders wanted Kashmir to accede to India, the leaders of the Muslim League worked for its accession to Pakistan. In 1944, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the League President, went to Kashmir and stayed there for two months doing everything he could to strengthen the positions of the Muslim Conference Party which was allied to the Muslim League.

It would be interesting to trace the changes in the Muslim League's position on the status of Kashmir. In a statement issued to the press early in May 1947, the acting chairman of the Muslim Conference of Kashmir (who naturally shared the Muslim League's point of view) assured the Maharaja of the "support and cooperation of the Muslims forming an 80 per cent majority in the State as represented by their authoritative organisation, the Muslim Conference", and said that the Muslims "would readily acclaim him as the first constitutional king of a democratic and independent Kashmir".<sup>79</sup> In early July 1947 the *Dawn*, the semi-official organ of the Muslim League, congratulated the Kashmir government on not having yielded to the pressure of National Congress President A. Kripalani, who had visited Kashmir in order to persuade the Maharaja to

join India.<sup>80</sup> But towards the end of July 1947 an editorial in the *Dawn* openly demanded Kashmir's accession to Pakistan.<sup>81</sup>

On August 14, 1947, Pakistan signed an agreement, proposed by the Maharaja of Kashmir, undertaking to maintain the *status quo* in its relations with Kashmir for one year. On the very next day, August 15, Pakistani agents hoisted the Pakistani flags over the post offices in Kashmir, and the economic blockade of Kashmir by Pakistan followed soon after.<sup>82</sup> Economically Kashmir was vulnerable since it got its supplies of food, fuel and other necessities over the roads lying in districts which later acceded to Pakistan (while the only road leading to Banihal Pass, which lay in the districts having acceded to the Union of India, was usually closed for the greater part of the year).

In September 1947 the Pakistan Governor-General M.A. Jinnah, said that he would like to spend a fortnight in Kashmir. But the Kashmir government objected to the visits on the grounds that conditions in the State "were unsatisfactory" and the visitor "might not have the rest that he wanted".<sup>83</sup> Then, instead of Jinnah, his private secretary went to Kashmir and during his stay there which lasted several months he tried to stir up hatred for India.

Pakistan sought by various means to bring pressure to bear on Kashmir. On October 19 the Foreign Minister of Pakistan sent a cable to the Premier of Kashmir and on the very next day Governor-General Jinnah sent a cable to the Maharaja, both saying that the Maharaja's policy ran counter to the will of the people of Kashmir.<sup>84</sup> The cables were probably prompted by reports of the progress made in the Kashmir-India negotiations on the Kashmir question which were being conducted in Delhi by M.C. Mahajan, the newly appointed Prime Minister of Kashmir.<sup>85</sup>

Meanwhile, in Pakistan, detachments of the Pathan tribes, numbering 4,000-5,000 men were moved from the North-West Frontier Province to the border of Kashmir, so as to annex it to Pakistan by force. The invasion of Kashmir started on October 22, 1947. The Pathan troops armed with modern rifles, machine guns and mortars advanced quickly in motor cars towards Srinagar. On October 24 the Maharaja of Kashmir appealed Delhi for help. On October 26 he fled with the

government to Jammu taking with him his personal belongings which were loaded into a hundred lorries. The special administration set up at Srinagar by the National Conference party organised a people's volunteer corps to defend the capital.

Much has been written by historians and politicians in the West about who was responsible for the invasion of Kashmir. This is understandable as the invasion of Kashmir in October 1947 by the tribes which had acceded to Pakistan marked the beginning of a conflict which poisoned relations between India and Pakistan for many years.

D. F. Karaka, an Indian columnist known for his pro-American sentiments, gives the following interpretation of what led to the invasion of Kashmir. Under British rule, says Karaka, the tribal chiefs of the North-West Frontier Province used to receive from the British about 30 million rupees annually "in return for their goodwill". After India's partition these subsidies were stopped, and Pakistan had no money to pay them. The Pakistani government did not expect Muslim tribes to attack a Muslim state. The Pathans, however, "slipped into the habits of lawlessness which came naturally to them" and set out to plunder "the sun-flushed valleys of Kashmir".<sup>86</sup> Thus, according to Karaka, the invasion of Kashmir had not been organised by anyone; it was to be explained by the Pathans' "habits of lawlessness which came naturally to them".

For some months following the invasion, Pakistani official spokesmen emphatically denied that the invaders were getting help from Pakistan. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan told the UN Security Council on January 15, 1948, that the Indian charges were groundless, that the Pathans had no bases in Pakistan and were not trained by the Pakistan army. He said that his government continued to do all in its power to discourage the tribal movement by all means short of war.<sup>87</sup> The Prime Minister of Pakistan, however, said that "it was possible that some Pakistan army personnel, who were on leave, might have participated in the operations."<sup>88</sup>

Let us now turn to the professedly impartial historians in the West. Lord Birdwood wrote that his "own inquiry in Pakistan" had led to certain conclusions. Firstly, "no British officer, civil or military, had any idea of the plans in preparation".

Secondly, "certain senior officials were well aware of the intention, and discreetly turned the other way". Finally, the Chief Minister of the Frontier Province, who had family connections in Kashmir, gave it unqualified assistance "without which the operation might not have been possible".<sup>89</sup> So, if we are to believe Lord Birdwood, the British knew nothing about it.

Josef Korbel, a member of the UN Commission on India and Pakistan, which was set up later, writes that the Pakistani central authorities knew nothing about the invasion, but "the Prime Minister of the North-West Frontier Province, himself a Kashmiri, and his officers did give the tribesmen help".<sup>90</sup> So if we are to believe J. Korbel, the Pakistani central authorities too knew nothing about the planned invasion.

Prem Nath Bazaz, a pro-Pakistani political figure in Kashmir, while admitting that the invading tribesmen plundered the people, burned their houses, killed and raped, says at the same time that they did it "despite the strict orders of their officers".<sup>91</sup> Thus Bazaz justifies not only the Pakistani authorities, but also the officers.

Michael Brecher cites the correspondents for several British periodicals who reported that there was every evidence that the tribal invasion had strong support and the recruiting was going on inside Pakistan itself, and that there could be no question that encouragement and aid were given to the tribesmen in Pakistan.<sup>92</sup> But Brecher too failed to shed light on the part played by the imperialists in the invasion.

Nearly all the Indian authors on the subject also conclude that the responsibility for the 1947 invasion of Kashmir lay entirely with Pakistan. This is stated with particular conviction by Sisir Gupta, who adduces new evidence in support of his thesis. Thus, for example, he tells that Abdul Razzaque Khan, a Muslim League leader, filed a suit in 1956 against his party from which he sought to recover the 10,480 rupees he had spent in 1947 on transporting volunteers to Kashmir at the League's request, and that Jinnah promised Mountbatten soon after the start of the invasion to call it off if Mountbatten accepted his terms of settlement.<sup>93</sup>

Only Vijay Kumar, an Indian author, writes about the

responsibility of the British imperialists for the invasion, citing the following irrefutable proof. He recalls that in a personal letter sent by George Cunningham, the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, to Rob Lockhart, the British Commander-in-Chief of India, a few days before the invasion, Cunningham warned General Lockhart about the coming invasion of Kashmir by the tribesmen. As Lockhart failed to hand the letter over to the Indian Government, in whose service he was, and as this important document was destroyed by someone, while Cunningham failed to inform the British government about the coming invasion (or, if he did inform the British government, the latter did nothing), Kumar concludes that Britain encouraged the invasion.<sup>94</sup>

The evidence cited by Kumar might be supplemented with other facts. About two weeks before the invasion started, most of the English in Kashmir had been evacuated on the instructions of the British High Commissioner in India. Furthermore, the invading tribes were accompanied by British reporters.<sup>95</sup>

It should be noted that, like the British ruling circles, the United States too was responsible for the 1947 invasion, for one of the commanders of the invading army was Russel K. Haight of the US Office of Strategic Services. B.N. Rau, India's representative in the United Nations, well understood that Haight had not gone to Kashmir on his own initiative and told the Security Council that India could, if she chose, "ask for damages from the United States for losses sustained as a result of Haight's activities".<sup>96</sup>

The Maharaja's appeal for help on October 24 faced the Indian government with the necessity of reaching a decision quickly. Nehru, says Madhok, "feared that direct military help to Kashmir would lead to war with Pakistan". That provoked Patel, "who shared the views of Dr. Mookerjee that India must rush her troops to save Kashmir without caring for the consequences...Pt. Nehru had to submit and air-borne Indian troops reached Srinagar just in time..."<sup>97</sup>

Was it so indeed? Were there any differences of opinion inside the government or among the Indian political parties on giving military aid to Kashmir? In reality Kashmir's appeal

for help met with complete unanimity of opinion on the part of the Indian government and the public. Even Gandhi thought that his non-violence doctrine did not apply in that instance and issued a call to "do or die".<sup>98</sup>

How did the events actually develop? Simultaneously in the Maharaja's appeal for help of October 24, information was received from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Indian and Pakistan armies, Field Marshal Auchinleck,<sup>99</sup> that the tribes were advancing rapidly. However, the situation in Kashmir was discussed by the Indian Government Defence Committee only on the following day. The meeting despite the fact that another telegram had arrived saying that the invading tribes were only 35 miles from Srinagar,<sup>100</sup> decided, on Mountbatten's instance, to send V.P. Menon, Secretary of the Ministry of States, to Kashmir to see for himself what the situation was and report to the Government. After his trip to Srinagar, Menon told the meeting of the Defence Committee on October 26 that it was urgent to save Kashmir from the invaders.

Mountbatten now began to insist that troops could be sent to Kashmir only when it had acceded to India. Menon flew to Jammu where the Maharaja of Kashmir had fled, and returned with a document on Kashmir's accession to India and a personal letter from the Maharaja to Mountbatten in which the Maharaja again asked that troops be sent to Kashmir without delay and stated that Sheikh Abdullah had been appointed head of the interim government. A request for troops and for Kashmir's accession to India was made also by Sheikh Abdullah who had arrived in Delhi.<sup>101</sup> Discussion of the question was set for the next day, and on October 27, 1947, the Defence Committee agreed to Kashmir's accession to India and decided to send troops there. On the same day, the first Indian battalion was airlifted to Srinagar and immediately upon landing engaged the superior enemy. It had arrived just in time. "A few minutes later the airfield might well have been in enemy hands".<sup>102</sup> As it was, the airfield and Srinagar were successfully defended.

These events convincingly show that by holding back discussion of the situation in Kashmir, Mountbatten had given the invading force, already on the approaches to Srinagar, three

days in which to seize the capital of Kashmir. During those crucial three days (October 24-26) the people of Kashmir were defenceless against the invading force.

On the question of Kashmir's accession to India, the Hindu Mahasabha leadership had more than once accused Nehru of having "torpedoed this brilliant decision" to send troops to Kashmir by making the offer of plebiscite to determine the future of Kashmir after "Indian soldiers had cleared it of the Pakistani hordes".<sup>103</sup> Robert Trumbull, a noted American journalist, shared this opinion. He wrote: "Nehru had made it a formal condition of accepting the Maharaja's accession to India that this action should be confirmed, after order had been restored, by ascertaining 'the will of the people' of the state. Constitutionally, it was not necessary to do this, for the Maharaja's action...legally and irrevocably handed the state over to India...Nehru's idealistic gesture was to make Kashmir a powder keg for years to come..."<sup>104</sup>

The question of plebiscite in Kashmir is of great significance and we must ascertain who indeed raised it. The Maharaja's letter of October 26 to Mountbatten, in which he asked that Kashmir be admitted to the Indian Union and that troops be sent to the state, made no mention of any subsequent plebiscite. But Mountbatten, in his reply of October 27, after stating that his "Government had decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India", said "...as soon as law and order have been restored...the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people".<sup>105</sup> The meaning of Mountbatten's reply is this. Firstly, by adding the second sentence he altered the meaning of the first, and now the implication was that Kashmir's accession was merely temporary. Secondly, Mountbatten literally repeated the proposal he had made to the Maharaja during his visit to Kashmir in June 1947, about "ascertaining the will of the people". Thirdly, the British were experienced in falsifying the will of the people, having conducted in July 1947 a referendum in the North-West Frontier Province,<sup>106</sup> so that Mountbatten might well be confident that should a referendum be held in Kashmir too, it could be made to yield the "required result". Thus, the idea of a plebiscite came from Mountbatten.



a radio address on November 2, 1947, Nehru merely modified Mountbatten's formula, adding after the word "referendum" the phrase "held under international auspices like the United Nations".<sup>107</sup> This proposal to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir was communicated by cable on October 31, 1947, to the Pakistani Government, which rejected it. Governor-General Jinnah made a counter-proposal which called for joint Pakistani-Indian administration of Kashmir. This was rejected by India. Gururaj Rao, an Indian scholar, observes that "when an offer is made and the same is not accepted within a reasonable time, it automatically lapses".<sup>108</sup> Therefore the obligation to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir does not follow from the aforementioned declaration of the Indian Government made in November 1947, but from the fact that the Indian Government had subsequently agreed to the resolutions of the UN Commission on India and Pakistan calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir.

The Indian troops which had arrived in Kashmir repulsed the invading force from Srinagar, pressing it back beyond the river Uri and thus halted the invaders' offensive operations. Later Nehru was criticised for not having ordered the army to clear the entire territory of Kashmir, and it was suggested that "a strong man like Patel, if he had his way, would have done it".<sup>109</sup> It was Mountbatten's pressure again that led to the decision to freeze military operations in Kashmir in late 1947 and early 1948. Mountbatten tried to convince the Indian Government that to have Indian troops advance beyond the Uri might provoke a still greater conflict between India and Pakistan.<sup>110</sup> To Nehru, who felt keenly the consequences of India's partition, the very idea of an all-out war with Pakistan which would inflict still greater calamities on the people, was odious. This is what he himself said about the Kashmir question: "We have indeed been overscrupulous in this matter so that nothing may be done in the passion of the moment which might be wrong".<sup>111</sup> Meanwhile Mountbatten kept trying to exert pressure on the Indian Government in the matter of Kashmir.

The British newspaper *Daily Telegraph* reported on December 27, 1947, that Mountbatten, threatening to resign from his office of Governor-General, demanded that India

pursue a policy in Kashmir which would not make a clash with Pakistan inevitable and insisted on either outright partition of Kashmir or the immediate reference of the issue to the Security Council. The Indian Government referred the Kashmir question to the Security Council on December 31, 1947. Many years later, in April 1964, shortly before Nehru's death, his daughter Indira Gandhi said in a speech in New York, probably expressing Nehru's own view, that "the Kashmir issue should not have been sent to the UNO".<sup>112</sup>

Krishna Menon believed that India should have referred the question to the United Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter, i.e., "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression", rather than under Articles 34 and 35 of Chapter VI, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes". The error, he explained, was due to the Government's implicit faith in the United Nations.<sup>113</sup> Meanwhile this error enabled the then Chairman of the Security Council, Fernand van Langenhove (Belgium), obviously acting under instructions of Britain and the United States, to turn the "Kashmir issue" into the "India-Pakistan controversy", including therein also the question of the state of Junagadh, the question of the division of state property, etc.

The Pakistan representatives persistently denied that the Pakistan Government had in any way helped the invading tribes. On February 6, 1948, Sheikh Abdullah, who had flown in from India, addressed the Security Council on the subject. He said: "I have fought many battles along with my own men, on the borders of Jammu and Kashmir. I have seen with my own eyes the support given by the Pakistan Government; not only in supplying bases, but in providing arms, ammunition, direction and control of the tribesmen".<sup>114</sup> The Security Council resolved to establish a United Nations commission composed of three members, one of India's choice (she named Czechoslovakia), another of Pakistan's choice (she named Argentina), and a third of their mutual choice. Subsequently, the Commission came to include also representatives of Colombia, Belgium and the United States. The *Modern Review* (Calcutta) reported that in 1950, Dr. Oldrich Chyle (Czechoslovakia), a Commission member, showed in his report to the

Security Council that the double game the Western powers' representatives were playing hindered a settlement of the Kashmir issue.

Meanwhile Pakistan intensified her armed intervention in Kashmir. The Pakistan Foreign Minister informed the UN Commission that three regular Pakistani brigades had been fighting in Kashmir since May 1948.<sup>115</sup> Subsequently, hostilities in Kashmir were stopped. In response to the UN Commission's appeal to the sides to abstain from hostilities, the Government of the Union of India issued orders accordingly to its troops in Kashmir. A ceasefire was put into effect on January 1, 1949, but North and West Kashmir continued under Pakistan's jurisdiction, being administered through the Azad Kashmir Government set up by Pakistan.

In the part of Kashmir which was under India's jurisdiction (roughly three-fifths of the territory of the state) the positions of the Sheikh Abdullah Government and the National Conference were growing stronger. The National Conference had increased its membership to 600,000 by May 1948. Its rising popularity was due to the part it played in the struggle against the autocracy, to the fact that it organised resistance to the invading forces, and, above all, to the fact that on coming into office it opened to the people of Kashmir the prospect of freedom from the former tyranny. Under the Maharaja land tax in Kashmir was higher than anywhere else. The Maharaja had also imposed a "special window tax" (which is the reason why windowless houses are still found in Kashmir), a "tax on the hearth" (winters in Kashmir are very cold), a "tax on every wife", and so forth.<sup>116</sup>

Before looking at the alignment of political forces in India on the Kashmir issue in 1947-1949, we must first have a clear idea as to the attitude of Britain and the United States to the Kashmir question as it influenced the struggle going on in India.

After its plans for Kashmir's accession to Pakistan had aborted, Britain continued to support Pakistan at the first stage of the discussion of the question in the Security Council, and tried to force India either to cede the whole of Kashmir or to consent to its division. For then Britain would be able to retain control of the militarily more important northern districts

of Kashmir after they had formally acceded to Pakistan.

The British Government at the same time tried to attain its objectives by taking other steps. The Kashmir question was put on the agenda of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in October 1948. However, although Pakistan was supported by Britain and the "old Dominions", no settlement was reached. In 1949 Pakistan again demanded that the question be discussed by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference to be held in April, but this time the British Government declined Pakistan's request. As the main point to be taken up at the Conference was whether India would continue in the Commonwealth, it was essential for Britain to show that she was willing to make concessions to India at the expense of Pakistan.

The concessions, however, did not relate to the northern districts of Kashmir or the roads leading to them for Britain wanted them to remain in Pakistan's possession. From the autumn of 1949 the imperialists had been trying to establish an "anti-communist cordon" in South Asia based on an Indian-Pakistan military and political alliance. Since it was impossible to do this without first settling the Kashmir issue, British Prime Minister Attlee and US President Truman called on the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan to resolve the question through the agency of a "neutral" party. Simultaneously the British press set out to persuade India that the Kashmir question was merely a "matter of prestige" to her while it was vital to Pakistan. However, discussion of the British plans for setting up a "cordon", and of the Kashmir question at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held at Colombo in January 1950 yielded no results.

The position of the United States on the Kashmir question largely coincided with Britain's since both wanted above all to use Kashmir as a military base against the USSR. Karunakaran writes that "it was the feeling of many in India as well elsewhere that 'one of the underlying factors has been the Anglo-American concern about their bases in Pakistan'". At the same time, there was a difference of approach between the two countries. Unlike Britain, the United States would not be satisfied merely with Kashmir's partition between the

British dominions. The United States advanced various proposals, including the "establishment of an international administration in Kashmir", "a plebiscite under the supervision of a UN administrator", and the setting up of an "independent Kashmir" under US guarantee. The United States was in fact taking over the initiative with regard to the Kashmir question since it came to be discussed in the Security Council, seeking to get control of Kashmir for its own ends, first, as a military base spearheaded against the Soviet Union, and secondly, as a means of getting a foothold in that part of the world, ousting Britain.

The imperialists' designs on Kashmir became increasingly clear to its people. Those experienced in diplomacy saw that Kashmir was not a localised issue but one of the "fronts of the cold war" being waged by world imperialism against the USSR and other socialist communist countries. In his conversations with Michael Brecher on Indian foreign policy problems, Krishna Menon said: "Kashmir is a cold war issue; it's part of the desire to forge a ring round the Soviet Union, part of the policy of what is called 'containment'." Menon mentioned Kashmir three times, saying that it was the cold war that made Kashmir an issue.<sup>118</sup>

As mentioned earlier, at the start of the conflict, when the Indian Government was deciding whether to send troops to Kashmir, all national Indian political parties supported the decision, though for different reasons. Most of the Congress party members shared Nehru's view which has been described as follows: "Beyond the strategic importance which geography gives it, Kashmir embodies in Nehru's eyes the secular spirit which he cherishes. That a State with a Muslim majority should cast its ties with India has always seemed to him a refutation of the two-nation theory on which Pakistan was founded."<sup>119</sup> For the leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha the most important thing was to defend the Maharaja of Kashmir, a Hindu, against Muslims. An Indian Socialist leader, R.M. Lohia, publicly stated: "The accession of Jammu and Kashmir state to the Indian Union is the first blow to Pakistan. It is the beginning of Pakistan's end, because Kashmir is a state where 75 per cent of the Muslim population lives, and it elected

to join the Indian Union".<sup>120</sup> To appreciate the ominous undertone of this statement, one should recall that a fortnight before (or a week before Kashmir's accession to India), Lohia had confidently predicted that Pakistan would disappear in the next five years.<sup>121</sup>

When it referred the Kashmir question to the United Nations, the Indian Government got no support from the opposition but was sharply criticised by the CPI, the Socialist Party and the Hindu Mahasabha. The last two noted the weakening of India's foreign policy positions, but drew entirely different conclusions from this. Lohia wanted the Government to declare boldly that under no circumstances there shall be any war with Pakistan. The Hindu Mahasabha, on the other hand, adopted a resolution asserting that the Kashmir issue was a threat to India's freedom and demanding a militarisation of India.

When in 1949 Attlee and Truman suggested that the Kashmir question be settled by arbitration and Nehru rejected it, the Government again was supported by all national Indian parties. The *Organiser*, the semi-official organ of the Hindu Mahasabha, said on September 6, 1949: "Arbitration is no solution of the problem. There can be no arbitration between the burglar and the man whose house has been burgled".<sup>122</sup> Most of the Indian Muslims, who after the partition constituted a minority in all provinces except Kashmir, were also opposed to arbitration. That was why the accession of Kashmir, in which Muslims were a majority, to the Union of India gave the Indian Muslims a certain sense of security.<sup>123</sup> Arbitration was supported only by the pro-Pakistan parties in Kashmir. Prem Nath Bazaz, leader of the Kisan Mazdoor Conference, criticised the Indian Government for rejecting arbitration, reminding it that the Indian delegate to the Security Council, Sen, two years before, on August 8, 1947, insisted on Holland's accepting an International Arbitration Commission "to resolve the Indonesian deadlock".<sup>124</sup>

A sharp political struggle developed in India in 1948-49 over the question of the administration of Kashmir. In the Indian part of Kashmir there was a sort of diarchy, with the power of the absent Maharaja steadily dwindling and with the

Sheikh Abdullah Government gaining strength. Formally, however, the question of government in Kashmir was not decided. The forces of foreign and home reaction joined in the struggle against the democratic aspirations of the people of Kashmir. From the very outset all Western proposals on the Kashmir question advanced in the United Nations included the point about establishing a "neutral rule" in Kashmir, handing government over to an "international administration" and so forth. The Canadian *Montreal Daily Star* said on February 7, 1948: "All the conciliation proposals thus far have concentrated the establishment of a neutral regime to govern Kashmir". Pakistani leaders shared a similar view: "Jinnah did not like the plebiscite idea at all, largely because he was convinced that its result would be determined by Sheikh Abdullah.... Thus Jinnah was not prepared to run the risk of confirming Sheikh Abdullah in power".<sup>125</sup>

As for the Hindu reactionaries—the Hindu Mahasabha and its Jammu branch, the Praja Parishad, and the chauvinists in the Congress party and in the Indian Government—their position was that the Maharaja should remain in power. In 1949, after the reform of the states had been completed throughout India, the Praja Parishad launched a campaign to have the Maharaja appointed *rajpramukh* (a constitutional leader performing the functions of Governor).

Meanwhile Nehru and his supporters in the Congress party and the Government, the Indian Socialists and the greater portion of the public supported Sheikh Abdullah and believed that the National Conference should remain in power in Kashmir in future as well.

In the summer of 1949 the Kashmir National Conference leaders began to urge the Indian Government to take steps to prevent the return of Maharaja Hari Singh to Kashmir. In view of the strong popular opposition in Kashmir to the restoration of the Maharaja's rule and of the state of the international talks on the Kashmir question, Nehru and his supporters took the upper hand in the Government which "advised Hari Singh to voluntarily remain in exile. The Maharaja had no choice but to agree. On June 20, 1949 he appointed his son, Yuvraj Karan Singh, to carry on all functions of the state,





disputed issues between India and Pakistan such as the waters of the irrigation canals in the Indus basin, mutual financial claims, border issues and the situation of religious minorities—the Hindus in Pakistan and the Muslims in India.

The Indus basin comprises the Indus river, its tributaries—the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas, and the Kabul River. The Kabul in its lower reaches runs in Pakistan (the greater part of it is in Afghanistan) and the Beas in India, while the rest of the rivers rise in India and then flow to Pakistan.

The India-Pakistan border cuts across the Indus basin in such a way that India had much less possibilities for irrigating her fields than Pakistan (5 against 21 million acres respectively). Of the total discharge of the rivers in the Indus basin (168 million acre-feet) India received, according to Indian figures, 9 and Pakistan 66 million acre-feet of water. The rest was lost through seepage or wasted for want of dikes and canals. After the boundary had been delimited, the more important head installations of the irrigation canals went to East Punjab, i.e., to the Indian Union. The Indian Independence Act of July 18, 1947, contained no provisions on the supply of water to West Punjab (Pakistan) from East Punjab (the Indian Union). In December 1947 the provincial governments of West and East Punjab concluded an agreement under which they would maintain the *status quo* in water supply until March 31, 1948.

When the term of the agreement had expired and as the authorities of Western Pakistan took no steps to conclude another, on April 1, 1948, East Punjab stopped feeding water into the irrigation canals running to West Punjab. This precipitated a crisis in India-Pakistan relations which continued nearly throughout the month of April. On April 29, the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India exchanged telegrams, as a result of which agreement was reached on holding talks on the issue at the forthcoming Inter-Dominion Conference and the Indian Minister gave orders to resume the supply of water to West Punjab. At the Conference the Indian Union and Pakistan signed, on March 3-4, 1948, an agreement on the waters of the Indus basin.

Notwithstanding the agreement, Pakistan and India continued to clash over the distribution of water from the irrigation canals, blaming each other for being left without water, until a new agreement was signed in 1960.<sup>129</sup>

At India's partition many other issues also had to be settled. They related to the monetary system, distribution of the funds of the Reserve Bank, division of stores at the military depots, and division of the sum of £1,160 million sterling which Britain owed India for the foodstuffs, raw materials and war materials that it obtained from India during World War II. The Indian interim government set up a committee on partition consisting of the Viceroy and four Executive Council members. After August 15, 1947, the committee was reorganised into a Partition Council which consisted of two Cabinet members from each of the Dominions under the chairmanship of the Governor-General of the Union of India, Lord Mountbatten. It was decided that both states would have a common monetary system for the period until March 31, 1948, during which time the Indian state printing house at Nasik would print the notes and the mints at Calcutta and Bombay make the coins for Pakistan. It was also agreed that a sum of 200 million rupees should be made available to Pakistan as a non-repayable subsidy.<sup>130</sup>

In May 1948 representatives of India and Pakistan, meeting at Karachi, signed an agreement on reciprocal deliveries under which Pakistan was to supply raw jute and cotton to mills in India and India was to export iron, steel and coal to Pakistan. The purpose of the agreement was to lessen the adverse economic consequences of the partition which left Indian mills without raw materials as the latter were grown in areas that went to Pakistan. But the agreement did not work because of financial frictions arising from Pakistan's refusal in September 1949 to devalue the Pakistani rupee when Britain and then India and other sterling zone countries devalued their currencies.

A source of acute conflict between India and Pakistan was their mutual claims for refugee property. The cost of Hindu property left behind in Pakistan was estimated at Rs 38,000 million and of Muslim property left behind in the Indian Union at Rs 3,800 million. This conflict, as was the constant tension

between India and Pakistan generally, was aggravated by the presence of numerous groups of refugees who concentrated in towns. In India feeling ran high over the issue. As Das Gupta, an Indian scholar, has noted, "the Indians attach as much importance to it as the Pakistanis do to Kashmir".<sup>131</sup>

An atmosphere of hostility prevailed in the Hindustan Peninsula owing to bitter border disputes. The Indian Union and Pakistan interpreted differently the so-called Radcliffe Award (i. e. the demarcation line in the Punjab set by the British at India's partition in 1947) so that some populated areas and irrigation installations at the western border as well as the border between Kutch (the Indian Union) and Sind (Pakistan) came under dispute. Differences over the border in its northern part (in the Punjab) concerned small areas, the largest of them not exceeding a few thousand hectares, but they had important economic implications because the border as mentioned earlier, cut irrigation systems in two, and thus the dispute over borders involved a struggle for control of the head installations of the systems. A somewhat larger disputed area (3,500 square miles) was a part of the Rann of Kutch, an uninhabited salt marsh east of the mouth of the Indus.<sup>132</sup>

On the eastern border there were petty disputes over the boundary between East Pakistan and the Indian provinces of Assam and West Bengal and the territory of Tripura.<sup>133</sup> The illegal border crossings in the disputed sections and minor border clashes were used by the chauvinist elements to strain relations between India and Pakistan still further.

The situation of religious minority groups in both countries presented a knotty problem. As said earlier, there were massacres of Muslims in the Indian Union which had started at the time of India's division on a religious basis and which continued until January 1948 (massacres of Hindus occurred in Pakistan). In India these massacres were incited by the Hindu Mahasabha, RSS and other Hindu reactionaries. There were also many militant Hindu reactionaries in the Congress party. For instance, P. Tandon, a prominent Congress party figure, said at a rally held in Jubbulpore on the occasion of the first anniversary of independence: "Muslims in India will have to win the confidence of their fellow countrymen and Government

not by words but by deeds. They must stop looking to Pakistan for inspiration and make India's culture their own".<sup>131</sup> Although he did not openly call for suppression of Muslims in India, Tandon's words clearly implied that Muslims were, at best, second-class citizens.

Hindu chauvinists were also found among Congress leaders and in the Government. This can be seen in Patel's speech in the Subjects Committee of the INC Congress at Jaipur in December 1948. He said that India could not allow the flow of refugees from Pakistan to continue and warned that if such conditions were not created as were suitable for the Hindus to live in East Pakistan, then Pakistan must give up some territory for settlement of refugees. There was not a single Hindu or Sikh left in West Pakistan, he continued, while in East Bengal there were still about 15 million Hindus; the Indian Government had assumed the responsibility for settling the refugees from West Pakistan, but the refugees from East Bengal must go back. Patel suggested, threateningly enough, that the only solution that could be found peacefully was that a part of East Pakistan be carved out and handed over to India for rehabilitation of refugees.<sup>135</sup> In the light of this speech, Patel's statement at a mammoth meeting two days later hardly sounded convincing. He said : "It is our determined resolve that we will not allow RSS or any other communal organisation to throw the country back on the path of slavery or disintegration".<sup>136</sup>

Meanwhile Nehru and his supporters in the Government and Congress tried to build a secular state to counteract militant Hinduism and create conditions in India in which different religious communities could coexist peacefully. Krishna Menon, who took this position, told Brecher : "As for this two-nation theory, we never accepted it. We accepted the Partition and Pakistan merely as an *ad hoc* practical arrangement".<sup>137</sup>

One may infer from this that the religious minority groups in Pakistan were in a still more difficult situation. The two-nation theory was a basic principle of the ruling Muslim League, and oppression of the Hindus in Pakistan was made into government policy.

In the disputes between India and Pakistan in 1947-48 over

the situation of the religious minority groups, the matter did not boil down to speeches at rallies and in Parliament or to press polemics. Oppression of religious minority groups caused constant migration (the number of refugees varied) in both directions. And each wave of refugees arriving in India or Pakistan provoked hostile reaction on the part of the majority, sparking off new clashes between religious communities and sending a fresh wave of refugees in the opposite direction.

At the Inter-Dominion Conference held in Calcutta on April 15-18, 1948, India and Pakistan reached the following agreement: "The responsibility for protecting the lives and property of minority communities and for ensuring that they receive justice and that their civic rights are fully safeguarded rests on the Government of the Dominion in which the minorities reside".<sup>138</sup> This agreement, however, like all other talks on the situation of different minorities, eased tensions only temporarily.

It would be hard to find another two countries in the world which had held so many talks and signed so many agreements as the Indian Union and Pakistan did. How did India-Pakistan relations stand by the end of the period under review, i.e., by 1950?

First, it is necessary to point out that Indo-Pakistani relations were largely determined by a unity of the internal political forces in India with respect to Pakistan. Many Congress leaders at that time believed that the partition of India and the existence of Pakistan as a separate state were temporary. This view was reflected in Circular No. 28(a) signed by Shankarrao Deo, General Secretary of the Indian National Congress party, sent to all Congress organisations on July 21, 1947, i.e., before Pakistan came into being. The letter stated: "This separation, we hope and believe, is temporary and short-lived".<sup>139</sup> The resolution of the Congress Working Committee of July 19-20, 1947, said: "The Committee believe that the destiny of India will yet be realised and that, when passions have cooled, a new and stronger unity based on goodwill and cooperation will emerge".<sup>140</sup>

Nor was it the INC alone that supported the theory of Pakistan's "automatic collapse." As said earlier, R.M. Lohia,

an Indian Socialist leader, predicted that Pakistan would disintegrate within five years. As for the Hindu Mahasabha and other militant Hindu organisations, their leaders insisted that Pakistan be "abolished" and the partition "undone as early as possible".<sup>141</sup> General Secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha, A. Laliri, on the second day after Gandhi had been assassinated by a member of that party, urged the Indian Government to disown all the commitments to Pakistan and resume unfettered action against it or to let others form a government.

The only political party that openly opposed the "collapse of Pakistan" theory was the Communist Party of India. The Pakistan question was given much attention by the 2nd CPI Congress in March 1948. The Congress disproved the idea which was spread by some Congress party members that Pakistan was going to collapse, while at the same time refuting the notion held by the Muslim League that "Pakistan was an advance towards the so-called Muslim freedom from Hindu domination".<sup>142</sup> But the leftist sectarian errors made by the CPI with respect to other problems of India and the mass persecution of Indian communists that started soon after the 2nd Congress hindered their fight against the bourgeois views on Pakistan.

Despite serious internal difficulties, Pakistan set about building the country. Her international position became stronger.<sup>143</sup> Since the autumn of 1949 the Indian statesmen and political leaders who had expected Pakistan to collapse began to speak of the Pakistan menace to India. Tara Singh, leader of the Akali, a Sikh party, said in October 1949 that war with Pakistan was in sight. But that can be regarded as a piece of anti-Pakistan demagoguery to which Singh often resorted. It was quite a different matter when Krishna Menon, the former Defence Minister, began to speak about the danger of the possible seizure of India by Pakistan. "My belief", he said, "is that the Pakistani leaders looked upon Pakistan as a first instalment, thinking in terms of the English doctrine 'take what you can and fight for more'. They never seem to have accepted the Partition as final, as we did. Their main approach to the problem was that...India was a Muslim country historically; the British had taken it away from them; now the British

had gone away and it should be handed over to them".<sup>144</sup>

The Hindu and Sikh chauvinists insisted on the militarisation of India, but, despite pressure both inside and outside the Government, Nehru decided to take a major step towards easing tensions in Hindustan. Through the Pakistan High Commissioner in Delhi India offered to sign a joint declaration with Pakistan on renouncing war as a means of settling disputes. In his address to the Indian Parliament on January 31, 1950, Rajendra Prasad, who had just taken the office of the President of the Republic, said that both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan "should make a solemn declaration for the avoidance of war as a method for the settlement of any disputes between them", and that the two sides should resort "to negotiation, mediation, arbitration or reference to some international tribunal in order to settle such disputes".<sup>145</sup> The Pakistan Government declined the proposal, with the result that relations between India and Pakistan became further strained and by 1950 they were worse than when the two young states had just emerged.

### **The Indian Union and the British Commonwealth**

The British ruling circles had hoped that British troops would remain in both India and Pakistan in order to protect British interests there and to help carry out Britain's imperialist plans in that part of the world. When the bill on the transfer of power to India was discussed in the British Parliament in July 1947, Prime Minister Attlee confidently stated that the British Government's jurisdiction over any British armed force remaining on the territory of each of the Dominions could not be affected by the Independence Bill.

But the Indian people did not accept such a situation. The presence of British troops on Indian soil infringed on India's national interests and was resented by the Indian people. The Indian Government succeeded in having the troops withdrawn, and on February 28, 1948, the last of the British military units stationed in India left the country from the port of Bombay. However, many high commanding posts in the Indian armed forces continued to be filled by Englishmen for some years after. A week before the transfer of power took place *The*

*Indian News Chronicle* reported that 16 of the 20 British major-generals and 260 of the 280 brigadier-generals "consented" to continue in service in the Indian and Pakistan armies.

It wounded the Indians' national pride to have Mountbatten, an Englishman, for Governor-General and so it was decided that he should be replaced by Rajagopalachari, an Indian.<sup>146</sup>

The withdrawal of British troops from India and the replacement of an Englishman by an Indian in the office of Governor-General did not of course mean that India had thereby attained full statehood. Nehru wrote as far back as 1936: "... the whole conception of Dominion status seems to me to be an acceptance of the basic fabric of British imperialism".<sup>147</sup> For many years previously the Indian people had rejected Dominion status promised by Britain and fought for full independence. This idea had such wide support in India that the Dominion status granted in 1947 was regarded by all politically-minded Indians as a temporary thing. But if India should reject Dominion status, what should her relations be with Britain?

In 1947-49 a sharp debate was under way in India on whether she should remain in the British Empire (renamed the British Commonwealth of Nations in 1948)<sup>148</sup> or whether it should leave it. Professor Rajan (India) wrote that before World War II there were three main objections to India's maintaining any form of association with the metropolitan country and the Commonwealth. The first objection arose from the widespread belief in India "that Dominion Status under the terms of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, was not equivalent to *Purna Swaraj* or complete independence, which was the goal of the Indian National Congress laid down at the end of December 1929".<sup>149</sup> The second objection of Indian leaders to continued membership in the Commonwealth was that the latter "was an association of nations bound by racial and cultural ties."<sup>150</sup> The third objection was of a "psychological character. Far too many Indians [the leaders of the nationalist movement especially]...retained too fresh and bitter memories of the cruelties, indignities and humiliations suffered by the country as a whole as well as individual Indians under



British rule".<sup>151</sup> Although Professor Rajan, in citing these objections, referred to the period before World War II (evidently out of diplomatic considerations), they fully applied to the postwar period as well.

In a conversation with M Brecher, Krishna Menon said that he had always supported India's continued membership in the Commonwealth. When he was asked whether Nehru had shared that point of view (in 1948), Menon replied: "Sub-consciously, yes...I think it is true that at one time I was the only person who wanted it...."<sup>152</sup> If Menon had influenced to some extent Nehru's decision for India to remain in the Commonwealth, Mountbatten had tried even harder to influence Nehru in that direction.<sup>153</sup> It is safe to say that Mountbatten left India only after he, and thus the British Government, had made sure that India would remain subservient to Britain. As W. Norman Brown, an American Indologist, has pointed out, "severance of relations by India was sure to be a serious blow to the Commonwealth. It would deprive the Commonwealth of nearly two-thirds of its population and a large part of its area, diminish its economic power, and impair its prestige in Asia and the world".<sup>154</sup>

But to explain India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth by the desire of any one individual would be unobjective. G.V. Plekhanov, a prominent figure in the international socialist movement, wrote: "Marx observes that *ideas* 'were worsted' every time they did not coincide with the real economic interests of that social stratum which at the particular time was the bearer of historical progress.... It is only the understanding of those interests that can give the key to understanding the course of historical development."<sup>155</sup>

What, then, were the real economic interests of the Indian bourgeois system with which the idea of India's leaving the Commonwealth failed to coincide?

First of all there was India's strong economic dependence on Britain which could be ended only by drastic measures such as nationalisation of British property in India. But the Indian bourgeoisie could not be expected to carry out such measures. Further, in terms of her currency reserves India was tied to the sterling zone within which Indian foreign trade was mostly

conducted. Lastly, the Indian bourgeoisie pinned its hopes for the country's industrial development largely on the sterling balances. Apart from these economic considerations, there were also military considerations, namely, that the Indian army was equipped with British-made weapons and still depended on Britain for military supplies and personnel training.<sup>156</sup>

The Constituent Assembly session on March 8, 1948, clearly showed how strong the opposition was to India's continued membership in the Commonwealth. Although a general debate on Indian foreign policy had been expected, one of the four points suggested for the agenda, namely, the question of relations with Britain, was moved to first place, the other three problems being relations with Pakistan and the Kashmir question; the situation of Indians in the Union of South America and in other parts of the British Empire; and India's relations with the United Nations. Professor N.G. Ranga, a prominent Congress party member, pointing out that India's relations with Britain were uncertain, called on the Government to issue a statement as soon as possible on the proclamation of India as an independent republic. Another Congress party member, Santhanam, said that the important thing was to establish closer relations with India's neighbours.<sup>157</sup> Kamath, a Socialist, said that India should associate with countries which could be of help to her and suggested that she should try to create a bloc together with the USSR and China. Kunzru, an independent, alone spoke for closer relations with the Anglo-American bloc.

In concluding the debate, Nehru, who felt that the opposition feelings ran high, assured the Assembly that India's future relations with Britain would be decided by the Constituent Assembly. He also said: "Whatever the final decision might be, it is quite certain, I believe, that India would be a completely independent and sovereign republic..." and denied reports that negotiations with Britain were under way.<sup>158</sup>

During the latter half of 1948 the question of India's relations with Britain was carefully studied by the Indian Government. The turning point was reached at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in October 1948 in London, the first to be attended by the Prime Minister of the Indian Union,

at which he discussed with Attlee India's relations with Britain. Nehru later said that he had realised then that "membership in the Commonwealth meant independence plus, not independence minus".<sup>159</sup>

After the decision had been reached at the conference that India should remain in the Commonwealth, there was still a prolonged struggle ahead to overcome opposition to this decision in India. The question of India's continued membership in the Commonwealth was to be brought up at the 55th Congress of the INC at Jaipur in December 1948. When this became known, more than a fortnight before the meeting, Professor Shibbanlal Saksena, a member of the Constituent Assembly and the All India Congress Committee (AICC), proposed the following draft resolution: "This session of the Indian National Congress resolves that India shall have the status of a completely sovereign independent State like America and Russia, and shall sever all links with the British Commonwealth of Nations in accordance with the pledge of *purna swaraj* or complete independence which has been reaffirmed by the nation from year to year since 1929 when the Congress at Lahore defined *swaraj* in Article 1 of the Congress constitution to mean complete independence".<sup>160</sup>

A resolution passed by the Congress Working Committee prior to the Congress indicated that even in that small body consisting of 21 members appointed by the chairman of the Congress party there was strong opposition to India's continued membership in the Commonwealth. The resolution stated that India wished to maintain such relations with other countries as did not hinder her freedom of action and independence and that the Congress would welcome India's free association with the independent nations of the Commonwealth for their common weal and the promotion of world peace.<sup>161</sup>

After being passed by the Working Committee, the resolution was sent on for discussion to the Subjects Committee, a 600-member organisational political body into which, just before the conference, the AICC was transformed. Of this number, 120-150 belonged to the so-called old guard, the leading group which had formed round Gandhi and which had existed for over 30 years, while the rest represented the higher category

of the party membership, being full members (under the party rules endorsed by the AICC in April 1948 there were two other categories, the rank-and-file and the competent). Although the Committee consisted, therefore, of Congress members who were completely devoted to the leadership and well-disciplined, the draft resolution of foreign policy (which included the aforementioned statement on association with the nations of the Commonwealth) was sharply criticised. In spite of the fact that there were 14 different resolutions to discuss, many speakers who took the floor focused attention on the suggestion for India's continued membership in the Commonwealth and proposed amendments of a negative kind. A discussion followed, as a result of which two amendments were withdrawn and the others were rejected by the Committee, and the resolution was passed by a majority of votes.

At the open session on December 18, 1948, attended by almost 4,000 delegates and 200,000 guests, the resolution on foreign policy was to be proposed by G.B. Pant.<sup>162</sup> He told the meeting that India had established contacts with all the countries of the world, something which she could not have done "as long as she was ruled by foreigners". He said that India "did not intend to join any bloc", that on the contrary, "India's object would be to maintain cordial and cooperative relations with all nations", and even suggested the formation of a "Federation of Asia for raising the standard of the oppressed and the weak". He did not say a word about India's membership in the Commonwealth.<sup>163</sup> At that open meeting there could, of course, be no question of a serious discussion of foreign policy principles. The resolution on Indian foreign policy containing the vague phrase about "free association with the independent nations of the Commonwealth" was approved without debate.

Despite their different comments on the decision to remain in the Commonwealth, all Indian newspapers of various leanings, except the *National Herald*, disapproved of it.

Of the opposition parties the Socialist Party was the first to react to the Jaipur resolution. Ten days after the Jaipur Congress, the National Executive of that party adopted a resolution on the question of the Commonwealth of Nations saying that,

not only India should not join any bloc, but steps should be taken to create a "third force" for averting another world war. If the purpose of this resolution was, as it might seem, to register opposition to India's membership in the Commonwealth, its alternative proposal, in effect, weakened this opposition. From statements made by Right-wing Socialist leaders it was clear that they wanted to set up a bloc with the participation of Indonesia, Malaya and other South-East Asian countries. But, as the newspaper *Indian Nation* noted at the time, such a bloc would be too weak to offset the great powers and, moreover, it seemed rather improbable that it could be set up at all as the South-East Asian countries would not ally themselves with India in a bloc which, as the Socialists conceived it, was to be spearheaded against the Soviet Union.

The meeting of the National Congress party at Jaipur, the critical comments of the entire Indian press concerning the decision on the "free association" of India with the Commonwealth nations, the reaction to this decision from one of the opposition parties—all had clearly demonstrated the strong anti-British feelings of the Indian people. It was one thing to have a vaguely worded decision passed by a meeting of the AICC, and quite another to have a treaty on India's membership in the Commonwealth, a treaty that had been signed, ratified. This could be done only if Indian public opinion were persuaded that being in the Commonwealth would not prevent India from pursuing an independent foreign policy and proclaiming herself an independent sovereign republic. While long talks and consultations were held and legal investigations and discussions were conducted for the implementation of the second objective, the international conference on Indonesia which convened in January 1949 at Delhi demonstrated the independent character of Indian foreign policy.

The Indonesian people had been fighting for more than two years against Holland's attempts to restore colonial rule in Indonesia by armed force. In January 1948, with the aid of a "good offices" committee comprising the United States, Australia and Belgium, the young Indonesian Republic was forced to accept the Renville Agreement which, above all, met the interests of the colonialists. However, in less than a year Holland

began to find the agreement unsatisfactory. On the night of December 19, 1948, Holland, breaking the agreement, launched a new war against the Indonesian Republic. Jogjakarta, the capital, was seized by Dutch paratroopers and President Sukarno, Prime Minister Hatta and other members of the Indonesian Government were arrested and interned on a solitary island. Prime Minister of Burma U Nu turned to Nehru with the proposal to call a conference of Asian states in defence of Indonesia.<sup>161</sup> Ten days later, on Nehru's instructions, invitations to attend the conference were sent out.

Nehru's decision on convening the conference was probably influenced by the following considerations : (1) Holland's fresh aggression against the Indonesian Republic had evoked widespread indignation among the Asian peoples. (This can be seen from the fact that most of the countries invited to attend the conference responded promptly and in three weeks' time the conference was convened.)

(2) The fact that India emerged as the initiator of the conference put the Nehru Government in the van of the struggle against the colonialist policies of the Western powers, the more so since for many the memory was still fresh of the moves made by the Soviet Union in 1945-48 in the UN Security Council and elsewhere denouncing the Dutch aggression against Indonesia which was perpetrated with the support of the United States and Britain, and demanding that it be halted at once.

(3) Long-standing cultural and religious ties existed between India and Indonesia.

(4) Nehru had been a friend of Mohammed Hatta, the Prime Minister of the Indonesian Republic, ever since their first meeting at the Oppressed Nations' Congress in 1927 at Brussels.<sup>165</sup>

When the US and British ruling circles began to show anxiety in connection with the proposed Conference on Indonesia the Indian Government issued the following explanation : "The United Kingdom and United States attitude—the initial nervousness was the result of apprehension that after this first meeting the Asian countries might learn to work together in matters of common interest and thus break away from the tutelage of Western powers. The exchange of views with the

governments has secured their general goodwill. Had the conference been designed to discuss or devise something hostile to the United Kingdom we should not have invited Australia and New Zealand".<sup>166</sup>

The Conference on Indonesia took place in Delhi on January 20-23, 1949. It was attended by India, Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, and by observers from Kuomintang China, Nepal, New Zealand and Thailand. At the opening of the Conference, Nehru, in the presence of the diplomatic corps and newsmen, made a short speech saying that the conference should concentrate on the Indonesian problem so as to "supplement the efforts of the Security Council, not to supplant that body".<sup>167</sup> To prepare the draft resolution, the conference set up an editing commission consisting of representatives of India, Australia, Ceylon and Pakistan, all Commonwealth members.

On January 22 the Conference approved the draft resolution submitted to it by the chairman of the Commission, Bajpai, who was Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. The Conference condemned the Dutch aggression and insisted on the release of the arrested members of the Government of the Indonesian Republic and other political prisoners, withdrawal of Dutch troops from Jogjakarta and then from Indonesia at large, transfer of power by January 1, 1950, to the United States of Indonesia and settlement by negotiation of its relations with Holland.<sup>168</sup> The resolution was conveyed at once by cable to the Security Council which showed by its decision of January 28, 1949, how little the Western powers at that time heeded the opinion of the Asian countries expressed in the resolution of the Indonesia Conference. The only point to which the Security Council paid attention was the demand to free the captured members of the Government of the Indonesian Republic. Besides this recommendation, the Security Council envisaged the establishment of a UN mediating commission and made the utterly unrealistic proposal that Indonesia should be granted independence not later than May 1, 1960.

Much of the time at the Conference on Indonesia was taken

up by a discussion, initiated by Nehru, on setting up a permanent organisation of Afro-Asian countries.<sup>169</sup> During the discussion representatives of Australia, Ceylon and Iran said that the invitations to attend the conference had mentioned the Indonesian question alone and that they were not authorised to take decisions on other problems. The delegates from Burma, Syria and Yemen, on the other hand, maintained that their governments would not have agreed to take part in the conference if they had thought that it would not promote co-operation in future on all problems. Most persistent of all was the Philippines representative Brig. Gen. Romulo, who called for the establishment of an "Asian anti-Communist front" and who saw his wish fulfilled six years later when SEATO was set up.

The discussion ended with the adoption of a rather brief and vague resolution which said that "participating Governments *should consult among themselves* in order to explore ways and means of establishing suitable machinery...*for promoting consultation* and cooperation within the framework of the United Nations" (italics mine—Y.N.).<sup>170</sup> Commenting on this resolution, the Delhi correspondent of an American newspaper said: "The only actual Asian bloc today is that which may exist in the minds of Western observers".<sup>171</sup>

The Conference on Indonesia elicited conflicting comments. Lawrence K. Rosinger, an American scholar, expressing the opinion of the US ruling circles (in December 1949 he was appointed head of the US delegation to the India-US conference in Delhi), wrote: "None of the resolutions was as strong as had been expected, and Indonesian hopes that the Conference would call for sanctions and offer aid against the Dutch were not realised. Particularly noteworthy was the absence of any threat of future economic sanctions by the conferees if the Security Council did not act, the vagueness of the resolution proposing future consultation of the nations represented, and the absence of any reference in the resolutions to the desirability of ending Western aid to the Netherlands".<sup>172</sup>

A correct appraisal of the conference was given by V.P. Nikhamin, a Soviet scholar, who said that the conference had contributed to some extent to the recognition of Indonesia's



independence and that it had demonstrated the community of interests of the Asian countries fighting against colonialism. But, he pointed out, as the resolution did not denounce the policies pursued by the colonial powers or show the possibility for Asian countries to take independent action should UN decisions prove ineffectual, the Soviet Union and all progressive forces criticised the conference decisions.<sup>173</sup>

Meanwhile, the numerous meetings in India protesting against aggression in Indonesia, Prime Minister Nehru's sharp denunciation of Holland's action which he described as naked and brazen aggression in a speech on January 3, 1949, the closing of all Indian sea and air ports to Dutch vessels and aircraft from January 1, 1949, and the organisation of an international conference on Indonesia which asked the Security Council to take measures to protect the Indonesian Republic—all this had a strong impact on the Indian people who were convinced that the Indian Government was pursuing a fully independent foreign policy. Even Karunakar Gupta, an Indian scholar, who was rather critical of the conference on Indonesia, wrote: "Whatever might have been the original plans of India in calling the Asian Conference in New Delhi, it had the effect of 'taking the wind out of Russian anti-imperialist sails, by giving leadership to Asian opinion on the subject' as the *Economist* suggested on 5 March, 1949, while achieving a compromise settlement which satisfied the Big colonial powers as well as the moderate elements in control of national leadership in Indonesia".<sup>174</sup>

A month and a half after the Indonesia Conference, during a debate on March 8, 1949, in the Constitutional Assembly on the general budget, Nehru had an opportunity to ascertain how the attitude of the Assembly to India's membership in the Commonwealth had changed. Nehru began his speech by saying that India must play an important role in Asia thanks to its geographical situation, history and for many other reasons and that India was the point where "East and West met".

"Look at the map", he went on. "If you have to consider any question affecting the Middle East, India comes into the picture inevitably; if you have to consider any question concerning

South-East Asia, you cannot do so without India. So also about the Far East...So, even if you think in terms of regional organisations in Asia, you may have to keep in touch with other regions. And whatever regions you may have in mind, India cannot be ignored her important part in Asia".<sup>175</sup> At the end of his speech, Nehru, after noting that one of the resolutions of the Conference on Indonesia called for a study of methods of close collaboration, promised that another conference would be held to look into the possible lines of collaboration.<sup>176</sup> Somewhere in the middle of his speech Nehru referred briefly to India's membership in the Commonwealth. First, he recalled that he had had occasion to inform the Assembly of the Government's general approach to this problem and had gathered that the House agreed with that in spite of "possibly some individual Members not agreeing with it".<sup>177</sup> Then he said that at its Jaipur Session the Congress party had laid down in broad lines the policy on this question to be pursued by the Government.

This speech evoked immediate comments from many Assembly Members. H.V. Kamath, a Socialist, and Brajeshwar Prasad, a Congress party worker from Bihar, were the only ones who spoke against India's membership in the Commonwealth.

The question of India's membership in the Commonwealth was again raised in the Assembly three weeks later, on March 31, 1949, when the bill on additional allocations for the Ministry of External Affairs was discussed. This time, of all the Members who spoke on the question, only one, Sahu, opposed India's membership in the Commonwealth. He recalled that Indians were discriminated against not only in South Africa, but also in Australia, the United States and Canada, and read out a passage from Leo Tolstoi's *Letter to a Hindoo* which read : "...in India and in other countries...the dominant class belongs to an entirely different nation from those oppress-

"It appears especially strange of India, for here we have a people of 200 millions of individuals, highly endowed with spiritual and physical powers, in absolute subjection to a small clique, composed of persons utterly alien in thought and aspira-

tion and altogether inferior to those whom they enslave".<sup>178</sup> The next speaker, Mahavir Tyagi,<sup>179</sup> a prominent member of the Congress party, thought that India should be a member of the Commonwealth but insisted on a clearer definition of the Government's foreign policy. He said : ".....we are claiming every day that we are neither on this bloc nor on that—we are in the middle. Then again there is the talk of our cooperating with the British forces to fight together the Communist menace in the East and so many other things in the Press".<sup>180</sup>

The Assembly debates of March 8 and 31, 1949, showed that opposition (including that from Congress party members) to India's continued membership in the Commonwealth was not so pronounced as it had been a year before. As for the alignment of the internal political forces outside the Assembly, i. e., the "non-parliamentary opposition", the situation was as follows. The more determined opponents of India's membership in the Commonwealth, the Indian Communists, were, because of mass repressive action taken against them in 1948-49, in a semi-illegal position and were unable to exert much influence on Indian public opinion. Early in March 1949 the National Executive of the Socialist Party adopted another resolution which criticised the possible decision that India should remain in the Commonwealth and paid still more attention than before to the proposal about creating a "third force": under the impact of the Conference on Indonesia the Socialists were highly optimistic about the possibility of forming an alliance of Asian countries.<sup>181</sup> As regards other opposition parties, the Muslim League had failed after all to come back as an all-India party, while the Hindu Mahasabha not only had lost its onetime influence but, after resuming its political activities, was wary of attracting too much notice by opposition to the Government.

On April 10, 1949, the question of India's future relations with the Commonwealth was submitted to the Congress Working Committee for discussion. All Committee members were of the opinion that India must be a republic and her Constitution must make no mention of any link with the British Crown. After a five-hour debate, the Committee resolved to ask Nehru

to work out, in consultation with the Congress leadership, a formula of India's membership in the Commonwealth.<sup>182</sup>

During April 21-27, 1949, the annual Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference convened in London. The main point of discussion was India's membership in the Commonwealth. There was much argument about how India's republican status on which Nehru firmly insisted could fit into the monarchic system of Britain, which headed the Commonwealth. The Australian proposal that the British king be designated "King of the Commonwealth" was opposed by India and Canada. The Indians objected also to the proposal to have the President of India formally appointed by the king. Mountbatten suggested the inclusion of the Crown in the Indian flag, but this, too, was rejected. Finally, it was decided that the king be regarded as "symbol of the free association of members".<sup>183</sup> This formula became the basis of a document known as the Declaration of London.

Michael Brecher wrote that "India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth occasioned much surprise both at home and abroad".<sup>181</sup> In fact, it occasioned much more than surprise.

On May 16, 1949, the Declaration of London came up for discussion in the Constituent Assembly. Calling on the Assembly to ratify it, Nehru tried to prove that India would gain by remaining in the Commonwealth. His main argument was : "If we are completely dissociated from the Commonwealth, for the moment we are completely isolated. We cannot remain completely isolated, and so inevitably by stress of circumstances, we have to incline in some direction or other. But that inclination in some direction or other will necessarily be a give-and-take affair. It may be in the nature of alliances, you give something yourself and get something in return. In other words, it may involve commitments, for more than at present..."<sup>185</sup>

The next to speak was Shibbanlal Saksena, a prominent Congress figure. He made the following points : (1) the terms of membership were derogatory to India's dignity and incompatible with her new status, (2) they limited her freedom of action in international affairs and tied her down to the "chariot

wheel of Anglo-American power bloc", (3) India with a population of 350 million out of a total population of about 500 million of the whole of the Commonwealth could not accept the king of England as the Head of the Commonwealth, and (4) India could not become a member of the Commonwealth, many members of which still regarded Indians as an inferior race and enforced colour bar against them. Saksena said that the only recent problem of comparable importance to that under consideration had been that of India's partition, but that the decision on that question was made by the All-India Congress Council, not by the Constituent Assembly. "We know", Saksena continued, "the fruits of the decision that was taken on that occasion have not been very good. I was one of the most bitter opponents of the partition plan. Today also I have to voice my disagreement with my Leader on this London Declaration...."<sup>186</sup>

Later Saksena, speaking on a point of order, explained that his object was to see that the ratification should be deferred and "the country be called upon to give its decision on this momentous issue".<sup>187</sup>

Saksena's amendment was seconded by Congress members Damodar Swarup Seth and Professor K. T. Shah and by Maulana Hasrat Mohani, the poet.<sup>188</sup>

On the other hand, 12 Assembly Members spoke in favour of Nehru's proposal to ratify the London Declaration. Towards the end of the day, on March 17, 1949, it was ratified.<sup>189</sup>

Once the Assembly had ratified the Declaration, it was much easier to have it approved by the Congress party. But when the question was brought up before the Congress Working Committee, Nehru, according to *A Short History of the Indian National Congress*, became "the target of criticism, sometimes even violent, from members of the Working Committee for agreeing to line India with the Commonwealth".<sup>190</sup> A resolution approving of Nehru's actions at the London Conference was, nevertheless, passed. It was to be introduced at the AICC session by Constituent Assembly Chairman Rajendra Prasad and seconded by Pant, who had already helped to pass the resolution on "free association" at the Jaipur meeting.

The session of the AICC convened at Dehra Dun on May 21-22, 1949. The Indian press observed that even Prasad, who introduced the resolution, was not very eloquent in explaining the issue and pleaded expediency as the main justification of India's continued membership in the Commonwealth.

The resolution of the Congress Working Committee was seconded only by Pant, P. Tandon, Govind Das (who at the sitting of the Assembly three days before had supported Nehru, but with the explicit reservation that India must not be involved in war on the side of the Commonwealth), and by President of the Indian National Congress P. Sitaramayya. On the other hand, many at the session spoke against the agreement, criticised its various aspects and introduced amendments.<sup>101</sup> Altogether 54 unofficial resolutions were submitted for the consideration of the AICC.<sup>102</sup>

When all the resolutions had been submitted and B. Das had risen to introduce yet another, Mohanlal Gautam, a Committee member, asked with a note of sarcasm if the Government were prepared to send Nehru to London again to insist on the agreement being altered along the lines mapped out by the Congress party. This caused some embarrassment. The critics realised that all their amendments were just a waste of time. After that it was proposed that the amendments be withdrawn, whereupon the original resolution as drafted by the Working Committee was passed by an overwhelming majority, only five or six raising their hands against it".<sup>103</sup>

On November 26, 1949, the Constituent Assembly adopted the Constitution of the Indian Republic which went into effect on January 26, 1950. It is highly significant that the formula of the British king being a symbol of the unity of the Commonwealth was absent from the text of the Constitution and generally it did not mention India's relation to the Commonwealth.

However, the fact that India actually remained in the Commonwealth was later discussed in Parliament, in the National Congress and in the Indian press many times and on different occasions. Nehru had to defend to the end of his days the decision on India's continued membership in the Commonwealth. Speaking in Parliament on June 12, 1952,

He said: "Being in the Commonwealth means a meeting once twice a year and occasional consultations and references. Surely, that is not too great a price to pay for the advantages we get. If the Commonwealth had the right to interfere with any constituent country, then I should certainly cease to be in the Commonwealth".<sup>194</sup>

Later Professor M.S. Rajan, an Indian scholar, defended the decision by trying to prove that continued membership in the Commonwealth was necessary to India in the economic and military respects, and did not in any way conflict with the policy of non-alignment, for "the Commonwealth is a bridge between the Western bloc and the Communist bloc...."<sup>195</sup> Other Indian authors including Puran Bhatia<sup>196</sup> have also tried to show that being in the Commonwealth is to India's advantage. Dr. B.S.N. Murti, an Indian researcher, who dwells at greater length on the military aspects of the agreement on India's membership in the Commonwealth, writes: "...all the Commonwealth countries believe that collective security is like an insurance scheme to which all must contribute.... schemes for regional defence are required by all countries as a necessary part of the general international scheme of defence [i.e., involving all Commonwealth members—Y.N.]. The problem of the defence of the Commonwealth concerns the security of the communications which link its scattered parts together...." Further on, Murti speaks of broad collaboration and consultation relating to military matters, coordination of strategy, standardisation of armaments and training of the armed forces, and so on.<sup>197</sup> From this it follows that from the military standpoint the British ruling circles were no less interested than the Indian Government was in having India in the Commonwealth.

Further on we shall see how the struggle waged by the Indian people for the consolidation of independence, the mounting antagonisms between the Indian bourgeoisie and the British monopolies and Nehru's foreign policy course prevented India from becoming a docile Commonwealth member subservient to Britain.

## The Indian Union and the United States

In the early days of independence India badly needed financial and technical aid in order to build up her industry and agriculture. The Soviet Union and the United States were the only countries able to render her substantial economic aid. But, the Indian researcher Karunakaran wrote, "it was widely felt that the USSR would not help a non-Communist state. The Government and the industrialists of India realised that they had to turn inevitably to the United States. The spokesmen of the business community even maintained that the Government must formulate their foreign and domestic policies so as to create a favourable climate for the investment of American capital in the country".<sup>198</sup>

Shortly after World War II the United States sought to penetrate into the Indian economy and gain a foothold in the Indian market. Whereas before the war Britain's share in Indian import and export trade was respectively five and three times that of the United States, after the war, in 1947-48, the shares of Britain and the United States in Indian foreign trade were almost equal.<sup>199</sup> The United States had taken this kind of approach to India approximately until the summer of 1948 when it became clear that the American plans with respect to China had failed and the US State Department began feverishly to look for a new base from which to implement its imperialist plans in the East. Along with its economic penetration into India, the United States began to explore the possibilities of using India as a springboard for suppression of the national liberation movement in Asia. In connection with India's request for American loans a special mission sent by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) arrived in Delhi on January 22, 1949, to look into the economic situation in India and assess her paying ability. For six weeks the mission carried out a detailed study of India's economic position. The Indian press reported that the IBRD mission had made the elimination of the "communist danger" in the country a condition of the loan. After the IBRD mission, India was visited by a mission of the International Monetary Fund which also made a study of the Indian economy.



But the United States did not confine itself to examining the economic position of India. In May 1948 President Harry Truman invited Prime Minister Nehru to visit the United States. As was reported in the Indian press, Nehru intended to go to the United States in January 1949, after the Presidential election there was over. But circumstances prevented him from going to the United States in January, and it was only in May 1949 that he told the press that he had accepted President Truman's invitation. What made Nehru first postpone his visit to the United States and then avoid announcing his acceptance of the US President's invitation until May 1949 ?

The real reason, it seems, was not the Presidential election in the United States but the tense struggle that was going on in India at that time over the question of the future status of India. The bulk of the Indian people wanted India to leave the British Commonwealth. The radical press and diverse public organisations again and again pointed out the enormous harm which India's membership in the Commonwealth had done to the country. For example, the Hindi newspaper *Netaji*, published by the Forward Bloc party, said on September 21, 1949, that the Government had decided to devalue the rupee following the devaluation of the pound sterling only because India was a member of the Commonwealth.

In the ruling Congress party, as shown earlier, a struggle was going on between those who wanted India to leave the British Commonwealth, and those who maintained that the current international situation did not allow India to take such a step since separation from Britain would lead to India's isolation and might involve India in other commitments of a more onerous kind.

The struggle for India between the American and the British imperialists resulted in yet another approach whose exponents—business circles in Bombay and, to some extent, in Calcutta—claimed that it would be better for India to leave the British Commonwealth and conclude a military-political alliance with the United States. Such views were expressed, for example, by Professor K.K. Bhattacharyya in an article headlined, "Alliance with US Better than with Britain; Nothing to Gain from Commonwealth", which appeared in the newspaper *Bharat Jyoti*.<sup>200</sup>

Closer relations with the United States were advocated by V. Patel and his supporters in the Government and in the Congress party, as well as by some Socialist Party leaders, Ashoka Mehta in the first place.

Thus, the struggle over the question of India's future status went on within the Indian National Congress and in the Government, and not only among different political parties and other social groups. This is evident also from the cautious description of the situation by K.P. Karunakaran, who wrote : "Even within the Congress Party, which was the predominant element in the Central Government, there was no unanimous agreement on social, political and economic programmes.... The position was still more confusing in the Central Cabinet, where non-Congress Ministers held important portfolios. In regard to India's faith in the United Nations and her association with the Commonwealth, the Deputy Prime Minister's (Patel's—Y.N.) speeches did not show the same degree of vigorous enthusiasm as those of the Prime Minister".<sup>201</sup>

In our view, Nehru, who insisted on India maintaining her ties with Britain, postponed his visit to the United States because he considered that India's position in the Commonwealth should be clearly defined first. That question was to be discussed at the Congress Session at Jaipur, scheduled for December 1948, and thus Nehru's visit was initially postponed to January 1949. But the Jaipur Session had failed to resolve the issue, and Nehru again postponed his visit to the United States, announcing it in May 1949, after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, held in April 1949 in London, had arrived at an acceptable formula for India's continued link with Britain.

In June 1949, an unofficial Indian delegation consisting of Ghanshyamdas Birla, an Indian monopolist and a personal friend of V. Patel, Professor N.G. Ranga, a member of the Congress Working Committee and Constituent Assembly Member, and S.K. Patil, Mayor of Bombay and a prominent Congress figure, set out for the United States. The delegation held talks with President Truman, Secretary of Defence Louis Johnson, Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer, and other high-ranking American officials. The talks concerned such questions as

Indian foreign policy and American aid to Asian countries.<sup>202</sup>

Nehru went on a visit to the United States in early October 1949. He made the trip not merely because others wanted him to, but also because he himself wished to ascertain personally what chance India had of obtaining economic aid from the United States. He, evidently, did not expect to get American aid on the basis of inter-governmental agreements and tried, when in the United States, to get US business circles interested in investing capital in India. This was how the Indian press interpreted the Prime Minister's interview given to the American newspaper *Alliance* on August 21, 1949.

On his way to the United States Nehru stopped for two days in London where he had talks with Attlee. He arrived in the United States on October 11, 1949.

What, exactly, was Nehru's object in visiting the United States? Evidently not wishing to reveal the purpose of his visit, Nehru said at the National Press Club soon after his arrival that he had no business object in mind whatsoever, but that he had wanted to visit the United States for 35 years and had been unable to do so owing to pressure of work. Nehru concluded his speech by saying: "During the tour, I shall go from place to place and form innumerable pictures in my mind..."<sup>203</sup>

Frank Moraes, author of a biography of Nehru, interpreted the purpose of the visit as follows: "Nehru's idea in going to the United States was threefold—to demonstrate India's friendship for America as well as her gratitude for America's sympathy in India's struggle for independence; to learn more about America; and to make Americans more conscious of India as a factor in world affairs".<sup>204</sup> These words refer to the means by which the purpose of the visit was to be achieved without, however, disclosing what the purpose was. Nehru did it himself, in part and somewhat later, when he interrupted his sojourn in the United States for a brief visit to Canada. Speaking at a press conference in Ottawa, the Canadian capital, Nehru said with regard to his visit to the United States and Canada: "First, we would like one million tons of wheat to hold as a reserve to enable us to control the wheat crisis in India. Second, we want technical assistance. Third, we want

financial terms for our purchases in dollar countries, and we want to encourage private capital to be invested in India".<sup>205</sup> Yet another purpose of Nehru's visit, which, though secondary, was nevertheless important, was to secure US support on the Kashmir question. According to the *Indian News Chronicle*, Bajpai, the Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, who accompanied Nehru on his tour, conducted long talks on the Kashmir question in the US State Department on October 12-13, 1949.

In the course of his talks in the United States Nehru had quite a number of obstacles to surmount. Chester Bowles, the US Ambassador to India, wrote that Nehru was, "particularly irritated by the insistent assumption of many Americans, both in and out of public life, that if he was unwilling to accept completely the American analysis of the world situation, he must be pro-communist".<sup>206</sup> Since Nehru came to the United States to get economic aid, he had to overcome his irritation and do his best not to return to India empty-handed. Thus Nehru tried first of all to convince the US ruling circles that India was beginning to play an important part in world politics. He observed in one of his speeches during the tour that "India's pivotal position between Western Asia, South-East Asia and the Far East made it the crossroads of that part of the world...India's role of leadership may not be so welcome to others although it may satisfy our vanity. But it is something which we cannot escape. We cannot escape the various responsibilities that arise out of our geography and history".<sup>207</sup>

Having described in this way India's important role in Asia, Prime Minister Nehru delivered his famous speech at a joint meeting of both chambers of the US Congress. In this speech which is mentioned by nearly all writers on Indian foreign policy who interpret it in different ways, Nehru said: "Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral. What we plead for and endeavour to practise in our own imperfect way is a binding faith in peace and an unfailing endeavour of thought and action to ensure it...Friendship and cooperation between our two countries are, therefore, natural. I stand here to offer both in the pursuit of justice, liberty and peace".<sup>208</sup>

In the United States, where at that time all politicians in their public speeches and all the mass media tried to frighten the American people with talk about "Soviet aggression", Nehru's speech was interpreted as a promise that India would not be neutral should there be war between the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>209</sup> In India, however, the speech was given a different interpretation. The Indian press noted that "what Pandit Nehru meant by the threats to justice and freedom were the threats of imperial domination and discrimination".<sup>210</sup>

As for the attitude of the US ruling circles to the visit of the Indian Prime Minister, the best comment on it came from the American monopolists' magazine *Business Week*, which stated on October 22, 1949: "Prime Minister Nehru of India reached Washington last week just as the Chinese Communists prepared to take over Canton. It was not mere coincidence. It was the inevitability of a complete Nationalist rout in China—and the consequent need to strengthen US ties with India—that led the State Department to arrange for Nehru's American visit some time back".

Nehru and those who accompanied him on his trip held talks with President Truman, State Secretary Acheson and others for four days, but no results were achieved. This was due to a lack of confidence on the part of the American ruling circles in the stability of the internal situation in India, and still more to the fact that Nehru did not want to make any concrete political or military commitments to the United States. Nehru failed to get the US understand India's position in the Kashmir issue. Moreover, as the Indian newspaper *Netaji* observed on October 15, 1949, one of the most essential conditions of American investment in the Indian economy and American aid to the Indian Government was the demand that Kashmir should be handed over to the United States to be turned into a military base spearheaded against the Soviet Union.

Speaking at Columbia University in the presence of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was then its president, Nehru, annoyed by the failure of the talks, said: "The very process of marshalling<sup>211</sup> the world into two hostile camps precipitates the conflict which it is sought to avoid". Further he said: "If all the world takes

sides and talks of war, war becomes almost certain then. I do believe, in accordance with my master's (Mahatma Gandhi's—Y.N.) teaching, that there is another way to meet this situation and solve the problem that faces us".<sup>212</sup>

On November 7, 1949, Nehru left for home. Appraising India-US relations in the subsequent period, Brecher observed that they "cooled after Nehru's unsuccessful bid for large-scale American aid without strings in the autumn of 1949".<sup>213</sup>

An entirely different view of India's relations with the United States was expressed by Chester Bowles, who wrote: "Beginning with his trip to the United States in 1949 and continuing through the many fruitful months Nehru and I worked together, I believe he grew to have a far more sympathetic feeling for America's complicated problems and responsibilities".<sup>214</sup> One hardly needs to prove that this judgement is incorrect. Bowles, in fact, contradicts himself. At the beginning of his book he writes that "...to many Americans Nehru was a troubling enigma. Mr. Truman told me how puzzled he had been by the Indian Prime Minister during his trip to America. Some officials in Washington actually wondered whether he was a Communist sympathiser. Nehru said that we had no understanding of the 'mind and heart of Asia'".<sup>215</sup>

A month after Nehru's return from America, from December 12 to 22, 1949, an Indo-American conference was held in Delhi. It was organised by the Indian Council of World Affairs and the American Institute of Pacific Relations. The conference was intended to be a continuation of the talks between India and the United States begun by Nehru. Just before the conference, the influential *Hindustan Times* said, referring at the start to Nehru's trip to the United States: "...it was neither possible nor desirable to enter into detailed discussion of the ties, political, economic and cultural, binding the two countries. That task has been taken up by the present conference where distinguished educationists from the United States and Indian publicists of standing will be jointly studying and reporting on the lines of development. It is perhaps as an indication of the high importance of economic relation between the two nations that the conference is to be inaugurated by the Industry and

Supply Minister, S.P. Mookerjee".<sup>216</sup>

What did the conference achieve? Evidently it could not alter the results of Nehru's negotiations in the United States. It had been planned and preparations for it started even before Nehru's visit. Had his talks been successful, there would have been an occasion for elaborating on and developing the agreements reached. But after Nehru's unsuccessful trip, the only possible explanation of the conference was that it was convened by inertia. It is, however, of some interest to us as, owing to its semi-official character, both sides made fairly candid statements on policy (mostly that pursued by the other side).

In opening the conference, Kunzru, the head of the Indian delegation and President of the Indian Council of World Affairs, said: "In the sphere of foreign policy, India's position was clear. She pursued an independent policy, but she was bound with ties of sympathy with those nations who believed in the democratic way of life".<sup>217</sup> But in the conclusion of his speech Kunzru, confessing "his inability" to understand fully American foreign policy, said that developments in the Far East showed the "great danger in dividing the world into the two camps".<sup>218</sup> In his speech at the conference the leader of the Hindu religious-communal reactionaries, S.P. Mookerjee said: "The USA won her independence after a revolution against a Power which also ruled over India for more than a century and a half...The American people, however, never allowed their country to be partitioned".<sup>219</sup> This is the most interesting part of Mookerjee's speech. By this Mookerjee showed that he was interested most of all in American aid in establishing "Akhand Hindustan". When the newspaper *National Herald*, which was close to Nehru, said after the first day of the conference that it had "come close on the heels of Pandit Nehru's visit to the United States".<sup>220</sup> it sounded like an admission of its utter futility.

On the sixth day of the conference the American Orientalist Lawrence Rosinger introduced a draft report summing up the results of the discussion on the principal problems. The part which is of the most interest to us is, naturally, the summary of the foreign policy discussion which said: "Most of the

Indian speakers defended 'the middle course' policy. Many declared, however, that it did not mean neutrality but independence, or suggested that in the event of a world war India would canvass the situation and adopt a positive policy".<sup>221</sup> We also find in the summary that an Indian delegate (unfortunately the records of the conference do not mention the names of the speakers) declared—and his statement sounded like a protest—that "in economic matters the United States had used the United Nations as an instrument of its own policy or, where it was unable to do so, had created its own agency". To this "some American delegates" haughtily replied that "countries making the largest contributions to international organisations naturally want their money to be used for purposes with which they sympathise".<sup>222</sup>

By and large, the 1949 India-America Conference had no impact on the state of relations between India and the United States.

How did India's internal political forces regard India's relations with the United States? Before answering this question I should like to quote K.P. Karunakaran, who says that in India, "as in most other countries, public opinion followed rather than led the Government in the formulation of its foreign policy".<sup>223</sup> This may be true in the case of isolated foreign policy moves, but not in the case of long-term problems such as the Kashmir question, membership in the Commonwealth and so on.

The Indian public, Karunakaran observes, could be expected to pay much attention to India's relations with the United States after Nehru's visit to that country. That, however, did not happen. Before Nehru's visit the question of India's relations with the United States had been a subject of tense, if rather covert, struggle within the Indian Government, but after his return no great interest in India's relations with the United States was observable. When Nehru reported to the Congress Working Committee about his trip to the United States (at a sitting held on November 16-17, 1942), there were no questions or discussions.<sup>224</sup>

This loss of interest in the question of India's relations with the United States was, in our view, due to the following factors.



First, Nehru made his trip after the question of India's continued membership in the British Commonwealth had been settled; this means that maintaining relations with the United States no longer presented an alternative to maintaining the old link with Britain. Secondly, the majority of the Indian bourgeoisie wanted to have American aid without making commitments that might jeopardise India's independence. Thirdly, as no agreement had been reached with the United States, those of the Indian upper bourgeoisie who would cooperate with US monopolies even at the price of altering Indian foreign policy could do nothing except resign themselves to the situation, for some time at least.

Because of Nehru's failure to obtain American aid without military or political strings and because of the general foreign policy line of the United States which was directed at that time at suppressing the national liberation movement in Asia and preparing for another world war, by 1950 relations between India and the United States had deteriorated.

## NOTES

1. *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, Calcutta, January 6, 1948.
2. *The Indian and Pakistan Yearbook and Who's Who*, 1949, p. 768.
3. Birla wrote that after the assassination of Gandhi (on January 30, 1948), which put an end to their 32-year-long friendship, Patel had taken Gandhi's place in his constant correspondence. (G.D. Birla, *In the Shadow of the Mahatma. A Personal Memoir*, Calcutta, 1953, p. 328.)
4. From 1935 to 1941 S. Chetty was Dewan (Prime Minister) to the Maharaja of Cochin, a large principality, and in 1945, he was Constitutional Adviser to the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes (*The Indian Yearbook*, 1945-46, p. 1079).
5. John Matthai retired from Government Service and joined Tata Sons Ltd. in 1940. In 1944 he was appointed Director of the company and continued in this post until his appointment to the office of Minister (*The Indian and Pakistan Yearbook and Who's Who*, 1949, p. 768).

6. *The Indian Yearbook*, 1945-46, p. 1140.
7. Balraj Madhok, *Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee. A Biography*, Deepak Prakashan, New Delhi, 1954, p. 22.
8. Hiren Mukerjee, *The Gentle Colossus. A Study of Jawaharlal Nehru*, Calcutta, 1964, p. 223.
9. *ibid.*, p. 181.
10. George N. Patterson, *Peking Versus Delhi*, Faber and Faber, London, 1963, p. 71.
11. *ibid.*, p. 68.
12. Michael Brecher, *India and World Politics. Krishna Menon's View of the World*, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, New York, Washington, London, 1968, p. 22.
13. George N. Patterson, *op. cit.*, p. 68.
14. *ibid.*
15. *Cf.* the *Bharat Times*, January 20, 1948.
16. From 1937 to 1943 Ayyangar was Prime Minister to Hari Singh, Maharaja of Kashmir, one of the Indian princes most hated by the people, and earlier he was a high-ranking official in the Indian Civil Service (*Indian and Pakistan Yearbook*, 1949, p. 689).
17. A member of the Round Table Conferences in London in 1930-32, a member of the Governor-General's Executive Council in 1942-46 (*ibid.*, p. 686). The fact that he was a leader of the Scheduled Castes Federation, i.e., "minority representative", did not change matters. There was another representative of the "untouchables in the government." Jagjivan Ram, who was Labour Minister and one of Nehru's closest associates. From 1936 to 1946 Ram was President of another organisation of the "untouchables" 'the All India Depressed Classes League' and a political opponent of Ambedkar (*ibid.*, p. 800).
18. Michael Brecher, *op. cit.*, p. 569.
19. *ibid.*, p. 568.
20. *Cf.* S.V. Bharathi, *Can Indira Accept this Challenge?*, Bombay, 1966, p. 485.
21. *The Indian and Pakistan Yearbook*, 1949, p. 690.
22. A ceremonial gathering at which an Indian prince received pledges of fealty from his subjects.
23. George N. Patterson, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.
24. Michael Brecher, *India and World Politics. Krishna Menon's View of the World*, p. 263.
25. *ibid.*, p. 264.

26. *The Indian and Pakistan Yearbook*, 1949, p. 76.
27. *ibid.*, p. 469.
28. K.P. Karunakaran, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
29. T F. Deviatkina, *Indiiski natsionalui kongress (1947-1964)*, (*Indian National Congress (1947-1964)*), Moscow, 1970, p. 183.
30. A great number—hundreds of thousands.
31. *The Times of India*, February 2, 1948.
32. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-209.
33. *The Indian and Pakistan Year Book & Who's Who*, 1949, p. 509.
34. *ibid.*
35. *The Indian Year Book*, 1945-46, p. 888.
36. A Muslim League session in April 1940 in Lahore adopted a resolution containing a demand to separate Muslim districts from India and establish Pakistan as a separate state.
37. In 1946 Munshi rejoined the Congress party (*Indian and Pakistan Year-book*, 1949, p. 779).
38. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *op. cit.*, p. 217.
39. Ashutosh Lahiri, General Secretary of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, issued a statement on January 19, 1948, saying that Gandhi's policy towards the Muslims was "suicidal". He stated: "The net result of the fast has been a weakening of the Hindu front and strengthening of the Pakistan Government". (*The Statesman*, January 22, 1948.)
40. Balraj Madhok, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
41. Gobind Sahai, an Indian political figure, and at one time Chief Parliamentary Secretary of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly, wrote: "It would be foolish to say that Gandhiji's murder was the act of an individual. On the contrary, it was in fact the logical result of a system of thought and an attitude of mind which the hot-headed gospel of communal hatred and continuous preaching of violence and retaliation had created in the country." (Govind Sahai, *R.S.S. Ideology, Technique and Propaganda*, New Delhi, 1956, p. 6.)
42. During three months following Gandhi's murder, more than 15,000 RSS members and several hundred Hindu Mahasabha members were arrested.
43. Madhok Balraj, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
44. *The Indian and Pakistan Year Book*, 1949, p. 497.
45. An article in *The Hindustan Times*, entitled "Socialists and Communists Exploiting National Crisis. Danger from the Left", was

clearly aimed at directing the public's attention to the political forces on the Right. (*The Hindustan Times*, February 5, 1948.)

46. *The Indian and Pakistan Year Book*, 1949, p. 521.
47. *ibid.*, p. 525.
48. *ibid.*, p. 524.
49. J. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, Delhi, 1961, pp. 2-3.
50. George N. Patterson, op. cit., p. 77.
51. Hiren Mukerjee, op. cit., pp. 182-183.
52. K.P. Karunakaran, op. cit., p. 6.
53. *ibid.*, p. 27.
54. V.P. Nikhamin, *Ocherki vneshnei politiki Indii, 1947-1957 (Essays on India's Foreign Policy, 1947-1957)*, Moscow 1959, pp. 33-34.
55. The official "Indian delegation" to the San Francisco Conference was appointed by the British administration (the delegation's secretary and military adviser were both English). The National Congress party sent an unofficial delegation of its own which consisted of V.L. Pandit and B. Shiva Rao who acted outside the conference framework.
56. See *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, by the Indian researcher G.H. Jansen. (Faber and Faber, London, 1966, pp. 42-43.)
57. George H. Jansen, op. cit., p. 43.
58. Subsequently it was decided to invite also representatives of the governments of the participating countries who were to attend the conference as observers. As it turned out, many delegations to the conference, held in March 1947, were composed of official representatives of the participating countries. The Indian delegation, for example, included six interim government members.
59. George H. Jansen, op. cit., p. 48.
60. *ibid.*, pp. 48-49. (Also see Indian Council of World Affairs: *Asian Relations : Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference*, New Delhi, 1948, p. 4.)
61. *ibid.*, p. 49.
62. A vivid illustration of this is what went on at the Simla Conference (May 1946) held by the British Cabinet mission with representatives of the Congress party and the Muslim League.
63. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 251.
64. *The Hindu*, October 1, 1946.
65. *India and the Soviet Union. A Symposium*. Ed. by V.V. Balabushevich, People's Publishing House, Delhi, Ahmedabad, Bombay, 1969, p. 64.

144. M. Brecher, *India and World Politics*, p. 197.
145. *Congress Bulletin*. Issued by the Office of the All India Congress Committee, No. 1, January-February, 1950, p. 23.
146. In his biography of Mountbatten, Alden Hatch writes that in order to win the Indians' sympathy Mountbatten, during his six months as Viceroy of India entertained 7,605 guests at dinner, 8,313 at supper and 95,287 at garden parties, i.e., he entertained over that time altogether 41,205 persons.
147. M. Brecher, *Nehru : A Political Biography*, p. 414.
148. The Brookings Institution, a US organisation for the study of international relations, observed that in British official documents the word "Empire" was avoided in order to save the Conservatives, the word "dominion" was sparingly employed because it carried a connotation of dependent status and even the designation "British" in connection with the Commonwealth was officially avoided (*Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1950-1951*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1950, pp. 202-203).
149. M.S. Rajan, *The Post-War Transformation of the Commonwealth*, Asia Publishing House, New York, 1963, p. 7.
150. *ibid.*, pp. 14-15.
151. *ibid.*, p. 20.
152. M. Brecher, *India and World Politics*, p. 20.
153. M. Brecher, *Nehru : A Political Biography*, p. 570.
154. W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India and Pakistan*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, p. 242.
155. G. Plekhanov (N. Beltov), *The Development of the Monist View of History*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 122.
156. Professor Mukerjee writes that the only argument for the decision to remain in the Commonwealth that made any sense was "that it was sensible not to break away from a familiar association when 'no binding factor or inhibition accompanies it'. The more material arguments were usually left unsaid..." (H. Mukerjee, op. cit., p. 201).
157. *The Hindustan Times*, March 9, 1948.
158. *ibid.*
159. M. Brecher, *Nehru : A Political Biography*, p. 415.
160. *The Hindustan Times*, December 1, 1948. A singular way out, to prevent Congress from deciding on India's continued membership in the Commonwealth, was suggested by the *Indian News Chronicle*. It wrote that Congress should be dissolved in accordance with Gandhi's "Testament to the Nation".

161. *The Hindu*, December 13, 1948.
162. A member of the Congress Working Committee since 1931; at the time the Chief Minister of the United Provinces. (*The Indian and Pakistan Year Book and Who's Who 1949*, p. 789.)
163. *The Hindustan Times*, December 19, 1948, p. 15.
164. G.H. Jansen, op. cit., p. 88.
165. During the Dutch air and sea blockade of the Indonesian Republic, Hatta secretly came to India in one of the Indian aircrafts that ran the blockade, as a crew member under the name of 'Abdullah' (*ibid.*, p. 85).
166. *ibid.*, p. 87.
167. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Before and After Independence*, The Indian Printing Works, New Delhi, p. 491.
168. G.H. Jansen, op. cit., pp. 408-411.
169. G.H. Jansen says that Nehru, being a proud man, resented Anglo-American pressure aimed at preventing the establishment of an organisation of the Asian countries, and therefore returned to his old idea (*ibid.*, p. 92).
170. G.H. Jansen, op. cit., p. 411.
171. *ibid.*, p. 95.
172. L.K. Rosinger, *India and the United States : Political and Economic Relations*, The MacMillan Company, New York, 1950, p. 99.
173. V.P. Nikhamin, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
174. Karunakar Gupta, *Indian Foreign Policy. In Defence of National Interest*, The World Press Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1956, p. 43.
175. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates. Official Reports*, Vol. II, No. 9, Part II, 1949, p. 1227.
176. *Constituent Assembly*, p. 1233.
177. Nehru had in mind the foreign policy debate a year before, on March 8, 1948 (see pp. 70-71).
178. L.N. Tolstoi, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Complete Works), Vol. 37, Moscow, 1956, p. 246.
179. M. Tyagi was arrested 11 times by the colonial authorities and spent his entire youth in prison; during religious communal clashes in 1946-47 he organised a volunteer detachment known among the people as "Tyagi police" and defended the Muslim minority (*Indian Parliament : 1952-57*, Edited by Trilochan Singh, Arunam & Sheel, New Delhi, 1957, p. 298).
180. *Constituent Assembly*, Vol. III, No. 11, Part II, p. 2182.

181. According to the newspaper *Assam Tribune*, a month later, at a meeting of the Indian Council of World Affairs at Gauhati, Lohia suggested the immediate introduction of common citizenship for the peoples of India, Burma, Nepal and Ceylon.
182. *The National Herald*, April 11, 1949.
183. Brecher, *Nehru. A Political Biography*, p. 417.
184. *ibid.*, p. 579.
185. *Constituent Assembly Debates*, Vol. VIII, No. 1, pp. 9-10.
186. *Constituent Assembly*, p. 11.
187. *ibid.*, pp. 14-15.
188. *ibid.*, p. 27, No. 2, pp. 42, 48.
189. *ibid.*, pp. 71, 72.
190. M.V. Ramana Rao, *A Short History of the Indian National Congress*, S. Chand & Co. Delhi, Jullundur, Lucknow, 1959, pp. 266-267. On this occasion the AICC held a secret meeting at which the participants discussed the work of the Government and coordination between the party and different administrative bodies (*ibid.*).
191. *Congress Bulletin. Issued by the Office of the All India Congress Committee*, 1949, No. 4, pp. 24-25.
192. *ibid.*, p. 9.
193. *ibid.*, p. 27.
194. *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches. 1949-1953*, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi, 1954, p. 220.
195. M.S. Rajan, *The Post-War Transformation of the Commonwealth*, Asia Publishing House, New York, 1963, p. 45.
196. Puran Batria, *India's Foreign Policy*, Nath Publishing House, Raja Mandi, Agra, 1965.
197. B.S.N. Murti, *India in the Commonwealth*, Beacon Inform. & Publications, Delhi, 1953, pp. 51-52.
198. K.P. Karunakaran, *India in World Affairs. August 1947-January 1950*. Oxford University Press, London, 1952, pp. 43-44.
199. A.M. Dyakov, *India vo vremya i posle vtoroi mirovoi voini (1939-1949) (India During and After World War II, 1939-1949)*, Moscow, 1952, p. 145.
200. *A Contemporary History of India*, Ed. V.V. Balabushevich, A.M. Dyakov, People's Publishing House, 1964, pp. 510-511.
201. K.P. Karunakaran, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
202. On returning from USA, Ranga launched a campaign in India for

establishing a Pacific alliance with the participation of Kuomintang China, South Korea and Philippines (*ibid.*).

203. F. Moraes, *op. cit.*, p. 472.

204. *ibid.*

205. K.P. Karunakaran, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

206. Chester Bowles, *Ambassador's Report*, Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1954, p. 113.

207. M. Brecher, *India's Foreign Policy. An Interpretation*, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1957. p. 29.

208. J. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*. Sel. Speeches, Sept. 1946-Apr. 1961, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi, 1961, pp. 591-592.

209. K.P. Karunakaran, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

210. *ibid.*

211. A punning allusion to the Marshall Plan which was aimed at establishing American domination over postwar Western Europe and turning it into a base of US aggression against the USSR and the people's democracies.

212. Chester Bowles, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

213. M. Brecher, *Nehru : A Political Biography*, p. 487.

214. C. Bowles, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

215. *ibid.*, p. 3.

216. *The Hindustan Times* (Weekly), December 11, 1949.

217. It should be recalled that a year and a half before, during a foreign policy debate in the Constituent Assembly on March 8, 1948, Kunzru, an Independent Member, said that the policy conducted previously was "unrealistic" and insisted on closer relations with the Anglo-American bloc whose members, he said, recognised India's fundamental interests including defence.

218. *The Hindustan Times*, Dec. 13, 1949.

219. *ibid.*

220. *National Herald*, Dec. 15, 1949.

221. *Indian-American Relations. Proceedings of the India-America Conference held in New Delhi in December 1949*. Oxford University Press, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, London, 1950, p. 4.

222. *ibid.*, p. 6,

223. K.P. Karunakaran, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

224. Congress Bulletin, issued by the Office of the All India Congress Committee, 1949, No. 7, p. 4.



## India's Foreign Policy in the early years of the Republic (1950-1953)

### India and the Chinese People's Republic

IN THE late 40's and early 50's the struggle between the forces of world reaction and the forces of progress was sharply exacerbated. Along with military-political measures in Europe, the major one being the establishment of the North Atlantic bloc, the imperialist powers, headed by the United States, launched a fresh offensive in Asia in efforts to stop the growth of world socialism, of the international workers' and national liberation movements. Now they not only supplied weapons to the most reactionary regimes but committed open acts of aggression against newly independent young states and stepped up their efforts to organise a military bloc in the Pacific area.

Even at the time of Nehru's visit to the United States in October 1949 it became clear to the Indian Government that in exchange for economic aid India was expected to assume military-political obligations. Somewhat later, in 1950, when India asked the United States to sell her some weapons, it followed from the reply of State Secretary Acheson that "the items to be provided by the Government of the United States of America are required by the Government of India to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defence or permit it to participate in the defence of the area of which it is a part..."<sup>1</sup>

This change in the policy of the imperialist powers, the further upsurge of national liberation movement in Asia and the proclamation of the independent Republic of India made the Indian ruling circles reconsider their approach to problems of foreign policy. The beginning of such reappraisal can be seen in Nehru's statement on July 7, 1950, when he said : "... our economic policy is obviously tied to England and other Western powers", but "political policy is another matter..."<sup>2</sup>

A most important foreign policy problem which the Indian Government had to tackle at the end of 1949 was the question of India's relations with China.

After the proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic on October 1, 1949, Premier of the State Administrative Council Chou En-lai, through foreign embassies accredited with the Kuomintang government, suggested the establishment of diplomatic relations. Prime Minister Nehru's reply arrived two days later. It "was couched in very friendly terms, indicating that there would be early recognition and exchange of representatives".<sup>3</sup>

There was no difference of opinion among the Indian leaders as to the necessity of recognising the new China; there was a difference of opinion only about its timing. The more conservative members of the Congress leadership, including C. Rajagopalachari who was then the Governor-General, and Vallabhbhai Patel, were of the opinion that one should go slow in the matter. They were supported in this attitude by a powerful section of the Civil Service, including some of the senior officials of the Foreign Office. K. M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to Kuomintang China, expressed the view that India should recognise the new regime in China when the Kuomintang authority on the mainland of China ceased to function, and Nehru agreed with this view. Britain, Panikkar writes, also agreed with this view and it was decided that the Indian Government's recognition of the new Government of China should be conveyed to Peking by the end of the year.<sup>4</sup>

India was one of the first non-socialist states to recognise (on December 30, 1949) the Chinese People's Republic.<sup>5</sup>

The decision of the Indian Government to recognise

People's China was approved by the session of the All India Congress Committee in February 1950.

On March 22, 1950, the Governments of India and the Chinese People's Republic agreed to establish full diplomatic relations. From then on the Indian Government began to support the demands to grant China representation in international bodies, the United Nations above all. This idea was voiced more than once by Nehru and other official Indian representatives.<sup>6</sup>

Nehru tried to convince Britain, the United States and other Western countries that India's policy on the recognition and international support of new China was quite correct. When attending the regular Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in January 1951, in a radio address Nehru spoke of a great nation, China, "having been reborn and conscious of her new strength" but further on deplored the manner in which China sometimes acted.<sup>7</sup>

If Nehru succeeded to some extent in convincing the British Government, his efforts to secure understanding from the US ruling circles proved utterly hopeless. The American Indologist Norman Brown, naming eight points on which the United States and India differed in 1947-1952, places high on the list China's admittance to the United Nations and problems associated with it.<sup>8</sup> As Chester Bowles writes in his memoirs, his many conversations with Nehru about the "Communist menace" to world peace yield no results. And although Nehru knew China better than most Americans, having many sources of information, he remained convinced that "there is some middle way" and therefore "it is in the broader area of communism in world politics and the Cold War that the differences between Nehru and his American critics become sharpest".<sup>9</sup>

India's position on the Tibet question which was a serious trial for India-China relations did not improve matters.<sup>10</sup>

When in July 1949 the Tibetan authorities expelled the Kuomintang mission from Lhasa and proclaimed the "independence of Tibet", it provoked a sharp reaction from Peking which declared that it all had been done at the instance of the British and American imperialists and their "stooge", the Indian Nehru Government, so as to undermine the Central

Chinese Government's sovereignty over Tibet. The Tibetan delegate to the preparatory committee of the New Political Consultative Conference of China said in Peking in September 1949 : "We want the British, American and Indian aggressors promptly to cease all plots for encroaching on Tibet. They will receive due punishment if they dare to give provocation on Tibetan territory".<sup>11</sup>

This accusation was just only with respect to Britain and the United States. An official British spokesman told the United Press agency that if China attempted to force her rule on Tibet, Tibet could seek British intervention.<sup>12</sup> A few weeks after the expulsion of the Kuomintang mission from Lhasa an American radio commentator, Lowell Thomas, arrived there with a letter for the Dalai Lama from President Truman. The contents of the letter were not published. According to *The New York Times*, the State Department discussed the recognition of the independence of and military aid for Tibet.<sup>13</sup> Later, in 1950, the British High Commissioner's Office in Delhi kept from April to June the Hongkong entrance visas of the Tibetan delegation travelling through India to China for talks, and on June 5, 1950, the delegation were notified that their visas had been annulled.

At the same time the Indian Government would not aid imperialist aggression against the Chinese People's Republic using Tibetan territory. The "position of inaction" subsequently drew criticism of Nehru from the Right. The well-known Indian journalist F. Moraes wrote : "No reasonable person or government expected India to go to war with China over Tibet in 1950 or in 1959. But by refraining from recognising Tibet as a sovereign, independent state between 1947 and 1949, at a time when neither the Chinese Communists nor the Nationalists [i. e., the Kuomintang—Y. N.] could have effectively intervened, India lost the opportunity of bringing Tibet into the forum of independent nations and simultaneously of ensuring the existence of a buffer state between herself and China".<sup>14</sup>

It seems to us that the very essence of Nehru's approach to the Tibet question was disclosed by Krishna Menon in the following words : "There was at no time any doubt that Tibet

could not remain independent in the context of world politics. The only hope for Tibet was to be independent autonomous territory in an independent China. Our conversations with the Chinese were on these lines".<sup>15</sup> The Indian Government was for a peaceful settlement of relations between Tibet and China and for Tibet having the autonomous status that it had enjoyed for decades before.

On October 25, 1950, the Chinese People's Liberation Army was ordered to enter Eastern Tibet and it was announced over Peking radio that the "liberation of Tibet" had started. On the following day Ambassador Panikkar, instructed by the Indian Government, lodged a protest with the Government of the Chinese People's Republic. In its reply the latter "practically accused India of having been influenced by the imperialists..."<sup>16</sup> On October 31 another Indian note was presented expressing "deep regret" at China's actions to which the Chinese Government replied on November 17, 1950, that Tibet was an integral part of Chinese territory and its relations with the Central Government were a purely domestic affair.<sup>17</sup>

Panikkar writes that Indian Deputy Prime Minister V. Patel made "an unfriendly speech". There was also some support in the External Affairs Ministry for the view that "India should act vigorously to protect Tibet" and "knowing the attitude of some of the officials" Panikkar "was nervous that the Government might take some hasty step".<sup>18</sup>

Despite the outcry raised by the Indian press, the aforementioned general approach of the Indian Government to the Tibet question prevailed. When the Tibetan authorities turned to Delhi asking it to propose the question for consideration by the United Nations, they received no support. When the question was discussed in the General Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on the initiative of Salvador—of the United States in effect—Indian representative Jam Saheb, pointing out that the Chinese advance had stopped after the capture of Chamdo, 480 kilometres from Lhasa, objected to the inclusion of the complaint in the agenda to give them time to settle the conflict peacefully, for such a settlement might ensure Tibet's autonomy. As a result, the complaint was ruled out.<sup>19</sup>

The Nehru government's position of non-interference in the

affairs of Tibet displeased the leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Socialist Party. In an interview given to the newspaper *Pioneer*, N.B. Khare, President of the Hindu Mahasabha, warned the Government about possible "Communist infiltration" into India in view of the developments in the neighbouring countries.

The National Council of the Socialist Party declared in November 1950 in its resolution on Tibet that the Chinese invasion of Tibet was an act against Asia and the world, the Tibetan people and India. The resolution urged the Indian Government to bring pressure to bear on the Chinese Government in order to achieve such a settlement as would enable the people of Tibet to choose the form of their administration and association with the rest of the world by a free vote or plebiscite. The resolution called on the Indian people to help the people of Tibet to remain independent.

The Indian Government's policy towards China was one of the central points during the foreign policy debate in Parliament on December 6-7, 1950. Opening the debate, Nehru said that his Government had brought it to the notice of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic that India had no territorial or political claims in Tibet and was concerned solely about its continued autonomy under China's suzerainty and continued cultural and trade relations with India. Nehru also spoke of the diplomatic steps taken by the Government to help settle relations between China and Tibet.<sup>20</sup>

The Indian reactionaries used the events in Tibet as a pretext for a concentrated attack on the policy of India's non-participation in military blocs.

The first to take the floor in the discussion was a reactionary member of the Congress Working Committee, Professor Ranga, who started by saying that non-alignment had already resulted in one of the blocs branding the Indians as "reactionaries" and "warmongers". He further said that the peace in the situation was "risky" and "slippery" and claimed that "this peace can be made sound, strong and stable only when we are in a position to make ourselves strong strategically as well as industrially..."<sup>21</sup> In the end he came up with what was his customary conclusion, that the only way for India was alliance

with the United States. The ideological leader of the Hindu religious community S.P. Mookerjee declared, in connection with India's appeals to China to work for a specific settlement of relations with Tibet, that the policy was "like the old story of the operation being fully successful and the patient succumbing..."<sup>22</sup>

Acharya Kripalani, the former Congress President, urged the Government to take heed of the information supplied by an Indian ex-diplomat that there was only one bloc in the world [allegedly the "Soviet bloc"—Y.N.] and sharply criticised the Government whose "advocacy of China for the membership of the UNO" he found "was premature".<sup>23</sup> The ex-diplomat referred to, M.R. Masani,<sup>24</sup> also took the floor and began giving reasons for his "discovery" of there being only one bloc. There were 429 votes taken in the United Nations recently, he said, and on all those occasions "the Soviet *bloc* voted solidly behind Russia" while the countries of the Commonwealth voted solidly together only on 101 occasions, disagreeing with Britain and among themselves on 328 occasions. Thus, he said, "in only 23 per cent of the cases did the British Commonwealth behave like what may be called a *bloc*".<sup>25</sup> Some speakers in the debate, however, expressed directly opposite points of view. Gautam, a Congress party member, held that Tibet should be turned into a "buffer state" and that to ensure India's non-participation in blocs she should leave the Commonwealth.<sup>26</sup> Congress party member Brajeshwar Prasad spoke in support of friendly relations with China and even suggested the establishment of a "Delhi-Peking-Moscow Axis" as a means of safeguarding peace.<sup>27</sup>

Replying to the Members' speeches, Nehru said that in its correspondence with the Chinese Government, India invariably laid stress on China's suzerainty, not sovereignty, over Tibet and on the latter's autonomy. In connection with Gautam's proposal that Tibet should be made a "buffer state" Nehru gave the House to understand that it was beyond India's possibilities and rights to do so. As a result of the debate, K.T. Shah withdrew his amendment stating that the policy towards China had failed and Parliament approved the Government's foreign policy.

As some students of Indian foreign policy observe, "the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 cast a dark shadow over Indo-Chinese relations for a brief period, but Panikkar assisted greatly in restoring friendly relations".<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, the Chinese leaders began to demonstrate their wish to strengthen friendship with India. On January 1, 1951, a barter agreement was signed on supplying India, which was suffering from food shortages at the time, with 50,000 tons of Chinese rice in exchange for 36,000 bales of Indian jute. Whether he was influenced by these circumstances or it was his sober appraisal of the international situation at a time when American aggression in Korea threatened the whole of the Asian continent with war, or perhaps owing to both, Nehru decided to let the "Tibetan Question" alone for the future, and the Indian Parliament, on the whole, agreed with him. During the debate in Parliament on March 28, 1951, only one Member, Dr. P.U. Singh, mentioned the "Tibetan Question".<sup>29</sup>

Simultaneously the Indian Government took steps to strengthen India's political and strategic positions in the Himalayas. On December 5, 1950, she concluded with Sikkim a protectorate treaty whereby India assumed responsibility for Sikkim's defence, foreign relations and communications. On July 31, 1950, India signed a treaty with Nepal stipulating, among other things, the obligation of the parties to inform each other of serious frictions with "any neighbour countries" which might affect the friendly relations between India and Nepal. India also began to pay heed to the defence of the small state of Bhutan with which it had already signed a treaty on August 8, 1949, whereby Bhutan agreed to be guided by India's advice in foreign relations.<sup>30</sup>

Meanwhile Chinese troops resumed their movement towards Lhasa, and in Peking on May 23, 1951, representatives of the Tibetan authorities and the Central Chinese Government signed an agreement whereby the latter undertook to honour the autonomy of Tibet and the Dalai Lama's status as the spiritual and secular ruler of Tibet whereas the Tibetan authorities recognised Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and the Central Government's responsibility for Tibet's defence and foreign relations. After the signing of the agreement India recognised



Chinese sovereignty over Tibet as a gesture of goodwill, thus writing *finis* to her difference with China over Tibet in 1950-1951.

After the "Tibetan Question" was closed, in its policy towards China the Indian Government showed that it appreciated the need to recognise the appearance of a common border between India and China and did much to build up friendly relations with the Chinese People's Republic. One of India's more significant actions in this direction was its criticism of the draft "peace treaty" with Japan prepared by the United States and its refusal to take part in the conference convened to discuss the draft treaty in September 1951 in San Francisco and to sign the treaty. One of the reasons for the Indian Government's action was the fact that the treaty failed to stipulate that Taiwan was to be returned to the Chinese People's Republic.<sup>31</sup>

Indo-Chinese relations were definitely improved by the fact that the Chinese Government offered, in 1952, to sell India—which still suffered from great food shortages—100,000 tons of rice. As R.A. Kidwai, Minister of Food and Agriculture, said in reply to a question asked in Parliament on June 5, 1952, this offer was "deeply appreciated".<sup>32</sup>

The Nehru Government's policy towards China in 1951-1953 was generally supported by the ruling National Congress party. Commenting in an article on the resolution on the Government's foreign policy adopted by a session of the All India Congress Committee held in September 1952 at Indore, *The Times of India* observer writing under the pen-name of "Vivek" expressed anxiety that the author of the resolution and the AICC members who had endorsed it did not realise what a danger it was for China to become India's northern neighbour.<sup>32</sup> Of the all-India opposition parties, the Communist Party of India in that period constantly advocated better relations with the Chinese People's Republic. The Jana Sangh party took a dual attitude. On the one hand, its leaders regretted "Tibet's disappearance"; on the other, they derided "those who would want us to quarrel—and even go to war—with China, over the issue of Tibet".<sup>34</sup>

The only Indian political party which consistently criticised Nehru's policy towards the Chinese People's Republic was the

Praja-Socialist Party, formed as a result of the merger in September 1952 of the Socialist Party and the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party founded by former Congress party member Krishna-lani, in the spring of 1951, from a faction which had broken away from Congress. R.M. Lohia, a leader of the Praja-Socialist Party, did not object to diplomatic relations with the Chinese People's Republic but from 1951 on kept criticising the Government for its attempts "to purchase a shaky friendship" with China.<sup>35</sup>

In considering the attitude of Indian public opinion towards the Chinese People's Republic, two different trends were quite evident in 1951-53. On the one hand the Indians showed a lively interest in the measures being introduced in China to consolidate her independence, restore the economy and promote national culture. The Indian press gave considerable coverage to the first Chinese Cultural Delegation which arrived in India at the invitation of the Government on October 28, 1951. The delegation included 15 distinguished representatives of the Chinese scientific and artistic world and was headed by Ting Si-ling, Deputy Minister of Cultural Affairs of the Chinese People's Republic. Reports and comments on the delegation's tour of India were printed by the all-India bourgeois newspapers *The Hindustan Times*, *The Times of India*, the *Indian News Chronicle*, the Madras newspaper *The Hindu*, etc.<sup>36</sup>

On the other hand, the same newspapers—*The Hindustan Times* in particular in its long editorial on November 24, 1951—sought to belittle the successes achieved by the Chinese people in the first years after the victorious people's revolution and arouse apprehension at the appearance across the Indian frontier of a neighbour as strong as China. A few days after the agreement between the Tibetan authorities and the Central Chinese Government had been signed in May 1951, *The Times of India* wrote in an editorial: "Tibet's frontiers run some 2,000 miles along the borders of India, and Delhi is therefore vitally interested in the preservation of peace and stability in that region... Delhi would do well to negotiate for the continuance of the demilitarisation of the Indo-Tibetan border, and the right to free commerce between the two countries".<sup>37</sup> The *Free Press Journal* expressed, in September 1951, its anxiety

in connection with reports about Chinese troops having come to the Indo-Tibetan border and about the notable advances China was making to Nepal.<sup>38</sup>

The Indians' concern on account of possible complications in their relations with the northern neighbour was increased by the fact that after Tibet's accession to China there still remained some outstanding problems associated with it. In November 1953 the *National Herald* wrote in an editorial: "India does not want any new privileges for herself, but during the debate that followed the entry of Chinese troops into Tibet recently the question of India's existing trade agreements with the Tibetan authorities came inevitably to the fore".<sup>39</sup>

At the very end of the period under review, on December 31, 1953, Indo-Chinese negotiations were to start in Peking. The previous week Nehru had stated that the talks to be held at Peking had no relation to any other problems except those in regard to Tibetan trade and pilgrimage; there was nothing to discuss about the Indo-Tibetan border as the McMahon Line was there, and it was not an issue to be discussed.<sup>40</sup>

The above-mentioned statement of the influential *National Herald* and the statement of Prime Minister Nehru predetermined in the main India's position in the Indo-Chinese talks to be held. It will be discussed in the next chapter.

### India and the Korean War

The Korean war which started on June 25, 1950, was one of the issues which caused a tense political struggle in India (as well as abroad) while the gradual change in India's attitude to this war had a great impact on the evolution of the entire foreign policy line of the Indian Government.

When on June 25, 1950, the Security Council considered the "breach of the peace" in Korea, Indian representative B.N. Rau, on the instructions of his Government,<sup>41</sup> voted for the American draft resolution which laid the blame on the Korean People's Democratic Republic. The resolution was passed by nine votes with one abstention, the Soviet representative not attending the meetings of the Security Council at that time in protest against the non-recognition of the rights of the Chinese People's Republic in the United Nations.

Krishna Menon subsequently explained the report Nehru had received from the Chairman of the UN Korean Commission<sup>42</sup> had influenced Nehru's position.

On June 27, 1950, the Security Council adopted the second draft resolution proposed by the United States recommending that all members of the United Nations should furnish such assistance to South Korea "as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area". This resolution was adopted by seven votes, Yugoslavia voting against it. The Soviet representative was absent again, and the representatives of India and Egypt did not vote, having received no instructions from their Governments. However, the next day the Indian Government announced that it had decided to support the second resolution of the Security Council as well.<sup>43</sup>

This resolution was known to enable the US imperialists to mask their intervention in Korea under the flag of the United Nations. But, in spite of the fact that this resolution was subsequently accepted by 53 countries, only 15 countries agreed to take part in the war, many of them nominally. Of the Afro-Asian countries only the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Ethiopia and Chiang Kai-shek China gave military assistance to South Korea. As for India, Prime Minister Nehru said on July 3, 1950, that his country could not give any military support to South Korea.

President of the Republic Rajendra Prasad declared in his message to the Indian Parliament on July 31, 1950 : "My Government are deeply concerned over the present conflict in Korea. India supported the first two resolutions of the Security Council".<sup>44</sup> On August 4, 1950, the Indian Parliament expressed its approval of the Government's policy towards Korea.

In the first month and a half or two months after the war in Korea had started, all Indian bourgeois parties and newspapers, convinced that the war was due to "aggression from the North", supported this position of the Indian Government. They also believed that this position would help improve India's relations with the United States and other Western powers."

One might ask, why did India after agreeing with the

Security Council resolutions, take no part in "UN action" in Korea, sending none of its troops there? As a matter of fact, a strong popular protest movement against the imperialist intervention in Korea started in India even then. On July 4, 1950, 10 thousand people attended a Bombay meeting of solidarity with Korean people and of protest against US action. At the 8th Socialist Party congress in Madras, when the draft resolution, prepared by its foreign policy commission, regretting "the failure of the Government of India to adopt a positive policy in the recent Korean developments" was presented, 16 amendments were moved criticising UN and US action in Korea. Although the resolution was passed, over a third of the delegates voted against it.<sup>45</sup> On July 12, 1950, a 7,000-strong demonstration was staged in Bombay protesting against US aggression in Korea. Many other similar examples could be quoted. The anti-war feelings of the Indian people were bound to influence the Indian Government. As for Nehru's promise on July 29, 1950, to assist the UN forces in Korea by sending drugs and a group of surgeons, it was regarded as a humane mission.<sup>46</sup>

At the same time the Indian ruling circles were concerned lest the Korean war should spread from a local conflict into a big war. On July 13, 1950, Nehru sent messages to the Soviet and American governments, stating that India's aim was "to localise the conflict and assist the speedy, peaceful settlement" and suggesting that the United States, the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic with the assistance of other states "find a basis for the cessation of the conflict for a final solution of the Korean problem". Nehru stressed that it was necessary for the People's Government of China to have its representative in the Security Council so that the USSR could return to it. The Soviet Government replied at once, supporting Nehru's view on the desirability of achieving a peaceful settlement in Korea with the obligatory participation of People's Government of China.<sup>47</sup> The United States rejected Nehru's proposal, claiming that the question of China's membership of the Security Council had nothing to do with the Korean problem.

Nehru's messages were acclaimed by all of the Indian public except for the Right-wing Socialist leaders and pro-imperialist

groupings. One must stress that these messages, just as the previous decision of the Indian Government to recognise the Chinese People's Republic, were significant evidence of India's increasingly independent role in world politics.

The war crimes committed by American troops in Korea increased the Indians' loathing for US imperialism. *The New York Times* wrote in the middle of August 1950 : "Anti-United States feeling in India never has been so widespread as it is now. With every day of the Korean war bringing more news of bombed cities and flaming villages, the unpopularity of the United States is growing".<sup>48</sup> Soon Nehru spoke at a press conference denouncing American mass bombings in Korea<sup>49</sup> and ten days later the *National Herald* wrote : "The bombs which the Americans are dropping on South Korean towns may one day be dropped on New Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta ...The real reason why the USA is taking a keen interest in Korea lies in its determination to keep a bridgehead on the mainland of Asia in the Far East".<sup>50</sup>

Anti-United States in feeling India intensified still further after the United States had ignored Nehru's warning, voiced by him at a press conference in Delhi on September 30, 1950, that the "UN forces", which had approached the 38th parallel in the course of their offensive begun with an amphibious landing at Inchon, should not cross the 38th parallel to avoid the spreading of the war. Simultaneously the Indian Government conveyed to the United States and Britain the warning of People's Government of China made through Indian Ambassador in Peking Panikkar that in the event of American invasion of North Korea the Chinese People's Republic would be forced to intervene in the war.<sup>51</sup> The United States disregarded Nehru's advice and early in October 1950 American interventionists invaded North Korea.

M. Brecher wrote that "its flagrant disregard of India's advice" "strengthened the suspicion of America's motives" in Korea among the Indians<sup>52</sup> while Chester Bowles considered that it was as a result of it "that the first serious dispute began" between India and the USA.<sup>53</sup> When the President of India told Parliament on November 14, 1950, that the conflict in Korea has already brought tremendous destruction to that country and

its people and a like fate would befall many countries if war spreads," it presented a striking contrast with his evaluation of developments in Korea on July 31, 1950.

The subsequent development of events in Korea increased the Indians' anxiety still further. US President Truman reacted to the defeat of American troops in Korea by stating on December 1, 1950, that he was considering dropping an atom bomb on Korea. This atomic blackmail caused anxiety not only in India and other Asian countries, but also among America's allies who began to fear lest the Korean war should grow into another world war.<sup>51</sup>

As the Indian people became increasingly aware of the danger that the American aggression in Korea presented to Asian and world peace, mass pressure on the Indian Government mounted and, as a result of it, the Government's attitude to the Korean conflict underwent a change. An interesting admission was made in Parliament on December 7, 1950, by a prominent Congress party member from the state of Rajasthan, Raj Bahadur, who said: "We have seen that during the last two or three months, and even as late as just a fortnight ago there was a volume of opposition in our country against the foreign policy pursued by the Government. But events of the last fortnight have silenced that opposition".<sup>55</sup> Although R. Bahadur did not name the opposition, it may be understood that he meant the opposition from the Left which had been "silenced" after the statements of the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic denouncing the US action in Korea. As for the opposition from the Right, it, on the contrary, literally went the limit during the debates in Parliament on December 6-7 in which Bahadur took the floor.

Right at the beginning of the debate Naziruddin Ahmad, Member from West Bengal, rose to amend the draft resolution on the approval of the Government's policy. His amendment was that "...the Government of India should adopt fully the line of action followed by the UNO".<sup>56</sup> On the following day Frank Anthony proposed that the Government should declare its determination "...to resist any form of communist aggression...."<sup>57</sup> Kripalani criticised Nehru for thinking that the Americans could be stopped at the 38th parallel and blaming

them for talking in terms of using the atom bomb. He interpreted Nehru's proposal on the restoration of the rights of China in the United Nations as being something that Russia would have wanted India to do.<sup>58</sup> Member of the permanent advisory committees of the Defence and External Affairs ministries Kunzru argued that India's refusal to form military units "to help the United Nations" clashed with the spirit of Article 43 of the UN Charter which India had approved and was bound to obey.<sup>59</sup>

These debates demonstrated once again that the Right-wing opposition in the Indian Parliament was strong not because of its own resources but because of the support it enjoyed in the Government and among the leaders of the Congress party. Thus M. Masani, who was fervently pro-American, suggested that "India's foreign policy should have two pillars. One should be a hundred per cent and unstinted support of the United Nations and their decisions" (Masani cited the statement on it made on November 18, 1950, by P. Tandon, elected Congress President on August 23, 1950) and the other should be her national interests which "dictate that this country needs food, needs economic assistance from countries that can supply it". At this point Masani quoted Patel's words: "The American Ambassador recently declared in Bombay that America was desirous of helping India...."<sup>60</sup>

Nehru gave a very accurate description of the mood of the Right-wing Members during the debate when he said: "...some Members thought that we were having a discussion about communism, or that this House had suddenly become an Anti-Communist conference or congress...." He rejected Anthony's amendment that the Government should "resist any form of communist aggression" saying that he was going "to resist every type of aggression, communist or other, whatever it may be". But, he said, "still forces are compelling them in a direction which may end in war. And the whole problem today is how to prevent that".<sup>61</sup> Finally, the House voted against N. Ahmad's amendment that the Government "should adopt fully the line of action followed by the UNO", and the rest were withdrawn by their authors.

On December 5, 1950, a meaningful event took place in New



York: the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations was formed. It is noteworthy that it was American and British diplomats concerned over the defeats suffered by the "UN forces" in Korea who were instrumental in convening the first meeting of representatives of 13 Afro-Asian nations. The acknowledged "father" of the Afro-Asian group, B.N.Rau, India's permanent representative in the United Nations, mentions in his memoirs that at the end of November and beginning of December 1950 permanent representatives of Britain and the United States, Gladwyn Jebb and Ernest Gross, repeatedly urged the Afro-Asian countries to ask China to desist from allowing her troops to carry their counter-offensive below the 38th parallel.<sup>59</sup> On December 11 a meeting of the group of Afro-Asian countries reached agreement on two draft resolutions. The first was the resolution of 13 countries on establishing a "Committee of Three" (B.N. Rau, the Iranian representative, Entezam, and the Canadian representative, Lester Pearson) to determine the basis on which a ceasefire in Korea could be arranged. The second was the resolution of 12 countries (this time without the Philippines) to have representatives of a number of countries (meaning the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, China, India and Egypt) work out recommendations for a peaceful settlement of the problems existing in the Far East. On December 12 the draft resolutions were conveyed to the Chairman of the General Assembly Session. Subsequently, after some preliminary probing which revealed the Western powers' negative attitude to the second resolution, its authors decided not to insist on having it put to the vote. The first resolution was passed on December 14 by 55 votes with 5 socialist countries voting against and one abstention (Chiang Kai-shek China). On January 3, 1951, however, the Indian delegate reported to the General Assembly that the "Committee of Three" had made no progress because of the stand taken by China.

What was behind those efforts of the British and American diplomatic service? Even before the facts about the above-mentioned US and British initiative became known from B.N. Rau's private papers, Soviet scholar V.P. Nikhamin accurately summed up the gist of the Afro-Asian countries' resolution as

follows : "They were calling for a ceasefire just when the interventionists suffered defeat, stipulating no withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea which gave the aggressor a chance to gain time for redeployment and reinforcement of his troops". [italics mine—Y.N.].<sup>63</sup>

Jansen is of the opinion that in setting up the Afro-Asian group in the UNO, B.N. Rau was guided also by personal motives. Lacking the proper support from Nehru, B.N. Rau thought that "an initiative taken in concert with other Afro-Asian countries would be more likely to gain the approval of New Delhi than one taken by him alone".<sup>64</sup> The newly-emerged Afro-Asian group in the United Nations subsequently—up to 1955—played a significant role in the struggle going on in the United Nations. It promoted the solidarity of the Asian and African countries in the face of colonialism and firmly established in international practice the principles which were to become known as the policy of non-alignment.

In January 1951 the United States presented to the Political Committee of the General Assembly a draft resolution labelling the Chinese People's Republic an aggressor in Korea and simultaneously calling on the Chairman of the General Assembly session to have the conflict settled peacefully through his good offices. The Indian delegate, objecting to this resolution, said that its second part was hypocritical.<sup>65</sup> On January 24 the American resolution was denounced by Nehru in an address delivered over all-India radio. The very next day the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations postponed the consideration of the question of food aid for India until the entire question of US-India relations had been considered by the subcommittee. Even the British and American bourgeois press regarded this decision as a brutal attempt to force the Indian Government to support the US policy.

But using hunger as a means of blackmail did not help the American imperialists. When a roll-call vote was taken in the UN on January 30, 1951, on the resolution declaring the Chinese People's Republic an aggressor, India voted against it together with the USSR, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Ukraine and Burma.

Nehru's statement in April 1951, had tremendous

repercussions in India and abroad. Talking to Norman Cousins, editor of the *Saturday Review of Literature*, he said that the UN had been created as an instrument for peace but now its spiritual effectiveness was growing less. "If its peace structure is changed", Nehru added, "and it becomes an instrument for war, then it does not function as the UN but as something else which may really not be necessary".<sup>66</sup> At the end of May 1951 India abstained from voting in the United Nations on the resolution recommending that members apply an embargo on material against the People's Republic of China and refused to keep units in its armed forces to be used on the recommendation of the Security Council or General Assembly, stating that the Indian Army was intended solely for the purposes of defence and included no expeditionary forces for service overseas.

During the first half of 1951 popular support of the Indian Government increased. Among other things, it was evident from the fact that during the debate, in March 1951, in the Indian Parliament on the general budget not a single Member ventured to criticise the Government's policy on the Korean problem. Furthermore, on the grounds that time had confirmed that India was right in warning of the danger of the crossing of the 38th parallel by the Americans and in demanding a peaceful settlement of relations with China and her admission to the United Nations, Professor S.N. Mishra stated "...last year was indeed a year of great achievements and great decisions by our Foreign Minister in the sphere of international politics".<sup>67</sup> It was highly significant that even R M. Lohia, a Socialist Party leader and persistent critic of Nehru's foreign policy, expressed his approval of India's stand during the vote taken on the American resolution for imposing a blockade on China. The change in his attitude was due to intensified criticism inside the party of its leaders' pro-American policies.

On June 23, 1951, Y.A. Malik, Soviet representative in the UN, proposed in a radio address that discussions should be started between the belligerents for a ceasefire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel. His proposal opened the way to talks. They started on July 8, 1951, at Kaesong and were continued at

Panmunjom, but it took 24 more months before an armistice in Korea was finally concluded.

Peace supporters in India, whose movement was gaining momentum, demanded that the Indian Government continue its steps for the establishment of peace in Korea and also that it become more consistent in its foreign policy, withdrawing, among other things, the Indian military medical unit from Korea. On June 11-12, 1952, a foreign policy debate took place in the House of the People of the Indian Parliament. It was the first debate of its kind to be held in the Parliament elected at the first general election in late 1951-early 1952. The Indian National Congress won 364 of the 488 seats, or 74.6 per cent of the seats, in the House of the People, 20 opposition parties and independent candidates winning 126 seats. With the emergence of a strong opposition in Parliament, foreign policy debates acquired a new significance.

Firstly, the Communist group, which consisted of 26 Members, took part in a foreign policy discussion for the first time. This fact appreciably altered the usual course of the discussions, so that the approval of the Government's foreign policy was not the smooth sailing it had been even after strong attacks on the Government by the Right-wing opposition, somewhat small in number, in the Constituent Assembly (and subsequently in the Interim Parliament, as the Assembly was renamed after the proclamation of the Republic of India on January 26, 1950).

Secondly, the Government's foreign policy was now criticised by other opposition parties as well. The latter, for demagogic reasons, picked on India's being in the Commonwealth, the subject of widespread indignation among the Indians. Such criticisms were made by a noted Socialist Party figure, Sucheta Kripalani,<sup>68</sup> by S.P. Mookerjee, leader of the Jana Sangh party, and others.

Thirdly, representatives of the Right-wing pro-imperialist forces did not dare as before to insist that the Indian Government give full support to "UN action" in Korea. They criticised the Government for its efforts to restore peace in the Far East, allegedly to the detriment of its own affairs.

Fourthly, in connection with such criticism Nehru strove,

more vigorously than ever, to prove the independence of India's foreign policy. In his answering speech during the debate, after owning that the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force depended on Western powers for military supplies, he, at the same time, said: "Our association with the Commonwealth is remarkable in that it does not bind us down in any way whatsoever and... it has not done so during the last two or three years either. It has given us certain advantages without our having to accept any liabilities in return".<sup>69</sup> Nehru stated further: "We have never recognised the Government of South Korea... Nevertheless, because we are members of the United Nations and the United Nations is functioning in South Korea, what happens there is a matter of concern to us. The recent developments connected with the activities of President Syngman Rhee are not only very remarkable but, I think, should make the United Nations and every country connected with it think of the undesirability of any kind of association with a person like President Rhee. To support the regime of President Rhee is to support the very things which the United Nations is supposed to stand against".<sup>70</sup>

The debate wound up with a vote on the amendment moved by T K. Chaudhuri, a Revolutionary Socialist Party Member,<sup>71</sup> who proposed that the allocations for the Ministry of External Affairs be reduced from Rs 55 million to a token figure of Rs 100, i.e., that the Ministry be deprived of funds as an expression of disapproval of the Government's foreign policy. The amendment was supported by 73 votes cast by opposition Members while 296 votes were cast against it by Members representing the Indian National Congress.

The vote showed the Congress Government that for different reasons its policy failed to satisfy, either the Right-wing or the Left-wing opposition and that it provoked a corresponding public reaction.

How attentively the Indian public followed developments in Korea is seen, for instance, from the fact that on June 24, 1952, all the Indian newspapers carried reports about the American bomber raid (in which 500 bomber planes took part) on hydroelectric stations on the Yalu River. Two days later, the *National Herald* came out with an editorial denouncing the

raid, in which it stated : "... whatever it may have been, it is time that the United Nations ended American domination and unilateral American decisions to which it has submitted itself so long".<sup>72</sup> On July 28, 1952, Venkataram, a Congress party member, addressed a question in Parliament to the Government concerning these air bombings. Replying to the question, Nehru said that the Indian Government wanted these operations to stop, adding : "...Any possible extension of these military operations might imperil world peace".<sup>73</sup>

India's changed attitude to the Korean war was convincing evidence of the evolution of its Government's foreign policy. The principal factors to which this process was due were as follows : the diminished influence of the British ruling circles on Indian politics after the establishment of the Republic; the mounting general democratic movement of the Indian people, including the movement in defence of peace; a weakening of the positions of the Right in the Indian Government and Congress after the death of V. Patel in December 1950 and the consolidation of Nehru's position; and the dwindling prestige of the United States as its real attitude towards the Asian peoples in general and the Indians in particular was increasingly revealed.<sup>74</sup>

As a result, the Indian Government's foreign policy, which at the beginning of the period under review could be described as neutralist, albeit with a certain Westward bias, was becoming more consistent, ridding itself of this bias. It was a significant feature of this process that after about the middle of 1952 the attitude of the Government and the National Congress party to the movement of peace supporters began to change. Whereas previously the participation of Congress party members in this movement was, at best, not encouraged, in 1952 a Congress veteran, Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew, who had been prominent in the anti-imperialist movement in the Punjab in 1919,<sup>75</sup> was elected Chairman of the All-India Peace Council.

In September 1952 the 3rd All-India Peace Congress convened at Jullundur, in the Punjab. It demanded : the recall of the Indian medical mission from Korea; no recruitment of Gurkhas into the British army and no lifting of French troops to Vietnam via Indian airfields and ports; an end to the

colonial wars in Malaya and Vietnam; observance of international treaties by the US Government; full sovereignty for the Japanese people.

The concern felt by the Indian people about peace which was threatened by the continuing Korean war was also evident from what took place at the meeting of the Congress Working Committee, held in September 1952. After the usual expression of approval of the Government's activities the meeting's resolution on foreign policy went on to say: "The Committee would especially urge that every effort be made to conclude a truce in Korea and thus prepare the way to a peaceful settlement in the Far East".<sup>76</sup>

Peaceful settlement in Korea was the main question before the session of the UN General Assembly which convened in the autumn of 1952. By that time the United Nations already had a draft agreement on a truce in Korea consisting of 62 articles of which only two, concerning prisoners of war in Korea, had not been agreed upon. At the Session draft resolutions on this point were proposed by 21 countries headed by the United States, as well as by the USSR, Mexico, Peru, Canada, Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan and Israel. On November 17, 1952, the Indian delegation proposed that the exchange of prisoners of war should be put under the supervision of a neutral nations' commission so that the question of those not repatriated within a definite time should be decided by the General Assembly. At first the United States objected to the Indian proposal but then decided to support it. K. Menon put it down to the fact that he had secured support from British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden thus breaking "the unity of the Western group".<sup>77</sup>

On December 3, 1952, the plenary meeting of the General Assembly approved the Indian resolution by 53 votes against five, with one abstention. When this resolution was conveyed by the session chairman to the Governments of the Chinese People's Republic and the Korean People's Democratic Republic, they rejected it, but subsequently, at the end of March 1953, said they would like to resume the talks on the basis of the resolution, making efforts to overcome whatever shortcomings there were.

India deserves much credit for its efforts to secure a peaceful settlement in Korea and recognition of the fact that the Indian draft resolution formed the basis of the agreement on the prisoners of war which made it possible to lead the talks on Korea out of an impasse. At the same time, this draft had certain shortcomings which took the progressive forces a few more months of struggle to overcome.

At the end of January 1953 the situation in the Far East worsened again after President Eisenhower's declaration about the so-called "deneutralisation" of Taiwan by withdrawing the 7th Fleet from Formosa Strait. It was regarded in the whole world including India, as encouragement given to the Chiang Kai-shek Government to commit aggression against mainland China so as to extend the war.<sup>1</sup>

The Indian President's message to Parliament on February 11, 1953, said: "Certain statements recently made and the consequences that might flow from them in extending the war in Korea, have caused considerable apprehension in the minds of people all over the world. My Government has viewed these developments with grave concern."<sup>78</sup> This criticism not directed at anybody caused the Indian public to reprove the Government. On February 13, when the President's message was discussed in the upper chamber of the Indian Parliament, the Council of States, the Communist group introduced an amendment to the draft resolution which stated that the Council regretted that the message did not propose any concrete steps to be taken in order to prevent the extension of the war in the first place to the Chinese People's Republic and eventually to the whole of Asia and even to the whole world which, in effect, was the object behind the recent political decisions made by the Government of the United States of America.

Some Members spoke about not angering America. R.K. Mookerji said: "Well, I think that since we want to be at peace with all the nations of the world, there is no reason why we should cultivate an attitude of coldness or indifference towards USA. As the Five Year Plan shows, we still depend upon foreign aid in carrying through some of our development plans." He then recalled that US Ambassador Chester Bowles had stated in an article in *The Foreign Affairs* that the withdrawal



of American aid would seriously jeopardise the success of some of the Indian Five Year Plans.<sup>79</sup> In reply, Socialist Member M.P.N. Sinha called attention to American penetration in India and asked: "Why has America suddenly become so solicitous of our well-being? We all know that Americans are out to get markets. That is the main purpose."<sup>80</sup>

Indian opinion was so outraged by Eisenhower's decision that Nehru, on February 18, 1953, made a speech in Parliament in which he pointed out that the decision made by the US President with respect to the Far East had caused grave concern not only in India, but also in many other countries of the world and that talk about a blockade of China and other similar steps were not conducive to peace and settlement. In this speech Nehru, alluding to General Eisenhower said "... somebody once said—I think it was a French statesman—that even war was too serious a thing to be handed over to a soldier to control, much less peace".<sup>81</sup>

And so, at the end of March 1953 China and North Korea suggested that talks on the armistice in Korea be resumed and put forward some proposals which became known as the "Eight-Point Proposals". Speaking in Parliament on May 15, 1953, Nehru hailed these proposals and noted their similarity with the Indian resolution on prisoners of war in Korea, adopted by the UN General Assembly.

In order to disrupt the renewed armistice talks, the Syngman Rhee authorities "released", in late June 1953, 25,000 prisoners of war awaiting repatriation. Nehru immediately proposed that the General Assembly should meet to discuss the situation which had arisen in Korea as a result of this action which undermined the agreed decision of the United Nations.<sup>82</sup> On July 6-7, 1953, the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution denouncing the Syngman Rhee Government and its demands that the war should be carried on. The resolution expressed the hope that the General Assembly would convene in the shortest possible time to discuss the situation and take necessary steps. It is especially noteworthy that between June 25 and July 10 Nehru sent three cables to the General Assembly Chairman and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, urging the need for an early meeting of the General Assembly

on the armistice in Korea.<sup>83</sup>

On July 27, the truce in Korea was signed at last. India was asked to head the neutral nations' commission on the repatriation of the prisoners of war and to provide security forces during the prisoner exchange when explanatory talks were given to the prisoners of war.

In August 1953, when the question was decided as to who was to take part in the Korean Political Conference, the United States did everything, including vigorous representations to the government of some countries, in order to prevent the acceptance of the Soviet proposal that India should be invited to the Conference. Moreover, the United States, as *The Hindu* correspondent reported from New York, was "trying desperately to get India to withdraw her candidacy for the Korean Political Conference".<sup>84</sup> At the meeting of the UN Political Committee on August 27 India's candidacy was supported by 27 countries, including the USSR and other socialist countries and also Britain with 21 countries, the USA and Pakistan among them, voting against and 11 countries abstaining.<sup>85</sup> As India had failed to obtain the required two-thirds vote and as a number of countries continued to insist on her presence at the Conference, Indian delegate K. Menon asked the General Assembly, on August 28, not to insist on the resolution recommending that India should be given a place at the Korean Political Conference.

Chester Bowles wrote in his memoirs that relations between India and United States had sharply deteriorated by the end of 1953, "influenced by our opposition to India's presence at the Korean Truce Conference and by widely circulated stories of American intrigue in support of an independent Kashmir".<sup>86</sup> To this it should be added that the worsening of relations was also due to India's great contribution to ending the war in Korea and to US imperialist policies in Asia, above all to the efforts of the United States to draw Pakistan into the military blocs threatening the security of India and other countries in South and South-East Asia.

## Foreign Policy Problems during the First General Election in India

In late 1951-early 1952 the first general election was held in India. It furthered the demarcation of the internal political forces, including foreign policy problems. Before discussing what stand on foreign policy the different parties took at the election, it would be well to describe the situation regarding each of them before the election.

As mentioned earlier, on August 29, 1950, V. Patel's protegee, P. Tandon, was elected President of the Indian National Congress. Besides signifying the accession to Congress leadership of a conservative political figure<sup>87</sup> connected with the religious community forces, his election also meant that the Patel group had gained complete control over the party.

After Tandon's election, in the Congress party, the Patel group which expressed chauvinistic Hinduist tendencies, became consolidated. The following circumstances also contributed to it :

1. The protracted India-Pakistan disputes, stirred up by the British and American imperialists, were one of the reasons why Pakistan refused to devalue the Pakistani rupee simultaneously with the devaluation of the Indian rupee. This resulted in an almost complete stoppage of trade between India and Pakistan.

2. Indian big businessmen were hard hit by it. The stoppage of raw jute and cotton imports from Pakistan aggravated the crisis in the jute and cotton industries—the staple Indian industries.

3. A fresh wave of four million refugees from East Pakistan, which occurred in a comparatively short period of time, after the spring of 1950, aggravated the economic situation in India, especially in West Bengal.

It so happened, however, that after V. Patel's death Tandon found himself in not too sound a position. Besides the two main groups in Congress, the Nehru group and the Patel group, there were also many small groupings there whose interests were determined by diverse business, parochial, caste and other factors. Congress, as it was at that time, was fairly accurately

described by a South African progressive writer, Ronald Segal. He wrote : "And precisely because Congress is the only great party in the State containing within itself so many different pressure-groups of opinion, policy has taken second place to position. It has increasingly become a matter not of why, but of whom, not of whether one or other programme would be the right one for the country to follow, but of whether one or other faction would benefit from its adoption".<sup>88</sup> Evidently it has to do above all with economic programmes, but, when all is said and done, the latter influence also foreign policy positions.

The struggle among the groups and their mutual recriminations lessened the prestige that Congress traditionally enjoyed among the masses and furthered the development of centrifugal tendencies in it. On April 10, 1951, *The Hindustan Times* newspaper published the resolution of the Congress Working Committee prohibiting criticism and opposition group activity in the party. Three days later there were reports about the prohibition of the activities of the Democratic Front, an opposition group in Congress headed by A. Kripalani and Food Minister Kidwai.

But soon after the Kripalani nominees failed to be appointed to the Central Election Committee, the Democratic Front left Congress and in June 1951 the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party was founded by a conference held at Patna, the capital of the State of Bihar.

Neither the Working Committee resolution banning opposition activities in Congress nor the withdrawal of the Democratic Front put an end to the group struggle in Congress. By the beginning of July headlines like "Nehru or Tandon?" became frequent in the press.

The decisive battle between claimants to Congress leadership began on August 6, 1951, when Nehru sent a letter to the Congress leaders informing them of his resignation from the Congress Working Committee and the Central Election Committee. Along with the letter Nehru also sent his entire correspondence with Tandon showing their differences, above all, concerning the relations between the Congress leadership and the Indian Government. After Nehru, Education Minister

A.K. Azad and Minister for Home Affairs Rajagopalachari also resigned from the Working Committee. Nehru's letter was printed by the entire Indian press.

Except *The Hindu*, which defended Tandon's position, all major newspapers supported Nehru. A *Bombay Chronicle* editorial noted that Nehru's resignation from Congress bodies might be followed by his resignation from the Government which would be disastrous.

Nehru's letter of resignation was discussed at Working Committee meetings on August 11, 12 and 13, 1951, but neither these meetings nor Tandon's attempts to persuade Nehru to take his letter back had any effect. Considering Nehru's prestige among the people the Congress Working Committee decided, on September 9, 1951, to elect him President of the Indian National Congress instead of Tandon. The official history of the Congress party gives the following version of this change of leadership : "Why did Nehru agree to be the President of the Congress ? Were not his duties as Prime Minister heavy and onerous ? He wanted to keep harmony between the Congress and the Government....Then, he saw that within the Congress there were a lot of factions and groups and rivalries which militated against solidarity and unity of the organisation. It was essential that it should be well-knit, purposeful and single-minded. Specially was the need great and urgent in view of the forthcoming elections".<sup>89</sup> The change of leader appreciably undermined the positions of the Right while strengthening the positions of Nehru and his supporters and, in the final analysis, the positions of Congress as a whole in the general elections.

The Indian publicists and college lecturers who contributed to a collection of articles on political views in India in the first ten years of independence consider that it was in the foreign policy of the Government that the Congress record was most noteworthy.<sup>90</sup> The election Congress Manifesto of 1951 said briefly : "In regard to foreign policy, India has pursued an independent line in her own national interest and in the interest of world peace, and sought to maintain friendly relations with all countries".<sup>91</sup> This foreign policy course in 1951 did not suit those Congress party members who expressed the interests

of the Indian monopolies, particularly of the Tata group, and of the feudal landlords and princes. For this reason questions of foreign policy, along with the Government's economic programme, were the focus of attention at the 57th session of Congress held in Delhi in October 1951.<sup>92</sup>

At a meeting of the All India Congress Committee, held just before the Congress session, the resolution on foreign policy was put forward by G. B. Pant. He said that the Government's foreign policy was based on three principles, viz., friendly relations with all countries, regardless of their political system or ideology; efforts to help maintain world peace; and India's desire for every country to be free. While there was nothing new in the declaration of these principles, what was unusual was the answer given to the foreign policy critics who argued that India would gain a great deal by joining "one of the blocs". Pant recalled that extensive foreign aid of all kinds had not helped the Chiang Kai-shek Government to stay in power. Then the draft resolution was supported by A. K. Azad and two other AICC members, and the resolution was carried unanimously.<sup>93</sup>

If now we turn to the resolution itself, we shall see that it did not go quite as smoothly as its discussion had. It started with a confirmation of the foreign policy resolution adopted by the preceding session at Nasik in September 1950. That resolution stated: "Recent developments in the Far East, leading to war in Korea, have led to an intensification of the international crisis and have brought the prospect of a devastating world war nearer. India, in accordance with her basic policy, associated herself with the United Nations in resistance to aggression".<sup>94</sup> Well, then, had the foreign policy line of the Indian Government towards "UN action" in Korea not changed? Indeed, it had. The foreign policy resolution of the preceding session was confirmed to demonstrate the continuity of the foreign policy whereas the resolution of the Delhi session on that question said something entirely different. It said: "The United Nations Organisation was formed to provide a common platform for all countries, even though they differed from each other in many ways, and was based on each country having freedom to develop in its own way and not interfering

with another. If that basic policy of the UNO is followed, the fear that grips the world today will gradually lessen and a peaceful consideration of problems will become easier". Further, it expressed the hope that the cease-fire talks in Korea would be successful and a general settlement in the Far East would follow.<sup>95</sup>

In his opening speech at the session Nehru said : "The UN has somewhat drifted away from what it was meant to be". Of the other foreign policy problems, Nehru paid special attention to India-Pakistan relations, stating that India's objective was not only a peaceful settlement of her problems with Pakistan, but also "the growth of close and friendly relations with that country which, not long ago, was part of our country". On the Kashmir question Nehru said : "We are quite content to have a plebiscite in Kashmir...because we are quite sure of its result". But the plebiscite, he said, must not be held under conditions which would give encouragement to the aggressor. Especially interesting is that part of Nehru's speech in which he denied the assertions that India's foreign policy was "neutral or passive".<sup>96</sup>

The Prime Minister's foreign policy line at the general election satisfied both all the groups in Congress (where, after Tandon's replacement, the Right were considerably weakened and silenced for a time) and the greater part of Indian opinion.

In spite of some foreign policy deviations from the Government's declared course, many unsolved socio-economic problems and the known corruption by some prominent Congress party members, certain circumstances contributed to the success of the Congress party at the election. First of all one must bear in mind the party's standing in the eyes of the people ever since the struggle for independence, and Nehru's immense personal popularity. The Congress ran candidates for nearly all the seats in the House of the People and the legislatures of 22 states.<sup>97</sup> Campaigning for them, Nehru travelled 18,000 miles by air, 5,000 miles by car, 1,600 miles by train and 90 miles by boat.<sup>98</sup>

Speaking about the Communists at a meeting of the AICC in September 1951 immediately after being elected President of

the Congress party, Nehru said that Communist Party members were working industriously and devotedly and their enthusiasm and determination were truly remarkable. And although, in Nehru's opinion, the Communist Party favoured a great many methods which were wrong, there was no denying its members' spirit of self-sacrifice, dedication and sober confidence.

Estimating the chances of different political parties at the general election, many observers in India and abroad predicted that Congress would find its chief rival in the Socialist Party. Two years before the general elections, the Right-wing Socialist leader Lohia said in an interview in Berlin that the Indian Socialists had a "definite chance to gain majority in Parliament in the next elections".<sup>99</sup>

On July 5, 1951, the Indian newspapers published the election manifesto of the Socialist Party. The manifesto claimed that the Congress Government had no firm foreign policy and that both American influence and Russian influence were unacceptable. It proposed as a foreign policy course an independent way consisting in refusing to support any of the blocs in their disputes and to assist the aggressor, building up the UNO and its bodies, ensuring the security of the areas not belonging to the North Atlantic pact, and so on. The manifesto paid particular attention to the Kashmir question. It termed Pakistan's action as aggression and UN intervention as ineffective, and assumed that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly would finally decide on accession to India, whereupon the rest of the territory would be taken away from the aggressor in accordance with the will of the people.

It is needless to take up point by point the whole of the election manifesto of the Socialist Party leaders who sought by leftist phrases to win over to their own side those of the voters who might mistake their false programme for honest intentions. Moreover, there is no need to go into any detailed analysis of it as both the theory and practice pursued by the Right-wing Socialist leaders were scathingly criticised in a sharply polemical brochure published by Aruna Asaf Ali, herself a prominent Indian Socialist Party figure, who, in April 1951, left that party with a group of Left-wing Socialists.

The sole new point in the theories of the Right-wing



Socialists was the idea of a "Third Camp" whose "natural constituents" were to be "Socialists, newly liberated peoples, anti-imperialist movements and all liberals as want progress and world authority".<sup>100</sup> Besides promulgating this idea as though it were a new discovery of epoch-making significance the Indian Socialist Party also attempted to start carrying it out, calling in December 1950 at Lucknow a conference of "representatives" of Afghanistan, Pathanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Tibet, Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal and Burma. But, as the Indian press wrote, it was a flash in the pan.

The Socialist Party had considerable election funds. This enabled it to nominate the largest number—after Congress—of candidates, viz., 225 for the House of the People and 1,800 for legislatures of states.

The Socialists formed an election bloc with Ambedkar, leader of the Scheduled Castes Federation, Ambedkar and A. Mehta, General Secretary of the Socialist Party, declaring at once that their alliance was the beginning of the end of Congress rule.<sup>101</sup> It must be noted that during British rule Ambedkar was a constant antagonist of Congress, but when that party gained power he entered the Government, becoming Minister of Justice. Shortly before the elections, in October 1951, Ambedkar withdrew from the Government. In his resignation, tendered on October 11, 1951, he also expressed his disagreement on some points of foreign policy. Ambedkar alleged that during four years of independence India had lost all her friends. He suggested that in order to solve the Kashmir problem Pakistan should be given the part of Kashmir populated by Muslims, and so on. The *National Herald* wrote in connection with these proposals that Ambedkar and others who had never had much experience in questions of foreign policy, and had been loyal to the British interests, would not be receptive to continuing the foreign policy that the Prime Minister had pursued for years in Congress and in the country. The Scheduled Castes Federation nominated 32 candidates for the House of the People and 213 candidates for legislatures of states.

After the founding, in June 1951, of the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, the Indian Socialists who sought to establish a two-party system in India encountered a rival aspiring to the position of

the second party. The constituent session of the new party adopted an election manifesto which said : "We believe that our foreign policy must spring from and be directly related to our home policy. If we... are conscious of the urgent and paramount necessity of building up a decentralised economy that is neither capitalist nor Communist then the only alternative foreign policy for us is one of strict neutrality. Whatever the inclination of our... sympathies, we must scrupulously avoid any involvement or international commitment which is likely to drag us into a war, either on the side of this bloc or that".<sup>102</sup> The party lost much of its influence after the return to Congress, literally on the eve of the elections, of the Kidwai group, Kidwai coming next to Kripalani in the party leadership. Nonetheless, it contested 137 seats in the House of the People and another 945 in legislatures of states.

Speaking of the religious community parties, we must say first of all that the Muslim League requested the Central Election Committee to recognise it as an all-India party. The request, however, was not granted as the League functioned in the state of Madras alone.

It was different with the parties of militant Hinduism. The Hindu Mahasabha, after the resumption of political activity, took steps to get the public to forget the sinister role it had played in the riots and massacres following India's partition. In January 1950 its President, Khare, alleged that there was no conflict between Nehru and the ideals of the Hindu Mahasabha; from Nehru's statement that at present there was no sense in talking about the unification of India and Pakistan, one might infer that he did not exclude such a possibility at some time in future. In September 1950 the Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha introduced a change in the party rules, of more than 30 years' standing, permitting the admission of non-Hindus.<sup>103</sup> In his address delivered to the 29th party session in 1950, Khare said : "The Hindu Rashtra shall be friendly with People's Government in China, shall support the unification of Korea....",<sup>104</sup> and so on. In spite of these demagogic declarations, the position of the Hindu Mahasabha was steadily becoming weaker. Even the leaders of the militarised organisation, RSS, which had cooperated with the Hindu

Mahasabha ever since 1925 when it was founded, began saying they had better break off with it".<sup>105</sup>

After the RSS was legalised, its leaders decided not to resume cooperation with the Hindu Mahasabha but to establish a political party of their own, or rather a political wing of RSS. At the beginning of June 1951 the establishment of the new party, called Bharatiya Jana Sangh, was launched with the active participation of a former Indian Government minister, S.P. Mookerjee. The establishment of this party was criticised not only by the Hindu Mahasabha leaders, but also by the leaders of another party of militant Hinduism, Ram Rajya Parishad, which was influential in Rajasthan and several other states of India.

All these parties propagated hatred of Muslims, demanded the "reunification of India" under Hindu rule, insisted on the militarisation of the country up to military instruction being given to the entire adult population including women, spoke for a "more realistic" foreign policy and renunciation of neutrality, i.e., supported in fact India's drawing closer together with the Anglo-American bloc. The foreign policy views held by these parties differed only in minor details, as also in the degree to which they camouflaged their real ends with demagogic phrases. Thus, the election manifesto of the Hindu Mahasabha called for the reunification of India and Pakistan by constitutional means, simultaneously criticising the Government for its "appeasement" of Pakistan and insisting on "reciprocity". The election manifesto of the Jana Sangh, adopted at its constituent session in October 1951, appealed to India's "sacred duty" to do all to ensure the rights and dignity of the Hindu minority in Pakistan, although a few lines above it pharisaically declared that, true to Indian traditions, "it will work for the maintenance of world peace and mutual understanding".<sup>106</sup>

The parties of militant Hinduism nominated their candidates for 181 seats in the House of the People and 1,242 seats in the legislatures of states.

The Communist Party was one of the nine principal parties contesting the first general election. It was faced with difficult conditions for carrying on its activities before and during the

general elections. Although mass repressions of Communists were stopped in 1951, the Communist Party remained banned in Hyderabad and Travancore-Cochin, the states in which it had the greatest influence. Even during the elections some Communists were arrested, including nominated candidates.<sup>107</sup> The CPI acted on the basis of its new programme which had been published in draft form in April 1951 and adopted at the All India session of the party in October 1951. The programme gave an erroneous description of the social composition of the Indian Government.<sup>108</sup> This also led to an unjust judgement of the Government's foreign policy: "While playing on the rivalries between England and America, to its own advantage in certain circumstances, the government of India essentially carries out the foreign policy of British imperialism".<sup>109</sup> In the minimum programme of the election manifesto, the CPI put forward as an immediate demand India's withdrawal from the Commonwealth and the removal of all Englishmen from the Indian armed forces. To be able to understand correctly the CPI's foreign policy platform, two more things should be taken into account. First, replying at a press conference at Calicut to the question of whether the Communist Party would support the Government if Pakistan again committed aggression in Kashmir, one of the CPI leaders said that his party would certainly support the Government provided it was convinced that there was real aggression.<sup>110</sup> Second, General Secretary of the CPI Central Committee A. Ghosh said at a press conference at Madras that the people of Kashmir should be advised in their own interests to accede to India as the democratic movement in India was stronger and the democratic movement in Kashmir would get much more help from India than from Pakistan.

Forming election blocs and alliances with several petty bourgeois parties in some of the states of India, the Communist Party nominated 73 candidates for the House of the People and about 700 for the legislatures of states.

When speaking about foreign policy problems at the Indian general election, we must keep in mind that the United States tried to influence the position of the Indian political parties. One of the levers whereby pressure was brought to bear

India was the long-term loan of 2 million tons of wheat requested by the Indian Government back in December 1950. We have mentioned that the US Senate postponed taking its decision on the wheat loan until the entire problem of relations between the United States and India had been studied.<sup>111</sup> In early February 1951, 43 Members of the Indian Parliament sent a cable to the US Congress expressing their friendly feelings and saying that Congress should not be influenced by any temporary political differences.<sup>112</sup>

Meanwhile the food situation in India was getting worse. On April 6, 1951, there was a four-hour debate in Parliament on it. K.M. Munshi, then Food Minister, informed the House that Ceylon would loan India 10,000 tons of rice, but did not mention that the Soviet Government agreed, in answer to India's request, to supply 500,000 tons of wheat,<sup>113</sup> which had been reported by the Indian press a week before.

*The Hindustan Times*, reporting from Washington, stated that the news that India was about to get grain from the Soviet Union and China had caused anxiety in the United States. Senator Humphrey, a Democrat, said that the Communists' victory at the recent elections in Howrah made it urgent that the USA immediately send the wheat to India. On May 10, 1951, Prime Minister Nehru announced in Parliament that Russia was starting wheat deliveries without waiting for the conclusion of negotiations on the terms.<sup>114</sup> On June 2, the first Soviet ship carrying wheat for India, the *Krasnodar*, arrived in Bombay. It was after that, on June 15, that the US Congress decided to grant India a 190-million-dollar loan for the purchase of American wheat. Bowles subsequently admitted that even the later arrival from America of a large amount of wheat "did not erase the public memory of this quick, dramatic act of the Kremlin".<sup>115</sup> It was indirect acknowledgement that the Soviet Union had put an end to the American blackmail by hunger.

US pressure on India before the elections was not confined to the political and economic spheres. The American imperialists staked on the religious community parties which, they hoped, might somewhat push back the Congress party at the elections and perhaps even be able to come to power.

The general elections were held from October 25, 1951, to February 24, 1952.

In the elections to the House of the People the National Congress party got about 48 million votes (44.5 per cent of the poll) and won an absolute number of seats, 364 out of 488 for which it had nominated candidates (74.6 per cent); in the elections to the legislatures of states it got 43 million votes (42 per cent and) 2,248 out of 3,278 seats (65.7 per cent), obtaining an absolute majority of seats in the legislatures of 18 out of 22 states.

The Communist Party came second in the number of seats won in the House of the People (26 seats). In the elections to legislatures of states the Communist Party and its allies won 234 of the 700 seats for which they had nominated candidates.

The Right-wing Socialists sustained a crushing blow, getting hardly a tenth of the seats for which they had nominated candidates in most states. Altogether, they managed to get 12 seats in the House of the People and 126 in the legislatures of states. The Socialists' ally, the Scheduled Castes Federation, won only one seat in the House of the People (the second candidate won, thanks to Communist Party support). The Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party obtained pitiful results. It managed to get a mere 10 seats in the House of the People and 78 seats in the legislatures of states.

The results of the election spelled the collapse of the hopes of the Indian reactionaries and their overseas patrons that the religious community parties might become the principal opposition and shift the government to the right. The religious community parties managed to win merely 10 seats in the House of the People and 87 in the legislatures of states. Thus the first general elections in India showed that the Indian National Congress enjoyed incomparably more influence than any of the opposition parties. The elections also demonstrated the rapid growth of the Communist Party's influence and the blasted hopes of the reactionaries in the success of the community parties.

Ajoy Ghosh wrote in the March 28, 1952, issue of the newspaper *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy* that

the general election results had greatly disturbed reactionaries both in India and abroad. The election results compelled the Executive Committee of the Socialist Party to adopt a decision on holding an extraordinary session in April 1952. The weakness of the Socialist Party and the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party and their common ideology and objectives prompted their leaders to decide to merge their parties. As a result of their union, the Praja-Socialist Party was founded in September 1952.

Appraising the approach of the internal political forces in India to foreign policy, as evident during the general elections, one can state the following :

1. The overwhelming majority of the Indians were for independent foreign policy, for India's non-participation in blocs and for her efforts to maintain peace.

2. The opponents of this foreign policy line, with the exception of the Hindu Mahasabha, did not dare to speak against it openly, although before the elections the Right-wing Socialist leaders and Jana Sangh leaders repeatedly showed that they wanted to draw closer together with the United States.

3. During the election campaign even the Communist Party of India, despite its incorrect appraisal at that time of the social character of the Government and of its foreign policy, did not criticise neutralism but only deviations from it.

4. In connection with unity on foreign policy issues and the acuteness of internal problems, the struggle during the general elections was mainly over matters of home policy. At the same time, the general elections furthered the demarcation of the internal political forces and the firm establishment in the Government's foreign policy of the latter's progressive features.

### Relations between India and Pakistan

Starting with the early 1950's, relations between India and Pakistan became sharply aggravated. Hindu Muslim clashes in both parts of Bengal divided by the state frontier assumed greater dimensions than during the country's partition in 1947.

After India's division on a religious basis, which caused a tremendous wave of migration mainly between Western Pakistan and the Indian Union, about 12 million Hindus remained in Eastern Pakistan. At one of the early meetings of the

Pakistan Constituent Assembly it was decided that the constitution should be based on Islam and that only a Muslim could be elected head of the state. A non-Muslim could not even become a member of the ruling Muslim League party. In view of all this and the discrimination against non-Muslims by the local administration, the Hindu minority in Eastern Pakistan felt oppressed. At the end of 1949 the ruling circles of Pakistan, in order to undermine and split the mounting national movement of the Bengalis, massacred Hindus through the extreme Right-wing Muslim organisations and even with the help of police.<sup>116</sup> Refugees thronged into India from Eastern Pakistan (an average of 15,000 daily), fleeing from the massacres.

Hindu Mahasabha President Khare demanded that the Indian Government should recall its Ambassador from Pakistan and break off trade relations in protest against the genocide of the Hindus in that area. On February 17, Nehru sent a cable to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, asking that the Indian Deputy High Commissioner in Pakistan be permitted to visit the riot areas. Nehru also proposed that a joint commission be set up to determine the causes of the situation. On February 20 Nehru sent a second telegram offering to visit the areas of the riots together with Liaquat Ali Khan. The Pakistani Premier rejected both these proposals, stating that a commission was not desirable and a tour by the two Prime Ministers would not serve any useful purpose.<sup>117</sup>

The influx of Hindu refugees from Eastern Pakistan was a welcome pretext for the Hindu chauvinists to step up their activities, and they reared their head again after mid-1949. In his speech delivered on May 28, 1949, marking the official resumption by the Hindu Mahasabha of its political activities, its General Secretary, V.G. Deshpande, said the decision to do so had been taken because the Mahasabha had implicit faith in Hindū nationalism, in the Hindu state. Deshpande demanded that the Muslims living in India should, if they wanted to be recognised as equal citizens, "accept the names, dresses and personal laws and customs from birth to death of this country,..."<sup>118</sup> In conclusion Deshpande said that the Hindu Mahasabha was not prepared to treat the partition of India as a



"closed chapter" and its first task was, therefore, "to reunite the divided parts of India into one Akhand Hindustan and re-settle all the Hindus who have been forcibly driven out of their motherland in their old homes."<sup>119</sup>

The Hindu chauvinists became more active in the Congress party, too. Its Working Committee decided in October 1949 (while Nehru was in the United States) that the party rules should not prevent members of RSS from joining Congress. General Secretary of the Indian National Congress Kala Venkata Rao explained that as RSS was not a political party and had neither rules nor programme its members could be admitted to the Congress party.<sup>120</sup> This decision, which was an insult to the memory of Gandhi, aroused a storm of protest from provincial and district Congress committees, so that the Working Committee had to revise its decision and declare that RSS members could join Congress "only when they could break off all relations from such a volunteer organisation as theirs".<sup>121</sup>

When Calcutta and other East Indian cities were literally overflowing with refugees from Eastern Pakistan in January 1950, the Hindu chauvinists massacred Muslims, sending a wave of Muslim refugees in the opposite direction. In February-March 1950 more than 2 million refugees from Eastern Pakistan arrived in West Bengal and Assam and about a million migrated from India to West Bengal. Relations between India and Pakistan became increasingly strained and presently in addition to militant Hinduist party figures Socialist Party leaders also began to call for a war with Pakistan to protect the oppressed Bengali Hindus in Eastern Pakistan.

On February 19 a closed session of the All India Congress Committee convened in Delhi to discuss developments in Eastern Pakistan. On April 2, 1950, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan met to discuss the situation and on April 8 they reached an agreement known in the history of India-Pakistani relations as the Nehru-Liaquat Pact. It dealt with, first, the prevention of religious communal disorders which might occur in any part of the two countries, and, second, with creating conditions for the freedom of movement of migrants within the area affected, i.e., West Bengal, Assam, Tripura and East

Bengal, and for their return to their homes if they wished. At the time of the signing of the Agreement the two Prime Ministers appealed to the people and to the press in both countries to help bring about a peaceful atmosphere.<sup>122</sup>

The Congress Working Committee adopted, on April 7, a resolution supporting the Prime Ministers' efforts to find a peaceful and lasting settlement to the problem of Bengal. There was, however, strong opposition to such a settlement among Congress leaders, in the Indian Government, Parliament and the press, as evident from the following facts. On April 19, one of the most noted Hindu reactionaries, S.P. Mookerjee, Minister of Industry and Supply, announced in Parliament that he was resigning, giving seven reasons for doing so. All of them boiled down to his taking issue with the Agreement signed and the Government's policy towards Pakistan and Muslims in general.<sup>123</sup> On that occasion the Hindu chauvinists of the Indian capital gave a reception for Mookerjee which was attended by over 1,000 guests. Among those who praised his "bold decision" was H.V. Kamath, M.P., a prominent Congress figure.<sup>124</sup>

The tension was eased only for a brief time, the flow of refugees from Eastern Pakistan into India continued unabated, and by July 1950 there were reports in the Indian press that war with Pakistan might be expected at any moment. On July 21 a group of Hindu Mahasabha leaders published a manifesto demanding the partition of East Bengal and exchange of population on a religious basis between India and Pakistan. The Hindu chauvinists thus began to fight for the implementation of a proposal initially expressed by V. Patel in February 1950. S.P. Mookerjee went even farther than that. He demanded that the 1947 division of Bengal should be annulled or that Pakistan should at least set aside a part of the territory for the resettlement of the entire religious minorities. The Right-wing opposition leaders referred to Nehru's policy for a peaceful settlement of relations with Pakistan as "escapism".<sup>125</sup> But Nehru, replying in Parliament on August 1 to Kamath's question concerning the India-Pakistan Agreement of April 8, 1950, and the continuing inflow of refugees, showed his unwavering determination for the problem to be solved by

the efforts of the Governments of India and Pakistan. Since that did not suit the leaders of the Indian reactionaries, before the session of the National Congress party which was to convene in September 1950 at Nasik, President of the Hindu Mahasabha Khare published a statement in the press calling upon the "patriotic delegates" of the session "to show his place to the Prime Minister where he can carry out his policy to his heart's content".<sup>126</sup>

The session adopted by a majority vote a resolution denouncing communalism. As for the refugees who had left their property in Pakistan, the resolution stated that it was urgently necessary "that a resolution of this should be found as speedily as possible" and, if need be, "it should be referred for arbitration to a tribunal consisting of representatives of India and Pakistan of high judicial standing..."<sup>127</sup>

In the autumn of 1950 the strain eased up somewhat but some important problems still remained outstanding. On December 6, 1950, opening the foreign policy debate in Parliament, Nehru said that among the many objects to be discussed there was "one important subject of primary importance for us—our relations with Pakistan".<sup>128</sup> Nehru made a similar statement in Parliament on March 28, 1951.<sup>129</sup>

In July 1951 India-Pakistan relations worsened again. According to *The Pakistan Times*, on July 16, 1951, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan called a press conference and made a statement about the concentration of Indian troops at the Pakistan borders, recalling: "...over a year ago even smaller concentrations of Indian armed forces against the Pakistan borders led to so grave a situation that the two countries were brought to the brink of war". The Indian Prime Minister made an immediate reply at a meeting in Bangalore. He read out his speech, quite contrary to his custom. In it Nehru stated that there had been movements of Indian army units in order to fully ensure the security of the frontier areas. He said that India would on no account attack Pakistan but should the latter commit aggression against India in any part of her territory, it would be met adequately. Then Nehru expressed regret at having to say that "the activities of British military

officers and ex-officers in Pakistan had added greatly to the prevailing tension...''<sup>130</sup>

The very fact that Indian troops were brought up to the border, which Nehru acknowledged, was so unlike his usual policy towards Pakistan that one is bound to ask : What made Nehru agree to that step? All the more so since the last thing Nehru wanted at that time when he was fighting to have Patel's man, P. Tandon, who supported the Hindu chauvinists, removed from Congress leadership, was any new aggravation of relations with Pakistan. We think that the answer must be sought in the dangerous activities of the British military in Pakistan the Prime Minister alluded to in his speech in Bangalore and which he disclosed more fully on August 10 replying to a question in Parliament. In view of their importance the question and answers are cited in full.<sup>131</sup>

"...will the *Prime Minister* be pleased to state :

- (a) whether Government have come to know that the former Commander-in-Chief of India, Sir Auchinleck, and Pakistan's former Commander-in-Chief are now in Pakistan;
- (b) whether Government have information as to in what capacity they are serving Pakistan now; and
- (c) whether Government are aware that those two British citizens have openly supported Pakistan against India on the Kashmir question?

The Prime Minister (Shri Jawaharlal Nehru) :

- (a) Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck has been on a visit of long duration to Pakistan. General Sir Douglas Gracey recently visited Pakistan for a short period but left for the United Kingdom soon after.
- (b) Government of India are not aware that either Field Marshal Auchinleck or General Gracey are officially employed by the Government of Pakistan.

- (c) It is not in the public interest to disclose any information”.

Concentration of troops along the borders was an episode provoked by the dangerous commotion made by the British military in Pakistan. This is evidenced by Nehru's statement a month later at a big rally in Delhi. He said : “In my opinion there will be no war between India and Pakistan”. The Prime Minister warned the people against the activities of rumour-mongers and astrologers who, he said, “never seem to be tired of predicting war with Pakistan in the near future”.<sup>132</sup>

In 1952, relations in Hindustan peninsula were further strained when the Government of Pakistan declared, on May 5, its intention to introduce a system of passports and visas for travel between India and Pakistan. Hitherto, movement between the two countries had been regulated by the April 8, 1950, agreement between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. Movement between Eastern Pakistan and India was free, and between Western Pakistan and India passes were required. Although the Indian Government and the press were highly critical of Pakistan's intention, the Indian Government had no alternative but to begin talks with Pakistan. The talks continued, with interruptions, till the end of January 1953 when the agreement introducing passports and visas was signed and later ratified by both countries on July 9, 1953.

Differences on this question demonstrated once again how even comparatively minor problems could cause a flare-up in relations between India and Pakistan. The Calcutta newspapers, for example, rightly predicted that the forthcoming introduction of passports and visas would swell the inflow of refugees into India. Indeed, as mentioned in Parliament, approximately an additional 500,000 refugees had arrived in India by December 1952. Apart from all else, assistance to refugees placed an additional burden on the budget, each family costing Rs. 50-60 a month.<sup>133</sup>

The Kashmir question was still a constant factor in straining relations between India and Pakistan in 1950-1953. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, India and Pakistan agreed to the proposals of the UN Commission to end hostilities in Kashmir

and to hold a plebiscite there subsequently. But these proposals, which were later made in the form of a resolution (the resolution of the UN Commission of January 5, 1949), were interpreted quite differently by the governments of India and Pakistan. After the failure of the Anglo-American attempts to force India to agree to arbitration on Kashmir, the majority of the UN Commission turned, in December 1949, to the Security Council, asking it to dissolve the Commission and vest its functions in one person, a UN Representative on Kashmir with broad powers. The Security Council accepted the proposal on March 14, 1950, and on April 12, Owen Dixon, an Australian judge, was appointed UN Representative for India and Pakistan.

Before speaking about the activities of this UN "mediator", let us see how Britain and the United States approached the Kashmir question at that time. As we mentioned, in 1947-49 Britain sought to "solve" the Kashmir question by supporting Pakistan's claim to Kashmir.<sup>134</sup> Subsequently, Britain began to favour a *status quo* division of Kashmir which would secure for Pakistan the strategically important northern areas. The United States, on its part, held that it would be best to withdraw Kashmir from the jurisdiction of India and Pakistan and place it under UN jurisdiction. At the same time, Britain and the United States were united by the common desire to aggravate relations between India and Pakistan, so as to make easier for them to blackmail one or the other. For this reason until 1953 neither the United States nor Britain had shown the slightest desire to achieve a settlement on the basis of talks between India and Pakistan. They were more interested in the conflict going on than in its settlement on terms other than what suited their imperialist plans.

Going over now to the various plans put forward by Dixon in the summer of 1950, one may say that they boiled down to the holding of a plebiscite in some districts of Kashmir so as to effect its partition and establish UN control over the Kashmir Valley.<sup>135</sup> Both India and Pakistan rejected Dixon's proposals. In a message to Dixon on August 16, 1950, Nehru gave several reasons why the proposals were unacceptable to India, stating above all that they were "opposed to our basic stand on the

Kashmir issue".<sup>136</sup> Pakistan, however, rejected Dixon's proposals because it would agree only to a partition of Kashmir which would give it possession of the Kashmir Valley.<sup>137</sup> On August 23, 1950, Dixon left Hindustan, informed the Security Council of the failure of his mission and resigned his post.

After the failure of Dixon's mission, an attempt to mediate was made by the Commonwealth. On December 17, 1950, the Prime Minister of Pakistan said in Karachi that he would ask Britain and other Commonwealth countries to put the Kashmir question on the agenda of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference which was to open in London on January 4, 1951. As the Indian Government objected to the discussion of the Kashmir question by the Conference, Liaquat Ali Khan said on December 31, 1950, that in that case he would not go to the Conference. But on January 4, 1951, it became known that Nehru had agreed to an unofficial discussion and together with Attlee urged Liaquat Ali Khan to attend the Conference. On January 6 the Pakistan Prime Minister arrived in London and on January 14 the British Government released a brief communique stating as the result of friendly talks "points of disagreement were narrowed although agreement has not been reached".<sup>138</sup> While the official communique did not disclose the substance of the talks, the Pakistan Prime Minister did so. Speaking in London on January 16, he said that three suggestions had been made. The first was to station in Kashmir troops from Commonwealth countries (Australia and New Zealand had agreed to lend troops). The second was to ask India and Pakistan to station a combined force in Kashmir during the plebiscite, and the third was to authorise the Plebiscite Administrator to raise troops locally. Pakistan was willing to accept each of these suggestions, but India had rejected all three.<sup>139</sup>

After the abortive attempt at Commonwealth mediation, at the end of February the United States and Britain proposed a draft resolution on appointing a new UN mediator to prepare for the plebiscite and stationing foreign troops in Kashmir for that time, as well as on settling by international arbitration before the plebiscite the questions of demilitarisation of Kashmir. As India was categorically opposed to foreign troops entering Kashmir, that point was excluded from the draft resolution and

on March 30, 1951, it was carried by eight votes with three abstentions.

Two days later, the Security Council appointed Frank Graham, an American, UN Representative in India and Pakistan. The great importance that the United States attached to the Kashmir question is obvious from the fact that initially it had proposed giving that post to General Dwight Eisenhower, and that later Graham got General J. Devers, chief of the US Army field forces in 1948-49, as military adviser. Subsequently, till March 31, 1953, when Graham submitted to the Security Council his fifth report on the results of talks with the Governments of India and Pakistan and refused to continue them any longer, his main efforts had been directed at having the Plebiscite Administrator inducted into office as speedily as possible and furthering the plans for "pushing into Kashmir either the regular troops of the imperialist countries or their military personnel masquerading as 'United Nations Observers' ".<sup>140</sup> But the firm stand taken by the Indian Government against the arrival of the Administrator before Pakistan had fulfilled the terms of the agreement on the truce and withdrawal of troops from Kashmir, prevented his coming. As to the plans for stationing foreign troops in Kashmir, they were firmly rejected by the Indian Government.

Going on to describe the attitude taken by the internal political forces in India on the Kashmir question, we must note that while the National Congress party gave full support to the Government, nearly all the opposition parties, advocating Kashmir's accession to India and firmly supporting Nehru in regarding the introduction of foreign troops into Kashmir as unthinkable, criticised the Government for having referred the matter to the United Nations. Thus, the Communist Party of India came out for Kashmir's accession to India and, as was mentioned earlier, tried to convince the people of Kashmir that it was in their interests as the democratic movement in India was at a higher level.

Acting from entirely different positions, the Hindu chauvinist parties which, from the start, were using the Kashmir question as the target of their campaign for a "tough policy" towards Pakistan, were also critical of having referred the



question to the United Nations, and in 1951 demanded that the matter be withdrawn from the Security Council. This demand was publicly made by Khare, President of the Hindu Mahasabha;<sup>141</sup> S. P. Mookerjee said in Parliament on March 28, 1951, that the Kashmir case should be withdrawn from the UNO and there should be no further question of plebiscite.<sup>142</sup> The Indian Socialists took a similar attitude. The constituent session of the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party in June 1951 expressed full support for the Government's policy on Kashmir and declared that, should Pakistan unleash aggression, the party, irrespective of party considerations, would give the Prime Minister its full support. As already mentioned the Socialists' ally at the general elections, the Scheduled Castes Federation, was the only one to support the partition of Kashmir.

Beginning with the spring of 1951, a new internal political factor came into play as preparations began for elections to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly which was to work out the Constitution and decide on the form of Kashmir's accession to India, the future of the dynastic rulers, and compensation to be paid to the landlords for the confiscated land.<sup>143</sup>

The elections in Kashmir had great repercussions abroad. The Kashmir Government decision to hold the elections provoked a storm of protest in Pakistan. On May 29, 1951, the Security Council chairman sent cables to the Governments of India and Pakistan drawing the attention of the Indian Government to the fact that the preparations for calling the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir were contrary to the resolution of March 30, 1951, of the Security Council which stipulated that the question of Kashmir's accession should be solved by an unbiased and just plebiscite. Nehru replied, also by cable, on May 31 that he had nothing to add to what had been stated on India's behalf by her representative. It was quite obvious that the Indian Government had decided not to hinder the calling of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly so that its decisions should denote the will of the people of Kashmir affirming the legality of Kashmir's accession to India.

In late August 1951 the Indian press reported the results of the elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly

in the Vale of Kashmir and Ladakh. Of 45 seats, candidates of the National Conference received 43 uncontested seats; two seats went to Independent candidates. Elections in Jammu were conducted at the end of September. Another 30 candidates were elected, most of them nominees of the National Conference. On October 31 the Kashmir Constituent Assembly started work in Srinagar.

On March 27, 1952, the Constituent Assembly considered the report of the Land Compensation Committee. It stated that the Committee recommended that no compensation be paid to the landlords for the land confiscated from them, regardless of specific provisions of the Indian Constitution because, as the report said, "this part of the Constitution of India<sup>144</sup> is not at all applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir".<sup>145</sup> On March 31, 1952, the Assembly approved the recommendation on non-payment of compensation.<sup>146</sup> On April 19, Sheikh Abdullah, amplifying the idea that the Constitution of India was not applicable to Kashmir, said that the full application of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir would be "unrealistic, childish, and savouring of lunacy" and recalled that Kashmir had recognised India's sovereignty only with respect to defence, foreign policy and communications.<sup>147</sup>

On June 7, 1952, the Assembly adopted a decision whereby Kashmir was given a national flag of its own. On June 10, Sheikh Abdullah presented to the Assembly the Committee's report on the fundamental principles pertaining to the future of the hereditary rulers. The Committee recommended that (1) the future Constitution should be democratic, (2) hereditary rulership should be abolished, and (3) the office of the head of state should be elective. After a three-day debate the report was unanimously approved and the Assembly asked the Committee to settle the question of the procedure of election of the head of the State.<sup>148</sup>

As observed by many students of the Kashmir problem, there were many in Delhi who felt that these developments in Kashmir "represented a situation far beyond the nature of the accession in 1947. A Kashmir deputation was accordingly summoned to Delhi..."<sup>149</sup>

What, then, was the attitude of the Indian Government and

the opposition parties to the aforementioned decisions of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly?

Replying to a question asked in Parliament, Nehru confirmed that the accession of Kashmir related to the three fundamental subjects "which could be interpreted to mean a little more or a little less", but that the accession was complete. At the same time Nehru made the reservation that "the Kashmir Constituent Assembly has every right to frame its own Constitution, but as far as we are concerned, we could not be bound by their decision, because the question is before the Security Council".<sup>150</sup> On July 5, the leader of the Communist group in the Council of State called on the democratic parties of India to support the demand of the leaders of Kashmir for limited accession and to support their decision to abolish monarchy.<sup>151</sup>

The Indian Right-wing parties took an entirely different attitude. On June 15, the Working Committee of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh passed a resolution describing the decision to abolish hereditary rulership as "unconstitutional".<sup>152</sup> The gist of this resolution was disclosed by the leader of the Communist parliamentary group who said in Parliament that the appeals for full accession of Kashmir and full extension to it of the Indian Constitution were in fact demands for the preservation of maharaja rule and landlord exploitation. On June 26, Hindu chauvinists staged a demonstration outside the Parliament building, protesting against the Government's policy on Kashmir. About 2,000 people for more than an hour chanted slogans and handed out leaflets to Members of Parliament. In Parliament itself, N.C. Chatterjee, a Hindu Mahasabha leader, argued that a republic within a republic was "nonsense", while S.P. Mookerjee accused Sheikh Abdullah of discriminating against Hindus.

On July 16, 1952, Sheikh Abdullah arrived in Delhi for talks with the Indian Government on the settlement of India-Kashmir relations and definition of the status of Kashmir. As a result of the talks the Delhi Agreement was signed which recognised the right of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly to frame a separate Constitution, i.e., it recognised limited accession.<sup>153</sup> The progressive newspaper, *Cross Roads*, wrote that Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru deserved to be congratulated by

the democratic sections of the people of India and Kashmir for having, in spite of the reactionaries' opposition, saved the gains of anti-feudal struggles in Kashmir and prevented the latter from being turned into a prince-and-landlord-dominated Part B state in terms of the Indian Constitution.<sup>151</sup> But the resistance of the reactionary forces continued when the Delhi Agreement was presented for approval by Parliament on August 7th.

In his opening speech Nehru recalled India's dual commitment to protect the people of Jammu and Kashmir from invasion and give them an opportunity to decide their future finally by plebiscite.<sup>155</sup> In spite of sharp criticism from the Hindu chauvinists, Parliament expressed its approval of the Government's policy towards Kashmir.<sup>156</sup>

On August 11, 1952, Sheikh Abdullah made a statement in Kashmir Constituent Assembly on the results of talks in Delhi and on the Delhi Agreement. In particular he warned that any "suggestions of altering arbitrarily the basis of our relationship with India would not only constitute a breach of the spirit and letter of the Constitution, but it may invite serious consequences for a harmonious association of our State with India".<sup>157</sup> These words were prophetic of the situation that was to arise in Jammu in six months and of Sheikh Abdullah himself exactly a year later.

Taking advantage of the fact that Sheikh Abdullah was in no hurry to have Kashmir's accession to India endorsed by an act of the Constituent Assembly and using as a pretext the festivities held on November 24 in the city of Jammu to celebrate the induction into office of the constitutional head of Kashmir, the Praja Parishad Party staged a mass campaign under the slogan of "...one President, one flag, and one Constitution", demanding full accession to India.

The Praja Parishad was a chauvinist Hindu party which expressed the interests of the feudal reactionaries and had influence only in Jammu, mostly in the towns. The party started its activities as a branch of RSS in 1931. After the assassination of Gandhi and prohibition of RSS, its Jammu branch at once renamed itself Praja Parishad, and when the Jana Sangh party was founded in June 1951, it became a branch of the latter.

The campaign launched by the Praja Parishad in November 1952 was inspired by religious fanaticism and was subsidised by rich Hindu landlords in Jammu who resented their being deprived of compensation for the land confiscated from them.<sup>158</sup> The Praja Parishad acted both in the interests of the landlords and also of foreign imperialists, as the second slogan of its mass campaign (in the event there was not full accession to India) was the partition of Kashmir, with at least two districts, Jammu and Ladakh, populated mostly by non-Muslims, acceding to India. Such a "solution" of the Kashmir issue was just what the British and American imperialists were after at the time.

The campaign in Jammu was accompanied by the wrecking of public offices and Muslims' homes on such a scale as to force the Indian Government to send additional police units from the neighbouring Punjab to Jammu, at the request of the Kashmir Government. The irony of it was having to send Indian police to suppress a seemingly pro-Indian movement. Nehru, mentioning in reply to a question on December 4, 1952, in Parliament that police had been sent to Jammu, charged some Hindu Mahasabha Members of the House of the People with "trying to encourage utterly undesirable activities" in Jammu. These gentlemen became extremely indignant, demanding that proof be given, etc.<sup>159</sup> Nevertheless, the annual session of the Hindu Mahasabha at Bhopal on December 30, 1952, adopted a resolution on Kashmir, congratulating the Jammu Praja Parishad on starting "a peaceful and constitutional agitation" for complete accession of Kashmir to India and condemning the State Government for "ruthlessly suppressing the peaceful citizens, who are loyal to the country and to the President and the flag of the Indian Union."<sup>160</sup> Simultaneously, the first Jana Sangh session took place at Kanpur. The party's President, S.P. Mookerjee, devoted his speech to the Kashmir question but, unlike Mahasabha men, spoke more cautiously. He said that the two problems of East Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir would be solved "by bringing pressure on the Government to take up the right attitude and tackle them in a proper manner".<sup>161</sup>

Riots in Jammu went on through the winter of 1952-53. In Parliament on February 17, 1953, a Member called attention

to the methods by which religious communal hatred was spread. He mentioned that the *Pratap* daily, the mouthpiece of the Jana Sangh, had carried on February 8, a report with its headline running over four columns in which it said: "My sword will remain out of its sheath until it cuts the number of Dogra heads equal to those Muslim heads cut by Hindus in 1947..." says Sheikh Abdullah".<sup>162</sup> On the following day A. Ghosh, Chairman of the West Bengal Congress Committee, said in Parliament that during the Hindu Mahasabha session in Calcutta a demonstration was staged in which posters were carried saying "Long live Godse" (the assassin of Gandhi). Raghunath Singh, M.P., added: "In Banaras also". Then C.N. Malaviya, MP, said that there had been a procession at Bhopal, where he was from, led by Khare, Chatterjee and Deshpande (Hindu Mahasabha leaders and MPs), and the slogan "Godse zindabad" was raised. Chatterjee jumped up at once, protesting: "It is an absolutely unfounded charge. It is a fabricated statement". To this C.N. Malaviya replied: "It is quite right, Sir. I say it with full responsibility". Chatterjee said no more.<sup>163</sup>

On February 28, 1953, Secretary-General of Congress Balvantray Mehta sent to all provincial Congress Committees a circular in which, after recalling the campaign being conducted in Jammu, he wrote that the latest news about the activities of the Praja Parishad, Hindu Mahasabha and Jana Sangh indicated a worsening of the situation not only in Jammu but also in the Punjab and other places. In conclusion, all Congress organisations were asked to hold public meetings and explain to the people the danger inherent in support of the situation brought about by the communalist organisations.

Soon S.P. Mookerjee, leader of the Jana Sangh, N.C. Chatterjee, leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, N L. Sharma, leader of the Praja Parishad, and T. Singh, leader of the Sikh Akali party which had begun rendering support to those parties, were arrested. Released after a short imprisonment, S.P. Mookerjee decided, on May 8, 1953, to go to Kashmir "to see for himself what was happening behind the iron curtain". No sooner had Mookerjee set foot in Kashmir on May 11 than he was arrested for entering the State without a permit, obligatory to all

visitors. He was under house arrest in a comfortable bungalow near the Nishat garden, one of the most beautiful "Mogul gardens" in the Kashmir capital, Srinagar, until June 23, 1953, when he died suddenly following a heart attack.

On July 7, President of the Praja Parishad P.N. Dogra, after a long consultation with the leaders of the Jana Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha and RSS, announced that the movement "for complete accession of Kashmir to India", which had gone on for 8 months, was over.

Indian scholar Vijay Kumar, analysing the reasons for which the leaders of the Kashmir National Conference demanded limited accession to India, pointed out that the sole reason was the wish to abolish landlordism without the payment of compensation, which would otherwise be obligatory under Clause 31 of the Constitution of India.<sup>164</sup> It must, however, be taken into account that the Prime Minister of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, had, besides, important personal reasons stemming from his increasing efforts to attain "independent status" for Kashmir.

Having analysed the situation in Kashmir, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India adopted a resolution which was published on August 2, 1953. It stated: "The Central Committee of the Communist Party of India views with grave concern the reports coming from Kashmir that some leading personalities of the Sheikh Abdullah group and its supporters in the National Conference have made public declarations that the State of Kashmir should be made independent of India and that its new status be guaranteed by India, Pakistan and the United Nations.

"It is also stated that the areas of Jammu and Ladakh should be allowed to be fully incorporated in the Indian Union.

"It is clear that these declarations mean that the problem of Kashmir is entering a new and very serious phase of its crisis, as serious as when Kashmir was made an object of invasion five years ago".<sup>165</sup>

On August 9, 1953, Sheikh Abdullah was removed from his post at the order of Karan Singh, Head of the State, and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, Abdullah's former deputy, was sworn in

as Prime Minister. Sheikh Abdullah, Mirza Afzal Baig and thirty other supporters of Sheikh Abdullah were arrested.

Sheikh Abdullah's removal was approved by the Working Committee of the National Conference of Kashmir and by Lohia, leader of the Praja-Socialist Party, Khare, leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, and M. Ch. Sharma, leader of the Jana Sangh.<sup>166</sup> On September 17, 1953, H. Mukerjee, CPI representative, declared full support of the policy conducted by Prime Minister Nehru with respect to Kashmir.

These developments in Kashmir promoted, rather than hindered, the holding of talks directly between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan which had started in June 1953.

The point is that in his address to Parliament on February 11, 1953, President Prasad noted "a certain improvement" in relations with Pakistan.<sup>167</sup> Somewhat later, the improvement of relations with Pakistan was welcomed by the Congress Working Committee and the session of the All India Congress Committee. These judgments of the state of India-Pakistan relations were based above all on the fact that some signs had appeared indicating the desire on the part of Pakistani leaders to settle relations with India by direct talks. Thus, on Indian Republic Day, January 26, 1953, Prime Minister of Pakistan Khwaja Nazimuddin (he became Premier after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951), speaking at a function in the Indian High Commission in Karachi, stressed the need for Indo-Pakistan amity".<sup>168</sup>

Still greater readiness to improve relations with India was displayed by Mohammed Ali, recalled from his post of Pakistan's Ambassador in Washington to fill the office of Prime Minister in place of Nazimuddin, who had been removed in April 1953. Very friendly conversations between Nehru and Mohammed Ali during their stay in London in the first half of June at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference wound up with an agreement to continue the talks at Karachi in July 1953. When on July 25 Nehru came to Karachi he was given a grand welcome. The talks lasted three days. The joint communique released at the end of the talks stated that they "were frank and cordial" and that "among the subjects



discussed were Kashmir, canal waters, evacuee and trust properties and shrines" and that the foundations had been laid for further talks, soon to be resumed at Delhi.<sup>169</sup>

The events of August 9 in Kashmir provoked a sharply negative reaction in Pakistan, so much so that the official celebrations on the occasion of Independence Day, August 14, were cancelled, and Mohammed Ali sent a cable to Nehru asking for an immediate meeting in order to settle the Kashmir problem. On his arrival in Delhi on August 16, Mohammed Ali was given a welcome no less grand than the one Nehru had been accorded at Karachi. On conclusion of the talks, on August 20, a joint communique was published, stating that the Prime Ministers had agreed to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir and to appoint a Plebiscite Administrator towards the end of April 1954.<sup>170</sup>

It seemed that the sorest spot in Indo-Pakistan relations was about to be removed and friendly relations with Pakistan established. How, then, did the principal political parties in India react to it? We mentioned the attitude taken by the Indian National Congress when the prospects for a settlement were only just appearing. At the same time M. Ch. Sharma, leader of the Jana Sangh, stated that no final agreement on Kashmir should be concluded until other significant problems with Pakistan had been settled".<sup>171</sup> Secretary-General of the Hindu Mahasabha Deshpande told a public meeting at Aligarh that the Indian Government had manifested stark blindness in agreeing with Pakistan on a plebiscite in Kashmir. The feelings of Hindu chauvinists scared by the prospect of settlement with Pakistan were expressed best of all by one Kodanda Rao who wrote in *The Times of India*: "Even war is better than a plebiscite" and suggested as a way out "the exchange of Kashmir for East Bengal".<sup>172</sup>

The apprehension felt by the Indian reactionaries was, however, premature. The results of the talks between Nehru and Mohammed Ali were interpreted differently in India and Pakistan. Nehru got the impression that his partner at the talks had agreed to choose as Plebiscite Administrator in Kashmir a representative of one of the smaller, most likely Asian, countries, since Admiral Nimitz (appointed earlier by the

Security Council and awaiting a suitable moment for assuming the office) was a US citizen, and that might create difficulties. After Nehru mentioned that, *Dawn*, the Pakistani semi-official daily, printed a long article treating Nehru's proposal as an attempt "to drive a wedge between Pakistan and the USA" and declaring that "Pakistan will in no circumstances walk into any such 'trap' ".<sup>173</sup> Ever since then till the end of the period under review, i.e., till December 1953, Nehru and Mohammed Ali continued to exchange letters containing arguments and counter-arguments and a correspondence was maintained which could not be conducive to a settlement of Indo-Pakistan relations.

In terms of these relations the talks between Nehru and Mohammed Ali and the subsequent correspondence hardly merit much attention. The whole idea of the talks was, from the very beginning, to draw India, even at the back door, into the aggressive anti-Soviet bloc that the American imperialists were concocting at the time. Already in February 1953 Indian MPs called the Government's attention to the fact that the strain in relations with Pakistan would increase in connection with the plans to establish a "Middle East Defence Organisation" of which Pakistan was to be a member, and asked the Government what steps it was going to take to prevent it.<sup>174</sup>

In May 1953, US State Secretary Dulles visited India with the intention of getting her to sign a "joint defence" agreement with Pakistan. In June, during his first conversations with Mohammed Ali, the latter's proposal of a "joint defence policy" put Nehru on the alert.<sup>175</sup>

In September 1953 Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, Supreme Commander of the Pakistan Armed Forces, went to the United States, and in October 1953 Governor-General of Pakistan Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed also went there. During these visits the talks on US military aid for Pakistan made progress. Late in November *The Hindustan Times* wrote that whereas Ghulam Mohammed had denied the report of the military negotiations in the United States as "absolutely unfounded and baseless", President Eisenhower said that the question of military aid and bases was "not discussed in detail" when he met the Pakistan Governor-General. "As between

the two versions", *The Hindustan Times* concluded, "it is easy to see which is nearer the truth".<sup>176</sup>

Starting with his personal letter to Mohammed Ali on November 10, 1953, and in official notes and his speeches in and out of Parliament, Nehru invariably expressed India's sharply negative attitude towards a military agreement between Pakistan and the United States, arguing that should such an agreement be concluded, it would alter entirely the psychological atmosphere in India and aggravate her differences with Pakistan. All Indian political parties, from extreme Left to extreme Right, were unanimous in their censure of the proposed military agreement between Pakistan and the USA. But neither this opposition nor the need to pay for American military aid with their country's independence stopped the ruling circles of Pakistan.

During the period under review, i.e., by 1954, Indo-Pakistan relations had deteriorated considerably.

## NOTES

1. *New Age*, July 18, 1954.
2. H. Mukerjee, *op. cit.*, p. 195.
3. K.M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas. Memoirs of a Diplomat*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1955, p. 61.
4. *ibid.*, pp. 67-68.
5. "For reasons of her own Burma was anxious that it should be the first non-Communist country to recognize New China and the Indian Government agreed to her request for a few days' start". (George N. Patterson, *Peking Versus Delhi*, Faber and Faber, London, 1963, p. 48.)
6. Two years later Nehru began to criticise the tendency for turning the UNO into a body representing the countries pursuing one policy. "The result is", said Nehru, "that a country as tremendous as China has been treated as though it did not exist and a small island off the coast of China is accepted as representing China". (*Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, p. 232.) But that was already after the United Nations had

compromised itself by its "joint action" in the aggressive war against the Korean people and Nehru said that it had become "a protector of colonialism in an indirect way". (*ibid.*, p. 224.)

7. H. Mukerjee, *op. cit.*, p. 205.
8. The other points were: Indonesian independence, US action in Korea, India's concern about American support of France and Bao Dai in Indo-China, India's refusal to sign the San Francisco Treaty with Japan, India's disagreement with the US position on Israel, India's indignation at the United States' leading role in having the Tunisian complaint ruled out of order by the Security Council in April 1952, and India's neutralist position in the cold war (W. Norman Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 271).
9. Chester Bowles, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
10. In this connection one must recall in the first place the 1907 Anglo-Russian treaty which Lenin epitomised in these words: "Britain and Russia divide Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet (preparing for war against Germany". (*Coll. Works*, Vol. 39, p. 687). Both sides agreed to recognise the immunity of Tibet, not to interfere in its internal affairs and communicate with Lhasa only through the Chinese suzerain (*Mezhdunarodnaya politika novейshogo vremeni v dogovorakh, notakh i deklaratsiyakh* [*Recent World Politics: Treaties, Notes and Declarations*], Vol. I, Moscow, 1925, pp. 176-177). Britain, which wanted to penetrate and gain a firm foot-hold in Tibet, convened in 1913 at Simla (India) a conference attended by herself, China and Tibet. After six months of discussions they effected a convention whereby Tibet was divided into "Outer Tibet" bordering on India and including Lhasa, and "Inner Tibet" bordering on China. Chinese suzerainty over the whole of Tibet was recognised. China recognised the autonomy of Outer Tibet and agreed not to interfere in its internal administration nor send any troops there. Borders between India, Tibet and China were demarcated. In April 1914 the convention was initialled by the parties. On April 25 Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Petersburg, handed in a copy of the convention to Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov (*Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya v epokhu imperializma* [*World Affairs under Imperialism*], Series No. 3, Vol. II, pp. 500-509). On July 11, 1914, however, Buchanan informed Sazonov that the Chinese Government had refused to recognise the Tibetan border in accordance with the initialled convention, disavowing the representative who had initialled it (*ibid.*, Vol. IV, pp. 225-227). Nevertheless, Tibet and Britain continued to recognise the convention as "binding upon themselves". (G.N. Patterson, *op. cit.*, p. 98.)
11. K.P. Karunakaran, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
12. G. Patterson, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102.
13. *The New York Times*, October 25, 1949.

14. Frank Moraes, *The Revolt in Tibet*, MacMillan Co., New York, 1960, p. 118.
15. M. Brecher, *India and World Politics...*, p. 164.
16. K.M. Panikkar, op. cit., pp. 112-113.
17. V.P. Nikhamin, *Ocherki Vneshney politiki Indii, 1947-1957*. (Notes on India's Foreign Policy, 1947-1957), p. 166.
18. K.M. Panikkar, op. cit., p. 113.
19. F. Moraes, *The Revolt in Tibet*, pp. 122-123.
20. *Parliamentary Debates, Parliament of India Official Report*, Delhi, 1950, Vol. VI, No. 17, Part II, cols. 1266-1267.
21. *ibid.*, col. 1280.
22. *ibid.*, col. 1283.
23. *ibid.*, cols. 1287-1288.
24. Minocher Rustum Masani, Founder and Joint Secretary of the All-India Congress Socialist Party: in 1941 took employment with the monopolist Tata family, heading three of their companies: in 1948-49 was Indian Ambassador to Brazil (*India and Pakistan Year-Book*, 1949, p. 766). Ten years later Masani took part in the founding of the Right-wing Swatantra party.
25. *Parliamentary Debates, Parliament of India*, Vol. VI, No. 17, Part II, col. 1299.
26. *ibid.*, No. 18, col. 1363.
27. *ibid.*, col. 1367.
28. M. Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography*, p. 372.
29. *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. IX, No. 17, col. 5271.
30. In the light of these steps taken by India, the following assertion of Satyanarayan Sinha, an Indian secret service agent and international adventurer, seems utterly fantastic. He alleged that the Chinese, who were in great haste to reach Lhasa, approached the Indian Government and obtained permission to transport rice and equipment for their troops in Tibet, as well as some military personnel, via Calcutta and further along the good roads through the capital of Sikkim, Gangtok (S. Sinha, *Adrift on the Ganges*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1964, pp. 189-90).
31. *Pravda*, August 28, 1951.
32. *Parliamentary Debates, House of the People, Official Report*, Delhi, 1952, Vol. I, No. 14, col. 566.
33. *The Times of India*, September 17, 1952.

34. A.M. Halpern, *op cit.*, p. 207.
35. R. Lohia, *India, China and Northern Frontiers*, Havahind, Hyderabad, 1963, p. 139.
36. On April 26, 1952, an Indian delegation headed by V.L. Pandit set off for China. It was warmly welcomed in the Chinese People's Republic. Receptions were given in its honour; it met Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. On May 13 *The Hindustan Times* printed a report from Peking, entitled "Indian Mission Impressed by China's Constructive Effort".
37. *The Times of India*, May 29, 1951.
38. *Free Press Journal*, September 4, 1951.
39. *National Herald*, Lucknow, November 19, 1952.
40. The line established as the eastern section of the border between India and Tibet (east of Bhutan) as a result of an exchange of letters on March 1914 between McMahon (Britain) and Lonchen Shatra (Tibet), which took place during the 1913-1914 Simla Conference already mentioned here.
41. This is quite clear from the secret correspondence between Nehru and B.N. Rau which was used by B. Shiva Rao in his article in *The Statesman* weekly, entitled "Nehru and the UN; Korea, China's Admission, Kashmir" (*The Statesman* weekly, December 11, 1965).
42. The Commission was set up by a decision of the UN General Assembly in December 1948, presumably to render good offices in the unification of Korea. In Krishna Menon's view, "the whole of the Korean business was an understanding—I don't use any stronger word—between Trygve Lie (UN Secretary-General in 1946-1953—*Y.N.*) on the one hand and the Americans on the other". (M. Brecher, *India and World Politics...* p. 34). Subsequently, early in 1956, Prime Minister Nehru told the correspondent of a Swiss newspaper, *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, that he did not consider North Korea guilty of aggression in 1950, as a detailed study of the documents had led him to believe that the real causes of the Korean conflict lay in Syngman Rhee's policy. (V.P. Nikhamin, *op. cit.*, p. 82.)
43. *The Hindustan Times*, June 30, 1950.
44. *Congress Bulletin*, issued by the Office of the All India Congress Committee, No. 5, July-August, 1950, p. 205.
45. *Indian Express*, July 10, 1950.
46. On November 8, 1950, a medical unit numbering 29 officers and 300 men left Calcutta for Korea.
47. *Vneslniyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza. Dokumenty i materialy. 1950* (*Soviet Foreign Policy. Documents and Materials. 1950*), Moscow, 1953, pp. 27-28.

48. *The New York Times*, August 13, 1950.
49. *National Herald*, August 24, 1950.
50. *ibid.*, September 3, 1950.
51. K.M. Panikkar, op. cit., p. 110.
52. M. Brecher, *Nehru : A Political Biography*, p. 556.
53. Ch. Bowles, op. cit., p. 239.
54. Panikkar wrote that his fear was "that though the Americans might be dissuaded from dropping atom bombs, they might in desperation attack Manchuria" and then "the Soviets would intervene..." (op. cit., p. 117.)
55. *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. VI, No. 18, Part II, col. 1365.
56. *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. VI, No. 17, Part II, col. 1274.
57. *ibid.*, No. 18, Part II, col. 1341.
58. *ibid.*, No. 17, col. 1290.
59. *ibid.*, No. 18, col. 1324.
60. *ibid.*, No. 17, cols. 1301-1302.
61. *ibid.*, No. 18, Part II, cols. 1377, 1385, 1380.
62. G.H. Jansen, op. cit., pp. 102, 105.
63. V.P. Nikhamin, op. cit., p. 88.
64. G.H. Jansen, op. cit., p. 110.
65. K.P. Karunakaran, *India in World Affairs, February 1950-December 1953*, Oxford University Press, Calcutta, 1958, p. 106.
66. *The Hindustan Times*, April 11, 1951.
67. *Parliamentary Debates. Parliament of India. Official Report. 1951*, Vol. IX, No. 17, Part II, col. 5251.
68. Wife of A. Kripalani. In 1947-1948 she was a member of the Congress Working Committee and was elected to the Constituent Assembly. Shortly before the general election both she and her husband left the Congress party : he organised the Praja Party (Peasants', Workers' and People's Party) and she was elected to Parliament from the Socialist Party. (*Indian Parliament—1952-57*, Ed. by Trilochan Singh, Arunam and Sheel, New Delhi, p. 155.)
69. *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1949-1953*, New Delhi, 1954, p. 219.
70. *ibid.*, p. 225.
71. One of the two Members representing in Parliament a small party which expressed the interests mostly of the petty bourgeoisie of Bengal.

72. *National Herald*, June 27, 1952.
73. *Par. Debates*, 1952, Vol. I, No. 30, col. 1315.
74. Chester Bowles quotes a rather typical statement of an Indian professor who said that after the US had dropped atom bombs on Japan "millions of Asians are willing to believe that, at least where Asian lives are concerned, you would not hesitate at even this new technique of mass killing of noncombatants". (Chester Bowles, op. cit., p. 224.)
75. As is known, expulsion of S. Kitchlew from Amritsar by the British authorities sparked off the notorious events at Amritsar on April 13, 1919. Analysing the new features of the national liberation movement in the East at that time, Lenin wrote: "British India is at the head of these countries, and there revolution is maturing in proportion, on the one hand, to the growth of the industrial and railway proletariat, and, on the other, to the increase in the brutal terrorism of the British, who with ever greater frequency resort to massacres (Amritsar), public floggings, etc". (Lenin, *Coll. Works*, Vol. 32, p. 455).  
During British domination Kitchlew was imprisoned six times, spending altogether about ten years behind bars.
76. *Congress Bulletin*, issued by the Office of the All India Congress Committee, No. 3, April-September, 1952, p. 133.
77. M. Brecher, *India and World Politics...*, p. 38.
78. *The Hindustan Times*, February 12, 1953.
79. *Par. Debates, Council of States*, 1953, Vol. III, No. 2, col. 109.
80. *ibid.*, col. 152.
81. *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1949-1953...* p. 249.
82. *The Hindustan Times*, June 26, 1953.
83. *ibid.*, July 11, 1953.
84. *The Hindu*, Madras, August 26, 1953.
85. *The Hindustan Times*, August 28, 1953.
86. Chester Bowles, op. cit., p. 231.
87. W. Norman Brown wrote that Tandon was opposed to inoculation, modern medicine and "other innovations". (op. cit., p. 192.)
88. Ronald Segal, *The Crisis of India*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1965, p. 246.
89. M.V. Ramana Rao, *A Short History of the Indian National Congress*, S. Chand & Co., Delhi-Jullundur-Lucknow, 1959, p. 291.
90. *Political Outlook in India Today. A Pre-election Study*, Ed. by J.R. Chandran, Bangalore, 1956, p. 61.



91. *ibid.*
92. M.V. Ramana Rao, op. cit., pp. 202-203.
93. *National Herald*, October 18, 1951.
94. *Resolutions on Foreign Policy, 1947-57*, All India Congress Committee, New Delhi, 1957, p. 5.
95. *ibid.*, p. 9.
96. *The Hindustan Times*, October 19, 1951. The important principle that India was neutral only from the angle of participation in military blocs or the cold war was further elaborated by Nehru in other speeches on foreign policy. (Cf., *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1940-1953...*, p. 216).
97. That is, all the states, except Kashmir and five small states which had no legislatures and were administered by Lieutenant-Governors appointed by the President of the Republic.
98. M.V. Ramana Rao, op. cit., p. 205.
99. *A Contemporary History of India*, Eds., V.V. Balabushevich, A.M. Dyakov, People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1954, p. 529.
100. R. Lohia, *The Third Camp in World Affairs*, Bombay, 1951, p. 15.
101. *Free Press Journal*, November 26, 1951.
102. *Pioneer*, June 17, 1951. It is worth noting that an Indian newspaper wrote that as the manifesto promulgated "a classless and a casteless society" the party "sets itself frankly as a proletarian organisation ... If the Praja Party is a proletarian organisation, neither Acharya Kripalani nor his close associates are qualified to lead it." (*Free Press Journal*, June 18, 1951.)
103. The decision proved counteractive. For example, the entire Amer city organisation left the Hindu Mahasabha in protest.
104. *Hindu Mahasabha, 29th Session, Poona, 1951, Presidential Address by Dr. B.N. Khare*, p. 36.
105. After long talks between its leader Golwalkar and Minister for Home Affairs and States Patel, RSS declared, in July 1949, that it was giving up terroristic and conspirational methods, whereupon the ban on it was lifted and its imprisoned members were released from detention.
106. *Manifesto of Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Adopted by the All India Convention of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh held on 21st Oct 1951*, Arjun Press, Delhi, 1951, p. 9.
107. *The Hindustan Times*, November 14, December 26, 1951.

108. *Programme of the Communist Party of India. Adopted by the Third Party Congress, Madurai, December 27, 1953, to January 4, 1954*, pp. 4-5. On the subsequent change of the characteristic of the Government, see Ajoy Ghosh's article. (*New Age*, Political Monthly of the Communist Party of India, December, 1955).
109. *Programme of the Communist Party of India. Adopted by the Third Party Congress, Madurai, December 27, 1953, to January 4, 1954*, p. 5.
110. *Assam Tribune*, August 27, 1951.
111. When Norman Cousins, editor of the *Saturday Review* (an American magazine), who was on a lecture tour in India in 1951, began to refer to the immense American aid to Japan and said : "The Japanese are now eating better than they ever did before", a listener asked this question : "Would you then say, sir, that India's mistake is in not ever having declared war on the United States of America ?" (Chester Bowles, op. cit., p. 376.)
112. An Indian newspaper subsequently reported that two MP's who were responsible for the sending of the cable had received from the US Ambassador in India, Loy Henderson, Rs 50,000. (*Cross Roads*, March 16 1951).
113. *The Hindustan Times*, April 7, 1951.
114. *The New York Times*, May 13, 1951.
115. Chester Bowles, op. cit., p. 220.
116. Y.V. Gankovsky, L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya, op. cit., p. 155.
117. K.P. Karunakaran, *India in World Affairs, February 1950-December 1953*, Oxford University Press, Calcutta, 1958, p. 175.
118. V.G. Deshpande, *Why Hindu Rashtra ???* A summary of speech delivered by Prof. V G. Deshpande, Delhi, 1949, p. 10.
119. *ibid.*, p. 15.
120. Anand Mohan Sahay, *The Lid Off RSS*, Jain Book Agency, New Delhi, 1950, pp. 46-48.
121. *ibid.*, p. 54.
122. K.P. Karunakaran, op. cit., pp. 175-176.
123. *Parliamentary Debates...*, 1950, Vol. IV, No. 14, cols 3018-3021.
124. Balraj Madhok, *Dr. Syanta Prasad Mukherjee. A Biography*, Deepak Prakashan, New Delhi, 1954, pp. 45-46. Soon after, Kamath left Congress and joined the Socialist Party.
125. K.P. Karunakaran. op. cit., p. 177.
126. *Hitavada*, Nagpur, September 15, 1950.

127. *Congress Bulletin*, No. 6, Sept.-Oct. 1950, p. 231.
128. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1950, Vol. VI, No. 17, Part II, col. 1259. During the debate, S.P. Mookerjee, as usual, criticised Nehru for his "conciliatory policy" towards Pakistan (*ibid.*, col. 1285), while A. Kripalani said that "we must make it clear to our neighbours that we shall defend our rights with our life's blood". (*ibid.*, col. 1291).
129. *ibid.*, 1951, Vol. IX, No. 17, col. 5296.
130. *The Pakistan Times*, July 17, 1951.
131. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1951, Vol. IX, No. 4, col. 182.
132. *The Hindustan Times*, September 7, 1951.
133. *Parliamentary Debates. House of the People*, 1952, Vol. I, No. 4, cols. 131-132.
134. A detailed justification of Britain's attitude was supplied by William Barton, a high-ranking British official, in an article in the *American Foreign Affairs* magazine, which gave six reasons, the main one being the establishment of an "Islamic bloc" of Pakistan and other Middle East countries as a "barrier to Communism".
135. V. Kumar, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-126.
136. Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir. A Study in India-Pakistan Relations*, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1967, p. 219.
137. *ibid.*
138. *The Hindu*, January 17, 1951.
139. Sisir Gupta, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-228.
140. V. Kumar, *op. cit.*, p. 147.
141. *The Hindustan Times*, April 10, 1951.
142. *Par. Debates. Par. of India. Official Report*, Vol. IX, No. 17, Part II, col. 5276.
143. On August 15, 1950, in Kashmir a law was passed which became effective on October 17, on dispossessing landowners of estates in excess of 22.75 acres and distributing the same among landless peasants. Compensation, however, remained an open question.
144. The reference was to Article 31 of the Indian Constitution stipulating obligatory payment of compensation for confiscated property.
145. *Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly. Official Report*, 1952, Vol. II, No. III, p. 3.
146. An Indian bourgeois newspaper correctly pointed out that this decision by the Kashmir Constituent Assembly would arouse a wide response throughout India, as well as abroad. (*Amrita Bazar Patrika*, April 3, 1952.)

147. Lord Birdwood, *Two Nations and Kashmir*, Robert Hale Ltd., London, 1956, p. 166.
148. The bill on the election procedure was approved by the Assembly on November 12, 1952. On November 14, Sheikh Abdullah proposed that Yuvraj Karan Singh, son of the last maharaja, be elected Head of State, and on November 17, 1952, the young man, 21 years old, occupied the post of the first elected *Sadar-i-Riyasat* (Head of State).
149. Lord Birdwood, op. cit., p. 167.
150. *ibid.*
151. *The Hindu*, July 6, 1952.
152. *The Times of India*, June 16, 1952.
153. Article 370 of the Indian Constitution was formulated in 1952. For a detailed exposition of the article, see S. Gupta, op. cit., pp. 371-373.
154. *Cross Roads*, August 3, 1952.
155. *Parliamentary Debates, House of the People*, Vol. IV, cols. 5775-5776.
156. *ibid.*, col. 5922.
157. Sisir Gupta, op. cit., p. 373.
158. Lord Birdwood, op. cit., p. 166.
159. *Parliamentary Debates, House of the People*, Vol. IV, cols. 1569-1573.
160. *The Hindustan Times*, December 31, 1952.
161. *The Hindustan Times*, January 1, 1953.
162. *Par. Debates, House of the People*, Official Report, Part II, 5, Part II, col. 421.
163. *ibid.*, No. 6, Part II, col. 468.
164. V. Kumar, op. cit., p. 161.
165. *Cross Roads*, August 2, 1953.
166. *The Hindustan Times*, August 11, 1953.
167. *Parliamentary Debates, Council of States*, 1953, Vol. III, No. 1, col. 18.
168. S. Gupta, op. cit., p. 277.
169. *The Hindu*, July 29, 1952.
170. S. Gupta, op. cit., p. 270.

171. It is worth noting that earlier the Jana Sangh leaders repeatedly opposed the settlement of any problems with Pakistan until the "main problem", the Kashmir question, had been settled.
172. *The Times of India*, September 13, 1953.
173. *Dawn*, August 27, 1953.
174. *Parliamentary Debates. House of the People*, 1953, Vol. I, No. 4, Part II, cols. 227-228.
175. S. Gupta, op. cit., p. 260.
176. *The Hindustan Times*, November 26, 1953.

## Emergence of India's “Positive Neutrality” Policy (1954-1955)

### India and Military Blocs in Asia

TENSION MOUNTED in Asia in 1954 and early 1955 as the imperialists engineered military blocs to encircle the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as a follow-up to the start made in 1949, when the North Atlantic Pact was signed. Referring to the international situation in Asia, Nehru said in Parliament in March 1955 that it was changing for the worse. Having condemned the Dulles formula of negotiation through strength, Nehru said derisively: “Simply because a person has got a hydrogen bomb, it does not mean that his mind has also become as powerful as the hydrogen bomb”.<sup>1</sup>

The establishment of military-political blocs in Asia by the imperialists implied that Asians would be used as cannon fodder in a future war. On March 23, 1954, H. Mukerjee, a leading member of the Communist group in the Indian Parliament, cited in Parliament an excerpt from the US Congress records of June-July 1953, showing how financially advantageous it was to get somebody else to fight one's war. It said: “Whereas the average cost of an American soldier before he had a gun in his hand would be 5,566 dollars, this Mutual Security Programme would cost less than 10 dollars for a foreign [Read “Asian”—Y.N.] soldier to help him put a gun in his hand”. Further, according to a speech made by John M. Vorys in the American

House of Representatives, the Americans wanted to "arm and equip 4,900,000 men..."<sup>2</sup> for their aggressive ends.

In seeking to set up military blocs in Asia, the US ruling circles expected to use them for suppressing the national liberation movement on that continent. In May 1953, State Secretary Dulles said : "...all of Southeast Asia is today in great peril, and if Indo-China should be lost, there would be a chain reaction throughout the Far East and South Asia".<sup>3</sup> Forced in July 1953 to stop hostilities in Korea, the United States did everything to prevent France's defeat in the colonial war in Indo-China that had been going on for more than seven years. It shouldered 76 per cent of the expenses of its French ally.<sup>4</sup> When, in the spring of 1954, the French forces in Indo-China found themselves in a critical situation, the United States wanted to organise intervention with the participation of Britain and other countries and was even prepared to use atomic weapons. This suggestion was, however, declined by British Prime Minister Churchill, who had made a more sober appraisal of the balance of forces in the world, fearing that such actions might put the world on the brink of full-scale war.

It was an important part of the US imperialists' strategic plans to use Pakistan for their ends. To achieve this objective, it was decided as a first step to grant Pakistan military aid. India could not be indifferent to how the armament of Pakistan might affect her own international position. Indian opinion did not, for instance, overlook the highly meaningful interview given by Pakistan's Prime Minister to the *US News and World Report* on January 15, 1954. Replying to the question of how a military agreement with the United States would affect Pakistan's relations with India, the Prime Minister said that they would improve "as the military strength of the two countries became more nearly equal" and explained that this, in its turn, would, presumably, make the settlement of the Kashmir question easier. "At present, we can't get a settlement", he said, "mainly because India has greater military strength.. When there is more equality of military strength, then I am sure that there will be greater chance of a settlement". If we consider that a little earlier the self-same Prime Minister, after stating that Pakistan had no intention of settling the Kashmir issue by

armed force, added, "I cannot say what will happen in future",<sup>5</sup> it will be clear to us why the Indians were so worried about future relations with Pakistan. According to the Indian scholar M.S. Rajan, apart from the Kashmir question, nothing else since independence caused so much anxiety to the Indian Government leaders and people as the question of American military aid to Pakistan.<sup>6</sup>

Judging by numerous statements by Nehru and other Indian statesmen, the reasons why they strongly objected to US military aid to Pakistan were as follows :

(a) The Indians feared lest Indo-Pakistan relations, which had not been very cordial from the start, should become even more aggravated, thereby diminishing the chance of a peaceful settlement of disputes. Thus, Nehru stated in his letter of December 9, 1953, to the Prime Minister of Pakistan that acceptance of US military aid would affect above all negotiations on Kashmir, and all talk about demilitarisation in Kashmir would become absurd. (In Parliament, Nehru said that the less chance there was of peaceful settlement of disputes with Pakistan, the greater the danger of war became.) Regardless of the quantum of that aid and whether or not military bases were given [to the United States, on Pakistan's territory—Y.N.] and a military alliance concluded, once that type of aid came in, it made "a qualitative difference to the situation.... When military aid comes in, the whole country becomes a base....".<sup>7</sup>

(b) (By giving military aid to Pakistan the USA became a third side in Indo-Pakistan relations) since both it and Pakistan would inevitably support each other in their bilateral relations with India. As the Pakistanis asserted that there was not much difference between foreign military and economic aid, Nehru said that "when military aid is taken, the relationship between the giver and the taker of such aid at once becomes military. You cannot escape from it. (If our country takes military aid from America, there is not the shadow of a doubt that we will have to merge India into the American bloc.) This would be the direct result of receiving such aid, (and we would have to quit following our independent policy)".<sup>8</sup> By this Nehru intimated that by taking military aid Pakistan merged herself into the American bloc and would follow American policy.



(c) In January 1954, Nehru in a public speech said directly and unequivocally that military intervention by European powers and America in Asian affairs would enhance colonialism and hinder the growth of the national liberation movement in those Asian countries which were still fighting colonial domination in one form or another.<sup>9</sup>

(In the diplomatic struggle for preventing US military aid to Pakistan, India expected to be supported by Britain.) Although up to that time the British ruling circles had more often taken Pakistan's side in Indo-Pakistan disputes and, above all, on the Kashmir question, Nehru and his advisers supposed that as it was a matter of estrangement between two members of the Commonwealth, Britain would try to keep the United States from taking that step. Similar hopes were expressed also in the British press. A no less important newspaper than the *Times* wrote about it in its editorial on January 12, 1954. But these hopes soon collapsed when Secretary for Commonwealth Relations Swinton said that the American plan was "a perfectly legitimate arrangement and nothing to make a fuss over".<sup>10</sup>

In the United States some prominent statesmen and public figures challenged the advisability of giving military aid to Pakistan.<sup>11</sup>

In spite of India's protests, the US National Security Council, at the beginning of February 1954, decided in principle the question of military aid to Pakistan, which was followed by an official request from Pakistan for such aid.<sup>12</sup> On February 24, 1954, the American Ambassador to India delivered a letter from Eisenhower to Nehru informing him of the decision to grant military aid to Pakistan. The US President wrote: "... I want you to know directly from me that this step does not in any way affect the friendship we feel for India". He tried to convince Nehru that the decision was not aimed against India in any way, assuring him that American economic and technical aid to India would continue and concluded by saying that should the Indian Government want military aid as well, its request would receive "most sympathetic consideration".<sup>13</sup>

In connection with Eisenhower's letter, Nehru made a long speech in Parliament on March 1, 1954. He categorically rejected the offer of American military aid to India and, describing

American policy in Asia, referred to a recently-published speech in the US Congress of the Assistant Secretary of State, Walter Robertson, who was reported to have said that the United States must dominate Asia for an indefinite period.<sup>14</sup> Nehru demanded the removal from the UN force in Kashmir of the American military observers.<sup>15</sup> He said : "These American Observers can no longer be treated by us as neutrals in this dispute, and hence their presence there appears to us to be improper".<sup>16</sup>

(The US decision on military aid to Pakistan had far-reaching consequences for India as it affected the whole complex of her relations with Pakistan.)

India's first step in answer to this decision was to speed up the legalisation of the accession of Kashmir. (By the end of January 1954 talks took place in Delhi between a Kashmir Government delegation headed by Prime Minister Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and the Indian Government on the practical implementation of the Delhi Agreement on Kashmir's accession to India, which had been concluded in July 1952.) Next, on February 6, 1954, the Kashmir Constituent Assembly approved the report of the Constitution Committee, thereby ratifying in fact the Delhi Agreement.<sup>17</sup> The Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan immediately demanded that the Prime Minister of India cancel the decision of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly which, they alleged, violated India's international commitments under Security Council resolutions, as well as the recent understanding reached between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. (Speaking in Parliament in this connection on February 22, 1954, Nehru said that the people of Kashmir had a right to endorse their Constitution; as for India's international commitments she would certainly honour them. "To ask me...to repudiate the Constituent Assembly's decision", Nehru continued, "is manifestly...quite absurd."<sup>18</sup>)

(Nehru said further that although Kashmir's accession to India in October 1947 was complete and legal and needed no confirmation or ratification, "nevertheless, we had said that the People of Kashmir should be given an opportunity to express their wishes about their future, and we had agreed to a plebiscite under proper conditions".<sup>19</sup>) In spite of this affirmation

of India's consent to a plebiscite, it is easily established that the Indian Government circles were increasingly averse to hold it.<sup>20</sup>

The first official evidence of it was the statement made by the Home Minister, G.B. Pant, in a press interview in July 1955, at Srinagar.<sup>21</sup> After the protest made in this connection by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nehru tried to moderate Pant's statement.<sup>22</sup> It, however, had become clear that it was not in the interests of India to comply with Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir.

(In May 1955, during his talks with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nehru put forward for the first time his proposal to settle the Kashmir question on the basis of recognising the January 1, 1949, ceasefire line as the state border between India and Pakistan.) In proposing it, Nehru underlined that American military aid to Pakistan had destroyed the "roots and foundations" of plebiscite in Kashmir. A year later, (in April 1956, Nehru said it publicly mentioning that in May 1955 the Pakistani Prime Minister had not given his reaction to the proposal.<sup>23</sup>)

Besides the Kashmir question, there were, of course, also other outstanding problems in Indo-Pakistan relations.

(One of the consequences of general aggravation of Indo-Pakistan relations after mid-1954 was that the calls for *jehad* against India became louder and the incidents on the border between India and Pakistan became more frequent.) There were more than 650 such incidents in 1955 alone.

Lastly, it must be mentioned that the conclusion of the US-Pakistan military agreement led to a growth of armaments both in Pakistan and India. The President of the Indian National Congress, U.N. Dhebar, said in this connection in January 1956 that American military aid to Pakistan had saddled India with the burden of arms spending. This burden had to be sustained by the Indian people and was one of the factors which indirectly determined the growth of anti-Pakistan feelings in all political parties in India.

(The Government's foreign policy got increasing support both from Congress and the opposition parties.) Even the parties and leaders that used to take an extremely hostile

attitude, now, in the face of war menace, supported Nehru's foreign policy, criticising merely some of its aspects.

One must also remember that after the 1951-1952 general elections the Indian Government was formed completely of representatives of the Indian National Congress, and Nehru was in a much stronger position both in the Government and in the leadership of the ruling party.

The annual session of the Congress was held in January 1954, at Kalyani (West Bengal). At that time the party had a membership of 8.5 million. It is significant that for the first time the address by the President of Congress at the session dealt mainly with foreign affairs. In connection with the proposed conclusion of a (US-Pakistan military pact,) the address pointed out that it "had created a grave situation which deserved the earnest attention of the people of India."<sup>24</sup> The Indian press observed that at the session the anti-American mood of the rank-and-file delegates had been manifested for the first time, whereas Working Committee members carefully avoided making any critical remarks about the United States during the debate.<sup>25</sup>

After the session, when American military aid had, after all, been given to Pakistan, the anti-American mood became more pronounced among the Party leadership as well as the Congress rank-and-file. Evidence of it was the circular of the Secretary-General of the Indian National Congress, sent in March 1954 to all provincial committees, suggesting that meetings be held throughout the country for the purpose of explaining the harm done to India by granting American military aid to Pakistan. The circular said: "The United States has offered military aid to Pakistan, despite protests raised by India and other countries...Practically the cold war has come to our doors..."<sup>26</sup> The anti-American mood and full support of the Government's policy persisted in Congress throughout the period under review (1954-1955).

(The Government's foreign policy was supported also by the Praja Socialist Party.<sup>27</sup>) Its leaders' criticism of the policy referred merely to individual foreign policy problems (e.g., to membership in the Commonwealth) or to some tactical details. Thus, (Acharya Kripalani said in Parliament that India's foreign

policy produced the impression abroad that it alternately inclined towards one or the other of the blocs.) At the same time, Right-wing Socialist leaders, R. M. Lohia in particular, kept putting forward the idea of a "third bloc" but after the split of the Praja Socialist Party in June 1955 and the emergence of the Socialist Party headed by Lohia, this conception was taken up by the new party along with its author.)

(The Jana Sangh, on the whole, supported the Government policy line,) although it criticised Nehru for allegedly viewing internal and other problems through "international glasses" and so helping neither his country nor the cause of peace. At the same time, it must be noted that the strengthening of friendship with the Soviet Union in 1955 ruffled the pro-Western leaders of the Jana Sangh who began to criticise the Government for "a steady alienation of the west and a drift towards the Russian camp".<sup>28</sup>

(The Hindu Mahasabha, even before 1954, tried to wage a campaign against the Pakistan-propagated pan-Islamism.) A curious feature of this campaign was that this party of Hindu reactionaries tried to turn to account the people's anti-imperialist feelings, assiduously emphasising that pan-Islamism was an offspring of Anglo-American imperialism. After the Americans began to rearm Pakistan and the Indian Government adopted a tougher line towards Pakistan, the Hindu Mahasabha, while demanding a renunciation of neutralism and a speedy armament of India, simultaneously supported the Nehru Government.<sup>29</sup>

(The Communist Party of India in 1951-1953 often criticised the Government for allowing the British military to carry across India the Gurkhas recruited in Nepal for the colonial war in Malaya and even to open recruiting stations on Indian territory close to the Nepal border.) In November 1953 Nehru admitted in Parliament that not only was there a tripartite agreement signed with Britain and Nepal in 1947, whereby the Indian Government provided for the transportation of Gurkhas from Nepal, but also that camps for training Gurkhas continued to function on Indian territory. Nehru said further that the Indian Government had requested Britain and Nepal to reconsider the agreement and close the training camps.<sup>30</sup>

The Indian Communists also criticised the Government for allowing French and US aircraft carrying troops and equipment for the colonial war in Vietnam to fly over Indian territory and even land on Indian airfields. (In December 1953, in reply to proposed US military aid to Pakistan, the CPI urged the Indian Government to introduce universal compulsory military training for all citizens.) At public meetings, the Party leaders supported Nehru's appeal to the nation to stand united so as to face the dangerous development of affairs.<sup>31</sup> In the middle of 1955 the CPI observed with satisfaction that "the foreign policy of the Government of India had undergone a welcome change" but continued to disapprove of some of its aspects (in particular, of India's being in the Commonwealth).<sup>32</sup> At its 4th Congress at Palghat in April 1956, the CPI stated that the "emergence of India as a sovereign and independent republic upholding the cause of peace and freedom is a factor of profound significance in the present-day world".<sup>33</sup>

Subsequently, the Communist Party of India, which at first supported the Nehru Government on the question of its policy towards Pakistan, began, in accordance with the evolution of the Government's foreign-policy, to give general support to its foreign policy line.

The aforementioned criticism by the opposition parties of individual aspects of the Government's foreign policy did not affect the general support for Nehru's foreign policy line by the internal political forces in India in 1954-1955. In that period the voice of what Krishna Menon called an "American lobby" sounded lonely. Thus, when on March 23, 1954, Parliament discussed the allocations to be made to the Ministry of External Affairs, just one Member ventured to say that he did not condemn or question the motives of the US Government in giving military aid to Pakistan. He was Frank Anthony, of the Anglo-Indian community.<sup>34</sup>

American military aid to Pakistan and the stepping up of US imperialist policy in Asia on the whole were important factors behind the evolution of India's foreign policy towards positive neutrality. That came to mean neutralism accompanied by practical actions for preserving world peace, i.e., non-participation in blocs combined with vigorous moves against the

establishment of imperialist military alliances, for universal disarmament and elimination of colonialism.

The armament of Pakistan by American imperialism showed that India's non-participation in blocs was still not enough to avert the menace of war.

The first indication of the evolution of India's foreign policy was her great contribution to the achievement of a ceasefire in Indo-China. Before 1954, the Indian Government's attitude towards the French war in Indo-China was contradictory. On the one hand, Panikkar wrote, "the sympathy of the people of India was...on the side of the national freedom movement", but in so far as Ho Chi Minh "had not established his authority over the entire State...we had been careful to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality".<sup>35</sup> On the other hand, as already mentioned, the Indian Government allowed Indian airfields to be used by aircraft carrying combat equipment and French soldiers to Indo-China. At the end of December, 1953, Nehru, referring to the proposed US military aid to Pakistan, said that "India would not allow foreign troops on her soil under any circumstances and any pretext".<sup>36</sup> And in March 1954, replying to a question in Parliament about the American planes carrying French troops to Indo-China across Indian airspace, Nehru explicitly stated that the Indian Government did not allow it.<sup>37</sup>

(On February 22, 1954, Nehru made an appeal for a ceasefire in Indo-China.<sup>38</sup>) What caused the Indian Government to take this step? Michael Brecher believes that the reason was the fear that the "outbreak of war between super-powers would wreck the ambitious programme set in motion by Nehru and his colleagues..."<sup>39</sup> M.S. Rajan believes that there were three reasons: (a) The Indians saw in Indo-China a typical national struggle against a foreign imperialist authority and the latter's attempt to suppress this struggle by the use of force; (b) they wanted to maintain and enlarge a peace area around India; and (c) they wanted to promote the interests of Asian countries so as to gain for Asia and Asians the right to a due voice in world affairs.<sup>40</sup> Krishna Menon said that India had become involved in the Indo-China conflict "because it's Asia, it is peace". All the reasons quoted above were true. But weren't they there

earlier, say, in 1963? In our opinion, the decision of the United States to supply Pakistan with weapons was regarded by India as the last link in America's imperialist policy in Asia. It brought the danger of war closer to the borders of India and made the Indian Government step up its efforts to consolidate peace in Asia.

According to K.P.S. Menon, former Indian Ambassador to the USSR, 'Nehru's proposal that a ceasefire be declared in Indo-China aroused lively interest in France while England was polite and America was cold and almost hostile.

(In March 1954, fighting in Indo-China became even more bitter.) American diplomacy put it down to the influence of China. It is of great interest therefore that Nehru said on March 23 in Parliament that the war in Indo-China had begun 'before the culmination of the Chinese revolution'. He noted that "...people are apt to tie up too much what is happening in Indo-China with China. Now, it is quite clear that for the the first year or two or more what happened in Indo-China had nothing to do with China: it was something which arose in Indo-China".<sup>43</sup>

Nehru's sharp criticism of US military aid to Pakistan, his insistence on the withdrawal of American observers from Kashmir, his efforts to bring about a ceasefire in Indo-China, etc., gave rise to personal attacks on him in the American press. In this vein newspapers printed the report of an American correspondent in India, Robert Trumbull, containing allegations about serious differences in the Indian Parliament and Nehru's imminent downfall.

(In accordance with the decision of the four-nation Foreign Ministers' Conference in Berlin, a conference of all interested countries to discuss a peaceful settlement of the Korean and Indo-China issues was to open in Geneva on April 26.) Two days earlier, on April 24, Nehru made a speech in the Indian Parliament, putting forward a six-point programme for the establishment of peace in Indo-China. It envisaged an immediate ceasefire, that France grant the countries of Indo China independence, that the great powers agree on non-interference in the affairs of these countries, and so on.<sup>44</sup>

These proposals formed the basis of the *Commonwealth of the*



conference of the Prime Ministers of five countries which convened on April 29-May 2, 1954, in Colombo. The Conference which was called on the initiative of the Prime Minister of Ceylon, John Kotelawala, was attended by Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Burma. Pakistan agreed to attend the Conference only upon receiving assurances from Ceylon that the subject of talks between Pakistan and the United States about their military alliance would not be discussed.<sup>45</sup> The Conference had to cope with many difficulties. For one thing the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, tried to have the Kashmir question included in the agenda. Nehru objected, saying that in that case he would bring up the question of US aid to Pakistan. The Prime Ministers rejected the proposal cabled to the Conference by the British Foreign Minister, A. Eden, that they should take part in "guaranteeing Indo-China's future" (naturally, by military means). Obviously, the participants in the Conference had no difficulty in recognising it as an attempt to set up a military bloc in South-East Asia.

(There was a great deal of argument on one of Nehru's six points, the one about the non-interference of great powers in the affairs of Indo-China.) Mohammed Ali was against including it in the communique, whereas the Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu, said that if it was not included, he would not sign the communique. A compromise solution was found, and the communique stated that the success of direct negotiations in Indo-China would be greatly helped "by agreement on the part of all countries concerned, particularly China, the United Kingdom, United States, and Soviet Union, on steps necessary to prevent a recurrence or resumption of hostilities".

At the end, the Conference adopted a joint communique in which the participating countries demanded an immediate ceasefire in Indo-China and direct talks between the parties concerned, urged France to grant Indo-China independence, declared that the rights of the Chinese People's Republic in the UNO must be recognised, condemned colonialism as a violation of fundamental human rights and a menace to world peace, and so on.<sup>46</sup> The communique was brought to the notice of the members of the Geneva Conference. As K.P.S. Menon wrote, "This was the voice of Asia. It spoke on

the whole, recognises it as such, but America continues to regard Bao Dai, Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek as the pillars of Asian democracy".<sup>48</sup>

On May 18, 1954, there was a foreign policy debate in the Indian Parliament which was held in an atmosphere of general approval of the results of the Colombo Conference".<sup>49</sup>

The way the Geneva Conference proceeded in May-June inspired no great hopes of success; nothing was achieved with respect to the peaceful reunification of Korea; no progress was made in discussing Indo-China's problems. The British diplomatic service regarded a "Locarno-type pact for Asia" as the answer.<sup>50</sup> This proposal was made on June 23, by Eden, who had somewhat modified his idea of "a future safeguard" for Indo-China. Nehru rejected the proposal as going counter to the Indian policy of non-alignment.<sup>51</sup>

Late in June 1954, during a recess in the Geneva Conference, the Premier of the State Administrative Council of China, Chou En-lai, was invited to India. (The talks between Nehru and Chou En-lai terminated on June 28 in the signing of a joint statement on the principles on which relations between India and China were to be based. They were: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) non-aggression; (3) non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-existence.<sup>52</sup>) These principles were first set out in the preamble to the Indo-Chinese agreement on trade and communications between the Tibetan areas under China's control and India, which was signed on April 29, 1954, at Peking by Indian Ambassador to China N. Raghavan and Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Chang Han-fu. Nehru spoke very highly of this agreement. (He said: "We have done nothing better in the field of foreign affairs during the last six years than signing this agreement over Tibet".<sup>53</sup>)

Following India's example, the Government of Burma, too, signed a similar joint declaration with China. Subsequently, the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence of states or Panch Sheel gained the widest recognition and support of all peace-loving peoples and many governments.

When the conference in Geneva resumed its work in July

1954, the impact of such a factor as the joint Colombo Communiqué of five Prime Ministers was augmented by the declarations, just signed, on the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence of states. Although officially India did not take part in the conference at Geneva, an Indian representative, Krishna Menon, was sent there. His cooperation with the Soviet delegation and unofficial meetings with heads of other delegations contributed a great deal to the success of the talks. It was Menon who suggested the idea of Soviet and British co-chairmanship at the conference. He believed, not without reason, that it was "the only way to get this thing going" and as he put it, "It all sounds simple today but it was very difficult in those days".<sup>54</sup> India's involvement was such as to prompt the French Premier, Mendes-France, to speak of the conference as "this tenpower conference—the nine at the table—and India".<sup>55</sup>

The forces of peace won a major victory on July 21, 1954. The Geneva Accords were signed, and after nearly eight years of war there was peace in Indo-China. To supervise the fulfilment of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, international commissions were appointed, consisting of representatives of Canada, Poland and India and chaired by the latter. It was evidence of the international recognition of her services.

After the successful termination of the Geneva Conference, for the first time in many years there was no war in any part of the globe. The Geneva Accords signified the failure of the American diplomatic effort to use the Asian peoples in the military plans of the USA. They also provided the prerequisites for the independent development of the countries of South-East Asia, a highly important and large region. But this in no way suited the ruling circles of the United States and some other Western powers.

Even on the day the agreement on a truce in Indo-China was signed at Geneva, US President Eisenhower said at a press conference: "*The USA is actively pursuing discussions with other free nations with a view to the rapid organisation of a collective defence in South-East Asia to prevent further direct or indirect Communist aggression in that area*".<sup>56</sup>

In the course of these discussions, particular attention was given to drawing into the proposed military bloc the "Colombo Powers", i.e., India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon. As preparations were in progress for a conference to set up the new military alliance, Anthony Eden said that "without their understanding and support no permanent South-East Asia defence organisation could be fully effective".<sup>57</sup>

India reacted promptly and unequivocally. Nehru, who strongly objected to India's participation in the conference which was scheduled to take place on September 6, 1954, in the Philippines, as well as to the idea itself of a military bloc being established in South-East Asia, said on August 26, 1954, in the Council of States of the Indian Parliament that the conference in the Philippines was an attempt "to change the whole trend towards peace that the Geneva Conference had created..." Nehru stressed that "...this conception of countries agreeing to protect the other countries, whether the other countries want it or not, is...an old conception, which lasted at the time of the first World War".<sup>58</sup>

(During the debate, an overwhelming majority of the Members supported Nehru's position. The few critical remarks that were made were meant to fortify India's position of positive neutrality.<sup>59</sup>) There were only two opponents to such a policy among the speakers in the debate. For instance, S. Mahanty, representing the Gana Tantra Parishad, a party established by ex-princes in the State of Orissa, said that the Government's foreign policy "has been aimed at solving the outstanding foreign problems of other nations, while we have left our own outstanding problems in cold storage...."<sup>60</sup> Thus, Nehru's refusal to take part in the Philippines Conference was soundly supported in Parliament.

Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon followed India's example. Besides the United States, Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand, the Manila Conference which set up, on September 8, 1954, the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was attended only by three Asian states—Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan which were populated by hardly a tenth of the people of Asia.

In a statement issued on September 15, 1954, the Soviet

Foreign Ministry said that the agreement on establishing SEATO had been concluded to prepare for war, not to strengthen peace; it was to prevent the implementation of the Geneva Accords on Indo-China and bolster the positions of the colonial powers in Asia.<sup>61</sup> Speaking in Parliament on September 29, Nehru gave a similar description of SEATO. He said: "The Manila treaty rather comes in the way of that area of peace... and almost converts it into an area of potential war".<sup>62</sup>

In this connection Nehru increasingly set store by the idea of creating a "peace zone" in Asia. He paid much attention to the discussion of this problem during his visit to China in October 1954, apparently meeting with complete understanding from the Chinese leaders.

Telling Parliament about his visit, Nehru said it was somewhat difficult to make an appraisal of its political consequences because the parties had had no pact or treaty or agreement in mind (not even a joint statement on the talks had been published); a large variety of subjects had been discussed and "a large measure of agreement" in the parties' approach to different questions and many problems had been found.<sup>63</sup> One significant consequence of Nehru's trip was, however, obvious. On his way back from China he visited Rangoon, Vientiane, Hanoi, Saigon and Phnompenh. As a result, opposition in South-East Asia to SEATO increased.<sup>64</sup>

Lastly, it must be mentioned that during his visit to China the Prime Minister of India told Chinese leaders that he had seen some Chinese maps where the border between the two countries had been marked incorrectly. That did not bother him, he said, as India's frontiers were clear and had provoked no disputes. Chou En-lai replied that the maps were reproductions of the old maps made before 1949, and they had not had time to correct them. It was the first sign of what the Indians were later to call China's "cartographic aggression", which developed into outright aggression in the late 1950's.

For a while, soon after the 1954 Manila Conference, the United States and its allies still hoped that India and other South and South-East Asian countries would join SEATO. Just before the first session of SEATO at Bangkok in February 1955, invitations were sent to some Asian countries, India

among them, asking them to reconsider their attitude to the bloc.<sup>65</sup> In spite of their refusal to attend the session, a communiqué was issued presumptuously declaring that "other countries of the region" would soon join in the activities carried on under the SEATO treaty. India not only repudiated the fresh attempts to draw her into the aggressive bloc, but also used her position in the international commissions supervising the fulfilment of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China to keep the United States from drawing the countries of Indo-China into SEATO. For instance, as a result of talks between the United States and Cambodia, on May 16, 1955, an agreement on American military aid was concluded.<sup>66</sup> India and other members of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in a special report advised Cambodia that some of her commitments assumed under the Military Assistance Agreement with the USA clashed with the Geneva Accords. This action by the International Commission led by India made the Government of Cambodia revise its decision. In a special letter to the Commission Chairman, Cambodia avowed that she would join no military alliance and would always scrupulously observe the Geneva Accords. In reply, the United States organised an economic blockade of Cambodia and military provocations were engineered on her borders. Cambodia withstood the pressure brought to bear on her by the American imperialists, in which India's economic and diplomatic support played a no small part.<sup>67</sup>

Obviously enough, such actions on India's part were completely at variance with the aims and purposes of the policy pursued by the United States in Asia. That variance became all the more pronounced in connection with the role India played at the Bandung Conference, held approximately at the same time.

### **India and the Bandung Conference**

In May 1954, the Colombo Conference supported the proposal made by Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo to hold at some future date a conference of Asian and African countries. At the end of September 1954, Sastroamidjojo was invited to Delhi to discuss preparations for the Afro-Asian

conference. In a joint statement issued on September 25, 1954, the Prime Ministers of India and Indonesia, after recalling the recent developments in South-East Asia, said that the early holding of the conference would promote the consolidation of unity and peace. It was also stated that a preliminary meeting of the members of the Colombo Conference was desirable.<sup>68</sup>

Such a meeting of the Prime Ministers of India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon took place on December 28-29, 1954, at Bogor (Indonesia). Shortly before the meeting, Nehru informed its participants of his preliminary suggestions, viz., that about thirty countries should be invited and the conference should be held at the level of Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers, that controversial items must be excluded and only broad issues including "good neighbourliness and the Five Principles" placed on the agenda, and that a secretariat should be set up to conduct preparations.<sup>69</sup>

The information on the Bogor meeting itself is contradictory. G.H. Jansen writes that in closed session and after only a brief discussion, a four-point statement on the objectives of the Afro-Asian conference put forward by Nehru was accepted, that John Kotelawala and Mohammed Ali made points that are significant in their presage of the great debates at Bandung, and that the composition of the conference was the only point on which there were some differences.<sup>70</sup> It appears to us that the evidence supplied by Krishna Menon, who was present at the closed session and prepared the principal document—the joint communique—is more authentic. He says that the whole thing very nearly failed, and it was not until 4 a.m. that agreement was finally reached. Mohammed Ali rejected a thirteenth or fourteenth formulation proposed by India, and only after a two-hour break, during which the Burmese were able to persuade the Pakistanis, did they manage to come to an agreement.<sup>71</sup>

The obstructionist behaviour of the Pakistani Prime Minister was due to the fact that Pakistan was bound by military-political commitments with Western powers, and the prospect of an Afro-Asian conference was bound to cause uneasiness to the West. The well-known American news analyst Walter Lippmann described it as "the most formidable and ambitious move yet made in this generation to apply the principle of Afro-

for the Asians".<sup>72</sup> In some Western circles apprehension was voiced that there would emerge "a vast economic co-operation agency for Asia and Africa controlling the bulk of raw materials on which West industrial nations depended".<sup>73</sup>

The trend of the conference largely depended on its composition. When the latter point was discussed at Bogor, the meeting took Nehru's suggestion to consider one by one the Asian and African countries which had independent status, as well as those whose independence was about to be recognised. As a result, it was decided to invite seven African countries, viz., Egypt, the Gold Coast, Liberia, Libya, Sudan,<sup>74</sup> the Central African Federation,<sup>75</sup> and Ethiopia.

As for the Asian countries, the most controversial question was whether or not the Chinese People's Republic should be invited. Mohammed Ali said that the Arab countries and also Thailand and the Philippines might refuse to sit down at the same table with the Chinese. To this U Nu replied that Burma would not take part in the conference unless the Chinese People's Republic was invited. Nehru especially insisted on China's participation, recalling that the Colombo Conference had declared the need for recognition of the rights of People's China in the United Nations. If China were not invited to the Afro-Asian conference, Nehru said, that would be a revision of the decision of the Colombo Conference; China's participation in the Geneva Conference was also to be taken into account, the more so since they had already decided to invite the countries of Indo-China.<sup>76</sup> Finally, it was decided to invite China, writing down in the Joint Communique, however, that "acceptance of the invitation by any one country would in no way involve or even imply any change in its views of the status of any other country". Burma insisted on inviting Israel as the U Nu "Socialist" Government was closely linked with the Israeli "Socialists". The Pakistani delegation declared that as Israel was in a state of war with the Arabs, they would not agree to Israel's participation in the conference. India readily supported Pakistan.<sup>77</sup>

Finally, 18 Asian countries were invited, namely, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, South Vietnam, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Cambodia, the Chinese People's



Republic, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, the Philippines and Japan.

Thus, together with the five initiating states, there were to be 30 participants in the conference.<sup>78</sup>

It was decided to hold the conference during the last week of April, 1955, at Bandung (Indonesia), and that its purposes would be : (a) to promote goodwill and cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa; (b) to consider social, economic and cultural problems and relations of the countries represented; (c) to consider problems of special interest to Asian and African peoples, e.g., problems affecting national sovereignty and of racialism and colonialism; (d) to view the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in the world of today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.<sup>79</sup>

As the international situation deteriorated during the three-odd months that separated the meeting at Bogor from the conference of Asian and African countries, the need for their close cohesion became imperative. The situation became worse in the Far East, in Formosa Strait, after the United States had signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with the Chiang Kai-shek government on December 2, 1954. On January 24, President Eisenhower asked to be authorised by Congress to employ American armed forces to "protect" Formosa and the Pescadores. The situation was such that because of the island of Matsu and a few other small islands in Formosa Strait, war might break out. At the other end of the Asian mainland, in the Middle East, a military agreement was signed on February 24, 1955, between Iraq and Turkey, which formed the basis of the Baghdad Pact (in April 1955, after signing a treaty with Turkey, Pakistan joined the new military bloc). And four days later, on February 28, Israel attacked the Egyptian city of Gaza and the situation in that area again became extremely strained.

Of great significance in this connection were the talks between Nasser and Nehru, who visited Cairo at the invitation of the Egyptian Government. The talks were held on February 15 and 16, 1955. The Joint Communiqué expressed the "identity of views on major international issues" and the confidence

that the forthcoming Asian-African conference "will contribute to the advancement of world peace and welfare."<sup>80</sup> A month and a half later, on April 6, 1955, a Treaty of Friendship between India and Egypt was signed at Cairo. In March India was visited, at Nehru's invitation, by Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambodian head of state. Cambodia accepted the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence, and it was decided to establish diplomatic relations between India and Cambodia.<sup>81</sup> In April India was visited, at Nehru's invitation, by Pham Van Dong, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The talks resulted in stressing the importance of carrying out the Geneva agreements on Indo-China, the DRV accepted the Five Principles, and the parties expressed their determination to cooperate, at the Bandung Asian-African conference as well.<sup>82</sup>

All this shows that India was making energetic diplomatic preparations for the Bandung Conference, seeking among other things to secure support of other countries for the principles of peaceful co-existence.<sup>83</sup>

Indian public opinion unanimously welcomed the forthcoming Bandung Conference and the Indian Government's leading part in its preparation. When the question of additional allocations for the Ministry of External Affairs was discussed in Parliament on March 31, 1955, Nehru expressed his great anxiety on account of the international crises in Formosa Strait and the Middle East and stressed once again the importance of the Asian-African Conference and the significance of the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence. Observing that some people criticised these principles, Nehru said: "Either you admit co-existence in the modern world or you admit conflict and co-destruction. That is the alternative to it". He further recalled a saying attributed to Albert Einstein that after the next war, wars would be fought by bows and arrows, i.e., civilisation would be back at the bow and arrow stage.<sup>84</sup>

During this debate, only two Members in the whole of Parliament (a Right-wing Socialist leader, A. Mehta, and K. Raghuramiah, a Congress party member) spoke against the idea of peaceful co-existence. Out of Parliament, too, there were not many critics of the principles of peaceful co-existence on

the whole at that time. The initiators of this criticism were the Praja Socialist leaders, especially R. M. Lohia, who called on "all Socialists in Asia" to repudiate the doctrine of peaceful co-existence.

The imperialists attempted to disrupt the Asian-African conference. At first the pro-Western governments of some countries invited to attend the conference declined and revised their decisions only when it was clear that the conference would take place anyway and at least half of the world's population would be represented. Late in March 1955, a secret memorandum of the US State Department urged its friends "to take a positive and constructive attitude" at the conference but to be prepared to resist proposals that were merely anti-American. These friends were listed as the Philippines, Japan, South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Turkey, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Libya and the Central African Federation.<sup>85</sup>

To prevent the conference, Chiang Kai-shek agents engineered an act of sabotage. On April 11, 1955, *The Kashmir Princess*, an Indian plane chartered by the Chinese People's Republic for a group of the delegation members, blew up in the air before reaching Kalimantan. All passengers and most of the crew died.

But delegates of two continents were already arriving in Bandung. The conference was so much the focal point of the world public attention that even the SEATO Council which had its first session at Bangkok in March 1955, passed a resolution conveying "cordial greetings" to the forthcoming conference of Asian and African countries.<sup>86</sup>

The conference took place in Bandung from April 18 to April 24, 1955. It was attended by delegations of 29 countries. Altogether there were 340 delegates representing a total area of 30.5 million square kilometres and a population of 1,440 million (almost two-thirds of the world's population). The interest in the conference was also evident from the fact that there were 655 correspondents at the conference who sent daily reports on its progress.<sup>87</sup>

The agenda, framed in accordance with the Bogor communique, contained the following points: (1) economic co-operation, including the peaceful uses of atomic energy; (2) cultural

cooperation; (3) human rights and self-determination including the Palestine problem and racialism; (4) problems of dependent peoples, including Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco; (5) promotion of world peace and cooperation, including the question of weapons of mass destruction and disarmament. The first two were to be referred to committees to enable their chairmen to report the results of their discussion to a meeting of delegation heads. The last three were first to be discussed by delegation heads at closed meetings. As for the rules of procedure, they adopted Pakistan's proposal of unanimous vote so that any one delegation could veto draft decisions.

It would be wrong to imagine that the Bandung Conference was merely a forum of solidarity of Asian and African countries. In reality it was the scene of an acute struggle between the non-aligned countries and countries entangled by the imperialist powers in all sorts of economic, military and political commitments. Moreover, among heads of the delegations of non-aligned countries (they presented a majority at the conference) there were people like Nehru who, being a genuine patriot of his country, wanted the principles of peaceful co-existence to become a rule of international behaviour and help preserve and build up independence and general peace, and people like John Kotelawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon, who did not want or were unable to take an anti-imperialist stand.

The arguments became particularly sharp when, during the discussion of the problems of dependent peoples, Kotelawala made a speech slandering the policy of the USSR towards the East European countries. In this way he tried to divert the attention of the Conference from considering the situation with regard to the peoples in the colonies and demanding that they be granted independence without delay. Nehru put a stop to Kotelawala's attack with an impressive and well-reasoned speech. He stressed that the United Nations had recognised the East European countries as sovereign and independent states, and to challenge that recognition was "a most extraordinary position to take up—for anybody, and more especially for representatives of the Governments of Asia and Africa". In conclusion, Nehru appealed to the Ceylon Prime Minister and his supporters to take a broader view of the issue and not

to attempt to divide up the Conference.<sup>88</sup> As a result of the efforts mainly of the Indian delegation, a way out of the crisis situation was found as Nehru told Parliament on April 30, 1955, when reporting on the Bandung Conference.<sup>89</sup>

Another bitter fight at the conference was provoked by the speech made by Pakistan's Prime Minister on April 22 wherein he claimed during discussion on the question of promotion of world peace and cooperation that the principles of peaceful co-existence and even the United Nations Organisation did not sufficiently guarantee the sovereignty, independence and security of the smaller countries and they were therefore forced to resort to great powers' aid and union for the sake of their own security. In his reply, Nehru stated that "the so-called realistic appreciation of the world situation" had actually led the world to the brink of a third world war. He pointed out that if the Asian and African countries remained non-aligned with either bloc, they might be in a position to tilt the balance of strength in favour of peace. "If all the world were to be divided up between these two big blocs, what would be the result? The inevitable result would be war".<sup>90</sup> Referring to the right to individual or collective self-defence which the Prime Minister of Pakistan had been trying to get the Conference to approve, Nehru said that he did not deny this right, any more than the right to join military pacts, like Pakistan, but he strongly objected to the Conference being asked to approve it. Referring to the Turkish delegate's defence of NATO, Nehru said that bloc had become "one of the most powerful protectors of colonialism".<sup>91</sup>

India did much at Bandung to help China to use the Conference to extend its contacts. Appreciating this aspect of the activities of the Indian diplomatic service at Bandung, K. Menon said: "...we were introducing China to the world; we were making China acceptable".<sup>92</sup> Subsequently Peking, as is known, repaid India with ingratitude, trying to compromise her and undermine her positions and prestige among the Asian and African countries.

Thanks to Nehru's efforts, a meeting was arranged between Chou En-lai, who represented China, and heads of delegations of the countries at whose initiative the Conference had been

called, plus Thailand and the Philippines, at a dinner given by the Indonesian Prime Minister on April 23. It was then that Chou En-lai stated : "The Chinese people are friendly to the American people. They do not want a war with the United States. The Chinese Government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States Government to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East, especially in the Formosa area".<sup>93</sup> In his concluding speech at the Conference, Chou En-lai repeated his proposal to hold negotiations with the USA.

On April 24, the Bandung Conference finished its work. Its Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation denoted the eagerness of the Asian and African nations to secure respect for fundamental human rights and the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set down in its Charter : respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; equality of all races and all nations, big and small; non-intervention and non-interference in other countries' internal affairs; renunciation of the threat or use of force; settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means; respect for justice and international treaties; and some other principles. These Bandung Principles were based on the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence of states. The Declaration was incorporated in the text of the Final Communique which also reflected the results of the discussions on economic and cultural cooperation, problems of dependent peoples, and so on.<sup>94</sup>

At the same time, insufficient preciseness in formulating some important points in the Final Communique enabled the delegates to interpret them differently on their return home. While Mohammed Ali and John Kotelawala said the Conference had been in favour of military blocs, Nasser said it had denounced pacts like SEATO and NATO.<sup>95</sup>

Apart from the Final Communique, the general results of the Conference were appraised quite differently. Hiren Mukerjee, a leading CPI figure, regarded the Bandung Conference as "the high water-mark of Nehru's success in the sphere of foreign relations".<sup>96</sup> On the contrary, another Indian scholar, Jansen, believed that, except for reducing tension in Formosa Strait, the practical political consequences of the Conference

were presumably negative.<sup>97</sup>

In our view, in spite of the somewhat vague wording of the Final Communique, the failure to launch a permanent Asian-African countries' organisation as some delegations hoped, and other shortcomings, the Bandung Conference generally had highly positive results.

Firstly, the Conference condemned the colonial system of imperialism which it viewed as an evil to be eliminated as quickly as possible. This opinion was shared even by countries bound by different obligations to imperialist powers. Afterwards Nehru said that different as the countries represented at Bandung were, "the common factor was rather against Western domination...The other common factor was a desire for social progress".<sup>98</sup>

These two factors are two sides of one and the same coin, anti-colonialism. Nehru's contribution was that during the Bandung Conference he insisted on correct expression being given to anti-colonial aspirations, preventing some delegates from leading the Conference away from the actual problem of how to abolish colonialism.

The Bandung Conference fully expressed the determination to end colonialism. Only five years later, the anti-colonial struggles of Asian and African countries enabled the 15th UN General Assembly session to adopt, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

Secondly, it was unquestionably as a consequence of the Bandung Conference that the ideas of non-alignment struck root among most of the "third world" countries. After Bandung, all Asian and African countries immediately on achieving political independence and emerging on the international scene opted for non-alignment. It became the spirit of the time.

It is quite possible that had a permanent Asian-African countries' organisation of some kind been launched at Bandung, it might have helped to somewhat speed up the process of the emergence and formation of non-aligned states. But it is quite certain that the existence of the Soviet Union and other socialist community countries has a far greater impact on this process. They not only keep imperialist powers from attempting

to restore the colonial way of life, but also give the young independent states political, economic and military aid.

Thirdly, the Bandung Conference helped many representatives of Asian and African countries to rectify some wrong ideas about the socialist states and helped China to gain a foothold on the international scene.

In connection with the more recent changes in the policy pursued by the Chinese leaders, the question may arise as to whether it was correct to create such a favourable climate for China at Bandung, which India did so much to bring about. We believe it was. After all, the conference regarded the Chinese People's Republic as an Asian state pursuing a socialist policy. For this reason the current Peking policy is viewed as running counter to the socialist principles and the line of the world communist movement.

### Strengthening of Relations between India and the USSR

US military aid to Pakistan, the emergence of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, which were giving India, in Menon's phrase, "a sense of encirclement", and other actions by the imperialists led to the evolution of India's neutralist foreign policy to positive neutrality.

We have already mentioned that positive neutrality consisted in non-participation in blocs, combined with active moves against the conclusion of imperialist military alliances, and in championing general disarmament and abolition of colonialism. In more detail, the main features of positive neutrality may be described as follows : (a) non-participation in military blocs, together with actively opposing the policy of forming such imperialist blocs and concluding military pacts, and so on; (b) the struggle for general disarmament and, as a first step towards abolishing weapons of mass destruction, the ending of nuclear tests; (c) independent opinion on all international issues and freedom for each to act, in accordance with the interest of one's own country; (d) mediation in the settlement of international disputes for the purpose of easing international tensions; (e) anti-colonialism manifesting itself in active support of all peoples fighting for independence and, once that has been gained, for complete elimination of the colonial aftermath; and (f)



anti-racialism expressed in the demand for complete equality of races and the banning of discrimination of any people.

India's change to positive neutrality manifested itself, above all, in a more active struggle for preserving and strengthening peace. And as the imperialist powers made encroachments on peace, India's foreign policy naturally became increasingly anti-imperialist. This is quite evident when we compare Nehru's statements on foreign policy made somewhat after mid-1954 with his previous statements.<sup>99</sup> Concerning the need for the anti-imperialist trend in Indian foreign policy, the question arises as to how possible it was to pursue such a course.

As pointed out in the Declaration of the Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, held in 1957 in Moscow, "The existence of the socialist system, the aid rendered by the socialist nations to these [i.e., liberated—*Y.N.*] countries on principles of equality and cooperation between them and the socialist nations in the struggle for peace and against aggression, help them to uphold their national freedom and facilitate their social progress".<sup>100</sup> The whole history of international relations shows conclusively that the support given by the Soviet Union to young independent states and the readiness of the entire socialist community to render them economic, political and military aid is the key condition for carrying out the policy of positive neutrality in spite of the resistance of the imperialist states. Moreover, it was only because of the presence of the socialist countries on the international scene that positive neutrality was feasible. This international factor is based on the Leninist principle of international assistance to the struggle against imperialism and the fact that the socialist and "third world" countries have a common interest in preserving peaceful conditions of development.

Thus, the emergence and development of India's policy of positive neutrality are closely linked with the strengthening of her relations with the Soviet Union.

As for economic relations, one must note first of all that until 1955 they were, in fact, in an embryonic state. On December 2, 1953, the first trade agreement between the USSR and India for a term of 5 years was signed. During the very first year, India's exports to the Soviet Union grew seven-fold while

her imports from the USSR grew two and a half times.<sup>100</sup> Nevertheless, the volume of business done by India with the USSR amounted in 1954 to no more than Rs. 36.5 million, which was an insignificant share of India's foreign trade. The trade agreement made it possible for India to get Soviet machinery, and the correspondence regarding the agreement specified that the Soviet Union would render technical assistance to India in implementing her economic development projects. Nevertheless, some Indian statesmen relied on Western support and were not keen on Soviet assistance. For example, on May 4, 1954, the Indian Minister of Commerce, D.P. Karmarkar, replying to a question in Parliament, said that "it has not been found necessary to seek such technical assistance".<sup>101</sup>

And what was the situation with regard to Western economic and technical assistance? Under an agreement on technical cooperation between the United States and India, signed in December 1952, India was allotted up to March 31, 1956, the sum of Rs 1,250 million, of which only Rs. 77.5 million was used, most of it going to infrastructure development. For assistance, on a wider scale India would have had to renounce its independent foreign policy and agree to its inclusion in the strategic military plans of US imperialism. Of the many admissions that such were the aims of the American ruling circles, we shall quote just one, by Prof. F.L. Schuman, an American scholar, who wrote in 1953: "American aid in 1951-52, in the form of famine relief, technical assistance, and the tact and wisdom of genial Ambassador Chester Bowles, evoked gratitude but no disposition to align the new India, potentially a 'Great Power' in its own right, with the USA against China and the USSR".<sup>102</sup>

India's repeated requests for aid from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) at that period did not yield any palpable results either. The Bank granted a loan of \$ 16 million to the Tata Hydroelectric Company in Trombay in November 1954, and in March 1955 it granted a loan of \$ 10 million to the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India. Not a single loan was granted to assist projects in the public sector.<sup>103</sup>

Nor did foreign private investment in the Indian economy

fare much better. Even so, there were many politicians in India who hoped that with the assistance of foreign monopolies the country would develop economically and become less dependent on these self-same monopolies.

The situation being such, the Indian Government began to change its attitude to Soviet aid since 1954. In view of the need to lay the foundations of heavy industry, the second Indian development plan (1956-1960) envisaged the construction of three metal-making plants in order to boost steel production to 6 million tons a year. The IBRD refused to help India carry out these plans. Because of the unfavourable terms of the agreement concluded in 1953 with the West German Krupp and Demag companies on the construction of one of the works—to pay in dollars for the equipment, to give the companies a share of the profits and the exorbitant annual interest rate of 12 per cent—the Indian Government considered the Soviet proposal, made in September, 1954, to help with the construction of a steel-making plant.

In spite of all the attempts by foreign monopolies and their agents in India to prevent her from obtaining economic aid from the USSR, the talks in Delhi with Soviet representatives beginning in November 1954 led to the agreement signed on February 2, 1955. It stipulated that the Soviet Union was to help India construct an integrated steel-making plant at Bhilai (India) with an annual capacity of one million tons of steel, with the prospect of later enlarging the plant to 2.5 times that figure. This agreement was a far cry from the one concluded with the West German companies. The interest of 2.5 per cent was to be paid with Indian exports; there was no claim for a share of the profits or for running the plant; maximum use was to be made of Indian industry in the production of equipment and materials needed for the construction of the plant.

The signing of this agreement marked the first major step towards a breakthrough in overcoming the West's monopoly of technical aid and credits for the industrial development of newly-independent states. Soon after the long-drawn-out negotiations between India and a British company about the construction of the third metal-making plant were concluded. This time, the terms were better, credit being granted at 5.75 per

cent. And a little later India compelled the West's companies to forego their claim to share in profits.

The Soviet-Indian agreement of February 2, 1955, marked the beginning of extensive and fruitful economic cooperation between India and the USSR.

M.S. Rajan points out that besides India's intention to develop economic relations with the socialist countries, the following three other related reasons had a bearing on why India was eager in 1954-1955 to develop and strengthen relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist community countries.<sup>105</sup>

1. Because of the critical and unsympathetic attitude of the Western bloc to Indian neutralism, the Government and people of India felt that the only way for India to survive as an independent nation and, moreover, to do so honourably by following her own independent foreign policy, was to promote wider and deeper relations with the socialist countries.

2. Closely related to the first reason was the Indian desire to play the part in world affairs "enabled by her geopolitical factors and circumstances which was now being made difficult by Western pressure on, and around, her". The only way in which India could resist this pressure was by cultivating and strengthening her relations with the socialist nations.

3. Where India's vital interests were concerned (as in the case of Kashmir) or where Indian national feelings were deeply stirred (as in respect of the Goa question), the Western powers failed to support India, while some of them tried to hobnob with India's adversaries.

When in the spring of 1955 the Soviet Government invited Nehru to visit the USSR, he accepted the invitation.

During their sojourn in the USSR from June 7 to June 22, 1955, Prime Minister Nehru, Indira Gandhi, his daughter, and members of the Government delegation visited, in addition to Moscow, Volgograd, the Crimea, Tbilisi, Ashkhabad, Tashkent, Samarkand, Alma Ata, Rubtsovsk, Magnitogorsk, Saratov and Leningrad. They visited some industrial establishments and cultural centres and got to know about the Soviet people's achievements with regard to the economy, science and culture. Wherever Nehru went, the warmth and interest he found

outdid the welcome ever accorded to any other foreign statesman. This was, above all, an indication of the Soviet people's high opinion of the efforts of Nehru and the entire Indian people for freedom and peace. Simultaneously it was, as the Indian Ambassador wrote, "the most spectacular affirmation yet made by the Soviet Government of its belief in co-existence".<sup>106</sup>

The Indian Prime Minister spent many hours talking with Soviet leaders. About the results of the talks, Nehru said at a press conference that the Soviet Government had expressed its readiness to assist India in carrying out her development plans and that Soviet aid was without any political strings whatsoever.<sup>107</sup>

The discussion of a wide range of international issues and questions bearing on Soviet-Indian relations revealed an identity of closeness of views on major points of the international situation, which found reflection in the Joint Statement by the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister of India, signed on June 22, 1955. The Statement expressed the desire to continue developing relations between the two countries on the basis of the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence. The heads of governments acclaimed the results of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, noted the signs of improvement in the general world situation, stated that the Chinese People's Republic must be given its legitimate place in the United Nations, and expressed concern about the threat to the further implementation of the Geneva Accords on Indo-China. In conclusion, they expressed the desire to develop and strengthen relations between the two countries in the economic and cultural fields and in the field of scientific and technological research.<sup>108</sup>

As a logical sequel of the development of Indian-Soviet relations, Nehru invited the Soviet leaders to pay a return visit to India. The visit took place from November 18 to December 14, 1955, with one week's interruption to visit Burma. During its three-weeks' stay in India, besides Delhi the Soviet government delegation visited Bombay, Bangalore, Mysore, Madras, Calcutta, Jaipur, Srinagar and some other places.

While in India the Soviet government delegation had an opportunity to speak at public meetings, workers' rallies, formal

receptions, and at a joint session of both chambers of the Indian Parliament on November 22, 1955. Besides expressing the friendly feelings of Soviet people, in their speeches in India Soviet leaders paid tribute to India's contribution to the settlement of many international issues such as the cessation of war in Korea, the peaceful settlement in Indo-China, the ending of the "Formosa crisis", insistence on China's admission to the UNO, the moves for disarmament and against weapons of mass destruction, and so on. They corroborated Soviet foreign policy, exposed the colonialist policies of the Western powers, etc. The Soviet representatives declared that the Soviet Union was ready to assist India with her economic development, to share technical know-how and scientific developments, including the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

By the second day of the delegation's sojourn in India, at a state banquet in honour of the guests, Nehru said that the welcome they were accorded in India was not a formality but an expression of the profound friendship and understanding between the peoples of India and the Soviet Union. Having reaffirmed India's attitude to military pacts and alliances, the cold war and disarmament, the Prime Minister said that the only "camp" India would like to be in was the "camp of peace and goodwill".<sup>109</sup>

At the same time, the striking contrast between the Soviet Union's attitude, its support of the peoples' struggle to wipe out colonialism and its aftermath, and the imperialist countries' position with relation to the problems troubling India became increasingly obvious even to the man in the street. The Soviet statement on the Portuguese possessions in India, to the effect that the continued existence on India's own soil of the Portuguese colony of Goa was a disgrace to the civilised nations, produced a very great impression in India and elsewhere. In reply to this statement US State Secretary Dulles and Portuguese Foreign Minister Cunha signed on December 2, 1955, a communique asserting that Goa was not a colony but a province of Portugal. That provoked such a storm of indignation in India that a member of the House of Representatives of the US Congress, Adam Powell, declared he would demand the removal of Dulles from his post of State Secretary.

As the Western press kept spreading rumours that Nehru allegedly was displeased with some declarations of the Soviet representatives, he remarked that they said some "very good things" and "the correct things" and "We are naturally pleased." Referring to the rumours that were being spread, Nehru said: "It is foolish to think that I or any of us did not like these statements".<sup>110</sup>

Just before the departure of the Soviet government delegation from India, a joint communique was signed on December 13, 1955. Along with confirming the identical or similar points of view, as expressed earlier in the Joint Statement of June 22, 1955, the Communique expressed profound belief in the need to observe the principle of universality in admitting members to the United Nations and stressed that one of the most effective ways of reducing international tensions was to remove barriers to cooperation and mutual understanding in the economic and cultural fields.<sup>111</sup> Simultaneously, a Joint Statement on economic cooperation was signed. The Soviet Union undertook to supply India during three years with one million tons of ferrous rolled stock and with equipment for oil extraction and mining and to import more raw materials and manufactured goods from India.<sup>112</sup>

The exchange of state visits between India and the Soviet Union was of great significance. As a result of talks conducted on a government level, firm foundations were laid for the development of economic, political and cultural cooperation between India and the Soviet Union.

In connection with the visit of the Soviet government delegation to India and the welcome it was given by the Indian people, reactionary newspapers in the United States, Britain and other imperialist countries could not conceal their extreme irritation and attacked India, accusing her of "ingratitude" and even "treachery", and tried to intimidate the Indian, by talking about "Communist penetration", and so on.

US ruling circles were particularly troubled by the prospects afforded for joint moves by the Soviet Union and India for consolidating peace and opposing imperialist policies. Reflecting this mood, referring to the Joint Communique of the Prime Ministers of India and the USSR of December 13, 1955,

and to Nehru's toleration of "Soviet anti-Western attack on Indian soil", *The New York Times* claimed they "have aligned him so closely with Soviet policies as to put a large question mark behind his professed neutrality"<sup>113</sup>

In connection with such Western judgements it must be stressed that, as evident from the entire subsequent activities of Jawaharlal Nehru in guiding India's foreign policy, he proved himself able to ensure to the end the consistency of neutrality which he had chosen.

It is of great interest to know how the Indians themselves felt about closer relations with the Soviet Union. According to the official point of view, there were the following good points about it.<sup>114</sup>

1. Unlike the West, the Soviet Union publicly and unambiguously expressed itself in favour of the Indian policy of non-alignment and did not make even the slightest attempt to draw India into any ideological, political or military alliance.

2. The assurance of continued Soviet economic aid was of considerable importance, both for political and economic reasons.

3. The satisfaction that millions of Indians received from the fact that in their stand on certain world issues and, more importantly, on issues involving India's national interest, they were supported, for the first time practically, by a Great Power (and a permanent member of the UN Security Council).

4. The expansion of Indo-Soviet relations in the fields of trade, science and culture resulted in increasing interest in Soviet studies, especially in the study of the Russian language, in India.

All of it put together, taking into account the aforementioned international situation and correlation of political forces in India after the first general elections, by the end of the period under review, i.e., by the end of 1955, had led to strong support in Parliament, the Indian press and broad sections of the Indian public for the course pursued by Nehru for strengthening relations with the Soviet Union.



## NOTES

1. *Lok Sabha Debates*, 1955, Vol. II, No. 30, cols. 3896-3899.
2. *Parliamentary Debates. House of the People. Official Report*, Vol. II, No. 28, Part II, col. 2809.
3. L. Natarajan, *From Hiroshima to Bandung. A Survey of American Policies in Asia*, People's Publishing House Ltd., New Delhi, 1955, p. 99.
4. K.P.S. Menon, *The Flying Troika. Extracts from a diary by K.P.S. Menon, India's Ambassador to Russia, 1952-61*, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, p. 75.
5. *The Hindu*, January 14, 1954.
6. M.S. Rajan, *India in World Affairs, 1954-56*, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1964, p. 429.
7. *Parliamentary Debates. House of the People. Official Report*, Vol. X, No. 29, Part II, cols. 2978-2879.
8. *The Hindu*, January 25, 1954. In connection with the Americans' efforts to persuade India that she had nothing to fear from the weapons supplied to Pakistan, Krishna Menon remarked: "We cannot believe that guns that fire only in one direction have been made". (*ibid.*, June 4, 1956).
9. *The Hindu*, February 1, 1954.
10. *ibid.*, January 16, 1954.
11. *ibid.*, January 2, 1954.
12. The agreement on military aid between the USA and Pakistan was made legal on May 19, 1954.
13. *Parliamentary Debates. House of the People*, 1954, Vol. I, No. 12, Part II, cols. 964-965.
14. M.S. Rajan, *op cit.*, p. 272.
15. Chester Bowles writes that when he was in Kashmir in late 1952, some two-thirds of the observers "on the cease-fire line" were Americans. (Chester Bowles, *op cit.*, p. 254.)
16. *Par. Debates. House of the People*, 1954, Vol. I, No. 12, Part II, col. 971. After an exchange of opinion between representatives of India and the United States and the UN Secretary-General, it was decided to replace the American observers in Kashmir by observers of other countries, as soon as their terms were up—and there were none to be up. (M.S. Rajan, *op cit.*, p. 274.)

17. The Indian President's decree endorsing Kashmir's accession was issued on May 14, 1954.
18. *Parliamentary Debates. House of the People. Official Report*, 1954, Vol. I, No. 6, Part II, col. 435.

Nehru said the same in the Council of States, adding, however, that India would stand by her commitments made with regard to Kashmir "subject to changes that may come about by other events", clearly meaning that it was subject to rejection of US military aid by Pakistan (*Par. Debates, Council of States. Official Report*, 1954, Vol. VI, No. 5, col. 487).

19. M.S. Rajan, *op. cit.*, p. 455.
20. There is a chapter in Prof. Rajan's fundamental work, entitled 'No Plebiscite' Movement Gathers Strength (*ibid.*, pp. 459-469).
21. *The Hindu*, July 10, 1955.
22. *Lok Sabha Debates...*, Vol. IV, No. 10, col. 3400.
23. *The Hindu*, April 15, 1956.
24. *The Hindustan Times*, January 24, 1954.
25. *Anrita Bazar Patrika*, January 23, 1954.
26. *The Hindu*, March 10, 1954.
27. *Report of the Second National Conference of the Praja Socialist Party*. Gaya (Bihar), December 26-30, 1955, New Delhi, pp. 96-99.
28. *The Hindu*, April 23 1956.
29. *ibid.*, January 3, May 9, 1954.
30. *Parliamentary Debates. House of the People...* 1953, Vol. I, No. 1, col. 3.
31. *The Times of India*, December 16, 1953.
32. *The Hindu*, June 30, 1955.
33. *ibid.*, April 28, 1956.
34. *Parliamentary Debates. House of the People. Official Report*, 1954, Vol. II, No. 28, Part II, col. 2831.
35. K.M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas. Memoirs of a Diplomat*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1955, p. 141.
36. *The Hindu*, January 2, 1954.
37. M.S. Rajan, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-126.
38. *Parliamentary Debates. House of the People...*, 1954, Vol. I, No. 6, Part II, col. 417.
39. M. Brecher, *Nehru. A Political Biography*, p. 558.

40. M.S. Rajan, op. cit., p. 123.
41. M. Brecher, *India and World Politics...*, p. 44.
42. K.P.S. Menon, op. cit., p. 78.
43. *Parliamentary Debates. House of the People. Official Report*, Vol. II, No. 28, Part II, col. 2795.
44. *ibid.*, Vol. IV, No. 52, Part II, cols. 5581-5582.
45. G.H. Jansen, op. cit., p. 145.
46. *ibid.*, p. 413.
47. *ibid.*, pp. 412-414.
48. K.P.S. Menon, op. cit., p. 80.
- ✓ 49. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. V, No. 71, Part II, 1954, cols. 7629-30.
50. In 1925 at Locarno (Switzerland) the West European powers concluded a treaty guaranteeing Germany's western borders.
51. *The Hindu*, June 25, 1954.
- ✓ 52. *Foreign Policy of India. Texts of Documents, 1947-58*, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1958, pp. 97-98.
53. M.S. Rajan, op. cit., p. 220.

This appreciation is due, among other things, to the fact that, in the Indians' view, the agreement was also a confirmation of the border line. An Indian Foreign Ministry top official writing under the pen-name "Kautilya" stated in the Ministry's semi-official organ, *Foreign Affairs Report*, in October 1954: "Our Prime Minister has declared more than once, in Parliament and outside, that we stand by our present frontiers. China has never questioned this. Besides, the Tibet Agreement itself expressly recognised our frontier at the six passes mentioned therein and we have no reason to believe that any frontier dispute exists". (*Foreign Affairs Report*, October 1954, p. 126).

54. M. Brecher, *India and World Politics...*, p. 49.
55. D.R. Sardesai, *Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, 1947-1964*, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1964, p. 40.
56. R.K. Karanjia, *SEATO: Security or Menace?* Blue Publications Ltd., Bombay, 1956, p. 33.
57. Francis Low, *Struggle for Asia*, Frederick A. Praeger, N.Y., 1954, p. 213.
58. *Parliamentary Debates. Rajya Sabha. Official Report*, Vol. VII, No. 5, col. 619.

59. *ibid.*, Nos. 4-5.
60. *ibid.*, No. 5, col. 560.
61. *Pravda*, September 15, 1954.
62. M. Brecher, *Nehru. A Political Biography*, p. 555.
63. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. VI, No. 5, Part I, cols. 1343-1344.
64. M.S. Rajan, op. cit., p. 227.
65. *Pravda*, February 20, 1955.
66. Roger M. Smith, *Cambodia's Foreign Policy*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1965, pp. 80-81.
67. D.R. Sardesai, op. cit., pp. 137-140.
68. *Foreign Policy of India. Texts of Documents. Lok Sabha Secretariat.* New Delhi, 1958, p. 101.
69. G.H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, Faber and Faber, London, 1966, p. 172.
70. *ibid.*, pp. 173-174.
71. M. Brecher, *India and World Politics. Krishna Menon's View of the World*, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, New York, Washington, 1968, pp. 51-52.
72. *The Hindu*, January 9, 1955.
73. M.S. Rajan, op. cit., p. 203.
74. As Sudan had no flag of its own yet, at the opening of the Afro-Asian Conference the Secretariat on its own responsibility hoisted a white cloth, with "Sudan" inscribed on it in red.
75. It was decided to invite the Central African Federation so as to show that the Conference exercised no radical approach, but the white minority government of that artificial polity thought it more prudent not to attend the Conference.
76. G.H. Jansen, op. cit., pp. 195-196.
77. *ibid.*, pp. 195-196.
78. On his return to India, Nehru mentioned, most laconically, the reasons why some countries had been refused an invitation. South Africa was not invited, he said, because of its "aggressive racial policies", and Israel because there was no unanimity, and Formosa "was no state". (M.S. Rajan, op. cit., p. 202.)
79. *Foreign Policy of India.* op. cit., p. 135.
80. *ibid.*, p. 141.
81. *ibid.*, p. 145.

82. *ibid.*, p. 153.
83. It is worth noting that Nehru sought to win support for the Five Principles from Buddhist countries first, evidently remembering that the expression Panch-sheel ("The Five Principles") itself was of Buddhist origin. (Hiren Mukerjee, *The Gentle Colossus*, Manish Granthavala Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1964, p. 180.)
84. *Lok Sabha Debates*, 1955, Vol. II, No. 30 cols. 3902-3895.
85. G.H. Jansen, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-186.
86. *The Hindu*, March 7, 1955.
87. G.H. Jansen, *op. cit.*, p. 187.
88. M.S. Rajan, *op. cit.*, p. 206.
89. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. IV, No. 53, col. 6965.
90. M.S. Rajan, *op. cit.*, p. 207.
91. *ibid.*
92. M. Brecher, *India and World Politics....*, p. 165.
93. G.H. Jansen, *op. cit.*, p. 218.
94. *Pravda*, April 26, 1955.
95. G.H. Jansen, *op. cit.*, p. 222.
96. H. Mukerjee, *op. cit.*, p. 185.
97. G.H. Jansen, *op. cit.*, pp. 223-224.
98. Tibor Mende, *Conversations with Nehru*, Secker & Warburg, London, 1956, p. 62.
99. Cf., for instance, Nehru's speech in the foreign policy debate in the House of the People on September 29, 1954. (Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, Sept. 1946-April 1961, Delhi*, 1961, pp. 87-93.) Nehru's increased criticism of imperialist politics is noted by Jansen and other researchers (G.H. Jansen, *op. cit.*, p. 138).
100. *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, Moscow, Languages Publishing House, 1963, p. 8.
101. *Pravda*, March 18, 1955.
102. *Parliamentary Debates, House of the People, Official Report*, 1954, Vol. III, No. 55, col. 2502.
103. Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics, Authority and the New World Society*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, N.Y., 1954, p. 31.
104. M.S. Rajan, *op. cit.*, p. 621.
105. *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 303-304.

106. K.P.S. Menon, op. cit., p. 115.
107. *Pravda*, June 22, 1955.
108. *Pravda*, June 23, 1955.
109. M.S. Rajan, op. cit., p. 314.
110. *ibid.*, pp. 321-322.
111. *Pravda*, December 4, 1955.
112. *ibid.*
113. *The New York Times*, December 15, 1955.
114. M.S. Rajan; op. cit., pp. 326-327.

# 5

## India's Struggle against Colonialism and for Peaceful Co-existence of States (1956-1958)

### *India's Positive Neutrality and the Reaction to it*

ON THE very eve of the New Year, 1956, the Indian Prime Minister, J. Nehru, received the French historian Tibor Mende at the latter's request, to discuss a number of problems.<sup>1</sup> Replying to one of Mende's questions as to what were the practical results of the Bandung Conference, J. Nehru said : "It had a powerful effect on European and American opinion as well as on Asian opinion....

"In regard to Asia, to some extent it produced a sense of solidarity. In regard to America and Europe, it produced a sense of...alarm at Asian nations coming together and intrinsically challenging the supremacy which the Western nations had exercised".<sup>2</sup> Nehru said further that there was still to be found "a lack of realisation in European countries or in America that Asian problems cannot be decided without Asia; without Asian opinion or without Asian cooperation. They still continue the attempt to decide the problems of Asia somewhere in London, in New York or in Paris, or wherever it may be".<sup>3</sup>

In the course of the conversation Nehru said that imperialist conquest and enslavement should be fought by every means. "I do recognise", he said, "that under certain circumstances

one has to fight. It depends less on theory than on the background of the people; on what they can do. Even Mr. Gandhi, who was a great pacifist, always said that it is better to fight than to be afraid....He meant that you must not surrender to evil...and that you must preferably fight in a peaceful way. If you cannot do that, well, then fight in the military way. But don't surrender to evil".<sup>4</sup>

This approach to the struggle against imperialism and colonialism was not at all like Nehru's past calls, addressed to nobody in particular, to recognise "that politically every country in Asia should be completely free"<sup>5</sup> and "to view with understanding and sympathy these historic changes which are taking place in Asia".<sup>6</sup>

Admittedly, the Indian Government did not confine itself to mere appeals in the past either; it took steps to make the Asian peoples rally together against colonialism, as, for example, it convened an Asian Relations Conference in Delhi in March 1947 and the First Asian Conference on Indonesia in January 1949. But they were of less significance than the subsequent conferences of the "Colombo countries" (India, Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, Ceylon) in April and December 1954 and especially the Bandung Conference in April 1955. India's leading role in conducting the conference of the "Colombo countries" and her initiative in convening the Bandung Conference, both of which were indicative of a serious shift in the foreign policy of the Indian Government, gravely alarmed American ruling circles, as nobody else but the US Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, testified in his book *The New Dimensions of Peace*.<sup>7</sup>

Ever since the national Indian Government appeared, its head, J. Nehru, constantly underlined that the basic features of Indian foreign policy were anti-colonialism, anti-racialism and non-participation in blocs.<sup>8</sup> While the aforementioned changes occurred in the period under review with respect to the problem of the elimination of colonialism, the Indian Government's attitude to racial discrimination and non-participation in blocs also changed no less significantly.

Since the first years of its existence, independent India came out against racial discrimination. India's proposal that



the situation of the Indian minority in South Africa be given consideration was the first complaint to come before the UN General Assembly session in 1946. And after 1954 the Indian Government did much to make demonstrations against racial discrimination promote the unity of the Asian and African peoples fighting colonialism. One of the students of Indian foreign policy, Karunakar Gupta, of no Communist sympathies,<sup>9</sup> wrote in a book published in 1956 that in spite of all the ties and affinities with the West, "India, like many other Asian governments, holds certain basic assumptions in world affairs, which form a sort of Asian Monroe doctrine. They distrust Colonialism—from which they have recently emerged. They insist on the importance of the Asian view in the settlement of Asian problems. Though they need Western help in developing their still primitive economies, they dread the expansion of Western influence over Asian affairs".<sup>10</sup>

The Indian Government's approach to preservation of peace underwent a still greater change. Previously the Indian Government held that in order to preserve peace India must keep away from military blocs. But, to repeat, it gradually came to understand that non-participation alone is not enough to keep away from war. "There is not the shadow of a doubt", Nehru told Parliament in August 1958, "that if a war is once started, the full panoply of the weapons of the atomic age will reveal itself".<sup>11</sup> India began to come out actively for the preservation of general peace, demanding disarmament and cessation, as a first step, of nuclear tests. She sharply criticised the United States for its policy—from a position of strength and was the initiator of the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence of states.<sup>12</sup> India's non-participation in military blocs, Nehru stressed, became a definitely positive and dynamic policy and made "India's name associated with peace" in every part of the world.<sup>13</sup>

Prime Minister Nehru, and after him also many other political leaders of young sovereign states, came to understand that full elimination of colonialism and peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems are indispensable conditions for the achievement of India's national aims as well as of world progress. To the extent that this was realised, the foreign

policy line of India's non-participation in blocs was transformed into a policy of positive neutrality, of India's active efforts against colonialism and for averting another world war.

This policy was earning India ever greater prestige in the international arena. Already at the Bandung Conference in 1955 India became the recognised leader of the non-aligned countries, and further on her example in pursuing the policy of positive neutrality was followed by an ever greater number of young Asian and African states. It is highly significant that the promulgation of a policy of positive neutrality—since about 1958 it has been more commonly known as non-participation in blocs or simply as non-alignment—became a general rule for countries emancipated from colonial subjection and often enough was the first foreign policy act of young independent states.

It is worth noting that the policy of non-alignment as pursued by India and other countries in Asia and Africa has some important characteristics distinguishing it from classical neutrality adhered to by some European states. Firstly, non-alignment is practised by a state not as a corollary of any written international agreement but as the main foreign policy line. Second, it is a line determining the entire foreign political activities and relations of a state in peacetime as well, not being neutrality in the military sense, i.e., the conduct of a state after the beginning of hostilities.

What is it, then, that makes an ever growing number of countries interested in non-alignment? In a collection of articles by Indian authors edited by the well-known scholar K. P. Karunakaran, the following are mentioned as the basic reasons: concern on the part of new independent states lest the Western powers should attempt to restore their old domination; to abolish the economic lag imposed by years of colonial oppression, peace is necessary; non-alignment reflects the outlook of the "middle classes" which had led the movement for national liberation and came to power after independence was gained.<sup>14</sup>

Speaking of the concept of non-alignment in general or the reasons why it should be adopted by any one African, Latin American or European country (e.g., Finland in Europe and Mexico in Latin America), there may be other motives. But

as regards India and other non-socialist Asian countries the reasons for the choice of non-alignment have, in our view, been stated fairly accurately.

At the same time, one cannot fail to notice the omission of yet another, highly important, reason for the choice of non-alignment, namely, the desire of the Indian and other young governments to have freedom of manoeuvre in foreign affairs in the interest of their countries, certainly, as seen by the ruling classes. This point is passed over in silence by almost all Indian bourgeois writers. One of them, however, K. Satchidananda Murty, has considered it possible to make the following admission in his well-detailed book on Indian foreign policy. He writes : "A new country which seeks influence in world councils must have freedom of political manoeuvre. In such a case that country can influence to some extent at least the policies of other countries and that country can also act in changing circumstances according to its best judgements. These considerations led India to keep aloof from both the power blocs".<sup>15</sup>

Further, he states his very interesting opinion about the significance of non-aligned countries to the existence and functioning of international organisations. He writes : "Apart from all this, if there are no non-aligned states in the world, the U.N. will lose its value, for if it only consists of committed states, what will be the use of the debates in it and the resolutions passed in it ? Whom will they convince or impress ? Without the non-aligned nations, the power blocs will have no moderating influences to work on them and no opinion to respect and fear; also, international commissions of enquiry and control will be hard put to find persons acceptable to both the blocs as chairmen; maybe there would be no one fit to be the secretary-general of the U.N. even if all countries became aligned with power blocs. The comity of nations needs at least some nations to be uncommitted and non-aligned".<sup>16</sup>

As was mentioned earlier, India's policy of positive neutrality was supported by the majority of Asian and African countries. What was, then, the attitude of the Soviet Union to neutralist foreign policy ? It was set out clearly in the Report of the Central Committee to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU

which said : "A few years ago there were two opposing camps in world affairs—the socialist and imperialist camps. Today an active role in international affairs is also being played by those countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America that have freed, or are freeing themselves from foreign oppression. Those countries are often called neutralist though they may be considered neutral only in the sense that they do not belong to any of the existing military-political alliances. Most of them, however, are by no means neutral when the cardinal problem of our day, that of war and peace, is at issue. As a rule, those countries advocate peace and oppose war. The countries which have won their liberty from colonialism are becoming a serious factor for peace, for the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, and the basic issues of world politics can no longer be settled without due regard for their interests".<sup>17</sup> A basic document like the CPSU Programme adopted by the 22nd CPSU Congress states : "The C.P.S.U. regards it as its internationalist duty to assist the peoples who have set out to win and strengthen their national independence, all peoples who are fighting for the complete abolition of the colonial system".<sup>18</sup>

These statements determined the approach to and all-round support of the positions of the non-aligned countries, India among them.

Early in the period under review, the attitude maintained by the Chinese People's Republic towards Indian foreign policy was largely the same. Thus Chou En-lai, during his state visit to India at the end of 1956, said at the joint meeting of both houses of the Indian Parliament : "The Chinese people highly esteem India's efforts for peace. India has made invaluable contributions to bring out peaceful solutions to the wars in Korea and Indo-China. India's role in formulating the five principles of peaceful co-existence and in initiating the first Asian-African conference is known to all. In addition, on the question of banning atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, and on the question of disarmament, India has been consistently and firmly pursuing a policy which is in the interest of peace.

"On the question of opposing hostile military groups and

of promoting collective peace, India too has been making untiring efforts. The Chinese people deem it an honour to have such a great neighbour as India".<sup>19</sup>

India's foreign policy was supported by Poland, Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries.

American ruling circles, however, adopted an openly hostile attitude to India's policy of non-alignment. The world press gave a wide enough coverage to the fact that State Secretary Dulles ran down neutralism as an immoral and short-sighted doctrine.<sup>20</sup> US ruling circles were bringing immense pressure to bear on India and other neutralist Asian countries so as to include them in one way or another in their military strategic plans.

Nor did the invitation for Nehru to visit the United States for talks at the close of 1956 help bring about a better understanding between India and the USA. During Nehru's stay in the USA from December 16 to December 21, 1956, his talks with President Eisenhower lasted altogether 26 hours. They were held privately, without even the closest advisers being present, and in conclusion a quite laconic joint statement was issued which said that "the talks confirmed the broad area of agreement between India and USA".<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, already on the next day, speaking at the session of the UN General Assembly, Nehru attacked military pacts, the arms race and military presence in other countries.<sup>22</sup>

A month later, after Nehru had scathingly criticised the Eisenhower Doctrine designed for drawing into the American bloc the Arab countries of the Middle East from which the British and French colonisers had been driven out (this will be discussed further on), the Indian *Blitz* weekly stated that the Americans' new actions had gravely impaired the new-born but short-lived "Indian-American friendship".<sup>23</sup>

(While the American attitude to India's neutralism was frankly hostile, Britain took a somewhat different stance.) First of all, British ruling circles took into account that in spite of being non-aligned India was in many respects still dependent on Britain, being a member of the Commonwealth and receiving British arms and military equipment. Nehru and other Indian official spokesmen, when criticising imperialism and colonialism,

always spoke in a different key, so to say, with reference to Britain, compared with what they had to say about the imperialist policies of other countries.<sup>21</sup> Lastly, it should also be taken into consideration that British ruling circles, bearing in mind their interests in the Commonwealth, did not want at all to see the number of countries in the Western bloc, whose foreign policies were dictated from Washington, increased by India joining it. It was for this reason that the British *Eastern World* magazine wrote in August 1956: "It is one of the great paradoxes of our day that Britain's world-wide interests have been better served by India's policy of non-alignment with power blocs than by Britain's participation in the American strategic alliances".<sup>25</sup> The British politicians wanted this "paradox" to continue and would have nothing to say against India's neutrality provided that the epithet "positive" were dropped together with all that it implied, and it were neutrality in the purely military sense. Only the more conservative of the British leaders and newspapers and magazines attacked Nehru and his policy.<sup>26</sup>

In other West European countries, Indian foreign policy worried only such politicians as West German Chancellor Adenauer. At the time of Nehru's visit to West Germany in June 1956, after his talks with Adenauer which revealed that there was "a substantial difference between the two statesmen's ideas of peaceful co-existence", the British newspapers *The Times*, *The Manchester Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* all with one voice that "Dr. Adenauer, the West German Chancellor, is disappointed over the talks".<sup>27</sup>

At the same time, broad sections of West European opinion praised India's foreign policy. Summing up the results of Nehru's visits to Western Europe in June 1956 and to Scandinavia and the Netherlands in June 1957, *Time* had even room to write of "a triumph for the principles of Peace with Honour in Europe and congratulate Nehru for his efforts to bring about the 'Area of Peace'".<sup>28</sup>

The most vivid proof of the intense recognition of the need of peaceful co-existence of all peoples and of the high regard maintained of India's role in the world is the fact that...



the manufacture of new products. For example, a French firm had helped construct an electrical equipment plant at Bangalore, the Swiss and Germans a tool-making plant, also at Bangalore, the Italians had helped in building an artificial fertiliser plant at Nangal and enlarging a similar plant at Sindri, and so on.<sup>37</sup>

Until the autumn of 1957 the United States had refused to grant India any loans to develop the public sector of the economy, but Soviet aid forced American ruling circles to revise their position. When in October 1957 Indian Finance Minister T.T. Krishnamachari visited the USA, India was granted a loan of \$ 225 million, 125 million of it being earmarked for the development of the public sector. Nevertheless, it was thought in India that "if the USA has hesitated to enter wholeheartedly the area of heavy industry which falls under public sector, the USSR has been equally reluctant to give such aid as would strengthen private sector".<sup>38</sup>

One of the causes to which the support of Nehru's foreign policy in India was due was the influence exerted on the Indians by the early successes scored by the Chinese People's Republic. In the early years of its existence, thanks to considerable aid it got from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as to the impact of the Soviet example on the Chinese people in the days when Maoist leadership was yet not strong enough to counter the growth of Marxist tendencies in the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese People's Republic achieved no small successes in its political and social development.

China's successes, especially in developing the economy, attracted the Indians' attention. Chester Bowles wrote that relations between India and China by 1955 "had taken bitter root. Not only among government leaders, but among most educated Indians as well, I sensed a surprising degree of tolerance if not a kind of enthusiasm for the 'New China'."<sup>39</sup>

The close similarity of their past and of the social and economic tasks that India had to tackle after independence, and China after the formation of the Chinese People's Republic, approximately the same initial level of the economic growth, the impression made on the Indians by the radical agrarian reforms and first successes in industrialisation in China, all these factors



the leaders of the National Congress party and other political parties as well as Indian scholars and publicists study again and again the experience of the Chinese People's Republic, compare economic development data, and so on. These were subjects of many articles printed in the party and general press.

Addressing a session of the All India Congress Committee in June 1956, Nehru, after saying that there were a lot of things common between India and China, gave much attention to a comparative analysis of the growth of production, national income and other indicators of India's and China's development.<sup>40</sup>

Many delegations went from India to the Chinese People's Republic to acquaint themselves with different aspects of life in the new China. In July 1956, for instance, a delegation comprising some leading figures of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and the national Planning Commission visited China to study the planning of agricultural development. The long report submitted by the delegation, which contained some conclusions and recommendations with reference to Indian conditions, was published by the Indian Government.<sup>41</sup>

At the same time one must say that some bourgeois Indian politicians hoped that in future China would break away from the Soviet Union and that capitalism would be restored in China. Naturally, such things were not mentioned either in documents published by the Indian National Congress or in the open press. But the presence of such ideas was attested to, among others, by Chester Bowles on the strength of his conversations with some Indians political leaders.<sup>42</sup>

While these and other causes ensured extensive support of the government's foreign policy by the Indians, the results of this policy and the international recognition of India's contributions to universal peace made the Indians proud of the role their country played on the world scene.

India's growing prestige in world affairs made her capital, Delhi, a sort of Mecca for statesmen both of East and West. It is hardly necessary to enumerate all presidents, kings, prime ministers and ministers from different countries who visited India during the period under review. Each of them tried to find out what the Indian Government thought about various matters of interest to them and secure different

As the Communist Party of India supported the Government's foreign policy and simultaneously sharply criticised its home policy, some people in India—and outside India too—got the impression that the Indian Government's foreign policy was progressive while its domestic policy was reactionary. Was this a correct notion? We believe not. Let us recall that long ago Lenin wrote : "It is fundamentally wrong, un-Marxist and unscientific, to single out 'foreign policy' from policy in general, let alone counterpose foreign policy to home policy".<sup>50</sup>

In India, both home and foreign policies were carried out in the interests of the national bourgeoisie. In both areas of politics there were positive and negative points alike, but at the stage of development under consideration the main aims of the ruling bourgeoisie in India were, at home, to eliminate the vestiges of feudalism and colonialism in order to ensure independent development along the capitalist path, and, in the international scene, to ensure peaceful conditions for such development. As the foreign policy pursued by the Nehru Government conformed to the interests of the entire Indian people, the Indian communists criticised it much less than its home policy. Besides, the Communists criticised deviations from the foreign policy line, not the line itself.

If we turn to Indian historiography on foreign policy, we shall see that most Indian bourgeois historians invariably stress that India's foreign policy rests above all on such immutable categories as Gandhi's precepts and the national traditions going back to the days of Emperor Asoka, the peacemaker. Still, one of the researchers, K. Gupta, acknowledges that "the foreign policy of India is not so much based on moral principles as on power politics guided by the concept of national interest".<sup>51</sup> Gupta explains further : "...under the circumstances, the defence of 'national interest' in Indian foreign policy would mean safeguarding primarily the interests of the propertied classes".<sup>52</sup> So, speaking of India's endeavour to keep aloof from the blocs, he points out : "The Indian Government has not refused to take sides as a matter of principle. It merely refuses to do so when there is nothing thereby to be gained".

The Indian Government has never hesitated to align...

judgement" where national interest was involved.) "...Where it has neither interest nor influence, India merely refuses to choose between sides until the absolute need arises.<sup>53</sup> Alignment either with the American or the Russian bloc would seem to India in the present state of her development to be to surrender political independence".<sup>54</sup>

To return to the overwhelming support of the Government's foreign policy by the people, we must say that this indisputable fact and the immense respect shown for India's foreign policy line by other countries restrained to a point the Right-wing circles in Congress and some other political parties which wanted a different foreign policy. They just did not dare to launch head-on attacks against the Government's foreign policy line, realising the sheer futility of any such attempt. For this reason criticism of the Government's notions and actions in the area of foreign policy often assumed a "constructive" form. Thus, one of the more influential Right-wingers in Congress, Morarji Desai, held that the Panch Shila should be supplemented with a sixth principle extending the fifth principle—on co-existence—to India's domestic scene so as to ensure peaceful co-existence of parties, groups, and individuals.<sup>55</sup> Although M. Desai did not mention "peaceful co-existence of labour and capital", he must have meant it in the first place.

Acharya Kripalani and other Right-wing Socialist leaders suggested that India should create a "third force" on the world scene, a bloc of non-aligned and small nations, which would oppose the great power blocs.<sup>56</sup> The Jana Sangh party demanded more flexibility towards the West. Dr. Ambedkar, leader of the Scheduled Castes Federation, claimed that the gist of Nehru's foreign policy was "...to solve the problems of other countries and not to solve our own", that India in its foreign policy was like "a sailor with binoculars. He could see things far ahead of him but not what was happening around him".<sup>57</sup>

Almost until the end of 1956 nobody in India spoke against the basic principles of the Government's foreign policy. Only later, when acute problems affecting India directly emerged on the international scene, did the forces opposed to the Government's foreign policy line begin to organise there.

### Mounting tension between India and Pakistan : 1956-57

As we already said, India's partition in 1947 on a religious basis by the British imperialists gave rise to a range of problems in relations between the newly-emerged Indian Union (the Republic of India since January 26, 1950) and Pakistan. Of these problems, the Kashmir question was the most acute and was constantly used by the imperialists in order to set India and Pakistan against each other to further their own selfish ends.

(Since 1954-55 when Pakistan joined the aggressive blocs of SEATO and CENTO, the situation on the border between India and Pakistan was troubled, and since the spring of 1956 relations between India and Pakistan reached a crisis.)

(The beginning of the crisis is associated with the discussion of the Kashmir problem at a SEATO Council session, held on March 6-8, 1956, at Karachi.) The dual purpose of the discussion is quite clear. On the one hand, it aimed to create a new seat of tension and, by supporting Pakistan's claims to Kashmir, to tie more strongly to SEATO its new military ally, and, on the other hand, to bring pressure to bear on the Indian Government which, at the end of 1955, had demonstrated a "dangerous" coincidence of views with the Soviet Union on key international issues. Imperialist circles hoped that with the aggravation of the Kashmir conflict India would have to turn from common world problems to what was happening on her own borders.

Speaking at a session of SEATO Council, US State Secretary Dulles said that India must be urged to carry out the UN resolutions, adopted in 1948-49, on holding a plebiscite in Kashmir to decide its future. This proposal, worded somewhat more mildly, was included in the final communique of the session. That, however, did not exhaust the meaning of the speeches made at the session by the American and British representatives. The military observer of the Blitz, Major-General Shedatt Singh, drew the following conclusions from the speeches made at the session by Dulles and the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd :

"1. Pakistan is definitely going to get more armaments from America in order to frighten India...

2. The absence of a Joint Staff means that America and Great Britain will not send their troops to fight in Pakistan.

3. The air display by the Pakistan Air Force was meant to stress the need of Pakistan getting more modern planes from America".<sup>58</sup>

Discussion of the Kashmir question by SEATO provoked a storm of indignation in India. The Indian Government expressed its official protest to the SEATO countries, stating that India considered the state of Jammu and Kashmir to be her integral part and viewed the discussion of the Kashmir question by the SEATO Council as interference in her home affairs.<sup>59</sup> Indian newspapers of diverse trends sharply criticised the provocative activity of the imperialists who managed the aggressive bloc.

As soon as the SEATO Council session was over, Dulles flew to Delhi hoping to persuade Indian public opinion of the "good intentions" of SEATO and simultaneously to exert fresh pressure on the Indian Government so as to make it alter its foreign policy line.<sup>60</sup> Apropos of this unexpected visit, Indian newspapers wrote that after what Dulles had done at Karachi he could hardly be expected to discuss anything in Delhi but the weather.

Nor was it of any help to Dulles that at a press conference after two days of talks with Nehru, the State Secretary declared that in the event of Pakistani aggression against India, the USA would be on India's side.<sup>61</sup> This declaration was meant for very naive people. The editor of *Blitz*, R.K. Karanjia, replied to Dulles, showing him that his statement was misaddressed. He wrote: "We have Mr. Dulles's most honourable word, of course, that Pakistan will never be permitted to indulge in aggression against India and that, if ever such aggression takes place, then the United States will generously come to our rescue: but will our Great American Saviour be pleased to tell us how he proposes to decide whether Pakistan is the aggressor against India or India against Pakistan? Even today, both India and Pakistan are accusing each other of aggression; may we know who, in the opinion of Mr. Dulles, is guilty?"<sup>62</sup> The Dulles visit to Delhi did nothing to moderate the sharp differences between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir question.

What is more, it never set out to do so, rather the other way round.

Now let us see why the Indian Government attached such great significance to the Kashmir question and how its approach to the question evolved.

Nehru always considered the status of Kashmir to be of paramount importance. Besides its strategic value, Kashmir's being part of India, with its predominantly Muslim population, accentuated the secular character of the Indian state and always seemed to Nehru to be a refutation of the "two nation theory" on the strength of which Pakistan was established. This subject recurred in Nehru's speeches again and again. Thus, he said in the Constituent Assembly in March 1948: "We could not for instance send our armies and we would not be there if we were not supported by very large sections of the population, which means the Muslims of Kashmir".<sup>93</sup>

Then, how did the stand of the Indian Government change with regard to the Kashmir question? From 1948 to 1952 it said that it agreed to a plebiscite in Kashmir which would determine its future, but after Pakistan had obeyed the UN orders to withdraw its troops from the areas of Kashmir occupied in 1947-1948. After the Delhi Agreement (which was concluded in July 1952 between the Governments of India and Kashmir and stated the conditions of accession to India) the Indian Government began to make reservations on the question of plebiscite in Kashmir. Speaking in Parliament on August 7, 1952, Nehru said: "So, while the accession was complete in law and in fact, the other fact which has nothing to do with law also remains, namely, our pledge to the people of Kashmir—and you like, to the people of the world—that this matter [Kashmir's accession to India—Y.N.] can be affirmed again or cancelled by the people of Kashmir...we will give them a chance to decide".<sup>94</sup>

Then Indian official spokesmen mentioned the plebiscite more and more seldom. Speaking in Parliament in May, 1956, however, Nehru, for instance, said: "There was a great deal of talk about plebiscite and a good deal of talk as to what India should and should not do. But throughout the process, the first demand of the United Nations has been to expect the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the area occupied

by them. Other factors came later. Today, eight and a half years after that, those armed forces are still there. All this talk of plebiscite and other things is completely beside the point".<sup>65</sup>

It seems to us that the stand of the Indian Government on plebiscite in Kashmir was influenced not only by the fact that Pakistan had not withdrawn its troops from the western and northern areas of Kashmir, but by other circumstances as well.

As is known, the Indian Government did very much to improve the conditions of the masses in Kashmir. They carried out a more radical land reform there than in any other state, confiscating from landlords all land in excess of the limit of 22.75 acres legally established in 1950 and distributing it free to landless peasants. The world press paid much attention to the progressive reforms carried out in Kashmir. But, in spite of all this, as the Indians themselves admitted, there was in Kashmir "no sense of inevitability about belonging to India".<sup>66</sup>

Prime Minister Nehru believed that changing the *status quo* in Kashmir would not only affect the safety of the big Muslim minority (50 millions) in India but also result in a growth of religious communal hysteria and so of the influence of the extreme Right, militant Hinduist parties.<sup>67</sup> All this could cause complications to arise wherever there was compact Muslim population. It could promote the growth of separatist feelings in the southern states and gravely undermine the unity of the Indian state.

Thus Kashmir turned into a major trump card the imperialists used in playing on the friction between India and Pakistan, which was also used at the aforementioned SEATO session to bring pressure to bear on India so as to influence her foreign policy in a direction suitable to imperialists.

A few days after Nehru made his statement about the plebiscite in Kashmir, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali, suggested in the National Assembly on March 19, 1956, that India and Pakistan should sign a declaration to the effect that they would never resort to war against each other if India agreed to arbitration by third countries on outstanding problems (on Kashmir too, of course). Speaking in Parliament the next day, Nehru welcomed the first part of the proposal, recalling that the Indian Government had been offering to sign

just such a declaration with Pakistan for several years. As for its second part, on arbitration, Nehru said that it should be replaced by the Panch Shila. The Pakistan Government, however, did not agree with Nehru and Mohammed Ali said that talking to India directly would not bring about any settlement of the Kashmir issue and the latter should be referred to the Security Council again.

On April 13, 1956, the Indian Government for the first time proposed publicly that the Kashmir question should be solved by giving recognition to the ceasefire line (of January 1, 1949) as the state border between India and Pakistan. This would resolve the deadlock and settle at once the sharpest issue between India and Pakistan and take away the pretext for the imperialists to intervene in Hindustan. India's proposal caused quite a flutter in the imperialist camp. *The New York Times* wrote (even before the reaction of the Pakistan Government to Nehru's proposal became known) that "it can hardly come as a surprise that Pakistan should have immediately and vigorously rejected the suggestion"<sup>68</sup> Indeed, Mohammed Ali stated in an interview given to the Associated Press of Pakistan agency that there could be no question of "such a preposterous proposal (division of Kashmir)" ever being considered, while Hamidul Huq Chaudhury, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, said: "Kashmir is a live issue for us and we shall raise it everywhere from the Security Council downwards".<sup>69</sup>

Pakistan put off requesting the Security Council to consider the Kashmir question again, being advised by Americans not to insist on it before Nehru's visit to the United States in July 1956. However, after Nehru had learned from the report sent by Krishna Menon, India's permanent representative at the United Nations, that American politicians intended to use his visit for their own ends at the 1956 Presidential election, he decided to postpone his visit to the United States.<sup>70</sup> Accordingly, the Pakistani Government decided to postpone bringing its new complaint on the Kashmir question. But after Nehru's visit the United States in December 1956 and Eisenhower's unsuccessful talks with him, the Kashmir question was immediately submitted for discussion by the Security Council.

When, on January 16, 1957, the discussion started, a group



of Western countries led by the United States proposed a draft resolution on holding in Kashmir an "impartial plebiscite under UN guidance". The proposal was rejected by India. The Indian representative said that it ignored the will of the people of Kashmir and the situation which had shaped up as a result of Pakistan's participation in military pacts.<sup>71</sup>

A month later, on February 20, 1957, the Western countries suggested that UN forces should be brought to Kashmir in preparation for the plebiscite. This proposal, however, was not passed by the Security Council. The next day the United States and other Western powers got a resolution accepted by the Security Council on mediation in talks between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir question. Gunnar Jarring (Sweden) was appointed to be mediator. In March-April 1957 he visited the capitals of India and Pakistan twice. The talks were kept secret but the Indian newspapers hinted that Jarring's visit had done nothing to change India's position on the Kashmir question. One newspaper reported that the Indian side had flatly rejected Jarring's proposal to submit the Kashmir question to the International Court of Justice.<sup>72</sup> Jarring presented his report to the Security Council at the appointed time, on April 15, 1957, but he had to state that he was unable to supply any recommendations for the settlement of the Kashmir problem.

The Jarring report on negotiations with the Indian and Pakistan Governments was discussed in the Security Council in September-December 1957. On December 2, the Security Council adopted a resolution to the effect that the plebiscite must be held under UN supervision, India refused to conduct talks on the basis of such a resolution, and the Kashmir question, therefore, returned to its former state.

During 1957 reports on Pakistan's military preparations for an attack on India kept appearing in the Indian press. It is hard to tell how much of that information was true and how much was invented by reactionaries seeking to divert the attention of peoples of India and Pakistan from the tasks of independent economic development and use the threat of war for their own selfish ends. It is, however, obvious that relations with Pakistan were in 1957 one of the chief factors in

determining Indian foreign policy.

### India and the Triple Aggression against Egypt

Speaking at Alexandria on July, 26 1956, President Nasser of Egypt said that the Suez Canal Company was to be nationalised and an Egyptian joint-stock company established in its place. This decision threw the imperialists into a paroxysm of fury and made them try to "get back" the Suez Canal at all costs.

The "Suez crisis" emerged as a result of a concentrated imperialist offensive on the Eastern peoples fighting for national independence. As a matter of fact, Egypt was selected merely as the direction of the main effort which might result either in the consolidation of the world national liberation movement or in imperialism's stronger pressure on all Asian, African and Latin American countries.

India and Egypt had become friendly even before the crisis occurred. The meetings of Prime Minister Nehru and President Nasser, including the one in April 1955, at the Bandung Conference, showed a concurrence of views on major international issues. One cannot help noticing that the decision to nationalise the Suez Canal Company came only a week after the termination of talks between Nasser, Nehru and President Tito of Yugoslavia. The talks took place on July 18-19, 1956, on the island of Brioni. After the talks a joint communique was issued on the international situation, stating that the Middle East problems should be considered paying heed to the legitimate economic interests and basing decisions on the freedom of the peoples concerned.<sup>21</sup> Speaking in Parliament on August 8, 1956, Nehru, after telling the House that a conference of the signatories of the convention of 1888 on the Suez Canal, and other interested countries, was about to be convened at London on the initiative of the United States, Britain and France, said that the Indian Government had accepted the invitation and was sending its representatives to the conference.<sup>22</sup>

Shortly before the conference, an influential American newspaper wrote that all the West's important interests in the Middle East would be desperately threatened unless a lesson was taught a lesson.<sup>23</sup> Horrified at the possibility of a Soviet

the nationalisation of the Suez Canal might provoke in other Middle East countries, the imperialists rallied together to face the common danger.

The London Conference which met on August 16-23, 1956, was attended by 21 countries, Egypt and Greece having declined the invitations.

Proceeding from respect for the rights of the Egyptian people and the interests of the countries using the canal, and with a view to settling by negotiation a dangerous conflict, the Indian delegate at the London conference made some suggestions based on the following points: (1) recognition of Egypt's sovereign rights; (2) recognition of the fact that the Suez Canal was an inseparable part of Egypt and an international waterway; (3) free navigation through the canal; (4) reasonable taxes and duties; (5) maintenance of the canal in good condition; and (6) recognition of the users' interests.<sup>76</sup>

The Indian draft was supported by the Soviet Union and other countries, but was rejected by the Western powers. The latter insisted on what they called the "Dulles Plan", by which the management of the canal was to be transferred to an "international body".

After the fruitless London conference, the Western powers undertook a series of moves to make Egypt give up its rights to the canal. A five-man mission headed by Australian Prime Minister Menzies (the "Menzies Mission") was sent to Cairo where it was to present the "Dulles Plan" to Egypt as an ultimatum. All foreign employees, pilots among them, were recalled. Large British and French troop contingents were lifted to the Eastern Mediterranean.<sup>77</sup>

Speaking in Parliament on September 13, 1956, Prime Minister Nehru expressed his deep regret at this turn of the events and said that he had sent messages to the British Prime Minister and the US President, setting forth the Indian point of view which was that the last statement of the Egyptian Government, expressing Egypt's willingness to assume international obligations on the Suez Canal and suggesting that negotiations be started on this basis, opened the way to peaceful settlement; Nehru urged the leaders of Britain and the USA to start talks accordingly.<sup>78</sup>

On September 19, in London, on the initiative of the USA, Britain and France, a conference of 18 nations was convened to secure their support in implementing a new plan for the establishment of a Suez Canal Users' Association. India refused to attend the conference. Simultaneously, it agreed to send her representatives to a conference proposed by Egypt.

It is worth noting especially that when the Western powers staged economic boycott of Egypt, blocking, among other things, all Egyptian assets in foreign banks, India granted Egypt a loan in October 1956. Although it was not a big loan, only Rs 50 million, it represented material as well as moral and political assistance to Egypt.<sup>73</sup> When the British and French imperialists saw that they would not manage—even through the Security Council—to force Egypt to cooperate with the Suez Canal Users' Association of their making, the triple aggression of Britain, France and Israel against Egypt was launched on the night of October 30. Its purpose was not only to bring Egypt to her knees, but also to restore colonial rule in the Middle East. Britain and France, using their position as permanent members of the Security Council, disrupted its work and then refused to carry out the resolution passed on November 2, 1956, by a special session of the General Assembly, on a ceasefire and withdrawal of their troops, thus bringing about an international situation fraught with danger of another world war.

On October 31, Prime Minister Nehru, in a message to the UN Secretary-General, condemned the aggression against Egypt and urged the United Nations to take steps to curtail it. Nehru described the attack on Egypt as "the most heinous aggression that has ever taken place" and said that the events in Egypt had made him wonder what would be the fate of India, if it were in the same position as Egypt. "The 'crime' committed by Egypt has committed", he said, "is the 'crime' which every country striving to win a better life for its people should not commit at any time."<sup>74</sup>

As the aggressors would not obey the United Nations demands, India, on November 3, 1956, proposed to the United Nations, on behalf of 19 Asian and African countries, a resolution requesting the Secretary-General to get a ceasefire effected

countries concerned and report the results of the talks in 12 hours' time.<sup>81</sup>

The situation kept getting worse, and on November 5, 1956, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers sent messages to the heads of governments of the United States, Britain, France and Israel, informing them that the USSR had submitted a proposal to the United Nations suggesting that the latter should use its armed forces as well as those of other UN members to stop the aggression against Egypt and avert the threat of another world war.

Only after this the governments of Britain, France and Israel agreed to cease hostilities. Nevertheless, in spite of continuing sporadic fighting, they did not withdraw their troops from Egypt. The British and French governments laid down conditions not in the UN resolution, while the Israeli Prime Minister simply refused to leave the district of Gaza. On November 14, the Prime Ministers of India, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon met at Delhi. They issued a joint statement expressing their view on what had taken place and pointing out the danger of war in the grave international situation that had arisen.<sup>82</sup> On November 16, Nehru said in the House of the People that the hostilities waged by Britain and France against Egypt were a "flagrant case of aggression by two strong powers against a weaker country with the purpose of enforcing their will, even to the extent of changing the Government of that country." He then told the House that India had agreed to send a contingent of her armed forces for the "United Nations International Force" in Egypt, to be brought into the areas being left by the aggressors, and that the contingent was leaving for Egypt that very day.<sup>83</sup>

Assessing the role India had played in stopping an aggression dangerous to world peace, Romesh Chandra, Chairman of the All India Peace Council, wrote in an article, entitled 'The Aggression against Egypt and its Lessons for the Work of the Indian Peace Movement', that the "stand taken by India against aggression helped considerably in rousing opinion in Asia and Africa and indeed in the whole world, including Britain and France, against the war".<sup>84</sup>

The attack on Egypt, mass bombings of Cairo, Port Said

and other Egyptian cities. Invasion of Egypt's territory by land forces, and other acts committed by the aggressors aroused indignation of the Indian people. There were numerous protest demonstrations in Delhi, Bombay and elsewhere.<sup>1</sup>

Thousands-strong manifestations literally choked the boulevards of the British and French embassies in Delhi. "I have never seen such mammoth and 'imperialist' demonstrations as to the proclamation of independence."<sup>2</sup> The demonstrations were held under the slogans "Stop the Aggression against Egypt" and "Leave the British Commonwealth!" The latter slogan was supported by the mass of Congress members.<sup>3</sup> At a session of the All India Congress Committee held in November 1956, Agha Shariq and others put forward a resolution that India should leave the British Commonwealth.<sup>4</sup>

In January 1957, when the Eisenhower doctrine was promulgated, which claimed that the defence of the Middle East of Britain and France had left a "vacuum" and that the United States had to fill it to prevent the Soviet Union from doing so, the Indian Government tabled its protest in the UN. Speaking in the National Congress session held in 1957, Nehru said that "this type of unilateral move is as wrong as it is stupid. It creates a dangerous displacement of influence in other countries and makes the world more dangerous."<sup>5</sup> Nehru also reminded the Congress that "the United States is behind the Cold War Policy" and that "New England is the primary beneficiary of the Cold War policy." He also pointed out the expense of the United States in the defence of the British Empire in Asia and the Pacific. When American troops were sent to the Middle East, he said, "it is a big question of the United States' ability to carry out its policy in the Middle East. It is a big question of the United States' ability to carry out its policy in the Middle East."<sup>6</sup>

Concerning the American policy in the Middle East, Nehru said that "the United States is behind the Cold War Policy" and that "New England is the primary beneficiary of the Cold War policy." He also pointed out the expense of the United States in the defence of the British Empire in Asia and the Pacific. When American troops were sent to the Middle East, he said, "it is a big question of the United States' ability to carry out its policy in the Middle East. It is a big question of the United States' ability to carry out its policy in the Middle East."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Indian Express*, 29 July 1956, 1 August 1956, 2 August 1956, 3 August 1956.

imperialist stand. At the same time, it failed to use the favourable opportunities created by the strong anti-imperialist feeling and unanimity of opinion on the aggression against Egypt so as to step up the peace struggle directed against the imperialist actions in other parts of the world. More than a year afterwards, CPI General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh wrote in an article on the Communist Party congress at Amritsar in April 1958 : "...the resolution 'draws pointed attention of the Party to the neglect of the struggle for peace. It must be frankly admitted that the war danger is underestimated in our Party and there is the tendency to forget imperialism altogether. We are so engrossed with internal issues that the threat of imperialism hardly finds a place in our agitation and propaganda'".<sup>89</sup>

The communalist Jana Sangh developed no particular activity in connection with the imperialist aggression against Egypt. Nevertheless it considered it necessary to mention the events in Egypt in its election manifesto for the 1957 general election in order to declare that these events "once again demonstrated that weakness is a curse and that if one wants to live freely and honourably, it is essential to have military and economic strength".<sup>90</sup>

The Rightist leaders of the Praja Socialist Party took a rather mixed attitude at the beginning of the "Suez crisis". In August 1956, for example, its Executive declared that the party supported President Nasser of Egypt in the dispute over the Suez Canal. Simultaneously, the Executive said it feared that the "confrontation of forces" staged by some countries might conduce to irritation in relations between Europe and Asia.

But when the triple aggression against Egypt had started, the Indian Right-wing Socialist leaders revealed their real attitude to it. It was at the Asian Socialist Conference, held in Bombay on November 1-10, 1956. In his opening speech, the leader of the Praja Socialist Party, Ashoka Mehta, dwelt at length on the "blooming forth" of socialism, but he found not a word to say in criticism of the invasion of Egypt by Israeli troops, committed two days before. While delegate after delegate from different Asian countries rose to denounce Israel and its Anglo-French partners in aggression, the Praja Socialist

Party delegation and its head, Ashoka Mehta, said nothing. When the conference burst into applause at the mention of Nehru's name by one of the delegates from abroad, the only ones who were not applauding were the delegates of Israel and Pakistan and the Indian Socialists. For four days the conference passed no resolution on the aggression against Egypt. In spite of increasing dissatisfaction of the delegates, the delegation of the Praja Socialist Party "found no time" to prepare the draft.<sup>91</sup>

A more definite attitude towards the aggression against Egypt was taken by the Socialist Party leaders.<sup>92</sup> After Britain, France and Israel had launched military operations in the Suez Canal zone, they issued a call to the Indian people urging them to boycott British and French goods as an expression of protest.<sup>93</sup>

—We mentioned earlier that almost till the end of 1956 the foreign policy line pursued by the Indian Government had encountered no overt opposition. Such opposition was first organised by the Forum of Free Enterprises founded by the Indian monopolist A. D. Shroff, and by a body known as the Democratic Research Service. The former was launched on July 18, 1956, when it published its manifesto in the press. The manifesto refuted in advance the possible charges that the Forum had been inspired by foreigners, and claimed that it was a "strictly national body". It went on to explain that the Forum was not a political organisation, its purposes being mainly educational.<sup>94</sup> What was meant by "educational purposes" transpired after some secret Forum documents fell into the hands of the Indian Government. They stated that the Forum aimed "to replace the Nehru Front both within and outside the Congress party by a conservative lobby", also mentioning the willingness of some American foundations to contribute to such anti-Nehru fronts in India. The Forum also contemplated "the building up of another Sardar Patel to take the crusade of Indian orthodoxy and conservatism against Nehru's socialism".<sup>95</sup>

The most sinister Right-wing opposition figure in India was R. M. Masani, the head of the Democratic Research Service, which was in fact, an American-aided lobby in India.



front organisation. Masani, twice a renegade (first from the Congress-Socialist Party and then from the Indian National Congress), was elected to Parliament in 1957 with the support of the Jharkhand Party<sup>96</sup> and other reactionary forces. After the French newspaper *Liberation* had printed an article on March 15, 1957, exposing Masani's activities as an American agent and reporting, among other things, that the budget of the Democratic Research Service for the previous year amounted to Rs 500,000, most of it transferred through the American Embassy in India to build up opposition to the Congress party, the Government's neutralist policy and so on, the *Blitz*, in a leading article, entitled *An Issue of Honour*, challenged Masani to answer the charges.<sup>97</sup> Two months later the *Blitz* printed a photocopy of the *Liberation* article and informed its readers that Masani had chosen to maintain silence.<sup>98</sup>

The effort to drum up opposition to the Government in the House of the People, launched by Masani with American money, was subsequently joined in, for "purely ideological" reasons, by one of the oldest Congress veterans, Rajagopalachari.

Two years later Rajagopalachari and Masani "found each other" at the founding of the Swatantra party, the former becoming its acknowledged ideological leader, and the latter its General Secretary.

### India's Foreign Policy during and after the 1957 General Election

If we begin our analysis of the positions of the Congress party on foreign policy at the 1957 general election with the Kashmir question, we may say that the Indian Government's policy was supported by all groups of the Congress party. This is clear, for example, from the articles of Shriman Narain, the General Secretary of the party, who belonged to its Right-wing. The articles were printed in the *Economic Review*<sup>99</sup> and the *Peace Review*.<sup>100</sup> A long article entitled 'What Justifies India's Stand on Kashmir?' was written by C. Rajagopalachari,<sup>101</sup> who was a noted Rightist.

As far as other world developments were concerned that occurred in the autumn of 1956, the Congress leadership were not so unanimous on them as they were on the Kashmir

question. Right-wingers were greatly displeased with the fact that when the "Hungarian question" was discussed in the United Nations, the Indian delegate Krishna Menon did not take an anti-Soviet stand.<sup>102</sup>

When an open meeting of the 62nd Congress session—in January 1957, at Indore—discussed the draft of the foreign policy resolution, S.K. Patil, a Right-winger who was a member of the Congress Working Committee and chairman of the provincial Bombay Congress organisation, made an amendment to the effect that the Soviet Union be requested to withdraw its troops from Hungary. On some explanations being given by Nehru, the amendment was declined.<sup>103</sup> Nevertheless, Patil's amendment was included in the final text of the resolution.<sup>104</sup> Simultaneously it was decided not to mention in the election manifesto either aggression against Egypt or the events in Hungary. The manifesto stated briefly: "India's foreign policy has had as its objectives the avoidance of war and the maintenance of friendly relations with all countries. India is opposed to 'cold war' which keeps up the mentality of war and promotes a race in armaments".<sup>105</sup>

In going over to the other Indian political parties' positions on foreign policy issues during the 1957 general election period, one should start with the Communist Party. The Indian researcher T.A. Nizami justly points out that of all political parties the Communist Party of India was the most active with reference to foreign policy problems. Speaking at election meetings, Communist Party leaders began to avoid entering individual instances of inconsistency in the Government's foreign policy, while on a range of cardinal problems (e.g., the Kashmir question) they declared their full support of the Government. At the same time, speaking at an election meeting at Hyderabad in February 1957, CPI General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh accused Congress of exploiting the Kashmir question for its own ends. Congress represented the Kashmir problem to the people as one of the party's policy—for which reason it urged voters to cast their ballots for Congress.<sup>106</sup> Although the Kashmir question was a matter of deep concern to the nation.<sup>107</sup>

In its election manifesto the Communist Party said: "It is

"will combat those reactionaries who try to swerve our foreign policy from the path of peace and opposition to military blocs. It will strive to strengthen our foreign policy still further.

"The Party will intensify the struggle for severance of India's relation with the British Commonwealth.

"The Communist Party will do all in its power to assist the liberation movement inside Goa and strive to secure effective intervention by the government ...

"It will strive for the establishment of relations of friendship between India and Pakistan, for increase in trade, cultural and other contacts between the two countries as well as for greater facilities for communication between their peoples".<sup>107</sup>

A rather complicated and contradictory approach to foreign policy issues was exercised by the leaders of the Praja Socialist Party. On the one hand, the party's election manifesto welcomed the relaxation of tensions in the world and general improvement in India's relations with other countries, declaring that "never in all history was the time so opportune for beating swords into plough-shares as today", while, on the other hand, it stated: "The Party will seek to settle in a friendly spirit all outstanding differences with Pakistan, but will not hesitate to take firm and even stern action if the flow of refugees [Hindus from Pakistan—*Y.N.*] is not stopped".<sup>108</sup>

Another example. To study the situation in Kashmir and present a report accordingly, the National Executive of the Praja Socialist Party in September 1953 sent to Kashmir a delegation composed of Sadiq Ali and Madhu Limaye. Having discussed their report at its meeting on January 15-17, 1954, the Executive adopted a resolution which was substantially in support of the Government's position. That, however, did not prevent the leader of the party, Ashoka Mehta, from telling an election meeting at Nagpur two years later that India's foreign policy over the preceding five years had been an utter failure, citing the Kashmir question as an example.<sup>109</sup> Soon after, Kamath, a prominent Socialist, sharply criticised in Parliament Nehru's suggestion to Pakistan about division of Kashmir along the "ceasefire line", and submitted a draft resolution saying that the Indian Government must take steps to liberate the Indian territory occupied by Pakistan.<sup>110</sup>

This inconsistency of approach of Praja Socialist Party leaders to foreign policy matters was due to their wish to win over to their side the mass of the Indian workers and the petty bourgeoisie on one hand, and not to anger those in whose pay they were, on the other.<sup>111</sup> That was the reason why Acharya Kripalani, a Praja Socialist Party leader, said in a foreign policy debate in Parliament, when he criticised the Government's policy on Kashmir, that he did not think that the Western countries had purposely united against India, and that if such an alliance did exist, it was an "unconscious league".<sup>112</sup>

The idea of creating a "third force" in the international arena had been the central point of the foreign policy programme of the Praja Socialist Party. Now, however, it was not even mentioned in the party's election manifesto.

But the leader of the Socialist Party of India, Lohia (the author of the idea of a "third force" which he put forward as far back as 1938), did not hesitate to make this idea the main point of his party's election manifesto which ran: "The Socialist Party is committed to the principle of equal irrelevance of capitalism and communism for promoting a new human civilisation. It wishes to build a third camp.... Only that foreign policy will persuade or compel co-existence between the Atlantic and the Soviet camps which is willing and unafraid to create new forces away from either camp and which possesses the necessary ideological and material strength to achieve co-existence with approximation. India's foreign policy is wholly unsuited to this end".<sup>113</sup>

For the rest, the manifesto of the Socialist Party was little different from that of the Praja Socialist Party.

The foreign policy programme of the Jana Sangh party, as set forth in its election manifesto, mainly covered different aspects of relations between India and Pakistan. The manifesto set the final aim of "closing Pakistan", neither more nor less. But, it went on, "so long as Pakistan continues to be a separate entity, Jana Sangh will adopt a policy of reciprocity in dealing with that State",<sup>114</sup> "reciprocity" in the material sense of "an eye for an eye" as follows: "Jana Sangh is against giving any concessions to Pakistan, a fair policy of evacuate-property, recovery of India's lost lands and other

dues"; "Jana Sangh... will take all possible steps for the liberation of Pak-held Kashmir"; "Jana Sangh... will demand land from Pakistan for resettling them (Hindus)",<sup>115</sup> and so on. The manifesto stated also that the "Bharatiya Jana Sangh will give top priority to national defence" and will "undertake following programmes to prepare the country physically and psychologically for self-defence": compulsory military training for all young men, organisation of a vast territorial army, etc.<sup>116</sup>

Simultaneously, mindful of the great popularity among the Indians of the policy of non-alignment, Jana Sangh declared in its manifesto: "Jana Sangh will... follow a policy of non-alignment with two power blocs, as also of non-involvement in international affairs not directly affecting Bharat...."<sup>117</sup>

The only all-India political party which in 1957 openly took its stand against the principles of peaceful co-existence was the Hindu Mahasabha, an extremely reactionary religious communal party. Its election manifesto declared: "The Mahasabha had always stood for the principle—the Militarisation of the Indian Nation... We call upon our Nation not to suffer any longer from complacency and not to suffer from the hypnotism of the principles of Panch-Shila and thereby sacrifice the hard-won freedom of our Mother-Land after eight centuries of servitude and alien domination".<sup>118</sup> But this appeal could hardly mean much if only because the Hindu Mahasabha, once rather influential, had practically lost all prestige among the Indians.

India's policy of non-alignment, its struggle for peace, co-existence and the final abolition of colonialism, the Government's position on the Kashmir question, all enjoyed wide support among the people.

By and large, during the 1957 election in India foreign policy issues were pushed into the background by the domestic issues.<sup>119</sup> Apart from the acuteness of the latter, this situation was due to the following circumstances: (a) India's position on the international scene was fairly secure (the build-up of uneasiness over the strain in relations with Pakistan began mainly after the election); (b) the Government's foreign policy largely coincided with the interests of the broad sections of the people; (c) the Right wing in the Congress leadership at that time dared not oppose Nehru's foreign policy line; and (d) none of

the political parties, except the Hindu Mahasabha, had, in effect, proposed any alternative to the foreign policy line pursued by the Nehru Government.

As a result of the 1957 election, the Indian National Congress, which had nominated its candidates for almost all seats in the House of the People, got 46.5 per cent of the votes and 72.6 per cent of the seats. The Communist Party of India again came second in the number of seats in the House of the People. Although it got twice as many votes as in the first general election (according to the official figures, 9.8 per cent as against 5 per cent), it got only three more seats, so that now it had altogether 29 seats.

At the election to the state legislatures, the Congress party got 42.2 per cent of the votes cast and most of the seats in every state, except Kerala. There the Communists came on top, winning 60 out of a total of 126 seats. Enjoying the support of five Independent Members of the Legislative Assembly, the Communist Party organisation of Kerala State formed the government. The emergence in India of the first state with a Communist government in the subsequent two odd years was a significant factor in the country's political life.

Already in 1957, after general election, some development occurred in India which could not but arouse the feelings of many Indians.

Symptomatically enough, in December 1957, the *AICC Economic Review* printed an article by Shri Mani Narayan, General Secretary of Congress, entitled "Communism and Communalism", which was full of anti-communist anti-Soviet slanders.<sup>11</sup>

A highly significant event was the trip to the West of the Finance Minister, T. T. Krishnamachari, and everything connected with it. Since the spring of 1957 the foreign exchange situation in India had been pretty serious. This was frankly admitted by the *AICC Economic Review*.<sup>12</sup> A year later, the situation became so grave as to make the latter write "Even in the most difficult hour of the foreign exchange situation, India has freely permitted not only the transfer of profits and income on foreign capital but also capital transfers themselves."<sup>13</sup>

In connection with the foreign exchange situation, the

autumn of 1957 Krishnamachari was sent to the United States and Western Europe to get foreign loans. To secure the support of the US Department of State and ensure success to his mission, Krishnamachari told the *New York Times* correspondent just before setting out : "We have to try to explain to them [Americans—*Y.N.*] that the battle here in India is a battle against Communism, too. We have lost the state of Kerala to the Communists, and one of the reasons behind it was that we could not spare enough money for development there..."<sup>123</sup>

In conclusion, Krishnamachari attacked Nehru, who, a few days before, had made a speech in the Council of States about "the menace of US military aid to Pakistan". Nehru had said then that the massive military help to India's neighbour poised for a "jihad" had "washed out" whatever economic aid India received from the United States. Asked about this speech, Krishnamachari said : "Politicians like Foreign Ministers [and Nehru, it will be remembered, also was Foreign Minister—*Y.N.*] make several speeches, and if with every speech our barometers go up and down then I am afraid nothing stable can ever be attempted. The world goes on in spite of these momentary changes in attitude".<sup>124</sup> That interview not only clashed with the Indian foreign policy line as a whole, but also aimed to undermine the people's faith in what Nehru said.

In the United States and West Germany, Krishnamachari said that India's foreign exchange difficulties placed her at a crossroads of her policy. He also pointed in glowing colours the privileges granted to foreign investors in India,<sup>125</sup> striving to efface the impression that the active government intervention in the Indian economy left no room for private initiative.

Addressing the Council of World Affairs in New York on October 2, 1957, Krishnamachari explained that a socialist-type society probably meant to most Americans a monolithic state or state capitalism, with all property and all economic power being concentrated in the hands of the state. Such a state was an anathema to most Americans, and Krishnamachari declared, a socialist state of such type was equally unacceptable to the Indians. In another speech Krishnamachari expressed it all with ultimate brevity, saying that the socialist-type society in India was not an antithesis to American capitalism.

All these statements by Krishnamachari, above all his interview before taking off for the United States, provoked a veritable political storm in the Indian capital. Simultaneously, the American Ambassador to India, Ellsworth Bunker, and M. Masani, who was "more American" than Bunker himself, began to praise Krishnamachari to the skies. The *Blitz* reported that "Mr. Masani lauded 'the fine effort made by Mr. Krishnamachari in America', appreciated his 'very balanced and realistic presentation of our problems' ".<sup>126</sup>

The Parliamentary debates held soon after Krishnamachari's return made it clear that there were others of the same views. Minister for Home Affairs Vallabh Panth spoke in Krishnamachari's defence, finding nothing to say to defend K. Menon from the attacks made on him by Masani at the same meeting.<sup>127</sup>

It is hard to tell how long T.T. Krishnamachari would have remained in the Indian Government but for another political scandal. On December 16, 1957, Nehru's son-in-law, Feroz Gandhi, made a sensational revelation in the House of the People, disclosing a huge swindle by Life Insurance Corporation manager Mundhra who had invested Rs 15 million of the Corporation funds in his own enterprises. After the inquiry had revealed Mundhra's connections with Krishnamachari and the latter's responsibility for the swindle as Finance Minister, he was retired.<sup>128</sup>

In March 1958, Morarji Desai was appointed Finance Minister. And then the story was repeated all over again. In August 1958 Desai went to the West for loans, by which time it had been estimated that if, as a result of Krishnamachari's mission, India had received over Rs. 1,100 million, and yet another Rs 2,500 to 3,000 million was needed to fill the gap in the budget.<sup>129</sup>

During Desai's trip the American and British press extolled him as Nehru's most likely successor. This was also Desai's presence without provoking any objection on his part.<sup>130</sup> In an interview given to the *Time* magazine, Desai made some "confessions" which aroused interest in the West. Among other things, he said, despite the "black and white" traits, that the Indians were a "kind nation" and "not



physically and morally, that they considered lying useful, and so forth. Besides saying things which were an insult to the Indians' national dignity, when Desai made a statement for the American radio service, he followed in Krishnamachari's footsteps and gave *carte blanche* to the imperialists who just then concentrated the 7th Fleet off the coast of China where, after the failure of the intervention in the Middle East, a new seat of world tension was being built.<sup>131</sup>

It was observable in 1958 that the Indian Government took a somewhat less active part in the settlement of acute international problems. In the summer of 1958, the Middle East again became the scene of a dangerous international crisis. After the revolution of July 14, 1958, in Iraq and the overthrow of the imperialist puppet Nuri as-Said, the United States and Britain, greatly worried by the fact that the "Baghdad Pact was being left without Baghdad", launched armed intervention in Lebanon and Jordan with the ultimate purpose of invading Iraq. This fresh imperialist provocation outraged the Indian people. Mass demonstrations began anew, some of them at the American and British embassies in Delhi and consulates in Calcutta, Madras and other places.

The world was again brought to the brink of war, and if the dangerous crisis was overcome this time too, India's contribution was less than in 1956, in the case of the triple imperialist aggression against Egypt. Although Prime Minister Nehru appealed to US President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Macmillan, urging them to withdraw their troops, his reaction to the message of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers of July 19, 1958, proposing the immediate holding of a conference of the heads of governments of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France and India, with the participation of the UN Secretary-General, was rather reserved. At a press conference on July 27 in Calcutta, Nehru said that should this be the wish of all parties, India was willing to take part in the meeting and to contribute to the restoration of peace.<sup>132</sup> The Western powers at once indicated that they did not want India to be present,<sup>133</sup> and no meeting took place at all.

¶ The aforementioned and other similar facts showed that in

Indian ruling circles opponents of positive neutrality policy were increasingly rearing their heads and building up pressure on Prime Minister Nehru and his supporters in the Government, and in 1958 it began making an impact on some of the aspects of Indian foreign policy.

## NOTES

1. Tibor Mende (a Hungarian by birth) works at the Institute of Political Studies at Paris. He has written *India Before the Storm*, *The Revolt of Asia* and *World Powers in the Balance*. His conversations with Nehru were a free exchange of questions and answers, Nehru's answers not having been prepared in advance. The conversation went on from December 31, 1955, till January 9, 1956, and were recorded on tape. Subsequently, Mende published a complete account of them in his book *Conversations with Mr. Nehru*. In the Foreword he mentions that Nehru at no time raised objection to any of the subjects as well as that Nehru had no time to read or check the typescript.
2. Tibor Mende, *Conversations with Mr. Nehru*, London, 1956, p. 62.
3. *ibid.*, p. 63.
4. *ibid.*, pp. 79-80.
5. J. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy. Selected Speeches, November 1947-April 1961*, Delhi, 1961, p. 256.
6. *ibid.*, p. 186.
7. Chester Bowles, *The New Dimensions of Peace*, New York, 1961, p. 165.
8. Faullq Ahmed Nizami, *The Communist Party and India*, New York, 1971, pp. 35-36.
9. His political views are well set out in the preface to his book *K. G. Gopinath*, which is a study of Western powers in the world. He is particularly critical of the United States and the Soviet Union. He is also critical of the Indian National Congress and the Indian National Movement. He is a strong advocate of the Indian National Movement and the Indian National Congress.

Indian diplomacy". (K. Gupta, *Indian Foreign Policy. In Defence of National Interest*, Calcutta, 1956. pp. VIII-IX.) The "venerable correspondent", it must be noted; was subsequently expelled from India for interfering in her internal affairs.

10. Karunakar Gupta, *Indian Foreign Policy*, p. V.
11. J. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 210.
12. Cf. Nehru's speeches in the House of the People on December 17, 1957, February 18, 1958, August 19, 1958, etc. (J. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, pp. 203-208, 210-211, etc.).
13. *ibid.*, p. 80.
14. K.P. Karunakaran (Ed.), *Outside the Contest. A Study of Non-alignment and the Foreign Policies of Some Non-aligned Countries*, New Delhi, 1963, pp. 29-31.
15. K.S. Murty, *Indian Foreign Policy*, Calcutta, 1964, p. 23.
16. *ibid.*, p. 109.
17. *Documents of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Oct. 17-31, 1961, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961, p. 41.
18. *Programme of the CP of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, 1961, p. 48.
19. *The Hindustan Times*, November 30, 1956.
20. *The New York Times*, June 10, 1956.
21. *The Hindustan Times*, December 20-21, 1956.
22. *ibid.*, December 22, 1956.
23. *Blitz*, January 26, 1957. Nehru's own expectations in connection with Eisenhower can be seen, for instance, from the fact that just before leaving for the USA on December 13, 1956, he expressed his grave concern about the situation in the Middle East and also hinted that when he reviewed the world scene with Eisenhower "the question of China's recognition, it is evident, is bound to crop up". (*The Hindustan Times*, December 14, 1956.) That Nehru was likely to raise the question of China's recognition when in the USA was inferred by the Indian press from the fact that shortly before Nehru had had talks with Chou En-lai. (*ibid.*) On his return from the USA, the Indian Prime Minister told a press conference that his meeting with the US President "enabled them to sit down and have an exchange of views" and that on China he "explained our viewpoint to President Eisenhower". (*ibid.*)
24. Karunakar Gupta, op. cit., p. 45.
25. *Eastern World*, London, August 1956, p. 12.
26. *The Hindustan Times*, June 29, 1956.

27. *ibid.*, July 18, 1956.
28. *Blitz*, July 28, 1956; July 20, 1957.
29. J. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, pp. 102-103.
30. *Peace Review*, Delhi, May 6, 1956, pp. 7-8.
31. *ibid.*, July 8, 1956, p. 3.
32. *ibid.*, March 4, 1958, p. 3.
33. *ibid.*
34. In their fundamental research *A Diplomatic History of Modern India*, Charles Heimsath, an American scholar, and Surjit Mansingh, a former employee of the Indian External Affairs Ministry, enumerate the following characteristics of Soviet aid which made it increasingly more attractive to India (Ch. H. Heimsath, Surjit Mansingh, *A Diplomatic History of Modern India*, Calcutta, 1971, pp. 422-424):
  - (1) The aid is an intergovernmental programme for expanding industries in the public sector.
  - (2) The USSR offers aid without strings attached
  - (3) The aid goes to set up entire industries rather than to build individual projects.
  - (4) The agreements signed cover design, supply of materials and equipment and training of Indian personnel which results in no brain drain.
  - (5) The Soviet system makes high-class experts available to India more easily and at lower salaries than Western experts from private firms.
  - (6) The agreements are concluded for long terms which is one of the most pressing requirements of India with respect to foreign assistance.
  - (7) Although Soviet credits are tied to purchases from the USSR the terms are comparatively easy—2.5 per cent repayable over 15 years being typical.
35. *AICC Economic Review*, Delhi, December 1, 1957.
36. *Reserve Bank of India Bulletin*, Delhi, March 1959, pp. 360-361.
37. *AICC Economic Review*, March 15, 1959, p. 3. Remarkably, Mansingh failed to quote any of the numerous instances where Western countries—even those engaged in building new enterprises and industrialised sharing know-how and faced technical difficulties—have turned to the Soviet system of engineering training of Indian students, technicians, workers and other establishments based on the Soviet model. In Western countries, however, the matter is not considered as a matter as well.
38. *Outline the Content of Memoirs of Jawahar Lal Nehru*, Vol. 1, p. 28. *Some Years and Some Days*, p. 28. *Some Years and Some Days*, p. 28. *Some Years and Some Days*, p. 28.

Devdutt, believed that non-alignment ensured a stable balance between the private and public sectors in the Indian economy. One cannot but remark in this connection that the bulk of the Indians, who supported non-alignment, were simultaneously opposed to the "balance between sectors", so dear to Devdutt, which resulted in practice in concentration of wealth in the hands of private capitalists.

39. Chester Bowles, *The New Dimensions of Peace*, New Delhi, 1955, p. 160.
40. *Congress Bulletin*, May-June 1956, p. 241.
41. *Report of the Indian Delegation to China on Agricultural Planning and Techniques*, New Delhi, October 1956.
42. Chester Bowles, *The New Dimensions of Peace*, p. 164.
43. *AICC Economic Review*, March 15, 1957, p. 3.
44. *ibid.*
45. *ibid.*, February 15, 1958, p. 15.
46. *Congress Bulletin*, January-February, 1957, p. 28.
47. *Outside the Contest* ., pp. 77-78.
48. *Political Resolution, Adopted at the 4th Congress of the Communist Party of India*, Delhi, 1956, pp. 6-7.
49. *New Age*, April 20, 1958.
50. Lenin, *Collected Works*, V. 23, p. 43.
51. Karunakar Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
52. *ibid.*, p. 72.
53. This was acknowledged by Nehru himself. Replying to questions in a foreign policy debate in the House of the People on September 2, 1957, he said : "We do not wish to interfere in international affairs, except where we feel that we might be able to be of some help, where something affects us directly—for instance, in regard to Goa, or when military help is given to Pakistan. Then we have to express our views clearly, strongly and unequivocally". (J. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy. Selected Speeches. September 1946-April 1961*, Delhi 1961, p. 711.)
54. K. Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
55. *Blitz*, June 30, 1956.
56. J. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 78.
57. Puran Batria, *India's Foreign Policy*, Agra, 1965, p. 38.
58. *Blitz*, March 17, 1956.

- ✓ 59. *The Hindustan Times*, March 11, 1956.
60. Dulles's position at the talks in Delhi was exposed in a cartoon published in *Shankar's Weekly* which showed Dulles extending one hand to Nehru and holding with the other hand a pack of dogs straining at their leashes, with "SEATO", "Goa policy", etc., written on their backs.
61. *The Hindustan Times*, March 12, 1956.
62. *Blitz*, March 31, 1956.
63. F. Moraes, *Jawaharlal Nehru. A Biography*, N.Y., 1956, p. 383.
64. *J. Nehru's Speeches, 1949-1953*, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1954, p. 353.
65. *Seminar*, Delhi, June 1964, p. 50.
66. *ibid*, p. 18.
67. Ronald Segal, *The Crises of India*, Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, p. 262.
68. *The New York Times*, April 15, 1956.
69. *The Hindustan Times*, April 15, 1956.
70. *Blitz*, July 21, 1956.
71. *Pravda*, January 26, 1957.
72. *The Hindustan Standard*, April 10, 1957.
73. *Pravda*, July 21, 1956. The All India Peace Council considered the statement to be a major contribution to peace and support of the peoples fighting for national independence, commencing the response in special letters to Nehru, Nasser and Tito. (*Peace Review*, August-September, 1956, p. 3).
74. J. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 530.
75. *New York Herald Tribune*, August 7, 1956.
76. *Pravda*, August 21, 1956.
77. It may be worth noting, as a curiosity fact, that the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, went on a long stay in India, in 1956, in a frantic attempt to resolve the day after tomorrow's crisis of the imperialists. He told an exclusive press conference in Calcutta inspired by the example of Mahatma Gandhi, the Chief Minister of Bombay State, who had gone on tour to meet the people, that he had ordered to put an end to the riots at Ahmedabad. He also stated that the Government's refusal to stop a band of 50,000 British troops for the reorganisation of the state was a mistake. He also stated that the British Government had decided to withdraw its troops from the state.

meeting, he read the telegram and remarked: "An empty stomach is much better than an empty head". (*Blitz*, September 15, 1956.)


78. J. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, pp. 532-534.
79. V.P. Nikhamin, op. cit., p. 220.
80. *Peace Review*, January 1956, p. 14.
81. *Pravda*, November 5, 1956.
82. J. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 535.
83. *ibid.*, pp. 535-56. It was the largest contingent (more than 1,000-strong) in the UN Emergency Force. (*India and International Co-operation*, Delhi, 1965, p. 5.)
84. *Peace Review*, January 1957, p. 15.
85. Even some months after the cessation of hostilities in Egypt, the anti-British feeling ran so high in India that the British information service there resorted to gross deception to do something about it. In January 1957 it published a brochure carrying some pictures of Port Said, presumably taken during its occupation by the British and French forces. There was not a trace in them of the destruction caused by the occupation troops. On January 9, 1957, the Egyptian Embassy in India issued a statement pointing out that the pictures showed Port Said as it had been before the aggression. The statement said that the pictures had been published in order to deceive Indian opinion by making it seem as if the attack on Port Said had been conducted with "particular caution", causing no damage to the city. The circulation of the brochure, too, had been managed in such a way as to suggest the idea that the information had been derived from the United Nations.
86. *Congress Bulletin*, October-November, 1956, pp. 544-55.
87. *ibid.*, January-February, 1957, pp. 27-28.
88. Chester Bowles, *The New Dimensions of Peace*, N.Y., 1955, pp. 161-162.
89. *New Age*, May 18, 1958, p. 2.
90. *Election Manifesto 1957. Bharatiya Jana Sangh*, Delhi, 1957, p. 22.
91. This caused a delegate to remark bitterly: "Asian socialism seems to be destined to die in Bombay". (*Blitz*, November 10, 1956).
92. To recall, in June 1955 a large group headed by R.M. Lohia broke away from the Praja Socialist Party to form the Socialist Party of India.
93. *The Times of India*, November 18, 1956.
94. *ibid.*, January 18, 1957, p. 5, cols. 5, 8.

95. *Blitz*, November 3, 1956.
96. Its membership was recruited from among the "untouchables" of Orissa State, but it actually represented the interests of the former local princes.
97. *Blitz*, May 4, 1957.
98. *ibid.*, June 29, 1957.
99. *AICC Economic Review*, February 1, 1957, pp. 3-4.
100. *Peace Review*, March 1957, p. 5.
101. It is worth noting that in this article he writes that it is a pity that "recent developments of a better understanding between America and India have led to some misunderstanding on the part of Russia, and she did not prevent this unconstitutional interference on the part of the Security Council in Kashmir affairs as was expected", (*Peace Review*, April-May, 1957, p. 11). He was plainly displeased at the Soviet Union not having vetoed the resolution on Jarring's mediation between India and Pakistan.  
 One must note that during the election period the Indian bourgeois press often enough distorted or passed over the statements made by the Soviet Union in the United Nations in support of India. To quote an example, on February 20, 1957, none of the Delhi newspapers mentioned the speech made the previous day by the Soviet representative in the Security Council, even though four newspapers had leading articles on different aspects of the Kashmir question, commenting at some length on the Colombian delegate's speech.
102. Indian leaders were not the only ones to be annoyed with Krishna Menon. It was noted in London that the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, refused to meet Menon during his last visit to London. Soon afterwards Menon was recalled from the UN and appointed India's Minister of Defence.
103. The author of this book was present at the meeting.
104. *Resolutions on Foreign Policy, 1947-1957 (Indian National Congress)*, New Delhi, 1957, p. 54.
105. *Election Manifesto, 1957. Indian National Congress*, Delhi, p. 10.
106. *The Times of India*, February 14, 1957.
107. *Election Manifesto of the CP of India*, Delhi, 1957, p. 27.
108. *Election Manifesto. Praja Socialist Party*, Delhi, 1957, pp. 12, 13.
109. *The Hindustan Times*, February 2, 1957.
110. *The Hindustan Standard*, March 27, 1957, p. 5.
111. *Blitz*, November 24, 1956, July 11, 1957.



112. *The Hindustan Times*, March 26, 1957.
113. *Socialist Party. Election Manifesto, 1957*, Hyderabad, 1957, p. 11.
114. *Election Manifesto. 1957. Bharatiya Jana Sangh*, Delhi, 1957, p. 17.
115. *ibid.*, pp. 17-18.
116. *ibid.*, p. 6.
117. *Election Manifesto, 1957, Bharatiya Jana Sangha*, p. 22.
118. *Election Manifesto 1957, Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha*, Delhi, 1957, p. 11.
119. It was not accidental that in the semi-official publication *National Politics and 1957 Election in India* in which the election manifestos of all-India parties were preceded by the policy statements of their leaders, none of the latter dealt with foreign policy matters (*National Politics and 1957 Election in India*, Ed. by S.L. Poplai, Delhi, 1957).
120. *AICC Economic Review*, December 15, 1957. Six months later, the *Blitz* exposed Narain's close association with the American-subsidised Democratic Research Service. (*Blitz*, June 17, 1958.)
121. *AICC Economic Review*, April 15, 1957, p. 13.
122. *ibid.*, March 15, 1958.
123. *Blitz*, September 28, 1957.
124. *ibid.*
125. *Speeches by T.T. Krishnamachari (Second Series)*, New Delhi, 1957, p. 22.
126. *Blitz*, October 12, 1957.
127. *ibid.*, December 7, 1957.
128. *ibid.*, February 15, 1958.
129. *ibid.*, August 23, 1958.
130. *ibid.*, September 13, 1958.
131. *ibid.*, September 20, 1958.
132. *Pravda*, July 28, 1958.
133. *Blitz*, August 2, 1958.

6



## Worsening of relations with China (1959-1962)

### Beginning of Chinese-Indian Conflicts

The Indian Government anxious to keep up the cultural and trade contacts with Tibet, etc., it concluded, it had no territorial or political claims since 1951 and it was not about Tibet retaining its autonomy.

After the Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed on April 29, 1949, an agreement on Tibet was signed. At the same time the PRC signed a political treaty with the Government of India. In 1950, the Chinese Government proposed that the two countries should sign a treaty of friendship, commerce, consular rights and other matters. The Indian Government refused to sign such a treaty. The Chinese Government then claimed that the Indian Government was not a sovereign state and that it was not entitled to sign such a treaty. The Chinese Government then claimed that the Indian Government was not a sovereign state and that it was not entitled to sign such a treaty. The Chinese Government then claimed that the Indian Government was not a sovereign state and that it was not entitled to sign such a treaty.

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March 10, 1959, a "revolt in order to seize Tibet from China". What really happened in Tibet, however, was that there the Han chauvinism practised by the Peking leaders had developed from suppression of local reactionaries into oppression of the Tibetan people. Demolition of Buddhist monasteries, persecution of cultural figures and the Buddhist clergy, mass-scale confiscation of land to accommodate numerous Chinese settlers, and so on, caused deep discontent among the Tibetans. As a result, the revolt started by the Khampa tribesmen "infected Tibet, threatened Lhasa itself".<sup>4</sup> After the revolt—in which, according to the Chinese press, 20,000 took part—had been suppressed, insurgent detachments, together with the Dalai Lama, fled in the direction of the Indian border.

These events put Nehru in a dilemma. He had to decide whether he should let the Tibetan refugees into India or refuse them asylum for the sake of continuing the same relations with China, not to mention the fact that the Indian Government was gravely concerned about the flagrant violation of the autonomous status of Tibet in China. On March 30, 1959, Prime Minister Nehru said in the House of the People that should a large group of people attempt to cross the Indian border from Tibet, they would not be allowed into India.<sup>5</sup> Notwithstanding this statement, after the Dalai Lama and his retinue who crossed the border on the evening of the following day, 12,000 Tibetan refugees were admitted into India. Explaining this step of the Indian Government at a meeting of the Parliamentary Congress Party on April 9, 1959, Nehru said that under international law giving asylum did not constitute an unfriendly act towards a country.

Analysing these developments, one must admit that in the matter of granting asylum to the Dalai Lama and other Tibetans the Indian Government was in an embarrassing situation. One must bear in mind that: (1) India is the birthplace of Buddhism; (2) Buddhism has much in common with Hinduism (which replaced Buddhism in India) which spread over most of the Indian territory and absorbed much from Buddhism; (3) Buddhist ideology left its mark on literature, monuments of the past and many other things that are part of Indian national culture as a whole; (4) many Indians, especially in the northern

border areas, are Buddhists; and (5) Indians venerate the religious head of Buddhism, the Dalai Lama, which was graphically demonstrated by the unprecedented honours paid to him at the end of 1956, when the Dalai Lama was a guest of the Indian Government for two months in connection with the celebrations held in India on the occasion of the 2,500th anniversary of Gautama, the founder of the Buddhist religion. If we take into consideration all these circumstances and the enormous sway religious views hold in India, it will be clear that the Indian Government had every reason to fear an outburst of popular indignation should the Dalai Lama have been refused asylum in India.

On April 18, 1959, the Indian External Affairs Ministry released a statement of the Dalai Lama made at Tezpur, near the border, where he stopped at first. The Chinese press went out of its way trying to prove that the document had been fabricated. They tried to find places in it which would contradict what the Dalai Lama had written with his own hand in three letters to the representative of the Central Government in Tibet, General Tan Kuan-san, between March 10 and 17, 1959. Therefore Nehru's estimation of the statement was a matter of no small importance. The British *Daily Telegraph* wrote in its leading article on April 24 that should Nehru say that he was sure that the Dalai Lama had published his statement of April 18 of his own free will, free Asia would believe then that not only had the Chinese been cruel but that they also had no right to Tibet, as nobody had doubted theretofore that the Dalai Lama was entitled to speak on behalf of all the inhabitants of Tibet.

Presently, having paid on April 24 a visit to Mussoorie where the Dalai Lama had moved by then, and talked for many hours with him, Nehru told Parliament on April 27 that the Dalai Lama was fully responsible for the statement he had made.<sup>1</sup> Nehru also said that when the news of the Government's in Tibet "came to India there was immediate and widespread reaction. It is true that a large number of people sought to prompt by it by turning it into an international question". The further development of the situation and the reactionaries not only in India but abroad have been

nationalists in the Chinese Communist Party leadership were interested in spoiling relations between India and China and between China and the Soviet Union.<sup>8</sup>

Relations between India and China became strained still more in connection with a dispute over the border. A long section of the border lies in the Karakoram Range and the Himalayas. It was never delineated on the ground and was shown differently on Indian and Chinese maps. This matter was repeatedly raised (in April 1954 when the agreement on trade and contacts between the Tibetan Region of China and India was being prepared, and during the visits of Nehru to China in October 1954 and of Chou En-lai to India in November-December 1956), but its settlement was put off, and it had not troubled anybody before.

It was a different matter when the question arose again at the height of a sharp controversy after the events in Tibet, when it arose in connection with the change in the frontier regulations. In previous years, as the Indian Government explained in a note to the Chinese Government, it had not opened border outposts along the traditional border because the area was inhabited very sparsely and the Government of India had no reason to anticipate any aggressive intention on the part of China, being content with sending regular police patrol parties to those areas.<sup>9</sup> The naked violation of the autonomous status of Tibet in China and China's subsequent actions in the frontier area forced the Nehru Government to start, in late April 1959, building up its armed forces along the border with China. Later Nehru himself explained it to the House of the People as follows : "As a result of the revolt in Lhasa, a large number of refugees came to India while the Chinese forces followed them and tried to cut them off on the eastern side also, namely, the McMahon Line. Later they (Chinese) spread out to some other parts in the West".<sup>10</sup> Naturally enough, the military measures on the border being effected by the two states far from served to improve relations between them.

On July 28, 1959, the first border incident occurred. A six-man Indian police party sent to north-eastern Ladakh "following reports of Chinese incursions" was detained by Chinese

border guards.<sup>11</sup> In that area, the Chinese completed in September 1957 the construction of a highway from Echen in Sinkiang to Gartok in Tibet, a section of it lying on the plateau of Aksai Chin.

A more serious incident occurred in the eastern sector of the border in the vicinity of the border post of Longju.<sup>12</sup> There, on August 25 and 26, 1959, an exchange of fire took place between the border guards, each side subsequently accusing the other of having been the first to fire. As a result of the clash, the Indian border guards left Longju.

A second armed clash on the border occurred at Kongka Pass in Ladakh. There, on October 20, 1959, the Chinese border troops detained three Indian soldiers, presumably for having crossed the border. On the next day there was an engagement between the patrol parties which lasted for about two hours. There were killed and wounded on both sides and several Indians were taken prisoner. After an exchange of notes, on November 14, 1959, representatives of the Chinese side met at an agreed place with representatives of the Indian side and handed over to them ten Indian servicemen and the equipment captured during the engagement.

After the very first armed clash at Longju, Nehru called a meeting of the Parliamentary advisory council on foreign affairs that it was a clear instance of China's aggression and declared that the stand taken by China served the interests neither of China nor of peace. Indian bourgeois newspapers went out alternately with warlike calls and panic reports. In many Indian cities meetings and demonstrations were held protesting China's actions.

Meanwhile several Indian newspapers began to attack the Nehru Government. Some of them criticised the Prime Minister for his appeal on October 24, 1959, to keep calm and others demanded Krishna Menon's resignation from the post of the Defence Minister, and still others accused the Government of having neglected the defence of India. The opposition tier and claimed: "The country has been lulled into a false sense of security in the ability of the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister's Ministry to solve the crisis created in the Far East."

Considering the fact that China's 1959, 1960 and 1961 attacks

stepped up its attacks on the Indian Government and on Nehru personally, and that the Chinese press was overflowing with anti-Indian articles and slogans, it will be clear that Indo-Chinese friendship which Nehru had done so much to build was at an end.

In connection with the disputes over the question of the border after the armed incidents that had occurred there was an intensive exchange of notes between the Foreign Ministries of India and China and of messages between the Prime Ministers of the two countries. The positions of the sides on the border issue were as follows :

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Sector of the border	Indian Government's view (according to <i>The White Book of the Indian Government on the India-China Border</i> )	Chinese Government's view (according to the <i>Collection of Documents on the China-India Border Issue</i> , Peking 1960)
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*Western Sector* between Sinkiang and the Tibetan Region of China on one side, and Ladakh (India) on the other.

Argument : The 1842 agreement between Kashmir on one hand, and representatives of the Chinese Emperor on the other, mentions the India-China border in the district of Ladakh.

Argument : The Peace Treaty of 1842 states that the two sides will respect the border, but its location is not mentioned. The Treaty was concluded by the local Tibetan authorities without the participation of the Chinese Government and was not ratified by the latter.

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In 1847, the Chinese Government acknowledged that the border in this sector had been fully and clearly established. The area claimed by China was surveyed by British officers and designated as Indian territory even on Chinese maps issued in 1893.

*Conclusion :* The border was formally established.

*Central Sector* between the Tibetan district of Ari and the Indian States of Punjab and Uttar Pradesh.

*Argument :* The border was not formally demarcated in the past, but Article 4 of the 1954 China-India Agreement mentioned six mountain passes in this area as passages for

In 1847, Governor of Kwangtung and Kwangsi Chi Ying, in reply to the British Government representative's request that this section of the border be demarcated, said that there was a traditional border there, and there was no need to demarcate it. This shows that the Government took a clear stand on the border and cannot be used as a proof that the border line was already formally established.

*Conclusion :* The border was not formally established.

The 1954 Agreement did not deal with the border. The paragraphs on the use of the mountain passes said nothing about the border line.



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	<p>traders and pilgrims on both sides, this proves that the Chinese Government agreed then with the Indian Government's opinion about this part of the border.</p>	
	<p><i>Conclusion :</i> The border is established, but the Indian Government is prepared to discuss the title to some districts, e.g., Bara Hoti (Wuje).</p>	<p><i>Conclusion :</i> The border lines on both Indian and Chinese maps closely resemble each other, but some districts (Sang, Chungshih, Wuje, etc.) belonging to China are included in the Indian territory.</p>
<p><i>Eastern Sector</i> from Bhutan to the border between China and Burma.</p>	<p>The border passes along the McMahon Line, the latter being the result of the Simla Conference of 1913-14.</p>	<p>The McMahon Line is the product of Britain's imperialist policies. The Simla Conference was illegitimate, and the secret agreement between Britain and Tibet all the more so.</p>
	<p>The Chinese Government never disputed the Line before.</p>	<p>This proves once again that the existence of the Line was unknown to the</p>

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Chinese Government.

The Line has geographical advantages, viz., it passes along the Himalayas which forms a natural demarcation line between the Tibetan plateau in the North and the submontane region on the crests of the Himalaya mountain range.

The territory between the McMahon Line and the border marked on Chinese maps and passing at the foothills of the Himalaya, had until recently been under China's control, but the British imperialists had gradually advanced there. The watershed principle is not the sole criterion in international practice where borders are delimited.

During his stay in India at the end of 1956, Prime Minister Chou En-lai said that he considered the line demarcated by the British imperialists to be unjust, and it was an obstacle to the friendly relations between China and India. He said that the line was not only a barrier to the free movement of people and goods, but also a barrier to the free movement of trade and commerce between China and India.

In reality, the British imperialists had demarcated the McMahon Line in 1914, and they had not yet completed the demarcation of the border between China and India. The British imperialists had not yet completed the demarcation of the border between China and India, and they had not yet completed the demarcation of the border between China and India.

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*The Times of India* printed on September 1, 1959, a photo-  
copy of a Chinese map of the Indian border. The map was  
supplied with explanatory notes from which it followed that  
China claimed 57,000 sq. miles of foreign territory including  
17,000 sq. miles of the territory of the Indian State of Assam,  
about 22,000 sq. miles of Kashmir, and 18,000 sq. miles of  
Burmese territory.<sup>14</sup>

The main thing about this dispute was that as it unleashed  
border conflicts with India, the Chinese Government was not  
the least troubled about what consequences it might have for  
the revolutionary forces, the Indian Communist Party above  
all, how it would influence the attitude and the anti-imperialist  
potentialities of the Indian bourgeoisie or how it would affect  
the foreign policy of India and other non-aligned countries.  
Thus, the Chinese leaders sacrificed matters of major inter-  
national significance to petty squabbling about the border.

Simultaneously it is worth noting that at that time, i.e., in  
1959-1961, the Chinese Government still showed some circums-  
pection, and while laying claim to Indian territory it gave indi-  
cations from time to time of wishing to settle the dispute and  
normalise relations with India.

After the incident at Kongka Pass on October 21, 1959, the Indian and Chinese Governments ordered their border guard units to stop patrolling the border so as to avoid further clashes. Apart from that, the Chinese Government suggested that both sides withdraw their troops 20 kilometres or some other agreed distance away from the border.

In his message to Nehru of November 7, 1959, Chou En-lai proposed that they should meet as soon as possible to discuss the border issue and other matters pertaining to relations between China and India. Rangoon, the capital of Burma, was proposed as the meeting place. We think it likely that Nehru would have accepted the proposal to meet Chou En-lai had not Peking's position at the proposed talks come to light just then. This is what happened. About that time, the Indian press published an interview with Dr. A.V. Baliga, President of the Indian Soviet Society for Cultural Relations, who had just come back from a visit to China. From his two long conversations with Chou En-lai, Dr. Baliga gathered that China was likely to agree to recognise the McMahon Line in return for some concessions in Ladakh.<sup>12</sup> The very way the question was put, i.e., that Peking would recognise the border in the eastern sector if Delhi put up with the seizure by the Chinese of Indian territory in the western sector of the border, provoked just indignation in India.

On November 16 Nehru declined the invitation, publicly explaining in Parliament that he did not like the method as it was worded in a letter which set out the Chinese point of view. This could not make it binding on him to accept the principles suggested, Nehru went on to say, but he would have accepted the invitation, the meeting would have to be held on the basis of the Chinese proposal.<sup>13</sup> The proposal to hold a meeting of the Prime Ministers of two countries was repeated by China in the Note of December 29, 1959, and Nehru again declined the invitation, saying at a press conference on January 8, 1960, that he was prepared to meet Chou En-lai only if he could be certain that the meeting would produce results.<sup>14</sup>

On January 8, 1960, Nehru sent a letter to Chou En-lai inviting him to come at a convenient time to discuss the border

Nehru also expressed his regret that his proposal of November 16, 1959, that the meeting should be preceded by some preliminary steps which would improve the situation and help settle the issue, had not been accepted.<sup>18</sup>

What happened, then, during that month (from January 8 to February 5, 1960)? What were the circumstances that prompted Nehru to invite Chou En-lai for talks? First of all there was Nehru's desire to settle the dispute with China by negotiation, without, however, the preconditions put forward by the Chinese side (in November 1959). Further, some Indian newspapers linked Nehru's proposal with the expected arrival in Delhi on February 11, on the way to Indonesia, of the head of the Soviet Government.

The Soviet attitude to the Sino-Indian border dispute found reflection in two documents. The TASS Statement of September 9, 1959, deplored the incident on the border between China and India and resolutely denounced the attempts to use it with the purpose of stirring up "cold war" and undermining friendship among nations. In conclusion, the Statement said: "Soviet leading circles believe that the Government of the Chinese People's Republic and the Government of the Republic of India will not allow this incident to be exploited by the forces which want the international situation to become worse, not better, and which were trying to prevent any relaxation of the tensions existing between different states. These circles also believe that the two Governments will settle the misunderstanding paying attention to each other's interests in the spirit of traditional friendship between the peoples of China and India. It will also help to build up the forces coming out for peace and international cooperation".<sup>19</sup>

Lastly, the Indian Government was also influenced to a certain extent by the settlement of a similar border dispute between China and Burma. On January 28, 1960, China and Burma signed an agreement on the border between them, simultaneously concluding a treaty of friendship and non-aggression.<sup>20</sup>

Indian reactionaries tried hard to torpedo the talks between Nehru and Chou En-lai. When Nehru told the House of the People on February 15, 1960, that an invitation had been sent

to the Chinese Prime Minister. Opposition members demanded an immediate debate on the situation allegedly brought about by the abrupt and arbitrary change of policy towards China. Parliament, however, rejected this demand. Attempts to stage anti-Chinese demonstrations during Chou En-lai's stay at Delhi, too, failed, thanks to the measures taken by the Government.

The talks between the Prime Ministers of China and India went on from April 20 to April 25, 1960, but no agreement was reached. The Prime Ministers therefore agreed to tell their officials to look into the border problems, sort out all the material and documents and prepare a report accordingly. The third and final meeting of the officials took place from November 7 to December 12, 1960. After that, the report was presented to each Government.

On February 14, 1961, Nehru gave the House of the People a brief summary of the report (the latter being nearly 600 pages long).<sup>21</sup> The summary pointed out that, as the report proved, the border between India and the CPR on which the Indian side insisted, was the traditional border between the two countries, and that the Chinese occupation of 12,000 sq. miles of territory in Ladakh (it had been occupied by September 1959) was an act of naked aggression.<sup>22</sup> On February 21, 1961, Nehru told the Council of States that the question of the Sino-Indian border would be resolved only "when the Chinese evacuated the Indian territory they had occupied and when they broadly acknowledged the Indian position on the border".<sup>23</sup>

Thus, the dispute between India and the Chinese People's Republic remained outstanding. The Sino-Indian border conflict for which Peking leaders are responsible did not do any harm to the Indian policy of non-alignment and did not cause any reaction in India and elsewhere against the influence of imperialist powers.

**Imperialists' efforts to make India change her Foreign Policy**

The imperialists and their Indian collaborators tried to make the Indian Government change its foreign policy. They planned to do this in two ways: (1) to make India

Lama and the United Nations. They brought pressure to bear on the Nehru Government through the press and Right-wing opposition in the Indian Parliament.

Soon after the events in Tibet, early in May 1959, a conference on India's economic and political problems, in which a number of American politicians and big monopoly representatives took part, convened at Washington. India was represented by the Commissioner-General for Economic Affairs, B. K. Nehru, Indian Ambassador in Washington M. C. Chagla, and an Indian Socialist leader, A. Mehta.

Speaking at the conference, Senator J. F. Kennedy (future US President) said that unless India could demonstrate her capacity to change from economic stagnation to development at a rate outstripping its population growth, it would find herself in a situation of blighted hopes and political instability, unable to be a counterbalance to Red China, and communism would score one of its greatest bloodless victories. To prevent this happening, Kennedy said, India must be granted credits from all foreign sources at a rate of at least \$ 1,000 million a year.

Chagla, the Indian Ambassador, told the conference that India was a battlefield in which democracy was to win or be lost. Defeat of democracy in India, he said, might spell the ruin of freedom in all Asia and Africa. He called for economic cooperation with India, trying to persuade the American side that such cooperation would be a more effectual weapon than hundreds of bomber planes and nuclear missiles being made available to India or any military pact could ever be.

The conference at Washington showed that its sponsors set out, first, to persuade India that without outside help, American help above all, she would be unable to assure economic progress and, second, by invoking the "Communist menace" to pull her, lock, stock and barrel, into the Western orbit.

In carrying out the task of dragging India into military blocs, the imperialists pinned their hopes on Pakistan more than anything else. As soon as a week after the Dalai Lama's arrival in India, the *Dawn* newspaper, which usually voiced the views of the Pakistan Government, came out in support of the circles in India which were urging Nehru to revise his policies -

towards Pakistan "so that there can be a common front against a common menace".<sup>21</sup> Soon the Indian Government received a formal proposal from the Pakistani President, Gen. Ayub Khan, to conclude an agreement on common defence of the Hindustan Peninsula. To India, however, such an agreement would imply indirect participation in aggressive blocs through Pakistan which participated in them directly.

The great majority of the people received with satisfaction Nehru's declaration on May 4, 1959, when he said with reference to Pakistan's proposal of joint defence that he would not fall into such a snare.<sup>22</sup>

Hoping that it might still be possible to persuade Nehru at a personal meeting with Ayub Khan, Chester Bowles suggested that such a meeting should be arranged. Nehru rejected it, saying he doubted that such a meeting could be useful.<sup>23</sup>

When the head-on attack had failed, turning manoeuvres were undertaken and several attempts were made to settle the long-standing disputes between India and Pakistan. Since the Western diplomats saw in 1956-57 how acute and difficult the Kashmir problem was, they decided this time to begin with settling the dispute on the distribution of water in irrigation canals in the Indus basin which had been going on 11 years. The matter was taken in hand by a mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development under the Bank's Vice-President William Hiff, and by August 28, 1959, the first of a series of consultations with representatives of India and Pakistan was—so it was declared—successfully completed (in reality the agreement was signed only a year after, in September 1960).

On September 1, 1959, Nehru and Ayub Khan met in Delhi but although some Pakistani newspapers called this a historic meeting, the talks had no effect on relations between India and Pakistan.

Thereupon fresh steps were taken. In October 1959, the Ambassadors met and then a Ministers' Conference took place. On October 21, 1959, India and Pakistan agreed on a declaration on the settlement of territorial disputes and the withdrawal of the border.<sup>24</sup> In January 1960, talks were held at the ambassadorial level on outstanding border questions. In the same month, the



districts along the border between Western Pakistan and India. On January 11, 1960, in Delhi, an agreement was signed relating to four disputed districts on the western border. The settlement of the question about the border between Kutch (India) and Sind (Pakistan) was postponed. In March 1960, Indian Finance Minister Morarji Desai went to Pakistan to settle outstanding financial problems and establish closer economic cooperation between India and Pakistan.

But neither this trip nor new meetings of Nehru and Ayub-Khan (at the signing of the agreement on the Indus waters at Rawalpindi in September 1960 and at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in March 1961) helped to resolve the differences between India and Pakistan or bring their foreign policies any closer. Nehru said back in November 1959: "Defence is always intimately connected with foreign policy. You cannot separate them. The foreign policies of our two countries, quite apart from our relations with each other, have not been in line".<sup>28</sup>

The next stake in the imperialists' game of dragging India into military blocs was frictions between India and China on account of India having given sanctuary to the Dalai Lama. On June 20, 1959, at Mussoorie, a press conference was arranged for the Dalai Lama, the first since his arrival in India. Replying to a question (there were more than 90 in all, and they were presented to him in advance), the Dalai Lama said that wherever he and his ministers might be, the people of Tibet would always look to them as their Government. He also said that he hoped for much moral support from the Indian Government in his "struggle for Tibet".<sup>29</sup> Then the Indian Government had to explain that it could not grant the Dalai Lama and his ministers the status of a "government in exile" because Tibet was part of China, although an autonomous part. This showed once again that the Indian Government wanted to normalise relations with China.

Early in September 1959, the Dalai Lama came to Delhi to secure support for bringing the Tibetan issue before the United Nations. He had several meetings with Nehru as well as with Indian Vice-President Radhakrishnan, leaders of the Congress party and the Praja Socialist Party, and the ambassadors of

some countries. The Indian Council of World Affairs arranged a meeting at which the Dalai Lama insisted on Tibet's sovereign right to have concluded in 1914 the agreement with Britain on the McMahon Line. He charged China with having imposed its tyranny upon Tibet and argued that to prevent extermination of the Tibetans there was no way but to ask for UN intervention. Although the Dalai Lama got some support from Indian public and religious opinion, the House of the People of the Indian Parliament, at Nehru's suggestion, declined the draft resolution on bringing the Tibetan issue before the United Nations.<sup>30</sup>

At the suggestion of Malaya and Ireland, the issue was nonetheless included in the agenda of the 14th Session of the UN General Assembly. The Dalai Lama's elder brother, Gyalo Tontup, went as his personal representative to New York where he met many diplomats at the United Nations and spoke on television. However, with the introduction of the Tibetan issue, the "cold war" atmosphere in the United Nations thickened.

Immediately after the events in Tibet, the imperialist press began to attack Nehru for not having taken a firm enough stand on the Tibetan issue. The conservative *British Daily Express*, for instance, wrote on April 6, 1959, that Nehru's views were "strange indeed" and that "crisis reveals Nehru as a leader who lacks the qualities of leadership".<sup>31</sup> Such allegations abounded in the American and British press at the time. Some Indian newspapers too joined in this campaign against the Nehru Government. Some of them did not confine themselves to attacking the Government for its alleged "weakness" but sought to represent the Chinese incursions as "part of a world communist strategy" and accused Nehru of taking no measures against the Communists who "have created cells not only in the Congress Parliamentary Party but even in the Government itself".<sup>32</sup>

The reactionary press and Right-wing opposition in Parliament attacked with particular venom Defence Minister Krishna Menon. Pro-American politicians were infuriated by Menon's actions, such as his telling a meeting in Delhi in January 1961 that the day when India joined a military alliance "would

mark the beginning of the end of her freedom".<sup>33</sup>

Many efforts were made in 1959-1961 to remove K. Menon from the Government. Seeking to have him removed from his post, Gen. Thimayya, Chief of the Army Staff, sent in his resignation to the Prime Minister on August 31, 1959;<sup>31</sup> A. Kripalani, leader of the Praja Socialist Parliamentary Party, said in March 1961 that the Army was deteriorating and demanded a "searching inquiry";<sup>35</sup> and so on.

In connection with the continuing clamouring for K. Menon's removal from the post of Defence Minister, Nehru said in Parliament that it was for him to judge what must be done, and should he prove wrong he should have to go himself.

However, the imperialists and their agents who were striving to bring about a change in India's foreign policy, did not stop at demanding the resignation of Menon himself. In October 1959 Praja Socialists staged a demonstration in front of Nehru's house. They shouted, "Nehru, wake up!" "Nehru, resign!" and gave the Prime Minister's secretary a letter demanding the resignation of Nehru and his Government. The Indian press wrote in this connection that in all the twelve years of Nehru's premiership no political party had staged demonstrations in front of Nehru's house, demanding his resignation.

The pressure brought to bear on the Nehru Government by the imperialists and their allies in India did not result in renunciation of non-alignment. Moreover, as the international situation had worsened, Nehru even more often than before and more clearly and definitely stated that non-alignment was the only foreign policy line that was in keeping with India's interests. As for relations with China, one cannot but agree with Chalapathi Rau, who is, in our view, the best informed and most unbiased of Nehru's biographers. He wrote that there were at that time "outbursts of sympathy with the Tibetan people in India" and that "political leaders who had never liked India's China policy made anti-Chinese statements" while the Indian press printed chauvinistic articles. In spite of all this, Rau writes, Nehru held that the Government "should not allow themselves to be swept away into wrong courses" and reiterated that India's policy was clear and "was governed by

three factors, preservation of the security and integrity of India, a desire to maintain friendly relations with China, and deep sympathy for the people of Tibet."<sup>36</sup>

### **The Indian Political Parties' positions**

The worsening of India-China relations resulted in a sharp aggravation of the struggle among the internal political forces in India.

Nehru, who always stressed the need for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, calling for wisdom, patience and self-control, expressed the views of most of the Congress leaders.

Simultaneously, some Congress leaders held views which were different from Nehru's. Morarji Desai, leader of the Right, who was a member of the Congress Working Committee and Finance Minister, was for a "defence alliance" with Pakistan. The Congress President Sanjeeva Reddy, while urging the need to study all "peaceful approaches" to the settlement of the disputes between India and China, i.e., sharing Nehru's view-point, simultaneously said that if the situation should become pressing, India could take back the Chinese-occupied areas by force. The Congress ex-President, U.N. Dhebar, was of a similar opinion. In addition, he saw the root of the evil in the "designs" of the Communist Party and claimed that if the Communists' propaganda was allowed to go unchecked, "they might drag India in a war".<sup>37</sup> Belonging to the Right in the Congress leadership were General Secretary of the Congress party Sucheta Kripalani, who headed the committee for assisting the Tibetan refugees, and the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Dr. Sampurnanand, one of the most rabid anti-communists in Congress, who denounced the Communist Party even for expressing the wish that the Indian Government settle its differences with China peacefully.<sup>38</sup> Of the lesser figures, one may mention A. Shastri, President of the Congress Provincial Committee of Uttar Pradesh, who said that the Government should be irreconcilable to the aggression, and R.S.Singh, M.P., who insisted on the cancellation of the 1954 agreement with China.

Discussions on the Government's foreign policy and India-China relations were held at sessions of the All India Congress

Committee in November 1959 and June and October 1960 at Bangalore, and at other meetings. During the discussions numerous efforts were made to get a renunciation of non-alignment. Proposals were presented to set up a bloc of South-East Asian countries, "to make alliance with any country which would help India in resisting aggression",<sup>39</sup> and so on. However, the course of non-alignment, defended by Nehru, invariably prevailed.

It is worth noting that at that time, in spite of all the differences among Congress leaders, the latter, as before, addressed the people from a common standpoint, bringing opinions in line beforehand.

The Right-wing group in the Congress party spared no efforts to use the frictions with China in order to diminish the influence of the Communist Party, accusing it of being "unpatriotic", "carrying on sabotage", and so forth.<sup>40</sup>

It was all the easier to assail the Communist Party as it had failed to take a clear and definite stand on the points the border dispute with China was about when the frictions started. Soon after the events in Tibet, in May 1959, the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of India adopted a resolution saying that the Communist Party of India regarded the revolt in Tibet as a reactionary insurrection and that it considered it erroneous to describe it as a "popular uprising", as the Indian Government did. The resolution warned that the flow of refugees from Tibet into India might produce serious political complications, as most refugees would work against China in which they would be supported by reactionary pro-American elements from the Praja Socialist Party, the Jana Sangh and others opposing the principles of peaceful co-existence and the foreign policy line followed by India. In conclusion, the Communist Party greeted Nehru's statement in the House of the People that India's foreign policy rested on the Panch Sheel Principles and on non-participation in blocs, and that he had firmly rejected all proposals for changing this policy.<sup>41</sup>

At the end of October 1959, after armed clashes on the border between India and China, the CPI National Council Secretariat declared: "Our Party shares the sentiment of our

people and conveys its deepest sympathies to the families of those who have died.

"Divergent versions of this incident have been given by the Indian and Chinese Governments. But, taking into account all the circumstances and especially the fact that it was a disputed territory, the Secretariat of the National Council of the Communist Party of India is of the opinion that there was no justification whatsoever for the firing which resulted in such heavy loss of life.

"The latest incident underlines the gravity of the situation and shows that it cannot be allowed to deteriorate any further without serious consequences. We would strongly urge, therefore, that the Heads of the two Governments, Jawaharlal Nehru and Chou En-lai, should meet immediately and take steps to reduce the tension and settle the dispute amicably".<sup>42</sup>

The statements quoted above make it clear that the Communist Party of India (1) was naturally concerned about the strain in relations between India and China and its possible effect on the internal political situation in India and on the Government's foreign policy; (2) took no definite stand on the substance of the points at issue on the border; (3) would blame nobody in particular for having opened fire on the border; (4) urged that no more armed clashes should be allowed to occur, and called for an early peaceful settlement of the disputes.

This approach provoked much argumentation among Indian Communists themselves. It is not, however, our purpose to go into it here.

The differences that existed in the CPI over what its position should be in the border dispute with China began to be overcome only towards the end of 1959. On November 15, 1959, the CPI National Council finished its six-day session at Meerut. Having discussed relations between India and China, the Council wrote down in its resolution the following: "After carefully considering every factor and all the arguments advanced, the National Council feels that such settlement is possible if political and administrative realities are taken as the most important factor in the formal delimitation of the frontier.

"The National Council feels that whatever the origin of the

McMahon Line may be, the fact cannot be ignored that for several years this has been the frontier of India and the area south of this line has been under Indian administration. The National Council holds that the area south of the McMahon Line is now a part of India and should remain in India.

"As regards the Western border, the Government of India has taken the correct stand that the traditional border in this sector should be accepted. There is, however, a dispute as to what exactly is the traditional border....All this makes it obvious that the proper delineation of the traditional line would require friendly discussions between our Government and the Government of China.

"The National Council places on record its appreciation of the stand of Prime Minister Nehru who, in spite of the terrific pressure from these reactionary forces, has expressed his determination to uphold the independent foreign policy, firmly rejected military alliances, has stressed negotiations and peaceful settlement and warned against war psychosis".<sup>43</sup>

Notwithstanding this resolution, the differences among CPI leadership continued, just when it badly needed to be united to fight the reactionary elements from the Praja Socialist Party, the Jana Sangh, the Swatantra, etc., who, linked by their common hatred of communism, used the border dispute not only to bring pressure to bear on the Government, but also to launch a new offensive against the Indian Communist Party.

Even the fact that the Indian Communists were calling for a peaceful settlement of disputes and restoration of good relations with China was used as a pretext for accusing the CPI of an "anti-national attitude". It was still so two years later, after Ajoy Ghosh said at a press conference in Delhi on December 16, 1961, that India would be fully justified in taking every measure to press back Chinese troops, should they cross the McMahon Line and enter North-East India. Ajoy Ghosh added that in that case the Communist Party would support the Indian Government.

Owing to continuing differences among its leadership and incessant attacks on itself, the Communist Party lost two-thirds of its membership which dwindled from 275,000 to 100,000.<sup>44</sup>

Particularly active in fanning the campaign against Nehru policy were Praja Socialist Party leaders A. Kripalani and J. Narayan<sup>45</sup> who had a sort of a "division of labour" between them, Kripalani, who was a Member of the House of the People, making public speeches and leading the campaign of criticism of the Government in Parliament<sup>46</sup> and Narayan organizing conferences, interviews, etc. For example, speaking at Calcutta in February 1960, in connection with Chou En-lai having been invited to Delhi for talks, Kripalani said: "India has been betrayed by leaders of the present Government", and he added: "How can we do anything when our honour is in the hands of dishonourable people?"<sup>47</sup>

Narayan was the chief organiser of the so-called All-India Convention on Tibet, held at Calcutta on May 30-31, 1959. It was attended by representatives of the Praja Socialist Party, the Jana Sangh and the Revolutionary-Communist Party.<sup>48</sup> The Indian National Congress refused to take part in it. The speeches made at the Convention, its resolution on the independence of Tibet and its call for an "international commission for Tibet" to be established clearly showed that its sponsors aimed above all to undermine India's neutralism.

Next Narayan tried to get recognition for a Tibetan emigre government and to have the Tibetan issue brought before the United Nations. For this purpose he went to Mussoorie and spent three days there talking with the Dalai Lama. On returning to Delhi, he met Nehru and visited the embassies of Burma, the United Arab Republic, Nepal, Iraq and some other countries.<sup>49</sup>

Addressing the session of the Praja Socialist Party held in November 1959, Narayan said that Chinese aggression was the result of Nehru's non-alignment policy.<sup>50</sup> These words make it clear what social—or, rather, military—interests he was the spokesman of.

When the imperialists began to work for having a military agreement concluded between India and Pakistan, Narayan lent a helping hand straightaway. By agreement with the Swatantra, a new Right-wing party, he went as its secret emissary to Pakistan where he had talks with President Ayub Khan on December 14, 1959.



In April 1960, a week before Chou En-lai's arrival in Delhi for talks with Nehru, Narayan organised an Afro-Asian Convention on Tibet and against Colonialism in the Indian capital. It was attended by 64 delegates from 18 countries. The Indian delegation included representatives of the Praja Socialist Party, the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra.<sup>51</sup>

Soon after the events in Tibet the *Indian National Herald* wrote that their most conspicuous effect on the Indian scene was to bring together the Praja Socialists and Jana Sangh.<sup>52</sup> The latter took a most active part in all chauvinist gatherings called on the initiative of the Praja Socialist Party. At the same time, public speeches by leaders of the Jana Sangh—which ideologically rests on Hindu religious chauvinism—were still more bellicose than Praja Socialist leaders'. A statement by the General Secretary of the Jana Sangh, Upadhyaya, published in April 1959, called for "more resolute steps" against China and said that the Jana Sangh was prepared to send volunteers to fight in Tibet.<sup>53</sup>

President of the Jana Sangh, Dr. Raghuvira, did his best to slander the Soviet Union in Parliament. On one occasion, for example, he warned the Council of States that the country "should be prepared for the worst" because, he said, "China was being trained in nuclear arms by Russian scientists". And he remarked provocatively: "The Russians' good words are for us and their good weapons are for China".<sup>54</sup>

Later on, the Praja Socialist Party and the Jana Sangh were joined in fanning war psychosis by the Swatantra party. The latter's constituent session, held on August 1-2, 1959, declared its policy principles whose economic basis was the rejection of government intervention in the economy and preservation of the old system of land ownership. The organisational committee chairman, M. R. Masani, told the session that the party's watchword was to be the struggle against communism as "Public Enemy No. 1". As soon as it emerged on the Indian political scene, the new party raised its voice against India's non-alignment. Rajagopalachari, one of the founders of the Swatantra (erstwhile a Congress leader), who advocated military alliance between India and Pakistan, said on January 17, 1960, that Nehru's refusal to accept the proposal made to

him by Ayub Khan showed that he had not enough wisdom.

In the Swatantra Party, Masani, elected earlier to Parliament as an Independent, was the trumpeter of the campaign to foment anti-Chinese chauvinism. He put forward in Parliament a programme of action demanding (1) the appointment (in place of K. Menon) of a Defence Minister "in whom the armed forces and the country have confidence"; (2) the construction of roads and airfields (in the border area) and procurement of arms (certainly from the West) to equalise forces with the Chinese armies; and (3) "the removal of all restraints on our armed forces to do their duty of making them (the Chinese) withdraw", should they fail to vacate the occupied territory themselves.<sup>55</sup>

The Hindu Mahasabha and the parties of the Right in different States took a similar stand on the question of relations between India and China.

In examining the positions of the Right-wing Parliamentary opposition parties, one must bear in mind the following admission made by Nehru in the House of the People. He said: "My difficulty is, and I am quite frank with you, that there are certain vested interests opposing any settlement between India and China".<sup>56</sup>

The Right-wing opposition parties exploited the strain in relations with China to create a political situation in India about which Ansar Harvani, a member of the House of the People, said, speaking at a meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party, that—as reported by *The Times of India*—"an atmosphere similar to that of 1948 on the eve of Gandhiji's assassination was being created by vested interests. In 1948 it was generally said that Gandhiji was influencing Mr. Nehru to sell India to Pakistan. Now, an impression was being created that Mr. Menon was influencing Mr. Nehru to sell India to China".<sup>57</sup>

### India's Foreign Policy during and after the 1962 General Election

The increased activity of the reactionary forces which exploited the Peking-instigated conflict with India in order to put pressure on Nehru and his Government, created considerable

anxiety among the Indian public. It found reflection in a question put to the Prime Minister by the Editor of the *Blitz* R.K. Karanjia, during their conversation in June 1959, when the latter said: "...it seems that the parallel agitation against Nagpur resolutions,<sup>58</sup> the campaign against China on the Tibet incident, the movement to overthrow the Kerala Government and the formation of the Swatantra Party are *all part of a plan* directed against your progressive national and international policies".<sup>59</sup>

Nor was this anxiety unjustified. Although India in 1958-1962 continued to pursue its policy of non-alignment, it was less active in the United Nations and other international forums. It did not stand up for the principles of peaceful co-existence so resolutely or expose the colonialists' intrigues so uncompromisingly as before. While at the 15th UN General Assembly session in 1960 the Soviet delegation moved that colonialism be stamped out as such, the *AICC Economic Review* took the following slant on the elimination of colonialism, writing in a leading article that "the Soviet Union would for a variety of reasons wish to weaken and demoralise the West where this colonialism and imperialism still existed. All countries subject to this exploitation cannot have that fierce hostility to the Soviet Union which the West entertains. In certain situations their attitude can be one of active sympathy. This is, therefore, a weak spot of the West. The sooner, therefore, Western countries give up their colonies and establish in them democratic institutions, the stronger would be their moral position. Economically they need not lose much if friendly ties could continue between them and their erstwhile colonies on a reciprocal basis. The standard of life in Britain has not gone down one whit on account of the loss of India and other dependencies."<sup>60</sup>

India's relative loss of anti-colonialist momentum manifested itself at the Non-Aligned Nations' Conference, held in 1961 at Belgrade, when there was a divergence of opinion as to which direction of the effort should be given priority—against the threat to peace presented by the Berlin question<sup>61</sup> (the Indian stand) or against colonialism (the Indonesian stand). As Krishna Menon told reporters, there was a sharp clash in

the committee entrusted with drafting the communique over the question of separating the war threat from colonialism, and in giving greater urgency to the former. Ultimately, however, the Indian stand prevailed which found reflection in the Statement on the Danger of War and Appeal for Peace and Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries released by the conference.<sup>62</sup>

The imperialists and the nationalists among Chinese Communist Party leaders were not the only ones who sought to profit by sustaining tension between China and India. General Secretary of the Communist Party of India Ajoy Ghosh wrote in an article that the dispute with China helped the Indian reactionary elements to divert the people's attention from major problems and breed confusion among the masses. This dispute had dealt a telling blow to the democratic movement in India.<sup>63</sup>

The Sino-Indian conflict was one of the reasons why India took a less active part in world affairs. Apart from it, one must take into consideration the following circumstances.

First, greater dependence of India's economic development plans on foreign aid, on American and other Western loans and credits. Whereas the total foreign aid to finance the first five-year plan (1951-56) was about Rs 2,000 million, the second five-year plan (1956-61) took roughly, Rs 11,000 million and the third (1961-66), Rs 22,000 million of foreign aid.

In 1958 India was beset by an acute currency crisis as the expenditure of foreign aid in the first two years of the five-year plan period had exceeded the initial estimates by 50 per cent.<sup>64</sup> The plan had to be somewhat curtailed, but in order to cope with the crisis, India was forced to ask the United States for more aid, and the United States would grant it only if India altered her foreign policy line in the first place. The influential *New York Herald Tribune*, for example, made no bones about suggestions having been made to India that it "could receive much more financial support if its foreign policy were less 'neutralist' ".<sup>65</sup>

Second, more extensive cooperation of the Indian bourgeoisie with foreign monopolies. The Indian upper bourgeoisie,

richer now than before, readily took part in mixed companies promising fresh profits, and its spokesmen in the Government and Congress leadership sought to assure a suitable "international climate" for it. The *Economic Times*, the organ of Bombay business circles, reported on July 23, 1962, that the number of mixed industrial enterprises had increased from 103 in 1958 to 150 in 1959, rising to 380 in 1960 and to 403 in 1961.

Masking the selfish ends of the Indian upper bourgeoisie with alleged concern for the interests of the whole nation, and in connection with the forthcoming talks with the US Government to obtain financial support for the 2nd five-year plan, *Commerce*, the mouthpiece of the Indian upper bourgeoisie, wrote that it was desirable to avoid making irritating political declarations which might make it more difficult for the US Government to influence opinion in its country in favour of the aid.

Third, the growing strength and influence of the Communist Party of India, especially evidenced by the formation and activity of a Communist government in Kerala State in 1957-59, alarmed the Indian bourgeoisie, making it seek closer contact with the imperialists. Thus, the American Indologist Norman Brown, examining the political situation in India in the period under review, wrote that as the 1957 election had demonstrated the growing strength of the Indian Communist Party and latter "came into ever more violent conflict with its democratic government, positive anti-Communist sentiment increased and the lines in the conflict became more clearly defined....In the circumstances India has found it increasingly difficult to maintain a position of nonpartisanship in the Cold War, and has on the whole been drawn closer to the West, especially to Great Britain, but also to the United States."<sup>66</sup>

Fourth, the increased pressure on the Indian Government of the reactionary Right-wing forces, and not merely of the upper bourgeoisie, as was mentioned before, but also of the landlords, former princes and those sections of the urban middle and petty bourgeoisie which, being economically depressed by the upper bourgeoisie, followed religious-communal parties.

The Indian propertied classes were not at all delighted with the concurrence of the Indian and Soviet positions on a range of major international problems. Rather, it made them uneasy. Trying to find some justification for the "sacrilegious unity" between the Nehru Government and "Moscow Communists", Devdutt, the author of a book on Indian foreign policy, wrote : "In fact, on account of the reluctance of colonial powers to retreat gracefully, it ( India ) had to oppose the western powers openly and since the attitude of the USSR on these questions [i. e., anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, anti-racialism and solidarity with Asian peoples—Y. N.] turned out to be in line with that of India, it appeared that it was supporting Russia".<sup>67</sup>

Early in 1962, India held its third general election. The Right-wing parties, which expressed the interests of different factions of the exploiting classes, at that time had no agreed line on foreign policy problems. Their sole common foreign policy "conception" was their non-acceptance of non-alignment. Yet, they did not dare to attack it openly and said merely that it had to be "improved". The Swatantra, for example, said in its election manifesto that it believed that "abstract concepts of co-existence and non-alignment have lost meaning and that our foreign policy needs to be reviewed... The Party will endeavour to rectify the unfortunate impression created in the world that India has a bias in favour of the Communist bloc".<sup>68</sup> The Jana Sangh said much the same things in its election manifesto.<sup>69</sup> The election manifesto of the Hindu Mahasabha attacked the Indian Government for taking part together with the USSR in the struggle against the existence of military blocs and for general disarmament.<sup>70</sup>

The Praja Socialist Party too spoke against the policy of non-alignment, only in a still more disguised way.<sup>71</sup>

At the 1962 general election non-alignment was one of the two pivots (the second was the slogan put forward by the Congress party about "building socialism") on which all the other, less important problems turned. The parties of the Right clamoured for a revision of foreign policy, saying that the Government's neutrality favoured the Eastern bloc. The fact that the Congress party lost during the election six million

votes to the Right-wing parties, the Swatantra in the first place, supplied the Right in the Indian Government with yet another argument in demanding a re-orientation of the foreign policy.

The stepping down of the activity and anti-imperialist orientation of Indian foreign policy in 1958-1962 did not imply any revision of its basic principles or any shift to the West. Addressing a Congress session at Bangalore on January 15, 1960, Nehru said in part: "SEATO and CENTO and all the odd things that have arisen in the last few years have done no good to anybody. I would like to know if any country belonging to SEATO or CENTO has profited by or has been strengthened by either".<sup>72</sup> "A country has to face challenges", he went on to say, "relying on its own strength and on its own gallant men. For instance, do we expect foreign armies to come and sit on the Himalayan peaks to defend our country? The moment the Indian Army and the people cannot defend its borders, and we rely on others to do this, India's freedom is lost..."<sup>73</sup> Nehru stood up for India's non-alignment still more resolutely when he said in Parliament on May 14, 1962, that the whole idea of joining some power bloc was horrible to him and intolerable to think of. "I would rather India sink and die," he said, "than it should continue in that fashion as a camp follower of some other nations".<sup>74</sup>

The more important of India's foreign policy moves in that period put it beyond all doubt that its non-alignment was not a mask put on by Nehru to conceal a policy spearheaded against the national revolutionary struggles in many countries, against socialism, a policy subserving imperialism, as Peking propaganda alleged.

Developments showed that the anti-imperialist potentialities of the Indian bourgeoisie were not yet exhausted.

One of such moves was the liberation of Goa, Diu and Daman from Portuguese domination by Indian troops in December 1961, and their reunification with India. For some years, India had been patiently trying to get Portugal to negotiate on its withdrawal from land seized by it on the territory of India four centuries and a half ago, but all was in vain. When, however, India started preparing to take action to liberate them, the US Government tried to stop her. Apart from

taking some diplomatic steps, President Kennedy sent on December 13, 1961, a personal message to Prime Minister Nehru, and on December 16 the United States asked Nehru through its Ambassador to Delhi and the Indian Ambassador to Washington to announce a six-month postponement of Indian action in return for which the USA undertook "to make a major effort with the Portuguese".<sup>75</sup>

A few hours after Indian troops had entered the Portuguese possessions in India at dawn on December 18, 1961, a meeting of the Security Council in New York was called to discuss Portugal's complaint about "Indian aggression". Adlai Stevenson, US permanent representative in the United Nations, made an affecting speech, telling the Council that he felt he was present at the death of the United Nations at whose birth he had been present 16 years ago.

When on the suggestion of Ceylon and Liberia the meeting was interrupted so that the delegations might consult with their governments, the Western representatives insisted that a night meeting should be appointed. At that meeting the United States submitted a draft resolution jointly with Britain, France and Turkey to stop hostilities forthwith and have India withdraw her armed forces. The Indian delegate turned down the draft, saying that its adoption would be an approval of colonialism and would help the preservation of Portuguese colonies in Indian territory. At the voting, the draft was also supported by Ecuador, Chile and the representative of Chiang Kai-shek China. The Soviet Union, a permanent member of the Security Council, voted against the draft, thus killing it. The Soviet stand was supported by the United Arab Republic, Ceylon and Liberia.

L.I. Brezhnev, the then Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, who was on a state visit to India just at that time, speaking at Madras, said: "The Indian people have now got a chance to see for themselves who are their real friends and champions of peoples' national liberation and who are merely paying lip service to friendship and, repudiating colonialism in word only, in practice seek to hinder by every means the elimination of the last strongholds of that predatory system".<sup>76</sup>



*The New York Herald Tribune* correspondent Joseph Newman reported from the UN headquarters: "After being defeated by the Soviet veto, the United States and its Allies briefly considered the idea of calling an emergency session of the General Assembly to override the Security Council. But they abandoned the idea when they realised they would be defeated by the Communist-Asian-African coalition in the General Assembly just as they had been defeated in the Security Council".<sup>77</sup>

This report also threw light on the real causes of the colonialists' reaction to the actions of India. It ran: "The United States and its Allies are more disturbed about the implications for the future of the UN and the world in general than they are about India's action in seizing three relatively insignificant pieces of land by military force. They fear that India's action has set an example and has served as an invitation for the eruption of violence in all parts of the world especially in Africa, Asia and Latin America, for the liquidation of vast remaining colonial regions by force".<sup>78</sup>

The Indian reactionaries were disturbed for a similar reason. Some opposition leaders and Indian newspapers, when action was launched to liberate Goa, called it an "election stunt".<sup>79</sup>

Events in Goa made it clear that for all the reserve shown by India on the question of colonialism at the Belgrade Non-Aligned Nations Conference, the Nehru Government, contrary to the vociferations of Chinese propaganda, had by no means become a tool of the colonial powers. These events also had demonstrated that the Indian national bourgeoisie was still capable of determined anti-imperialist effort.

There was nothing to draw India closer to the West in the further discussion of the Kashmir question in the Security Council in the spring of 1962. The Kashmir question created by the imperialists recoiled upon them 15 years later.

As was mentioned before, the efforts to implement the American idea of establishing a "bloc for the defence of Hindustan" undertaken in 1959-1960, were fruitless. The US diplomats came to the conclusion that there could be no question of carrying out the plan before the dispute over Kashmir had been settled. At the Security Council meeting on April

27, 1962, the United States made a proposal charging India and Pakistan to resume talks on the Kashmir issue. Incidentally, many delegations to the United Nations believed that the proposal emanated from the Pentagon rather than the White House.<sup>80</sup> When the draft resolution was put to the vote in the Security Council on June 22, 1962, it was supported by Britain and some other countries and would have been passed but for the fact that a permanent member of the Council, the USSR, taking into account the ends that the American proposal pursued, voted against it.

India's foreign policy in 1958-1962 continued to be independent. It continued to be a policy of non-participation in military blocs and played a positive part on the world scene.

## NOTES

1. *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches. 1949-1953*, pp. 173-174.
2. Taufiq Ahmad Nizami, *The Communist Party and Indian Foreign Policy*, New Delhi, p. 223. Subsequently, in October 1962, Nehru made this frank admission: "We were getting out of touch with reality in the modern world and we are living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation". (T.A. Nizami, op. cit., p. 265).
3. *Blitz*, February 14, 1959.
4. F. Moraes, *The Revolt in Tibet*, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1960, p. 206.
5. *Lok Sabha Debates...*, 1959, Vol. 28, No. 35, col. 8467.
6. *ibid.*, Vol. 30, No. 55, col. 13503.
7. *ibid.*, cols. 13501-13502.
8. The Soviet scholars O.B. Borisov and B.T. Koloskov write: "The purpose all these political forces pursued, different as they were at first sight, was to have a serious clash over the 'Indian-Chinese conflict' involving the USSR and the USA, occur in that part of Asia, and strain Chinese-Soviet relations". (O.B. Borisov, B.T. Koloskov, *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia (Soviet-Chinese Relations)*, Moscow, 1972, p. 174).
9. *The Times of India*, November 9, 1959.

10. *ibid.*, November 26, 1959.
11. *ibid.*, August 29, 1959.
12. It was opened by Indian authorities after the events in Tibet approximately half a mile south of the McMahon Line. (*Lok Sabha Debates*, 1959, Vol. 3, No. 31, col. 8113.)
13. *The Times of India*, October 28, 1959.
14. Besides this map which gives one an idea of China's territorial claims, one must also know that the Chinese Note of December 26, 1959, to the Indian Government specified that the district of Ladakh and the eastern sector contained respectively 20,000 and over 56,000 sq. miles presumably of Chinese territory.
15. *The Times of India*, November 13, 1959.
16. *Lok Sabha Debates...1960*, Vol. 39, No. 11, col. 2119.
17. *ibid.*, col. 2118.
18. *The Times of India*, February 16, 1960.
19. *Pravda*, September 10, 1959.
20. The agreement on the border was a temporary one. The treaty on the border between China and Burma was signed at Peking on October 1, 1960.
21. *Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question*. Government of India, Delhi, 1961.
22. *The Times of India*, February 15, 1961.
23. *ibid.*, February 21, 1961.
24. *Dawn*, April 7, 1959.
25. *Hindustan Standard*, May 6, 1959.
26. *The Times of India*, June 15, 1959.
27. The disputed areas were the forest-reserves at Pathoria and the Kusiya river and the populated area of Tokergram.
28. *The Times of India*, November 6, 1959.
29. *ibid.*, June 21, 1959.
30. *Lok Sabha Debates...Vol. 34*, No. 25, cols. 6554, 6560.
31. *The Daily Express*, April 6, 1959.
32. *The Times of India*, November 6, 1959.
33. *The Hindustan Times*, January 18, 1961.
34. Nehru managed to persuade him to take it back.

35. *Lok Sabha Debates*, 1961, Vol. 52, No. 22, col. 5108.
36. Chalapatli Rau, *Jawaharlal Nehru*, Delhi, 1973, p. 362.
37. *The Hindustan Times*, April 29, 1959.
38. *Congress Bulletin*, 1960, No. 1, p. 72.
39. *ibid.*, pp. 60-61, 74-75.
40. *Congress Bulletin*, 1959, Nos. 10-12, p. 454. With reference to these accusations, General Secretary of the CPI Ajoy Ghosh said that to call the Communist Party un-Indian was to insult the Indian people whose support had made it the second political party in the country.
41. *New Age*, May 17, 1959.
42. *ibid.*, November 1, 1959.
43. *ibid.*, November 22, 1959.
44. Between the 5th and 6th congresses, i.e., April 1958 and April 1961.
45. J. Narayan subsequently left the Praja Socialist Party.
46. See, for example, *The Times of India*, November 26, 1959.
47. *Lok Sabha Debates*...1960, Vol. 39, No. 11, col. 2104. Sucheta Kripalani, wife of A. Kripalani, who was Congress General Secretary and presided over the so-called Tibetan Refugee Aid Committee, also was an active opponent of Nehru.
48. *The National Herald* observed that the attendance of this "party" did not make the Convention "more representative". (*The National Herald*, June 3, 1959.)
49. *The Statesman*, June 30, 1959.
50. *The Hindustan Times*, November 7, 1959.
51. Asked who was paying for the Convention, Narayan replied that all the expenses were paid with the money allegedly collected in India. (*The Times of India*, April 2, 1960.)
52. *The National Herald*, June 3, 1959.
53. *The Statesman*, April 28, 1959.
54. *The Times of India*, February 12, 1960.
55. *Lok Sabha Debates*, 1959, Vol. 35, No. 8, cols. 1761-62.
56. *ibid.*, 1960, Vol. 39, No. 11, col. 2120.
57. *The Times of India*, November 25, 1959.
58. Resolutions of the 64th session of the Congress party, held in January 1959 at Nagpur, which stipulated that planning should be further emphasised and legislation enacted fixing a ceiling on the size of landed property and providing for the transfer of surplus land to agricultural cooperatives through the village authorities.

59. *Blitz*, June 27, 1959
60. *AICC Economic Review*, October 22, 1960. If we turn from nice words about "friendly ties" to plain figures, we shall see at once why the British monopolies did not suffer "one whit" from "the loss of India". It was because British private long-term investments in India more than doubled in 1948-59.
61. On July 4, 1961, the Soviet Government sent a Memorandum to the President of the United States, with a proposal to sign a peace treaty with Germany which would help normalise the situation in West Berlin and eliminate the source of conflict in the centre of Europe. The USA and its allies rejected the Soviet proposal and began to foment war hysteria. The American President announced that the armed forces were to be increased, US Senators insisted on some categories of reservists being called up, and so on. The international tension which resulted from these actions of Western powers became known at the Belgrade Conference as the "Berlin question". It is worth noting that one of the objectives pursued by US ruling circles in inflating the Berlin conflict was to weaken the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggles.
62. K. P. Karunakaran (Ed.), *Outside the Contest. A Study of Non-Alignment and the Foreign Policy of Some Non-Aligned Countries*, New Delhi, 1963, p. 206.
63. *Pravda*, April 5, 1961.
64. *Third Five-Year Plan*. Government of India, Delhi, 1961, p. 108.
65. *The New York Herald Tribune*, February 22, 1959.
66. W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India and Pakistan*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963, pp. 358-359.
67. K.P. Karunakaran, op. cit. pp. 71-72.
68. *1962 General Elections in India*, Ed by Poplai, 1962, Bombay, p. 164.
69. *ibid.*, p. 151.
70. *Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha. The Election Manifesto*, Delhi, 1962, p. 8.
71. *1962 General Elections in India*, pp. 96-97.
72. J. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, Delhi, 1961, p. 97.
73. *ibid.*, p. 98.
74. *Lok Sabha Debates*, 1962, Vol. III, No. 22, col. 4549.
75. J.K. Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal*, Boston, 1969, p. 284.
76. *Pravda*, December 25, 1961.

77. *The New York Herald Tribune*, December 20, 1961.
78. *ibid.* The American fears that the Indian action in Goa might set off a "chain reaction of violence" were mentioned also by US Ambassador to India J.K. Galbraith (J.K. Galbraith, *op. cit.*, p. 284).
79. K.S. Murty, *Indian Foreign Policy*, Calcutta, 1964, p. 49.
80. Professor G.P. Malalasekera, head of the Ceylon delegation, reported the fact in a secret dispatch whose contents were made public on August 22, 1962 (Norman Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 198).

## Nehru's Foreign Policy Stands All Tests (October 1962-May 1964)

cb. I

### Chinese incursion into India and its consequences

THE BEGINNING of full-scale hostilities on the Sino-Indian border in the autumn of 1962 radically altered the internal political situation in India. As far as foreign policy was concerned, relations with the Chinese People's Republic were in the centre of attention, pushing all other matters into the background.

Now, what happened on the Sino-Indian border in 1962?

As the border was not definitely delineated and as there were no frontier marks, Indian and Chinese frontier posts in the Himalaya often were in one another's rear. In 1962 frontier clashes occurred—one in the area of Galwan River in the western sector, in summer, and one on September 8, in the eastern sector. Since October 20, 1962, heavy fighting broke out all along the frontier. The non-aligned Colombo Conference countries in December 1962 appealed to the Chinese Government, calling upon it to withdraw its troops 20 kilometres back from the line where they stood as a result of large-scale operations in the autumn of 1962. The Chinese Government admitted that on October 23 it had ordered its troops to disregard the "illegitimate McMahon Line".<sup>1</sup> The Chinese troops advanced south, occupying Tawang, Bomdila, Wolong and some other populated areas 80-100 kilometres beyond the

McMahon Line. Simultaneously, in the western sector Chinese units drove the Indians out of 43 strong points. According to Indian reports, 2,500 Indian troops were killed during the fighting on the border on October 20-25, 1962, alone.

Jawaharlal Nehru regarded the Chinese incursion not only as a serious threat to India's security, but also as a great personal trouble, an attempt to undermine that in which he had profound faith. Nehru's biographer Chalapathi Rau considers that "the Chinese attack of 1962 was the saddest chapter of Jawaharlal's life".<sup>2</sup> China's action struck at the principles of peaceful co-existence and created great confusion among the "third world" countries as it endangered the very idea of the policy of non-alignment.

Naturally in India, as in the whole world, people tried to understand what had made China attack India. Neville Maxwell, London *Times* correspondent in South Asia, published a book in 1970, entitled *India's China War*. In it Maxwell assailed Nehru and justified Peking leaders' action. Citing a number of reasons whereby the Peking leaders "have found bonuses for their decision to hit back at India on the borders...", he wrote among other things : "A blow at India might bring what the Chinese saw as Nehru's covert alliance with the Americans against themselves into the open and so expose the ideological error of Moscow's support for India. It could not fail to damage the Nehru Government domestically, and so help the oppressed classes in India and the forces of revolution there".<sup>3</sup> In reality, however, the Peking adventurers could not care less about the future of the struggle of the revolutionary forces in India.

We feel that a much truer description of the probable reasons of the Chinese aggression was given by the Indian historian Satchidananda Murty,<sup>4</sup> who wrote that (1) Chinese leaders never believed in co-existence; (2) they thought boundary questions and territorial disputes might well be settled by force; (3) they wanted to divert the people's attention from internal tensions and crises; (4) they wanted to impress other countries with China's power; (5) they hoped to acquire leadership in Asia; (6) they thought the Indian Government would fall and that Communists would assume power; (7) they hoped that as



India was non-aligned, the West would not rush to its aid, while Russia would be forced to support China to preserve "socialist unity".

Analysis of Peking's hegemonic policy since the late 1950's, when the petty bourgeois nationalistic Mao Tse-tung group got the upper hand in the CPC leadership, on the whole confirms the aforementioned description of the causes whereby a major armed conflict with India was unleashed. We think that this exposition needs only to be made more precise as follows: (a) the Peking leaders, seized by hegemonic ideas, hoped to acquire leadership for China not only in Asia, but also in Africa and Latin America; (b) they did not want the Indian Communists to assume power at all because it is a well known fact that ever since 1959 the Communist Party of India was the butt of Peking propaganda; (c) the Peking leaders hoped to get the Soviet Union's support against India and thus damage Soviet Indian friendship.

The Soviet Union's attitude to the Sino-Indian frontier conflict was first stated in a *Pravda* editorial on October 25, 1962, which said in part: "Stirring up conflict between two great Asian nations does not serve the interests of imperialism alone, but also of certain reactionary circles in India which have cast in their lot with foreign capitalists, with the imperialist forces hostile to the Indian people".<sup>5</sup> Ten days later *Pravda* again came out with a leading article which said: "Should the conflict continue, it would involve ever greater mobilisation of manpower and material resources on both sides and might cause a long and bloody war". In conclusion the article stressed: "Soviet people firmly believe that the main thing to do under the circumstances is to stop hostilities and start talking on how to settle the conflict peacefully...A solution like this would meet the interests of the Chinese and the Indians and would contribute to the preservation of peace in Asia and the world at large".<sup>6</sup>

This appeal was, however, ignored by the Peking leaders. Chinese troops continued their offensive in the eastern sector of the border and reached the Assam valley.

A month after the start of hostilities against India, the Chinese Government, seeing the failure of its adventurous

plans to involve the Soviet Union in the conflict; encountering firm resistance from India; seeing that it was condemned by world opinion which considered China to be responsible for the armed conflict (more than 60 countries condemned China's action); and finding itself faced with the prospect of a big war, declared on November 21, 1962, that it was issuing orders to its troops to cease fire unilaterally all along the frontier from November 22 and by December 1, 1962, to withdraw to a distance of 20 kilometres from the actual line of control existing previously between China and India.<sup>7</sup> As a result, fighting on the Sino-Indian border stopped, but the situation was highly precarious as the armies with their weapons were still there, facing each other, and the border dispute remained unsettled.

In view of this, the Ceylon Government suggested holding a conference to discuss the settlement of the Sino-Indian frontier conflict. The conference convened at Colombo on December 10-12, 1962. It was attended by representatives of six non-aligned countries, viz, Ceylon, Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, the UAR and Ghana. The proposals made by the conference stipulated that in the western sector of the border the Chinese Government should agree to withdraw its military posts to a distance of 20 kilometres while the Indian Government should retain its positions. In the eastern sector, the actual control line might be considered to be the ceasefire line [i.e., the line of the border was considered not established and required to be demarcated more accurately—Y.N.]; the problems in the central sector must be settled peacefully, without the use of force.<sup>8</sup> To discuss the ways of settling the Sino-Indian conflict, Prime Minister of Ceylon Sirimavo Bandaranaike visited Peking and Delhi in late December 1962-early January 1963.

Although the Colombo Conference had made compromise proposals (while in the western sector they favoured India, in the eastern sector a notable concession was made to China), Premier of the State Administrative Council of the Chinese People's Republic Chou En-lai in his letter of January 19, 1963, to S. Bandaranaike said that the Chinese Government accepted these proposals "in principle", as a preliminary framework of talks between official representatives of China and India. As

far as India was concerned, its Government had the question debated in Parliament. On January 25, 1963, the House of the People approved by 349 votes against 59 the position of the Indian Government which had accepted without any reservations the Colombo proposals. India's position was that acceptance of the latter was a *sine qua non* of talks."

The Chinese incursion in the autumn of 1962 seriously affected the internal political situation in India. Since the first day of fighting on the border, Indian reactionaries raised a hue and cry about India being unprepared for defence and began to spread all sorts of tales and rumours. For instance, some of them declared at public meetings: "Our Jawans (soldiers) had no boots; they had only cotton clothing in icy-cold regions of NEFA [the North-East Frontier Area—Y.N.]"; others insisted that each Note to the Chinese Government should be debated and approved by Parliament before being sent. Dr. Raghuvira, President of the Jana Sangh said that they should set up a Supreme National Council "for deciding all the policies and programmes including foreign aid and foreign alignments".<sup>10</sup>

Speaking subsequently at a session of the All India Congress Committee, Nehru said that he found the persons who shouted the loudest about the Chinese aggression were the most reactionary people otherwise. "...They want to hide their reaction by loud shouting," he said, "not realising that it is not the way of meeting the Chinese menace".<sup>11</sup>

On the Indian political scene in the autumn of 1962 there was a clearly traceable tendency towards the consolidation of the parties of the Right, the Swatantra pretending to the role of the unification centre. While we cannot speak of the organisational unity of these parties as of an accomplished fact, a certain identity of aims and coordination of the methods of action were obvious. Leaders of different parties—from the ideological leader of the Swatantra, Rajagopalachari, to the leaders of the Praja Socialist Party—expressing different political trends, had joined in common opposition to Prime Minister Nehru and were carrying on propaganda against non-alignment, for an alliance with the Western bloc and "for fighting communism". Only then, they said, would Britain and the United States help India.<sup>12</sup>

To achieve these political objectives, the reactionary parties set themselves to deal with Defence Minister Krishna Menon with whom they identified non-alignment. After weakening Nehru's positions in the Government in this way, they wanted next to force the resignation of the Prime Minister himself. Then they would have a new Government formed in which the Right would be represented. Rajagopalachari even named the candidate for Prime Minister. He was S.K. Patil, Agriculture and Food Supply Minister in the Nehru Government.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, immediately after the start of the Chinese offensive on the border in October 1962, reactionary forces in India launched an all-out offensive against the Government and its foreign policy.

In their propaganda, all Indian reactionaries invariably linked the frontier conflict and the military defeat of the Indian troops on the border with the policy of non-alignment, and in the speeches of every Right-wing party leader, of whatever standing and stripe, some common points were observable, which gave one reason to suppose that there was a certain measure of concerted action.

Proposition No. 1 : There can generally be no such policy as non-alignment; if it exists at all, all the same it is not for a weak country like India to pursue it.

The Jana Sangh was trying to prove that the very notion of non-alignment had become obsolete as there were not two world centres (the USSR and the USA) but five (the USSR, the USA, India, China and Western Europe).

Hindu Mahasabha leaders considered that only a strong country could defend its policy of neutrality on world issues and non-alignment with military blocs.<sup>14</sup>

Proposition No. 2 : India supposedly is not a non-aligned country as it pursues a policy favouring the Soviet Union and other "communist camp" countries.

The Praja Socialist leader A. Kripalani asserted that "India's neutrality has a leaning towards the communist bloc, although the Prime Minister denies it".<sup>15</sup>

Proposition No. 3 : In its aggression, China relies on support from the Communist Party of India.

M.S. Golwalkar, the "fuehrer" of the Indian storm troopers,

leader of the militarised Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, in a two-hour speech in the centre of Delhi warned the Government and people of India about the menace of a communist revolution which could be supported by the Chinese invasion of India.<sup>16</sup>

Raghuvira, President of the Jana Sangh, devoted his speech at the 10th session of his party late in December 1962-early January 1963, to the "mounting communist menace" in India and the need to turn the latter into a "bastion against communism".<sup>17</sup>

Proposition No. 4 (the concluding one) : There is no other way for India but to scrap non-alignment and join the bloc of Western powers.

Speaking in Parliament the Swatantra President Ranga tried to prove that non-alignment "has not served us well" and called on the Government to reject it.<sup>18</sup> The Hindu Mahasabha leaders said the same, claiming that the policy of non-alignment insulted and angered the United States and Britain.<sup>19</sup>

The Jana Sangh mapped out at its session a complete programme for militarising India, calling for a drastic reorganisation of the Army, accepting Western military aid on a large-scale instead of expanding war production in the public sector, increasing the strength of the Army to 2 million, equipping the Air Force with 5,000 jet planes, and stockpiling both conventional and nuclear weapons.

It is worth noting that Indian reactionary figures who were clamouring for an alliance with the United States and Great Britain sought to lull the vigilance of the public by saying that India had a comparatively well-developed economy and great material and manpower resources, so it need not fear for its independence : even large-scale military aid could not damage it.

In conducting their offensive against Nehru's Government and policies, the parties of the Right used everything : questions in Parliament, debates, meetings, demonstrations and the press. The big dailies owned by Indian monopolists gave enormous support even to leaders of small reactionary organisations, and headlined their sayings and meetings, no matter how small.<sup>20</sup>

Describing the situation in India, US Ambassador J.K. Galbraith wrote : "The press, Army, politicians, indeed the country as a whole has come almost overnight [after the Chinese incursion into India—Y.N.] to regard us as a first friend. As I predicted, even the word non-alignment has disappeared from everything but Nehru's speeches and the left-wing press. ..."<sup>21</sup> Thus, in the judgement of Americans (and their Indian supporters) there were but two obstacles in their way, namely, Jawaharlal Nehru and the Indian Communists and their press.

As we said earlier, the campaign against the Communist Party and other democratic organisations was an essential part of the all-out offensive waged by the Right in India. In fomenting anti-communist hysteria, the Indian reactionaries did not confine themselves to speeches alone. On October 31, 1962, a mob led by Jana Sangh members and Praja Socialists ravaged the premises of the Central Committee of the Indian Communist Party, burning the furniture, hundreds of books, Gandhi's biography among them, and so on. The same mob also raided the building of the Delhi Communist Party Committee.<sup>22</sup> Since November 1962, fascist-like elements began to raid Communist Party offices in other Indian towns, also raiding branches of the Indian Soviet Cultural Society. They began to manhandle sellers of Soviet publications, and so on.<sup>23</sup> At Raipur in Madhya Pradesh, Indian ultras wrecked the editorial office of the Communist newspaper, *Naya Duniya*, and made a bonfire of the Party literature they had seized. On November 24, 1962, the Communist Party premises at Belgharia were set on fire. The reactionaries began calling for the extermination of "Communist traitors", liquidation of the Communist Party, and so on.

The Rightist elements in and about the Government used the heavy fighting on the Sino-Indian border to put concentrated pressure on Nehru, forcing him, in late October 1962, to dismiss Krishna Menon (who was one of Nehru's few personal friends) from the post of Defence Minister.<sup>24</sup> K. Menon was first appointed Minister of the Defence Industry and in a week's time was dismissed from the Government altogether.<sup>25</sup> Nehru first assumed the duties of Defence Minister himself, later appointing to the post Y.B. Chavan, the Chief Minister of Maharashtra.

With K. Menon's retirement, the positions of the opponents of non-alignment in the Government became stronger. Nevertheless, Nehru, far from moving away from non-alignment, missed no opportunity to reiterate his commitment to it. For instance, speaking on December 24, 1962, during the ceremony held on the occasion of the graduation of students from Santiniketan University, Nehru said that it would be a folly for India to abandon her policy of non-alignment and that any policy different from that India was following would be disastrous for the country. Such instances could be multiplied as Nehru often voiced this sentiment both in and out of Parliament.

And although we have not the slightest reason to doubt the sincerity of the conviction expressed by Nehru, some practical steps taken by the Indian Government in late 1962 and early 1963 were not always, as we are to see further on, in keeping with the policy of non-alignment.

The chief cause responsible for it was that in their campaign against the Indian Government the parties of the Right in India were backed up by the imperialists and, in their turn, were helping the latter to achieve their main objective, viz., to use the armed conflict unleashed by Peking adventurers as a means of pushing India off the path of non-alignment.

### **The pressure put on the Nehru government by the imperialists and Indian reactionaries**

India's non-alignment with blocs was gravely threatened by the decision of the Indian Government to accept large military aid from imperialist powers. This aid had certain strings to it designed to involve India in the imperialists' military-strategic plans.

In late October 1962, India had to turn to many countries for aid. Since November 3, 1962, India began to receive arms from the United States and Commonwealth countries. At first the terms of this aid were not specified. On November 14, however, the United States and India signed an agreement on military aid. Under the agreement India consented to allow American advisers and observers to exercise control over the use of the arms and also agreed to make available to the

United States a certain amount of military information. A fortnight before the agreement was signed, on October 28, 1962, Ambassador Galbraith made the following entry in his journal: "...Colonel Curtis, our Army Attache, was having a session with various Army intelligence people. Our military relations with the Indians, always rather distant, have become extremely intimate these last days. Orders of battle and other military information are being provided".<sup>26</sup>

Besides supplying India with firearms and mortars, the United States and Britain undertook to provide complete combat equipment for six alpine divisions. The Indian side also wanted the United States to supply it with transport planes manned by American crews.<sup>27</sup>

The USA offered to build more airfields in India, install a system of radar stations at the border (under American control) and establish communication with US aircraft carriers which would be ordered, accordingly, to station in the Bay of Bengal.<sup>28</sup> At a conference at Nassau in December 1962, US President John Kennedy and Britain's Prime Minister Harold Macmillan agreed to grant India urgent military aid to an amount of 120 million dollars.

Now that India had accepted military aid from the Western powers, the latter sent to India numerous military-diplomatic missions which used negotiations about the arms supply to influence India's foreign policy. Important tasks in this respect were vested in two missions especially, one of them led by Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President, and the other by Duncan Sandys, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. The missions arrived in India late in November 1962.

It is well worth noting that while these missions tried to persuade India to abandon non-alignment, they did not insist on her joining any of the existing military blocs. We already mentioned here one of the "paradoxes" of Britain's foreign policy, namely, its silent approval of Indian neutralism. This time, however, to the utter surprise of the Indian reactionaries, the Indian Government's declared policy of non-alignment received support from the United States as well. As it happened, it was not the "dogmatists of the Left" that took a



dogmatic view of the American position, but the Indian Right-wing parties. The Indian reactionaries, who regarded this position from the angle of the Dulles doctrine of "containment and rolling back of communism", had relied on the support from the United States in removing the Nehru Government. They had expected US armed forces to take an active part in the operations against China. At any rate, they had expected that US military aid would be made conditional on India aligning herself with a military bloc.

One can imagine their disappointment at learning from Galbraith's statement on November 6, 1962, that the United States "accepted non-alignment in bad times as well as good..."<sup>29</sup> Three weeks later, India's policy of non-alignment was "accepted" by the head of the American delegation, A. Harriman, who said at a press conference in Delhi on November 28, 1962, that on matters of Indian foreign policy "decisions were taken by the Indian Government itself".<sup>30</sup>

It is absolutely essential to see what made the United States apparently ignore the favourable opportunity to draw India into a military bloc in order to understand the steps it took later to promote relations with India.

Respect for non-alignment had nothing to do with it. It was simply that the American imperialists chose other ways of involving India in their military-strategic plans. They were not going to miss such "a good chance" of pushing India off the path of non-alignment. After all, *The New York Herald Tribune* wrote three days after the aforementioned press conference given by Harriman that the non-aligned countries were faced with a crisis which might cause "the non-aligned club" to collapse. And it went on: "The sooner the club disappears from the international scene, the better for all concerned, above all the 'non-aligned' countries".<sup>31</sup>

In our view, the reasons for the "turnabout" in the American attitude were the following :

1. The Pentagon could not but be mindful of the risk of a war with China while the US armed forces were tethered to the Caribbean area on account of the so-called "Cuban crisis."

2. American ruling circles were aware that concluding

a military alliance with India would impose on them the immense financial burden of re-equipping the Indian Army.<sup>22</sup>

3. American diplomacy hoped that India could be used as a wedge to drive between the Soviet Union and China. This was let out by A. Harriman in a radio interview on December 9, 1962, on completing his mission to India.<sup>23</sup>

Delays in the settlement of the border dispute between China and India, in spite of the compromise proposals of the six-nation Colombo Conference, gave the imperialists ample opportunity to carry out their long-term plans for involving India in the "Western defence" system, as well as made circumstances propitious for the Indian reactionaries to go on attacking the Government's foreign policy. Simultaneously, incessant propaganda against Nehru and his policy, carried on by Peking in a highly belligerent key, as well as numerous reports about the Chinese bringing up more troops and building fortifications on the northern frontier,<sup>24</sup> made rather useless China's numerous declarations that it was resolved to settle the dispute with India "by all means peacefully". Thus Nehru's foreign policy was subjected to triple pressure by the imperialists, the Indian reactionaries, and China. But Nehru did not budge.

One of the "long-term plans" of the imperialists was to have a "Hindustan defence bloc," which implied a military agreement between India and Pakistan. The establishment of such a bloc was simultaneously intended to improve the relations of the United States and Britain with Pakistan which was already giving warnings that military aid to India might affect Pakistan's loyalty to its commitments in SEATO and CENTO.<sup>25</sup>

The starting point for a rapprochement between India and Pakistan was for them to reach agreement on the Kashmir question because their relations were still strained, although all the other disputes had been settled, in the main, in 1960. Pressed by the United States and Britain, the Indian Government agreed to negotiate with Pakistan over Kashmir. Speaking at a mass meeting in Delhi in December 1962, Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, said : "...some Westerners, and more than them, a few handfuls in India, have begun to say that India should settle the Kashmir problem with Pakistan at any

cost...And some whispers have also been circulated that in order to receive full arms aid, we must settle with Pakistan even if we have to pay the price of Kashmir for this".<sup>36</sup> But even though it was aware of the conditions in which talks would have to be held, the Indian Government was obliged to do it.

The talks were held at a ministerial level. The Indian delegation was led by Sardar Swaran Singh, Minister of Railways, and the Pakistani delegation by Z. A. Bhutto, Minister of Industry (both were soon to become Foreign Ministers). The first round of talks was held at Rawalpindi in December 1962. They continued in Delhi (January 1963), and then in Karachi (February 1963). The Indian delegation were willing to settle the dispute over Kashmir if the "ceasefire line" were recognised as the state frontier. Hopes for the unification of India and Pakistan were entertained even by Left-wing congressmen. Expressing their feelings, the *Socialist Congressman* wrote: "What is most amazing is the fact that Chinese perfidy has brought Indian and Pakistani brethren as near as never before ever since the creation of the two sovereign States".<sup>37</sup>

However, Pakistan, which pretended to all Kashmir, if ostensibly it merely demanded a plebiscite there, would not agree to division along the armistice line. We must note at this point also that since May 1962 Pakistan had been conducting talks with China too over the boundary between the northern areas of Kashmir occupied by Pakistani troops in 1947-1948 and the Chinese province of Sinkiang. After the talks with India started, Pakistan took advantage of its continuing talks with China to bring pressure to bear on India. Indian opinion considered the fact that such talks were being held to be evidence of China's willingness to recognise Pakistan's claim to Kashmir.

Early in March it became known in India that Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto had visited Peking and signed, on March 2, 1963, an agreement on the border between Pakistan and China. Under this agreement, a territory of about 750 sq. miles, formerly under Chinese control, went to Pakistan. But the gist of the agreement was that, regardless of the proviso that the agreement was to be temporary, it was a definite

recognition of Pakistan's jurisdiction over North Kashmir. Commenting on the agreement, the *AICC Economic Review* wrote that it was a pattern of "hate-policy, which our immediate neighbour has been following since partition".<sup>38</sup>

The agreement between China and Pakistan aroused India's protest (India refused to recognise the agreement as it held that Pakistan had no right to conclude any agreements on Kashmir's borders) and made it still harder for the United States and Britain to mediate between India and Pakistan. In March 1963, US Ambassador to India J. K. Galbraith and British High Commissioner Paul Gore-Booth arrived in Calcutta in connection with the fourth round of talks.<sup>39</sup>

In April India and Pakistan were visited by Walt Rostow, one of the US President's closest assistants, who came "to promote the progress of the talks" on Kashmir, another round of which was to start on April 21 at Karachi. According to the Indian press, W. Rostow brought along a plan of the division of Kashmir under which a large part of Kashmir Valley was to go to Pakistan. To spare the negotiating parties any unnecessary trouble, W. Rostow even had with him a map plotted by American cartographers, showing the line of partition. Simultaneously, the US Defence Secretary McNamara did what he could to bolster the American proposal on Kashmir's partition. Telling the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the US Congress that the question of aid to India was still "under study", he added the significant comment: "Political and economic factors, including India's efforts to help and reduce the vulnerability of the subcontinent by contributing to the resolution of Indo-Pakistani differences, will be given due consideration in arriving at our final recommendations to the President".<sup>40</sup> As the size of allocations to be made for military aid to India directly depended on these recommendations, it was undisguised blackmail.

The sixth round of talks between India and Pakistan took place in May 1963. It was preceded by yet another attempt to bring pressure to bear on India, this time by Britain. The Commonwealth Minister, Duncan Sandys, who came to Karachi to attend a SEATO session, said he was not satisfied with the progress of Indo-Pakistani talks on Kashmir. This arrogant

remark provoked a sharp retort even from the *Indian Express*, published by the newspaper magnate Rannath Goenka.

This round of talks was as fruitless as all that went before it. The idea of a "Hindustan defence bloc" was finally dead and buried.

We said earlier that in November 1962 the United States had offered to extend the airfield network in India, set up on the border a system of radars controlled by foreign specialists and establish communication with US aircraft carriers which could be stationed in the Bay of Bengal. This proposal to set up an "air umbrella", as it soon came to be known in the Indian and Western press, was, in effect, a plan for locating American air bases on Indian territory. The US Embassy in India began working out the plan in practical terms. It was discussed, for example, at a long meeting of the Embassy staff on December 2, 1962. The Ambassador stressed the importance of the plan and said that it "would provide the basis for a close working relationship with India. We would contribute the planes; the Indians, the fields and ground support".<sup>41</sup> The American imperialists were so confident of success that the *U.S. News and World Report* magazine printed on January 7, 1963, a map showing India as one of the countries housing US air bases.

Indian press reports about the proposed "air umbrella" created grave concern among the Indians. Fifteen Congress party MP's called on the Prime Minister on February 2, 1963, in order to hand in to him a memorandum which said among other things that India would have no right to take independent decisions on how to use the planes she was offered, while the ground equipment would be serviced by Western specialists, and that it could result in the airfields being used as foreign military bases. The authors of the memorandum considered the plan to be utterly unacceptable and insisted that military aid and all other aid India might receive should be granted fully in keeping with the basic principles of her policy.<sup>42</sup>

The parties of the Right linked up with the imperialists as usual, to put pressure together on the Indian Government. In connection with Walt Rostow's stay in India in April 1963,

reactionary forces launched a vigorous campaign in support of the idea of an "air umbrella". Thus, N.G. Ranga, the Swatantra president, *The Hindustan Times* reported, told a meeting at Patna on April 6 that "his party would welcome an 'air umbrella' from any quarter—the United States or Russia—to protect India from Chinese aggression."<sup>13</sup> One hardly needs to explain that his reference to the Soviet Union was a hypocritical tribute this arch-reactionary found it necessary to pay to the Indians' friendly feelings towards the Soviet Union.

Although the American "air umbrella" obviously promised to cut both ways, the Indian Government—just as in the case of its talks with Pakistan over Kashmir—carefully studied the proposal for many months. One may say it was deliberately stalling in order to prevent any curtailment of the American arms aid which an abrupt refusal would cause. Such an assumption is, however, not true as the original American plan which was rejected had been transformed by the summer of 1963 into a plan approved by the Indian Government to hold a joint air exercise involving, besides the Indian Air Force, US, British, Australian and Canadian jet fighters. American radar equipment was to be used. So, the imperialists who refused to supply India with supersonic planes were ready to station their air squadrons on Indian soil and do what they liked in India's air-space and at her borders.<sup>14</sup>

The joint air exercise programme differed from the "air umbrella" plan in that it was not tied to any formal military agreement, nor did it imply any commitment on the part of the Western powers to give India air support in case of emergency. The air exercise programme which the United States viewed as the first stage of the "air umbrella" and which was utterly incompatible with the policy of non-alignment, was implemented in the autumn of 1963 and will be discussed further on.

Another infraction of the policy of non-alignment—not so dangerous perhaps from the military viewpoint as the decision to hold a joint air exercise—was a deal made by the Indian Ministry of Information and Broadcasting with the Voice of America radio station. Negotiations on it started already in November 1962.<sup>15</sup> According to the terms of the agreement

signed later, the United States was to build a big radio station at Calcutta and was authorised to retransmit Voice of America programmes for South-East Asia three hours daily over a period of five years, after which time the station was to pass into India's ownership. The implementation of this agreement would imply spreading the "cold war" to India.

In analysing the situation in India at the time of the Chinese aggression, the highly well-informed Indian *Socialist Congressman* magazine wrote a year afterwards that the reactionary conspiracy "in the months following the Chinese aggression had almost reached a bursting point. It is difficult to say what the outcome of Right Wing conspiracy might have been if the hostilities on the border had continued for another two or three weeks".<sup>16</sup>

Although the "Right Wing conspiracy" failed to reach its culmination, the question arises why, despite the simultaneous pressure brought to bear by the American imperialists, Indian reactionaries and Peking adventurers, they failed in 1962 to achieve their immediate objectives of pushing India off the path of non-alignment or dislodge the Nehru Government altogether.

First of all, Jawaharlal Nehru continued to enjoy the support of those sections of the Indian bourgeoisie who were in favour of India's independent development and feared the loss of independence, should her foreign policy be changed. At this point one must also bear in mind the belief widespread in India and elsewhere at the time that if India joined the American military bloc the USSR would join China. A.V. Bhave, the best known of Gandhi's followers in India, wrote, for instance, in his article entitled *Sino-Indian Conflict* which was published in the *Economic Review*: "India is at present a non-aligned country. Some people, even some prominent people, are trying to push us into the American camp. They will forgive me for saying that I see no wisdom in this; it would only result in Russia joining the other camp. Two blocs would be formed and China and India would become the centre of a conflagration".<sup>47</sup> A similar view was expressed at an All India Congress Committee session by Govind Das, one of the Congress veterans, M.P. for the State of Madhya

Pradesh, who said: "...anyone but Shri Jawaharlal Nehru would have given the policy of non-alignment under stress of Chinese invasion, but it was only due to Nehruji that they still pursued the same policy which was the correct one". Should India discard the policy of non-alignment, he said, it would draw another world war nearer. "If India joined the Western bloc", he continued, "Russia would throw itself completely on the side of China".<sup>48</sup>

Second, in spite of the Indian reactionaries' fierce attacks on the Nehru Government and its policy and contrary to the notions of the Chinese and Indian "Leftist" dogmatists that the delimitation of forces in India would result in a "self-exposure" of the Congress party and a growth of anti-Government feeling, there was a tremendous upsurge of patriotism in India, and the masses rallied round Nehru, whose prestige among the people was as great as ever. This cohesion was demonstrated, among other things, by the active involvement of the Indian poor in the collection for the National Defence Fund declared by the Government. One instance of it, quoted at an All India Congress Committee meeting by Congress President Sanjivaya in April 1963, was that Rs 70,000 collected by Bhopal street-sweepers, "the poorest of the poor",<sup>49</sup> was donated to the Defence Fund.

Third, the Soviet standpoint set out in A.N. Kosygin's speech on November 6, 1962, made on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution, in a speech at a USSR Supreme Soviet session on December 12, 1962, and in Soviet Government messages to Prime Minister Nehru of India, played a no small part in frustrating the designs of reaction. Indian political circles were greatly impressed, for example, by the Soviet Government's explanation of the fact that there was a "third side", interested in fomenting the conflict, namely, the imperialists (the confirmation whereof the Indians saw in daily practice).<sup>50</sup>

Chalapathi Rau who was privileged to meet Nehru constantly over a period of 25 years and learn from him personally his views and the motives of his actions, writes in his book about Nehru: "At the time of China's attack in spite of a feeling that his trust had been betrayed, he stuck to his faith



in non-alignment, the Soviet Union by its benign neutrality proving how right he was..."<sup>51</sup>

Although fighting on the Sino-Indian border had been suspended since November 22, 1962, relations with China were the main determining factor in India's foreign policy in 1963 as well. Speaking in Parliament on February 18, 1963, President Radhakrishnan of India said: "The issue of Chinese aggression has been, and is today, the overriding issue before us and, everything else has to be considered in that context".<sup>52</sup>

Early in 1963 the Indian reactionaries already saw that their frontal attack on Nehru had failed. While pursuing their objectives of making India abandon non-alignment and dragging her into a military alliance with the West, the reactionary parties began to alter their methods. Rajagopalachari, one of the pillars of Indian reaction and one of Nehru's most implacable opponents, formulated a programme of the further onslaught on Nehru's foreign policy in a speech addressed to the Swatantra Parliamentary Party. He said: "The Government is under pressure from Afro-Asian powers [meaning the Colombo proposals—Y.N.] to yield ground to the Chinese on many fronts, particularly the political front...The party-line should, therefore, attack the very 'roots of the foreign policy'... We must attack principally, the concept of neutralism...We must campaign for firm alignment with Western countries".<sup>53</sup>

Although the Right-wing parties had to reduce their activity as the international situation became more relaxed they spared no efforts to prevent a reversion of the political processes which took place in October-December, 1962, and give India's foreign policy a pro-Western orientation. Proceeding from these objectives, the Right opposed the acceptance of the Colombo recommendations, seeking to keep up the strain on the Sino-Indian border.

Five parliamentary opposition parties—the Swatantra, the Jana Sangh, the Praja Socialist Party, the Socialist Party and the All India Forward Bloc—took advantage of the "lull" in order to consolidate their forces further and take joint action more often. They began to hold common press conferences and meetings in Delhi and elsewhere in India and send joint deputations to Nehru. They even issued a joint appeal of five

parties to the people, urging the Indians not to allow the acceptance of the Colombo proposals and suggesting Western military aid as an alternative to them.

Fighting the Colombo proposals the Indian reactionaries called in question the principles of Afro-Asian solidarity and rejected the struggle against colonialism. On January 26, 1963, the 13th anniversary of the Indian Republic, Rajagopalachari said that now that Western colonialism had come or was coming to an end and all erstwhile exploited nations had gained or were gaining freedom, it made him question what the implications were of the slogan of Afro-Asian solidarity put forward by liberated nations at their meeting in Colombo and those in sympathy with them. Its implications, he said, were nothing but cold war and the ancient grudge against the former masters. To put it plainly, he went on, they were just so many more hate-slogans.<sup>54</sup>

Advocating India's military alliance with Western powers, Swatantra leaders explained that it was desirable in view of the need to take preventive measures on the northern frontier and to arm India without delay, as well as in view of the ideological affinity existing between the West and India.<sup>55</sup>

Analysing the struggle that the Right were waging in the sphere of foreign policy, one must note that early in 1963 there appeared some new points in their propaganda, arising from (1) the Soviet Union's great popularity among the Indians; (2) the reactionaries' intention to use in the interests of the Indian exploiting classes the differences between the CPSU and the CPI; and (3) the vitality of the idea of India's non-alignment with military blocs.

For instance, Rajagopalachari, speaking at Bangalore on January 29, 1963, said, as reported by *The Times of India*, "that he did not want to fight the theory of non-alignment, held so religiously by the Prime Minister. If by non-alignment the Prime Minister meant to keep friendly relations with Russia we would agree with him".<sup>56</sup> At the same time, the Right-wing parties, which sought to damage Soviet-Indian friendship but did not venture to disparage the Soviet Union openly, kept throwing out hints about this friendship being "deficient" and incapable of developing the qualities of a military alliance.<sup>57</sup>

The reactionary forces had to reckon with the vitality of the idea of non-alignment with blocs. That this idea was still alive, in spite of the war trials and systematic propaganda carried on against it by the Right, is clear even from the words of Norman Brown, an American scholar, who wrote: "The conflict with China in 1962 might be thought to have put India on the side of the western democracies in the Cold War, for India promptly turned to the United States for aid, and the Indian press seemed to think that the country was now being allied to the West. Nehru, however, has not yet (February 1963) abandoned the policy of non-alignment, and many Indians think that on second thought the Indian public, too, will wish to maintain it".<sup>58</sup> For this reason, in the spring of 1963, the Right-wing propaganda began to suggest that if it was possible to get military aid while pursuing the policy of non-alignment, why not take another "little step"—why not join a military alliance and get still more aid, allegedly "without detriment" to the independence of Indian foreign policy?

Apart from the consolidation of the Indian reactionary forces and the fact that they now used more subtle methods of propaganda, the Right-wing opposition parties were able to put pressure on the Indian Government more effectively inasmuch as they enjoyed the support of the Right-wing in Congress leadership and the Government. It was clearly manifested at a session of the All India Congress Committee in April 1963. This session was especially important as the annual session of the Indian National Congress (usually held in February) was not convened in 1963 on account of the state of emergency being declared in the country, and so the work devolved on the AICC annual session which had to frame the policy of the ruling party for a year ahead.

Just before the AICC session, the Original Working Committee asked—one can only wonder why—Finance Minister Morarji Desai to present to the session his views on the Chinese Aggression, a topic which was one of the main points of debate (the presentation of his views being connected with the growth of agricultural production). As the Minister of Planning, Chandra Shekhari Prasad, was absent from the session could not be held in the usual manner.

mention that India confirmed its commitment to the policy of non-alignment, although that point was in the draft. This drew criticism from Ajit Prasad Jain, Minister of State for Rehabilitation and Minority Affairs, and others at the session.<sup>60</sup> Simultaneously K. Hanumanthaiya, AICC member for the State of Mysore, openly said that India should renounce non-alignment and cooperate with "like-minded nations" and that it should have accepted Pakistan's offer of joint defence long ago.<sup>61</sup> Mahavir Tyagi, a Government member, sharply attacked the point of the draft resolution which said that the dispute between India and China should be settled by arbitration.<sup>62</sup>

B.J. Azad, MP, an active member of the revolutionary anti-British "Quit India" movement in 1942, when he was a youth of 17, who was present at the session, evidently had every reason to say that "Most of the people holding such ideas [he meant the rejection of non-alignment and economic planning—Y.N.] once occupied high offices" and that he was "sorry to note that there were those in the AICC as well, who attacked even basic policies, like non-alignment..."<sup>63</sup>

Although Nehru spoke at the session in defence of the principles of non-alignment and sharply criticised the activities of the Right-wing opposition parties,<sup>64</sup> the hostile Rightist attacks at the session itself were not given a fitting rebuff.<sup>65</sup>

Subsequently the positions of the Right-wingers in the Government and in Congress leadership became even stronger, after they succeeded in June 1963 in dismissing Minister of Mines and Fuel Keshav Deva Malaviya, the most consistent exponent of independent economic development of all Indian ministers.

The Right became stronger outside Congress too. During the parliamentary by-elections in some states in April-May 1963 they returned A. Kripalani, the ex-leader of the Praja Socialist Party, who stood as an Independent but was actually a Swatantra man, and Masani, General Secretary of the Swatantra. (Both previously failed in the 1962 general election.) Somewhat later, after the Colombo proposals had been accepted by the Indian Parliament, influential bourgeois newspapers began publishing more often critical speeches by public figures

against Right-wingers, recommendation on foreign policy matters.<sup>66</sup> On the whole, however, not enough was done to counter the reactionaries' activity. The peculiar character of the political situation in India at that time was pointed out by Nehru himself in an article written for the March 1963 issue of the *American Foreign Affairs* magazine. "The Right in India," he wrote, "has become more clamorous, basing itself on an extreme form of nationalism; and the Left, though also nationalistic, is to some extent weakened. The Communist Party of India is in disarray.... There is much heart-searching even in the Congress party".<sup>67</sup>

The above-mentioned alignment of the internal political forces was one of the factors which determined the deviations from the foreign policy of non-alignment we have pointed out, viz., India's acceptance of American and British arms accompanied by the presence of foreign advisers and observers; protracted talks with Pakistan over Kashmir, whose ultimate purpose was the setting up of a "Hindustan defence bloc"; the Indian Government's decision to hold an air exercise in India with the participation of Western powers; and the deal with the Voice of America. The *Blitz* wrote, although a little pessimistically: "While we have still maintained the posture of non-alignment, we have eschewed its active and dynamic logic. Seeking the position of isolationist aloofness, we have, in the name of defence requirements, veered from our course towards alignment with the West".<sup>68</sup>

### India's Foreign Policy in 1963-1964

On August 13, 1963, the Indian Parliament began its regular session, the first ever to debate the question of a vote of non-confidence in the Government. The opposition bloc was seeking to obtain the resignation of the Nehru Government, insisting on complete rejection of non-alignment, economic planning and development of heavy industry in the public sector.<sup>69</sup> Even altered as described above, the non-alignment policy still would not suit the Indian reactionaries and Western imperialist circles.

Of the numerous reports of the Indian press covering extraordinary meetings of Right-wing parties, leading bodies

preceding the session, urgent consultations, adjustments, and so on, one printed by the *Bilaspur Times*, weekly (published in Hindi) and coming from Bhopal in the State of Madhya Pradesh merits special attention. It said: "There is much talk in political circles here of the presence of an American lady, Miss Jeanne Abel, at the 6th National Conference of the PSP where Prime Minister Nehru's resignation was demanded, and it is said that the aforesaid American lady played an important role in getting passed the resolution demanding Prime Minister Nehru's resignation."<sup>70</sup> The weekly went on to say that the American lady was no stranger; she had been a top official at the US Consulate in Bombay and her keen interest in the Bombay session of the Jana Sangh had been noticed. During her visit to Delhi she met A. Mehta and other Praja Socialist leaders, while earlier still, during the Hindu-Muslim clashes at Bhopal in 1961, she came to Bhopal secretly where she met some prominent Muslims and expressed "her deep concern for the loss of life and property of the minorities."<sup>71</sup>

While a heated debate on the vote of non-confidence went on in the House of the People, two demonstrations were staged beyond its walls, on August 14, 1963. One was a 20,000-strong demonstration supporting the demands of the opposition; the other, even more numerous, supported the Government. One of the chief organisers of the last-mentioned demonstration was the head of the Delhi branch of the Congress party, C.B. Perkash, a man far removed from Communism. Speaking of the Socialists' part in the anti-Government demonstration, he said: "The most unfortunate part of the story is that blind anti-Communism is leading to alliance with reactionaries. The (Lohia) Socialists and the Praja Socialists represent exactly such socialist elements."<sup>72</sup>

After a three-day debate in Parliament, the draft resolution on a vote of non-confidence in the Government was rejected by 346 votes against 61, the Communist MP's abstaining.<sup>73</sup> The motion to hold a vote of non-confidence made it clear to Nehru and his supporters that the previous concessions made to the Right had weakened the Government's positions and that it had come to a point where any further step to the right would endanger the Government's stability.<sup>74</sup>

Three days before the opening of the aforementioned session of Parliament, when the opposition parties were feverishly knocking up their anti-Government bloc, on August 9-10, 1963, the All-India Congress Committee approved the proposal made by Kamaraj, the Chief Minister of Madras State, to ask the leading Congress Party members holding ministerial posts to resign and devote themselves henceforth entirely to party work. Declining Nehru's resignation from the post of Prime Minister, the AICC asked him to decide on the resignations handed in by Cabinet Ministers and Chief Ministers of States.<sup>75</sup>

A week after the debate in Parliament on a vote of non-confidence, Nehru told the Congress Working Committee that he had accepted the resignations of six Cabinet Ministers and Chief Ministers of six states.<sup>76</sup> Among those who left the Government were Finance Minister M. Desai, Minister of Food and Agriculture S.K. Patil, Minister of Information and Broadcasting B. Gopal Reddy and other notorious reactionaries. After some more reshuffling, the balance upset by the resignation of K. Menon and K.D. Malaviya some time earlier was restored and the positions of Nehru and his supporters in the Government enhanced. At the same time, one should not overrate this change of balance, as the implementation of the Kamaraj Plan did not eliminate opposition to Nehru from the Right, merely shifting the focus of the struggle from the Government to Congress leadership. Now Nehru had more opportunity to make current policy decisions, but as far as long-term decisions were concerned, the situation remained much the same.

The regrouping of forces in the Indian Government was a factor which, along with others, could not fail to influence India's foreign policy.

Another factor was the people's mounting struggle against the intrigues of foreign imperialists and home reactionaries. As temporary factors stemming from the military situation on the Sino-Indian border receded into the background, the Indians came to realise more clearly the dangers involved in the foreign policy line advocated by the Right, and stepped up their support of Nehru's policy.

We should dwell on this and the role of the Communist Party of India in more detail. Since the spring of 1963, after the CPI had overcome the confusion caused above all by the reactionaries' fierce attacks on it at the height of the conflict with China, it was able to make a worthy contribution to the democratic struggle. Hundreds of demonstrations were organised throughout India in support of the policy of non-alignment and the Colombo proposals. The CPI central secretariat published a resolution analysing in depth the American plan for a joint air defence exercise and showing that the country's sovereignty was gravely threatened.<sup>77</sup> The resolution of the CPI National Council suggesting that an eight-nation conference of the Colombo countries, India and China should be held to break the deadlock on the Sino-Indian border dispute had strong repercussions among the public.<sup>78</sup>

Eventually, however, the Indian Communists' attention was increasingly diverted from this problem by the inner-party struggle against the supporters of the "leftist" views on the Party's strategy and tactics. At a CPI National Council session, held on October 14-19, 1963, the demands of the "leftist" group were formalised in the *Declaration of 17*. The walkout of 32 of the 106 members of the National Council from its special session held in April 1964 to discuss the situation in the Party marked the beginning of an open split in the CPI.<sup>79</sup>

At that time, much was done to win public support for the Nehru line by the All India Peace Council. Immediately after the clashes on the Sino-Indian border started, in October 1962, the Council condemned China's action. (Since mid-1963, when the situation in India became more favourable to the growth of the peace movement, the latter reached such scope that the President and the Prime Minister of India sent greetings, for the first time ever, to the 7th All India Peace Congress which was held on November 1-3, 1963, at Amritsar. On December 7, 1963, Nehru inaugurated the Seminar on International Affairs and World Peace convened in Delhi on the initiative of the Committee of Indian Parliamentarians for Peace. The Seminar was a vivid demonstration of the support given to the Nehru foreign policy course by Indian progressive opinion.

A third factor which influenced the foreign policy was that



Indian political circles had become aware of the need to build up the country's positions on the world scene.

Naturally enough, the Ministry for External Affairs was concerned above all about the changed attitude to India on the part of its South-East Asian neighbours. Until the mid-1950's India's relations with countries in that area of the world had been improving, especially in the political field. At the Bandung Conference, India's stand was firmly supported by Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia and other countries. Now, however, the Indian writer on foreign affairs S. Krishnamurthi observed that in the years following the Bandung Conference India had become somewhat estranged from many South-East Asian countries. Analysing this process, S. Krishnamurthi said that the Indian Government's stand on a range of issues differed from her neighbours' and that many South-East Asian leaders saw India's position as tending rather towards the West.

*The Hindustan Times* pointed out another reason why India's prestige had somewhat gone down. It wrote that professions of friendship and calls for peace emanating from the militarily weak India were usually received with irony. To regain the favour of South-East Asian countries, India had to show that it was a great power counterbalancing China's strength and capable of forcing the Peking regime to restrain its expansionist ambitions.<sup>80</sup>

All this made it incumbent on the Nehru Government to follow the course of non-alignment more consistently and simultaneously to build up the country's defence capacity by utilising internal resources as well as getting outside aid without military or political strings.

A fourth factor in foreign policy was the general easing of international tensions, brought about by the signing, in the summer of 1963, of the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. India was one of the first to accede to the Treaty, and no wonder, if one recalls that Nehru told an AICC session in August 1963 that "this sort of Treaty had been suggested by India 7 or 8 years ago in the United Nations".<sup>81</sup>

It is worth noting that the Indian Government saw the signing of the Treaty as "a turning point in recent human

history, opening the way to disarmament and to secure peace all over the world".<sup>82</sup> The resolution of the international situation, adopted by the Jaipur session of the AICC on November 3-4, 1963, said that the test-ban treaty must be followed by other steps, and that the manufacture, storage and use of nuclear weapons must be banned by an international agreement. The AICC expressed full support for the Government's foreign policy of peaceful co-existence, non-alignment with blocs and of solidarity with the non-aligned countries in the struggle against colonialism and racialism.<sup>83</sup> It was the most explicit foreign policy resolution to have been passed by the Indian National Congress ever since 1959.

Another significant Government measure was cancelling the agreement on the Voice of America radio station. At first, after a stormy public reaction to the reports about the signing of the agreement, the Indian Government explained that it had been signed circumventing the Cabinet who had been misinformed. The *Blitz* made the following comment: "The VOA is dead as the dodo so far as India is concerned, but the implications of the deal provide us with a *forewarning* that cannot be ignored. It has been proved that there exist in seats of power people who are willing to sell our independence for a mess of foreign pottage".<sup>84</sup> Speaking in Parliament, Nehru said that the deal on the Voice of America radio station was out of line with India's general policy and that any decision would have to be in consonance with India's basic policies".<sup>85</sup> Nevertheless, the United States refused to revise the terms of the agreement and, moreover, suggested that there might be "serious complications" when questions of economic and military aid came up for decision.<sup>86</sup> Despite this blackmail which went on for six months, S. Sinha, the new Minister for Information and Broadcasting, told the Council of States of the Indian Parliament in February 1964 that the Government had notified the United States that the agreement on building the relay station could be signed only provided that it should not have to handle the Voice of America programmes.<sup>87</sup>

The new steps taken by the Indian Government towards strengthening friendly relations with the Soviet Union were very important in that they had far-reaching results.

Describing the opposite lines followed by the USSR and the USA towards India, the prominent Indian publicist Chanakya Sen wrote in the progressive *Mainstream* magazine early in 1963 that the Soviet Union believed an independent India pursuing the policy of non-alignment and having an independent economy to be an essential force in the struggle for peace and against war. The United States thought that the only way to save Asia from the Communist menace was to support as much as possible the local forces of conservatism and capitalism, to act on these forces within the amorphous Indian society, the forces which economically, traditionally and intellectually were opposed to radicalism.<sup>88</sup>

Besides the "forces of conservatism and capitalism", the USA had many other allies in India, with whose aid it hoped to drag India off the path of non-alignment. The *Blitz* wrote later that to most officials and Ministers "the Sino-Indian conflict is a God-sent opportunity to push India on to the Western bandwagon. But happily the Prime Minister with his vision of world history has been keeping the door open to the Soviet Union even during the worst days of the border trouble. Recently when he addressed our envoys in the Asian regions he was reported to have told that the Indo-Soviet friendship was worth 20 Divisions".<sup>89</sup>

The new rapprochement between India and the Soviet Union started in May 1963, when the Soviet Government offered to help India to construct an integrated iron and steel works at Bokaro. India previously turned to the United States for assistance, but US ruling circles haggled over the terms of aid just as long as it took the Soviet Union to construct the Bhilai Iron and Steel Works, and finally refused to build the works at Bokaro.

The Indian progressive press expressed a high opinion of the talks conducted by Bhattacharya—Secretary of Coordination of the Economy and Defence—in June 1963 in Moscow. As a result of the talks, the Soviet Government agreed to extend aid to build up the defence capacity of India. *Mainstream* wrote that diehards both of the Left and of the Right, from the pro-China wing among the Communists to the advocates of a military alliance in the Rightists, were thrown into confusion.<sup>90</sup>

The Indian Government then took further steps to build up inter-state and cultural relations with the Soviet Union. In July 1963, Indira Gandhi paid a visit to the Soviet Union. She came to Moscow for the opening of the Indian Exhibition (incidentally, it was the largest of all Indian exhibitions abroad) and had talks with Soviet Government representatives. Indira Gandhi said at a press conference that during the talks she had stated regarding the air defence exercise involving some Western powers that there could be no question of any foreign bases or strong points being set up on Indian soil. "The exercises," she went on to say "will not be held near the border but in Delhi and Calcutta area and they are temporary, their purpose being to train our people in the use of radar air defence". She also said: "We need powerful transmitters. But we are not going to allow foreign countries to use them. We shall not take the equipment otherwise".<sup>91</sup>

Closer friendship between India and the Soviet Union manifested itself convincingly in April 1964 at Jakarta during a meeting of 22 representatives of Asian and African countries which discussed preparations for the 2nd Afro-Asian conference of heads of state and government.

The Indian representative, Minister Sardar Swaran Singh, suggested that the Soviet Union, which was an Asian power and which ever since the Bandung Conference had invariably supported the Afro-Asian nations and given them much assistance, should by all means take part in the proposed conference. The delegate of Ceylon also said that the Soviet Union should be invited. Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi, however, sharply objected to the Indian proposal, saying that China was against it because the Soviet Union was not an Asian country. In view of the stand taken by the Chinese delegation, it was decided to take up the question again at the Conference itself.

After this meeting, the Indian Press Agency stated that the role India had played at Jakarta and the stand expounded by the Prime Minister in his foreign policy review in Parliament on April 13, 1964, that the policy of non-alignment must be followed unswervingly, spoke of major trends in India's foreign policy. These two points taken together, the Agency said,

could be assessed as a new stage in the foreign policy of non-alignment.

Alongside of measures towards improving relations between India and the Soviet Union the Indian Government also took steps to enhance India's positions in South-East Asian countries.

Apart from the aforementioned general factors affecting India's relations with each of the South-East Asian countries, the Colombo countries above all (for these were of primary concern to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs), there were particular difficulties as well.

Relations with Indonesia were somewhat strained ever since the Bandung Conference, owing to the rivalry for influence among the Asian neutralist countries. Relations became much worse after India had supported, contrary to Indonesia's stand, the establishment in September 1963 of Malaysia incorporating Malaya and Singapore. Nevertheless, the Indian Government hoped to get the Indonesian Government's support in fighting Chinese expansion in South-East Asia.

Relations with Burma after the Revolutionary Council headed by General Ne Win came to power there in March 1962, were first marked by caution. They became cool after the Revolutionary Council decree of February 23, 1963, on the nationalisation of the banks, including five Indian banks. Even so, the Indian Government, relying on Burma's distrust of China's Asian policies, hoped to secure the support of the Burmese Government.

Relations with Cambodia deteriorated after the Indian Government refused in 1962 to support the proposal of the Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, on holding an international conference to work out safeguards for Cambodia's neutrality and security. Later on, Indian ruling circles also refused to support Cambodia when she clashed with Thailand and South Vietnam, advising her to settle the issue by means of bilateral talks. India, on the other hand, was annoyed when Prince Sihanouk, after saying while in India in early 1963 that it was his intention to persuade the Chinese Government to accept the Colombo recommendations on the whole, went to Peking and said there that Cambodia "will always be on China's side".<sup>92</sup>

Relations with Ceylon were traditionally friendly enough, but they were complicated by the problem of the citizenship of the Ceylon Tamils,<sup>93</sup> as well as by some problems of economic relations with India.

In May 1963 in Delhi, the Indian Government called a conference of its Ambassadors to Asian countries, to discuss measures towards building up relations with these countries. The conference was also attended by the Prime Minister, as well as L.B. Shastri, M. Desai and some other Ministers. It mapped out measures for improving relations by paying more heed to the political interests of the Asian countries, enhancing economic and trade ties by means of such economic aid as was within India's power, and stepping up cultural exchanges. Later on, the Indian Government specially considered the extension of trade ties with and technical aid for South-East Asian countries, laying emphasis on long-term trade agreements.<sup>94</sup>

In the latter half of 1963 and the first half of 1964, India achieved certain improvements in its relations with the South-East Asian countries. Thus, these countries, Ceylon and Burma especially, stepped up their efforts to help settle the Sino-Indian conflict. For example, Prime Minister of Ceylon S. Bandaranaike visited Cairo in October 1963, to talk the matter over with President Nasser of the United Arab Republic.

Ne Win and Bandaranaike showed their willingness to help settle the dispute between China and India particularly during Chou En-lai's visit to Burma (February 14-18, 1964) and Ceylon (February 26-March 1, 1964), as well as when a Chinese delegation including Chou En-lai, Sung Ching-ling and others was making a tour of ten countries in Asia and Africa.

Shortly before his meeting with the Chinese Premier, Ne Win came to Delhi "to inquire personally about Jawaharlal Nehru's health". During the visit they discussed Chou En-lai's forthcoming visit to Burma and the terms of the talks possibly to be held between India and China. After the talks between Ne Win and Chou En-lai, their joint communique expressed the hope that China and India would find it possible to start direct talks on the basis of the Colombo proposals so as gradually to eliminate the differences between themselves and

finally achieve a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute.<sup>95</sup> This communique was not quite like the previous official Chinese statements accepting the Colombo proposals "in principle" only.

Ne Win at once sent a special message on these talks with Chou En lai to the Prime Minister of Ceylon where the Chinese delegation was soon to arrive.<sup>96</sup> However, the talks at Colombo equally failed to break the deadlock, although in the joint communique the Chinese Premier again agreed to have the Colombo proposals named as the groundwork for negotiations.<sup>97</sup>

Now, what difference was there at the time between China accepting the Colombo proposals *in toto* or "in principle"? While earlier China insisted that the Indian troops in the eastern sector should not move to the McMahon Line from the positions they occupied after the 1962 hostilities, and objected to either side setting up checkpoints in the disputed area of the demilitarised zone in Ladakh, it nevertheless had set up seven posts in the western sector by the beginning of 1964, six of them in the demilitarised zone. This caused India to send a protest note on February 24, 1964, saying that the Chinese action not only violated the Colombo proposals, but also China's own promises.

During Chou En-lai's sojourn at Colombo, S. Bandaranaike tried to persuade him to close those seven posts in order to clear the way to talks with India. But the Chinese Premier replied that he could not give his consent before consulting with Peking. *The Times of Ceylon* reported on March 1, 1964, that after consulting Peking by cable Chou En-lai presumably accepted S. Bandaranaike's compromise proposal that India should set up an equal number of posts in the Ladakh demilitarised zone. That left only China's second proviso, that the Indian troops should not advance towards the McMahon Line which India considered to be an international frontier.

It is hard to say whether the report was true. Nevertheless, the State Minister for the External Affairs of India, L. Menon, said in Parliament on March 12, 1964: "There has been no indication whatever that China had dropped her reservations in regard to those proposals. Therefore, the position is what it was before".<sup>98</sup>

Just when Chou En-lai was in Burma where Ne Win urged him to start talks with India on the basis of the Colombo proposals, India was exploring the chances for settling the dispute with China. She had to do it for the following reasons:

(1) The Indian press had begun to criticise the Foreign Ministry for its "frozen" stand over settlement with China, while the situation on the Sino-Indian border remained tense;

(2) Indian ruling circles were disturbed by the "conciliatory" attitude towards China adopted by the West because Western business interests sought to take advantage of the differences between the Soviet Union and China and of the reduction of trade between them in order to flood the Chinese market with their own goods.

(3) The United States and Britain took a pro-Pakistan stand in the Security Council when the Kashmir question was considered again in February 1964 (this will be dealt with below).

(4) There was growing apprehension that China and Pakistan might set up a common front against India in the military as well as foreign policy sphere, the more so as Chou En-lai was to go to Pakistan after terminating his visit to Burma on February 18.

It was not accidental that a Minister without portfolio (ever since the Kamaraj Plan was put into effect), L.B. Shastri, who was put in charge of the Foreign Ministry for the period of Nehru's illness (from the beginning of January 1964), voiced a soliloquy, as he put it, at a joint meeting of both Houses of the Indian Parliament on no other day but February 19, i.e., at the very beginning of Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan. Shastri said that efforts must be made to break the continuing deadlock [in the India-China conflict—Y.N.], that India had always wanted to settle the conflict peacefully and that "the door for discussion and negotiations should never be closed" as there was no alternative to negotiations but war.<sup>99</sup>

Shastri's speech had such repercussions in and out of Parliament that the Home Minister, G.L. Nanda, had to make a special statement underlining the constancy of the Government's position on the conditions for opening negotiations. According to the *Times of India*, he said that he did not know of any shift



in policy *vis-a-vis* the commitment to agree to talks with Peking after China had accepted the Colombo proposals "*in toto*".<sup>100</sup>

The reason for this prompt step-back after the very first exploratory move was that reports on the progress of Chou En-lai's sojourn in Pakistan were indicating that India might merely get snubbed for her pains.

Throughout Chou En-lai's stay in Pakistan, i.e., from February 18 to February 26, 1964, the Indian press watched him and his hosts movements with an eagle eye, reporting the minutest details, such as that "Mr. Chou En-lai took the unusual step of inviting the 'President' of 'Azad' Kashmir, Mr. K.H. Khurshid, to his banquet" while "President Ayub Khan had not invited Mr. Khurshid to his formal dinner";<sup>101</sup> that "Mr. Chou and President Ayub" had had a private three-hour meeting "during which the only other person present was Mr. Chou's interpreter";<sup>102</sup> that at a press conference on February 21 Ayub Khan said that India was the first to have started the fighting while China had allegedly tried to prevent the clashes; and that the Pakistani President said that India had "refused a Chinese offer to negotiate on borders".<sup>103</sup> The strongest reaction of all was provoked in India by Chou En-lai's support of Pakistan's claim to Kashmir and his vindication of Pakistan's being in SEATO and CENTO.<sup>104</sup>

Notwithstanding all this, Chou En-lai's visit to Colombo which followed rekindled for a brief span Indian hopes of a possible settlement with China. But they soon flickered out, now for a long time.

### The "Nehru Course" Lives on and Triumphs

Along with the aforementioned positive changes in India's foreign policy, in the latter half of 1963 and in early 1964 some deviations from the course of non-alignment still occurred, like echoes of the preceding period. The time appointed for the air defence exercise was drawing near. Besides about 100 Indian planes, the exercise involved 18 American planes, a squadron of British supersonic fighters, two Australian Canberras, 250 technical service units and ground personnel. All this crowd of Western military specialists was to stay in India for over three weeks. Indian democratic forces hoped that this exercise

violating the country's sovereignty would be cancelled, but late in October 1963 foreign air forces began to arrive in India and the exercise was held after all.<sup>105</sup>

It could not, however, by any means satisfy the appetites of the American imperialists who wanted to have bases in India. Norman Brown writes: "Americans have maintained that mere economic aid to Asia is not enough. The area must become militarily strong... And, finally, if countries wish aid from the United States, they should do something in return".<sup>106</sup>

In place of the "air umbrella" which India would have nothing to do with, US strategists worked out a "naval shield" plan. Early in December 1963 it leaked out (the "leak" was subsequently found to have been deliberate) that the 7th Fleet, which was equipped with nuclear submarines carrying Polaris missiles in 1964, was to extend its operation to the Indian Ocean. Before taking off for Karachi, General M.D. Taylor, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Army, who visited India and Pakistan in the latter part of December 1963, "inadvertently let it out" to reporters at the Delhi airport that the 7th Fleet was being sent to the Indian Ocean. These plans of the American military created concern and sparked off a strong protest movement in India and other countries in the Indian Ocean area.

At the Congress session at Bhubaneswar in 1964, B.J. Azad, an AICC member, initiated an amendment to the draft resolution on foreign policy, expressing the hope that the decision of the US Government to extend the operation of the 7th Fleet to the Indian Ocean "would be given up to strengthen the cause of world peace and help in lessening the sphere of Cold War."<sup>107</sup> The amendment was, however, declined at the instance of M. Desai. In his policy speech on foreign relations made in Parliament on April 13, 1964, Nehru said: "I can only express my regret that a cruiser which is equipped with nuclear weapons went about the Indian Ocean".<sup>108</sup>

This regret about the naval threat to India's policy of non-alignment was all the more justified as India took part in the naval exercise in the Far East between February 29 and March 23, 1964, which involved altogether about 10,000 seamen from Britain, Australia, India, Canada and New Zealand.

Although India's foreign policy in the period under review still fluctuated a little, it did so much less than in the preceding period (October 1962-August 1963), which made the Indian reactionaries furious. Notwithstanding all the changes introduced in the methods of pressing on the Indian Government, throughout the period following the aggravation of the Sino-Indian conflict in the autumn of 1962 the reactionaries pursued essentially the same course against the policy of non-alignment. Thus, in April 1964 when there was a three-day debate in Parliament on allocations from the Budget to be made for the Ministry of External Affairs, and questions of foreign policy were discussed too, representatives of all parties of the Right came out jointly against the Government's policies. A. Kripalani and B. Sethi, a Hindu Mahasabha representative, were especially vociferous. The former said that the policy of non-alignment had utterly failed, while the latter called for breaking off diplomatic relations with China and present it with an ultimatum, demanding that the Chinese should either vacate the territory they had seized or prepare for war.<sup>109</sup>

The greatest danger of all that India was faced with in the first half of 1964 was the sharp deterioration in relations with Pakistan, which owed a great deal to the exertions of Indian reactionaries and Muslim fanatics in Pakistan, which were both supported by the imperialists. If in the autumn of 1962 India was at a hair's breadth from a full-scale war with China, it was put on the brink of war with Pakistan early in 1964 because of "Prophet Mohammed's holy hair."

It all began with the events which occurred in Kashmir at the break of 1964. To get a correct idea of what it was about, one must take into account the political situation prevailing in Kashmir at the time. Prem Nath Bazaz, a Kashmir historian and politician, wrote in his article entitled "Last Chance for India in Kashmir" that after its accession to India Kashmir had been given much financial assistance, especially since 1953. An agrarian reform had been effected there and land confiscated from the landlords without compensation and distributed among landless tenants; great advances had been made in the economy and education; and the people's economic conditions had been improved. At the same time, the Prime Minister of

Kashmir, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, "raised the practice of corruption in the State to the level of an art" and pursuing a policy of repression carried it "to the logical end and completed the process of undermining Kashmir democracy and totally alienating the sympathy of people".<sup>110</sup>

An outburst of popular feeling was provoked in Kashmir by the mysterious disappearance on December 27, 1963, of "Prophet Mohammed's holy hair" from the Hazratbal shrine at Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir. During the religious riots that followed 4 persons were killed and 8 wounded. Fifty arrests were made, but the riots still spread and soon grew over into a political movement.

Mammoth anti-Government demonstrations in Kashmir paralysed the administration. B.G. Mohammed happened to be away from Kashmir, and Government members preferred to stay in their homes for safety. When B.G. Mohammed's brother, General Secretary of the National Conference Party Abdul Rashid tried to expostulate with the crowd, the furious people hauled him out of his car and smashed it to smithereens. The bulk of the brothers' property at Srinagar was burned down by the angry crowds. When the movement became a political one, religious differences were forgotten. *Socialist Congressman* wrote: "It is remarkable that complete communal harmony prevailed during the period of the upheaval and not a single Hindu—man, woman or child—was molested".<sup>111</sup> The upheaval continued until February, when a National Conference leader, G.M. Sadiq, B.G. Mohammed's cousin and old political opponent, was appointed Prime Minister of Kashmir and immediately set to work to relax the regime.<sup>112</sup>

When the news of the disappearance of the holy relic from its place at Srinagar spread to a distance of 2,000 kilometres, reaching Eastern Pakistan, local Muslim fanatics fell on Hindus and Christians too who fled for their lives to India. Tens of thousands of refugees came by train to East India from Pakistan. On January 11, 1964, communal riots started in and about Calcutta, such as India had not seen since the spring of 1950. Home Minister Nanda told the House of the People that 24 persons had been killed and 62,000 had their homes burned in Calcutta alone.<sup>113</sup> Refugees from Pakistan continued to arrive.

their number reaching roughly 150,000 in mid-March.<sup>114</sup> On March 16, 1964, another wave of religious-communal riots started in some places including the workers' centres of Jamshedpur, Roorkee and Raigarh in which hundreds of people were killed.<sup>115</sup>

The riots were not provoked by religious fanatics alone. It is easy to see the hand of the Jana Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha and other religious-communalist parties which were hatching even more serious provocations. It came to light on March 21, 1964, when there was an accidental bomb explosion in the house of a manufacturer at Lucknow and an underground bomb factory was discovered. Two of the three men killed by the bomb were found to be veteran members of the Jana Sangh and its militarised RSS organisation and so was the owner of the house.<sup>116</sup>

To foment religious strife and anti-Pakistani feelings, Indian reactionary circles pressed the Government to arrange for an exchange of population between Pakistan and India, in other words, to expel Muslims from India, which the Government absolutely refused to do. Home Minister Nanda made a special statement on the matter.<sup>117</sup>

On April 19-20, 1964, an All India Convention on East-Pakistan Minorities was held to foment religious strife at which the Praja Socialist leaders made common cause with the RSS Chief Golwalkar.<sup>118</sup> This unanimity will not surprise us at all if we take into account a highly noteworthy statement by J.P. Mishra, a Congress Party MP, who said that some opposition party members had sold their votes to Cawnpore industrialists during the election to the Council of States.<sup>119</sup>

Mishra said that one of these opposition parties was fomenting religious strife (he meant the Jana Sangh) while the other staged food riots (meaning the Praja Socialist Party), and that due measures should be applied to stop them.

Industrial tycoons were not the only source of money for some political parties. The magazine of the Congress "Left" recalled in February 1964: "It is common knowledge, for example, that during the 1962 election campaign, and the by-elections in the spring of 1963, the Indian Right-wing leaders received large sums of money from sources both inside the

country and overseas. The leaders of one of the two socialist parties are known to have received subsidies from the Ford Foundation. This money was used in part to set up a trade union school in Calcutta. This school trains functionaries for one of the two socialist parties.<sup>120</sup>

To influence the Indian Government's foreign policy, Western powers also resorted to the old method of setting India against Pakistan. On February 11, 1964, they brought up the Kashmir question for discussion in the Security Council, which had already devoted more than 100 meetings to it.

Britain and the United States stage-managed the business, distributing the parts between them so that while Patrick Dean (Britain) expressed his doubts of the justifiability of Kashmir's accession to India,<sup>121</sup> Adlai Stevenson (USA) acknowledged (for the first time since discussions on Kashmir began) that time was a factor that could not be ignored, underlining the value of direct talks, and urged India and Pakistan to reach agreement.<sup>122</sup>

Indian diplomats tried to understand what had made the United States shift its position. US Ambassador to India Chester Bowles told a press conference in Calcutta that the United States took no sides in the Kashmir dispute as the American people were aware of Pakistan's flirtation with China.<sup>123</sup> In spite of this explanation which was designed to persuade the Indians of the sincerity of the US stand in the Security Council, they were not taken in. K. Menon said in Parliament that the proposal that India and Pakistan should reach agreement was a clever trick: if it were made into a resolution, the problem would still stand (and the strain continue) and the General Assembly would have to take it up at its next session.

Indeed, when Indian representative Chagla rejected the American proposal, they stopped pretending. The Pakistani Foreign Minister asked for the discussion to be postponed and was supported at once by the Western powers.<sup>124</sup> The Kashmir Question remained on the agenda of the Security Council in spite of India's objection. This could only spoil further relations between India and Pakistan.

Summing up the foreign policy debate in the House of the

People on April 13, 1964, Nehru said that but for the support given to Pakistan by the West, the Kashmir problem would have been solved long ago.<sup>125</sup> Two weeks later *The Times of India* published the report that Nehru had sent a letter by Indira Gandhi to US President Johnson in which he protested against the support given to Pakistan on the Kashmir question and underlined that any step by the West towards altering the status of Kashmir, particularly in the light of the Sino-Pakistan collusion against India, might have very serious consequences.<sup>126</sup>

Even before the worsening of relations with India early in 1964 Pakistan sought to make the USA understand the following things<sup>127</sup> : (1) Military aid to India created a threat to Pakistan's security; (2) Pakistan did not recognise Indian action in Kashmir; (3) Normalisation of relations between Pakistan and China was their mutual desire.

After the events in Kashmir following the disappearance of the Muslim holy relic and after communal riots first in East Pakistan and next in East India, the strain in Indo-Pakistani relations reached a dangerous point. While the Western powers sought to continue this strain so that they could exert pressure on Indian foreign policy, the already mentioned talks between China and Pakistan late in February 1964 made the strain grow still further. Analysing the purpose of the talks, the theoretical journal of the CPI wrote: "With China's support Pakistan hopes to get Kashmir, if not the whole of it at least a large slice of the Kashmir valley. The alliance with China is also a useful weapon in her hands to frighten the Western powers so that they may come out even more aggressively in her favour on the Kashmir issue. China too is using her relationship with Pakistan to pressurize India into accepting an alignment at the Sino-Indian border that she wants".<sup>128</sup>

Speaking over the radio on March 26, 1964, Prime Minister Nehru said : "There is the menace of China and Pakistan. There is the tremendous influx of refugees from East Pakistan and our duty to look after them and rehabilitate them. There is the problem of rising prices which affects all our people".<sup>129</sup>

Thus, relations with Pakistan were regarded by Nehru as

India's key problem. In the spring of 1964 these relations reached the limit beyond which there could only be war.

The dangerous state of relations with Pakistan made Nehru pay much attention to the solutions suggested on Kashmir by its ex-Prime Minister Sheikh Abdullah, now released from detention. Coming to Delhi, Sheikh Abdullah talked for two hours with Nehru on April 30, 1964. Afterwards he met Nehru twice, also meeting with President Radhakrishnan and others. According to the Indian press, Sheikh Abdullah suggested the following choice of solutions : (1) 10 years of UN trusteeship over Kashmir and then a plebiscite; (2) condominium of India and Pakistan over Kashmir; (3) a confederation of India, Pakistan and Kashmir. In spite of Sheikh Abdullah's optimistic declaration at a press conference in Delhi on May 12, 1964, that he had already found the groundwork for the solution of the Kashmir question, in the judgement of *The Times of India*, the Indian Government did not reject Sheikh Abdullah's suggestions merely to keep him from openly refusing to recognise Kashmir's accession to India [which would be immediately taken up by Pakistan—Y. N.] and so preferred to leave the question open until Sheikh Abdullah was able to continue discussions on it after his proposed fortnight's visit to Pakistan.<sup>130</sup>

Whether it was because Pakistan had high hopes of Sheikh Abdullah's success with India or for some other reasons, the anti-Indian campaign in Pakistan was somewhat relaxed and since May 1964 Pakistan's relations with India had become much less strained.

The Indian Government also tried to do something towards a settlement with China too. Nehru, however, believed that the settlement of international relations should not depend on temporary changes in the situation and moreover could not be attained at the sacrifice of principles. On May 17, 1964, Nehru said that although India firmly adhered to the Colombo proposals as the framework of negotiations with China, she was prepared to have talks if China agreed to either side having no posts in the demilitarised area in Ladakh, i.e., if India's territorial integrity received confirmation in the very place where it had been violated by the Chinese invasion. China,



however, rejected India's proposal of talks based on the closure of the posts in the demilitarised area. Commenting on it, the Hsinhua Agency reiterated China's view that talks should begin on the basis of the acceptance of the Colombo proposals "in principle", without any preconditions, and called India's proposal "absurd."

On May 27, 1964, Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru suddenly died. His death terminated the nearly 17-year-long period in India's foreign policy which Nehru did more than anyone else to evolve and carry out. Not only did he create and pursue for many years a foreign policy line new to the history of international relations—the policy of non-alignment—but proved strong enough to defend it from fierce attacks of its opponents.

## NOTES

1. *Apropos of the Question of the Sino-Indian Border*, Peking, 1962, p. 31.
2. Chalapathi Rau, *Jawaharlal Nehru*, Delhi, 1973, p. 400.
3. Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, London, 1970, pp. 348-349.
4. K.S. Murty, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
5. *Pravda*, October 25, 1962.
6. *ibid.*, November 5, 1962.
7. The author of the official biography of J. Nehru, recently published in India, Chalapathi Rau, who enumerates a number of factors which caused China's "inscrutable" decision to cease fire, also puts to the fore the Soviet stand on the conflict. (Chalapathi Rau, op. cit., p. 397.)
8. *Pravda*, January 22, 1963.
9. *Lok Sabha Debates...*, 1963, Vol. XII, No. 31, col. 6552.
10. *Socialist Congressman*, Delhi, April 1, 1963, p. 11.
11. *Congress Bulletin*, 1963, No. 1-6, p. 25.
12. *Socialist Congressman*, May 7, 1963.
13. *The Hindustan Times*, November 14, 1962.

14. V.G. Deshpande, *Presidential Address. 47th Session. Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha*, Delhi, 1963, p. 5.
15. *Pravda*, December 30, 1962.
16. *The Times of India*, December 26, 1962.
17. *Mainstream*, January 15, 1963.
18. *The Times of India*, November 9, 1962.
19. V.G. Deshpande, op. cit., p. 6.
20. *Socialist Congressman*, April 1, 1963.
21. J.K. Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal*, Boston, 1969, p. 512.
22. *New Age*, November 4, 1962.
23. *The Times of India*, November 4, 1962.
24. Frank Moraes wrote in his book: "The closest to him [Nehru—Y.N.] today is probably the didactic and controversial V.K. Krishna Menon, with whom he visited Spain during the civil war some twenty years ago. Menon has an aptitude for rationalising Nehru's instincts and impulses, particularly in the field of foreign affairs, and of clothing them in clear, precise language and logical thought". (F. Moraes, *Jawaharlal Nehru. A Biography*, N.Y. 1956, p. 481.)
25. The Indian scholar J. Bandyopadhyaya writes that the question of Menon's dismissal was decided beforehand at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Congress Party in Parliament. At the meeting, Mahavir Tyagi and Satyanarayan Sinha, already mentioned here, fiercely attacked Nehru. Sinha said bluntly to the Prime Minister: "Either Menon goes or you will have to go". (J. Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy. Determinants, Process, Personalities*, Calcutta, 1970, p. 121).
26. J.K. Galbraith, op. cit., p. 443.
27. Galbraith accompanied the corresponding entry in his journal on November 17, 1962, with an ironic remark that it was done in "further modification of the non-alignment policy..." (*ibid.*, p. 481).
28. In a letter to President Kennedy of November 13, 1962, Galbraith, somewhat overrating the situation, wrote with satisfaction: "Much so-called non-alignment has already gone out of the window..." But further he expressed a not entirely unfounded hope, writing: "Popular opinion [by which he meant the voice of Indian reaction—Y.N.] and our military assistance has worked a further and major impairment [of non-alignment—Y.N.]". (*ibid.*, p. 475.)
29. After making that statement, quite obviously meant for the benefit of the Indian public (for, as we already know, Galbraith wrote something entirely different to President Kennedy a week afterwards), the

US Ambassador confessed to himself in his journal that "the Right-wing press in the United States which has been saying that Nehru's policy of non-alignment is now shown to be foolish, will say that I am guilty of equal shortsightedness". (*ibid.*, p. 461.)

30. *The Times of India*, November 29, 1962.
31. *The New York Herald Tribune*, December 2, 1962.
32. Nehru realised it much earlier and said in a conversation with T. Mende: "My point is that if a militarily weak Asian country links up with this or that Power, it does not add in the slightest to the military strength of that Power. In fact, it becomes a burden, because that Power will have to supply arms and, perhaps, even money for military defence, which otherwise that Power would not have to supply". (T. Mende, *Conversations with Mr. Nehru*, London, 1956, p. 84.)
33. *The Hindustan Times*, December 10, 1962.
34. Prime Minister Nehru and Defence Minister Chavan said in Parliament in August 1963 that there were more Chinese troops on the border compared with October 1962 and more frequent incursions into Indian territory and air space. (*The Hindustan Times*, August 20, 1963.)
35. *ibid.*, January 2, 1963.
36. *Socialist Congressman*, January 1, 1963.
37. *ibid.*, January 26, 1963, p. 3.
38. *AICC Economic Review*, March 15, 1963, p. 6.
39. Here is what J.K. Galbraith wrote in his journal: "The Department and the White House have been struggling for the last week on Kashmir. I have told them that I will move the Indians if they will promise military aid". (J.K. Galbraith, *op. cit.*, p. 560.) Six weeks before, Galbraith sent a long telegram to the US Defence Department criticising the distribution of military aid funds. "These", he wrote, "go principally to Korea, Formosa and South Vietnam, the places we hold after defeat by the Communists. The one place where we have had a modicum of success has been India. Here we are determined to economise. I asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff if it is a new canon of military policy to reinforce failure rather than success. I ventured the prediction if the Chinese should come back and drive the Indian Government to the Andaman Islands, we would then unquestionably see India as a bastion of the free world and finance it heavily". (*ibid.*, p. 549.)
40. *New Age*, April 14, 1963.
41. J.K. Galbraith, *op. cit.*, p. 504.

42. *Pravda*, February 4, 1963.
43. *The Hindustan Times*, April 8, 1963.
44. *New Age*, July 25, 1963.
45. J.K. Galbraith, op. cit., p. 472.
46. *Socialist Congressman*, December 1, 1963.
47. *AICC Economic Review*, April 15, 1963.
48. *Congress Bulletin*, 1963, No. 1-6, p. 15.
49. *ibid.* p. 9. Simultaneously, the want of patriotism among the rich was such that they not only put out of sight the traditional gold ornaments, but also hoarded gold. It caused AICC General Secretary J.R. Chandrika to publish a special sharply critical article. (*AICC Economic Review*, March 1, 1963, p. 9).
50. *Pravda*, November 7, 1962, December 13, 1962.
51. Chalapathi Rau, *Jawaharlal Nehru*, Delhi, 1973, p. 400.
52. *Lok Sabha Debates*... 1963, Vol. XIII, No. 1, col. 14.
53. *Link*, January 20, 1963.
54. *Samarajya*, March 9, 1963.
55. *Free Press Journal*, February 11, 1963.
56. *The Times of India*, January 30, 1963.
57. *The Hindustan Times*, January 19, 1963.
58. W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India and Pakistan*, Cambridge, 1963, p. 359.
59. *Congress Bulletin*, 1963, No. 1-6, p. 6.
60. *ibid.*, p. 14.
61. *ibid.*, p. 13.
62. *ibid.* On December 10, 1962, Nehru proposed in Parliament that the border dispute should be submitted to the International Court of Justice. Point 9 of the draft resolution presented to the AICC signified its approval of the Government's proposal to refer the dispute between India and China at the appropriate stage to the International Court of Justice or to arbiters appointed by agreement between the two countries. (*ibid.*, p. 48.)
63. *Congress Bulletin*, p. 17.
64. *ibid.*, pp. 24-25.
65. It is noteworthy that Nehru's warning at the AICC session about the danger of fascism in India was left out of the record edited for publication. (*Socialist Congressman*, August 15, 1963, p. 4.)

66. *The Times of India*, January 27, 1963; *Hitavada*, April 5.
67. *The Times of India*, March 31, 1963.
68. *Blitz*, August 15, 1963.
69. *Lok Sabha Debates...* 1963, Vol. XIX, No. 1, col. 173.
70. Quoted from *Socialist Congressman*, July 15, 1963, p. 3.
71. *ibid.*
72. *ibid.*, September 1, 1963.
73. *Lok Sabha Debates...*, 1963, Vol. XIX, No. 8, col. 2239.
74. *New Age*, August 11, 1963.
75. *Congress Bulletin*, 1963, No. 7-8, pp. 37-38, 42.
76. *ibid.*, p. 22.
77. *New Age*, July 14, 1963.
78. *AICC Economic Review*, printed an article explaining why this proposal was unacceptable. (*AICC Economic Review*, August 15, 1963, p. 10.)
79. *New Age*, April 5; April 19, 1964.
80. *The Hindustan Times*, December 18, 1963.
81. *Congress Bulletin*, 1963, No. 7-8, p. 45.
82. *New Age*, August 4, 1963.
83. *AICC Economic Review*, November 15, 1963, pp. 35-36.
84. *Blitz*, July 27, 1963.
85. *Lok Sabha Debates...*, 1963, Vol. XIX, No. 2, col. 411.
86. *New Age*, July 28, August 4, 1963.
87. *The Times of India*, February 12, 1964.
88. *Mainstream*, January 26, 1964.
89. *Blitz*, June 29, 1963.
90. *Mainstream*, June 29, 1963.
91. *New Age*, August 4, 1963.
92. *The Hindustan Times*, February 12, 1963.
93. Approximately 1,000,000 persons or 12 per cent of the Ceylon population are of Indian descent. (*The Times of India*, September 20, 1963.)
94. *The Times of India*, July 23, 1963. A similar conference of Indian Ambassadors to African and West Asian countries was held at Delhi in November 1963. It discussed problems of an agreed Africa policy

and of coordinated action by different missions in that area, to build up contacts with the local people, as well as the coordinated measures to be taken against anti-India propaganda. Yet, the Indian Government naturally paid more attention to the improvement of relations with South-East Asian countries.

95. *Statesman*, February 19, 1964.
96. *The Hindustan Times*, February 28, 1964.
97. *Mainstream*, March 7, 1964, pp. 6-7.
98. *Patriot*, Delhi, March 13, 1964.
99. *Lok Sabha Debates...*, 1964, Vol. XXV, No. 8, col. 1533-1534.
100. *The Times of India*, February 24, 1964.
101. *ibid.*, February 29, 1964.
102. *ibid.*
103. *ibid.*, February 22, 1964.
104. *Mainstream*, March 7, 1964, p. 7.
105. *The Hindustan Times*, October 19, 1963.
106. W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India and Pakistan*, Cambridge, 1963, pp. 374-375.
107. *Congress Bulletin*, December 1963-February 1964, pp. 110-111.
108. *Lok Sabha Debates...*, 1964, Vol. XXIX, No. 49, col. 10713.
109. *ibid.*, No. 48, col. 10489.
110. *Socialist Congressman*, Independence Day Issue, 1964, pp. 35-36.
111. *ibid.*, p. 36.
112. *The Times of India*, February 29, 1964.
113. *Lok Sabha Debates...*, 1964, Vol. XXV, No. 2, col. 164.
114. Altogether 682,000 refugees from Pakistan had arrived in India by September 1964.
115. *New Age*, March 29, 1964. Nanda said that in these three towns alone 346 people had been killed and 458 wounded.
116. *ibid.*, April 12, 1964.
117. *The Times of India*, February 22, 1964. At the same time it must be noted that even Indian writers who had nothing to do with the Jana Sangh and its ideology of militant Hinduism were troubled by the growth of Muslim population in the Indian border area. In 1951-61 when India's total population increased by 21.5 per cent (including a 25.61 per cent growth of the Muslim population), and Pakistan's

population increased by 30 per cent, Muslim population rose by 38.56 per cent in Assam, 38.01 per cent in the Punjab, 36.48 per cent in West Bengal, and more than 32 per cent in Rajasthan. (K.S. Murty, op. cit. p. 79.)

118. *New Age*, (Monthly), June, 1964, p. 35.
119. Numerous instances of this kind are quoted by V.M. Sirsikar in his book drawing mainly on material concerned with Maharashtra State. He mentions that Indian law allows election expenditures (including party funds) of Rs 8,000 and 25,000 respectively for candidates to state legislatures and the House of the People of the Indian Parliament. To meet their expenses, some political parties turned for assistance to industrialists. (V.M. Sirsikar, *Political Behaviour in India. A Case Study of the 1962 General Elections*, Bombay, 1965, p. 68.)
120. *Socialist Congressman*, February 20, 1964.
121. *The Times of India*, February 15, 1964. The report aroused indignation in India. A protest demonstration was staged in front of the High Commissioner's office in Delhi.
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66. *Constituent Assembly Debates. Official Report.* Delhi, 1947, Vol. V, No. 3, p. 26.
67. *ibid.*, p. 27.
68. *ibid.*, pp. 31-32.
69. Vijay Kumar, *Anglo-American Plot Against Kashmir*, Bombay, 1954, p. 54.
70. This idea was opposed in Kashmir not only by influential groups of the landed aristocracy and the army which was the Maharaja's mainstay, but even by some members of his own family.
71. Andrew Mellor, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
72. Alastair Lamb, *Crisis in Kashmir, 1947 to 1966*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966, p. 42.
73. *ibid.* For details of the Gurdaspur question, see M. Brecher, *Nehru...*, pp. 359-361.
74. Prem Nath Bazaz, *The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir*, Kashmir Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1954, p. 318.
75. Vijay Kumar, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
76. *The Hindustan Times*, October 6, 1947.
77. P.N. Bazaz, *op. cit.*, pp. 463-464.
78. See, for example, Bhagat Vats's *Foreign Intrigue Against India*, Aman Publishers, New Delhi, 1967, p. 72.
79. *Dawn*, Delhi, May 11, 1947.
80. Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir. A Study in India-Pakistan Relations*, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1966, p. 67.
81. *ibid.*, p. 100.
82. *ibid.*
83. *ibid.*, p. 101.
84. *ibid.*, pp. 107-108.
85. Lamb, *op. cit.* pp. 44-45.
86. D.F. Karaka, *Betrayal in India*, Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1950, pp. 171-172.
87. M.C. Chagla, *Kashmir, 1947-1965*, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, 1965, p. 20. In citing this statement, M.C. Chagla, the former Foreign Minister of India, points out that the emphatic manner in which the denials were made constitutes the most important and significant

aspect of the whole of the Kashmir problem as "at that stage Pakistan never tried to justify its presence in Kashmir or to claim any right to be there (*ibid.*, p. 21).

88. K.P. Karunakaran, *India in World Affairs. August 1947-January 1950*, Oxford University Press, London, p. 132.
89. Lord Birdwood, *Two Nations and Kashmir*, Robert Hale Ltd., London, 1956, pp. 54-55.
90. Josef Korbel, *Danger in Kashmir*, Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 95.
91. P.N. Bazaz, op. cit., p. 327.
92. Michael Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir*, The Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1953, p. 30.
93. Sisir Gupta, op. cit., p. 114.
94. V. Kumar, op. cit., pp. 64-66.
95. Rajbans Krishen, *Kashmir and Conspiracy Against Peace*, Bombay, 1951, p. 5.
96. V.Kumar, op. cit., p. 63.
97. B. Madhok, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
98. Bhagat Vats, op. cit., p. 71. Eighteen months later, Nehru told the Indian parliament that when the people of Kashmir appealed to Delhi for help he went to seek Gandhi's advice on the matter. "It was not natural to him to give advice about military matters", Nehru recalled. "What did he know about them? His struggles were struggles of the spirit. But listening to me...he did not say 'No' to the course of action that I proposed. He saw that a government as we were, had to follow its duty even in the military line when certain circumstances arose. And throughout those few months, before he was taken away from us, I conferred with him on many an occasion about Kashmir, and it was a great happiness to me that I had his blessings in steps we took." (*Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates. Official Reports*, Vol. II, No. 9, Pt. II. 1949, p. 1230).
99. The Dominion army command was divided only on November 30, 1947, after Auchinleck had been retired. Two British commanders-in-chief were appointed, Gen. Lockhart for the Union of India, and Gen. Gracey for Pakistan.
100. Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, London, 1952, p. 224.
101. V.P. Menon, *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States*, Longmans, Green and Co., London, New York, Toronto, p. 400.
102. Maurice Cohen, *Thunder over Kashmir*, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, 1955, p. 2.

103. B. Madhok, op. cit., p. 31.
104. Robert Trumbull, *As I See India*, William Sloane Associates, New York, 1956, p. 90.
105. Birdwood thinks that "the Maharaja's request for accession and Lord Mountbatten's reply are letters of such significance" that he has included them in Appendix to his book (op. cit., p. 58).
106. Y.V. Gankowsky, L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya, *A History of Pakistan*, Nauka Publishing House, Moscow, 1964, pp. 94-95.
107. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir, Govt. of India*, New Delhi, 1948, pp. 53-55 (quoted from Sisir Gupta, op. cit., p. 130).
108. Gururaj Rao, *Legal Aspects of the Kashmir Problem*, Asia Publishing House, London, 1967, pp. 86-87.
109. Hiren Mookerjee, op. cit., pp. 189-190.
110. Alan Campbell-Johnson, op. cit., p. 260.
111. Frank Moraes, *Jawaharlal Nehru. A Biography*, The MacMillan Company, New York, 1956, p. 395.
112. Bhupesh Gupta, *Quit Commonwealth*, Communist Party Publications, New Delhi, 1965, p. 13.
113. M. Brecher, op. cit., p. 195.
114. *Kashmir in Security Council*, Lalla Rookh Publications, Srinagar, p. 9.
115. M.C. Chagla, op. cit., p. 24. Birdwood believes that regular Pakistani troops took part in hostilities since March 1948, but he cites General Russell and General Cariappa, who were in command of the Indian Army units in Kashmir, as saying that regular Pakistan army units had been in Kashmir since January 1948 (Birdwood, op. cit., pp. 67-69).
116. R. Trumbull, op. cit., p. 88.
117. K.P. Karunakaran, op. cit., p. 136.
118. M. Brecher, op. cit., pp. 195-196, 204, 208.
119. F. Moraes, op. cit., p. 382.
120. *National Herald*, November 6, 1947.
121. *The Hindu*, October 20, 1947.
122. S. Gupta, op. cit., p. 199.
123. B.N. Chakravarty. *India Speaks to America*. The John Day Company, New York, p. 154.
124. P.N. Bazaz, op. cit., p. 438.
125. Alastair Lamb, op. cit., p. 50.



126. P.N. Bazaz, op. cit. p. 562.
127. B.N. Chakravarty, op. cit., p. 145.
128. D.F. Karaka, op. cit., pp. 176, 178.
129. Under the 1960 agreement based on the recommendations of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, India receives 20 and Pakistan 80 per cent of the waters of the Indus basin. The waters of three western rivers, the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum go to irrigate fields in Pakistan, and of the eastern rivers, the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, go to India. The agreement is effective to this day.
130. K.P. Karunakaran, op. cit., p. 147.
131. Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, *Indo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1955*, Djambatan-Amsterdam, 1958, p. 188.
132. Many years later, in April 1965, the dispute over this territory led into an outbreak of hostilities. On June 30, 1965, India and Pakistan agreed to ceasefire and referred the dispute to an international court of arbitration consisting of three members. India and Pakistan each suggested one member, a citizen from a third country of their choice while the chairman was selected jointly by two governments. The court's decision was binding on the disputing parties. After more than two years of talks, on February 19, 1968, the court announced its decision by which 90 per cent of the disputed area went to India and the rest to Pakistan. Delimitation of the new border was completed by June 1969.
133. During August 1947-February 1971 representatives of India and Pakistan met more than 800 times on the demarcation of the eastern border. As a result of these talks, most of the disputes had been settled by the late 1960's, but some sections of the border remained undemarcated.
134. P.N. Bazaz, op. cit, p. 347.
135. *The Hindustan Times*, December, 18, 1948.
136. *ibid.*, December 20, 1948.
137. M. Brecher, *India and World Politics*, p. 206.
138. K.P. Karunakaran, op. cit., p. 151.
139. *Congress Bulletin*. Issued by the Office of the All India Congress Committee, No. 5, November 7 1947, p. 10.
140. *ibid.*, p. 2.
141. K.P. Karunakaran, op. cit., p. 57.
142. *People's Age*, Bombay, March 21, 1948.
143. Cf. Y.V. Gankovsky and L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya, op. cit., pp. 119, 164, 169.